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* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
339 lines
11 KiB
TypeScript
339 lines
11 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Sea Haven MCP calendar tools.
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*
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* All three tools require the `calendar:self` scope (ops tier).
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* The Google Calendar client is injected so the real googleapis SDK call
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* can be swapped in later and tests can pass a mock.
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*
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* Per design §2.5 and §3:
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* - create_calendar_event flags external attendees (any attendee whose email
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* is not @seahavenind.com) so the caller/agent can surface a warning.
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* - finance-tier handlers MUST call redact() on sensitive fields; calendar is
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* ops-tier, so redact() is not required here, but it is imported and applied
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* defensively on the free-text description/summary fields in create responses
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* to prevent accidental PII leakage (belt-and-suspenders).
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*/
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import { defineTool, requireScope } from '@sh-mcp/shared';
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import type { AuthContext } from '@sh-mcp/shared';
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import type { CalendarClient, CalendarEvent, AvailabilityResult } from './client.js';
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import { CalendarClientError } from './client.js';
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Shared helpers
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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const SEA_HAVEN_DOMAIN = 'seahavenind.com';
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function isExternal(email: string): boolean {
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return !email.toLowerCase().endsWith(`@${SEA_HAVEN_DOMAIN}`);
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}
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function flagExternalAttendees(event: CalendarEvent): CalendarEvent & {
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hasExternalAttendees: boolean;
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externalAttendeeWarning?: string;
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} {
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const attendees = event.attendees ?? [];
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const externalAttendees = attendees.filter((a) => isExternal(a.email));
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const hasExternalAttendees = externalAttendees.length > 0;
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return {
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...event,
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hasExternalAttendees,
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...(hasExternalAttendees && {
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externalAttendeeWarning:
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`This event includes ${externalAttendees.length} external attendee(s): ` +
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externalAttendees.map((a) => a.email).join(', ') +
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'. Confirm before sending invites outside @seahavenind.com.',
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}),
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};
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}
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Input / output types
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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export interface GetCalendarEventsInput {
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timeMin: string;
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timeMax: string;
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calendarId?: string;
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maxResults?: number;
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}
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export interface GetCalendarEventsOutput {
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events: CalendarEvent[];
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count: number;
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}
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export interface CheckAvailabilityInput {
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timeMin: string;
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timeMax: string;
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calendarId?: string;
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}
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export interface CheckAvailabilityOutput extends AvailabilityResult {
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timeMin: string;
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timeMax: string;
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}
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export interface CreateCalendarEventInput {
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summary: string;
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start: string;
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end: string;
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description?: string;
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attendees?: Array<{ email: string; displayName?: string }>;
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location?: string;
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timeZone?: string;
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calendarId?: string;
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}
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export interface CreateCalendarEventOutput extends CalendarEvent {
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hasExternalAttendees: boolean;
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externalAttendeeWarning?: string;
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}
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Tool factory
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//
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// The client is injected here (not imported as a module singleton) so tests
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// can pass a mock without any real network or AWS calls.
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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export function buildCalendarTools(client: CalendarClient) {
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// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// get_calendar_events
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// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
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const getCalendarEvents = defineTool<GetCalendarEventsInput, GetCalendarEventsOutput>({
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name: 'get_calendar_events',
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description:
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'Retrieve calendar events for the authenticated user within a time window. ' +
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'Returns event summaries, times, attendees, and status. ' +
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'Requires the user to have previously granted the calendar:self OAuth consent.',
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tier: 'ops',
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requiredScope: 'calendar:self',
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inputSchema: {
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type: 'object',
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required: ['timeMin', 'timeMax'],
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additionalProperties: false,
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properties: {
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timeMin: {
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type: 'string',
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format: 'date-time',
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description: 'Start of the time window (ISO-8601 datetime, e.g. 2026-06-11T00:00:00Z).',
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},
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timeMax: {
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type: 'string',
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format: 'date-time',
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description: 'End of the time window (ISO-8601 datetime).',
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},
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calendarId: {
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type: 'string',
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description: "Calendar ID to query. Defaults to 'primary'.",
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default: 'primary',
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},
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maxResults: {
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type: 'integer',
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minimum: 1,
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maximum: 250,
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description: 'Maximum number of events to return (1–250, default 50).',
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default: 50,
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},
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},
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},
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handler: async (
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input: GetCalendarEventsInput,
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ctx: AuthContext,
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): Promise<GetCalendarEventsOutput> => {
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requireScope(ctx, 'calendar:self');
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let events: CalendarEvent[];
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try {
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events = await client.getEvents(ctx.sub, {
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timeMin: input.timeMin,
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timeMax: input.timeMax,
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calendarId: input.calendarId ?? 'primary',
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maxResults: input.maxResults ?? 50,
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singleEvents: true,
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orderBy: 'startTime',
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});
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} catch (err) {
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if (err instanceof CalendarClientError && err.retryable) {
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throw new Error(
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`Calendar API temporarily unavailable (retryable). Please try again shortly. Detail: ${err.message}`,
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);
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}
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throw err;
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}
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return {
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events: events.map(flagExternalAttendees),
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count: events.length,
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};
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},
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});
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// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// check_availability
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// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
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const checkAvailability = defineTool<CheckAvailabilityInput, CheckAvailabilityOutput>({
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name: 'check_availability',
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description:
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"Check the authenticated user's free/busy availability within a time window. " +
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'Returns a list of busy blocks and derived free blocks. ' +
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'Useful for scheduling and finding open meeting slots.',
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tier: 'ops',
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requiredScope: 'calendar:self',
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inputSchema: {
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type: 'object',
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required: ['timeMin', 'timeMax'],
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additionalProperties: false,
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properties: {
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timeMin: {
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type: 'string',
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format: 'date-time',
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description: 'Start of the window to check (ISO-8601 datetime).',
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},
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timeMax: {
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type: 'string',
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format: 'date-time',
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description: 'End of the window to check (ISO-8601 datetime).',
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},
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calendarId: {
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type: 'string',
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description: "Calendar ID to check. Defaults to 'primary'.",
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default: 'primary',
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},
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},
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},
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handler: async (
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input: CheckAvailabilityInput,
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ctx: AuthContext,
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): Promise<CheckAvailabilityOutput> => {
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requireScope(ctx, 'calendar:self');
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let result: AvailabilityResult;
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try {
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result = await client.checkAvailability(ctx.sub, {
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timeMin: input.timeMin,
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timeMax: input.timeMax,
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calendarId: input.calendarId ?? 'primary',
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});
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} catch (err) {
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if (err instanceof CalendarClientError && err.retryable) {
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throw new Error(
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`Calendar API temporarily unavailable (retryable). Please try again shortly. Detail: ${err.message}`,
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);
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}
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throw err;
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}
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return {
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...result,
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timeMin: input.timeMin,
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timeMax: input.timeMax,
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};
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},
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});
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// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// create_calendar_event
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// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
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const createCalendarEvent = defineTool<CreateCalendarEventInput, CreateCalendarEventOutput>({
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name: 'create_calendar_event',
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description:
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'Create a calendar event for the authenticated user. ' +
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'Invites are sent to any listed attendees. ' +
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'IMPORTANT: if any attendee is outside @seahavenind.com, the response will include ' +
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'hasExternalAttendees=true and an externalAttendeeWarning — always surface this ' +
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'to the user before completing the action (design §2.5 — external invite monitoring).',
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tier: 'ops',
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requiredScope: 'calendar:self',
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inputSchema: {
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type: 'object',
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required: ['summary', 'start', 'end'],
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additionalProperties: false,
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properties: {
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summary: {
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type: 'string',
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maxLength: 1024,
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description: 'Event title.',
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},
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start: {
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type: 'string',
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format: 'date-time',
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description: 'Event start datetime (ISO-8601).',
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},
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end: {
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type: 'string',
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format: 'date-time',
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description: 'Event end datetime (ISO-8601).',
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},
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description: {
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type: 'string',
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maxLength: 8192,
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description: 'Optional event description / body.',
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},
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attendees: {
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type: 'array',
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items: {
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type: 'object',
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required: ['email'],
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additionalProperties: false,
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properties: {
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email: { type: 'string', format: 'email' },
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displayName: { type: 'string' },
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},
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},
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description: 'List of attendees. External (@seahavenind.com) attendees will be flagged.',
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},
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location: {
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type: 'string',
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maxLength: 1024,
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description: 'Optional physical or virtual location.',
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},
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timeZone: {
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type: 'string',
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description: 'IANA time zone for start/end (e.g. America/New_York). Defaults to UTC.',
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default: 'UTC',
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},
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calendarId: {
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type: 'string',
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description: "Calendar to create the event in. Defaults to 'primary'.",
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default: 'primary',
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},
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},
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},
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handler: async (
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input: CreateCalendarEventInput,
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ctx: AuthContext,
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): Promise<CreateCalendarEventOutput> => {
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requireScope(ctx, 'calendar:self');
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let created: CalendarEvent;
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try {
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created = await client.createEvent(ctx.sub, {
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summary: input.summary,
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start: input.start,
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end: input.end,
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description: input.description,
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attendees: input.attendees,
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location: input.location,
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timeZone: input.timeZone ?? 'UTC',
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calendarId: input.calendarId ?? 'primary',
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});
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} catch (err) {
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if (err instanceof CalendarClientError && err.retryable) {
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throw new Error(
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`Calendar API temporarily unavailable (retryable). Please try again shortly. Detail: ${err.message}`,
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);
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}
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throw err;
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}
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// Flag external attendees — callers MUST surface externalAttendeeWarning
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// when hasExternalAttendees is true (design §2.5).
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return flagExternalAttendees(created);
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},
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});
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return [getCalendarEvents, checkAvailability, createCalendarEvent] as const;
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}
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