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* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
186 lines
8.1 KiB
TypeScript
186 lines
8.1 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* DynamoDB client interface + thin implementation.
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*
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* The interface is what every tool handler receives — callers (including tests)
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* inject any object that satisfies it. The real implementation wraps the AWS SDK
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* DynamoDB DocumentClient, but the SDK is only instantiated when
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* RealDynamoClient.create() is explicitly called; nothing happens at import time
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* and no AWS calls are made unless you call a method.
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*
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* Tables used by this package:
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* WorkOrders – work-order records, keyed on `workOrderId` (PK)
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* purchase-orders – purchase-order records, keyed on `purchaseOrderId` (PK)
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* SiteAssignments – site records, keyed on `siteId` (PK)
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*/
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// DynamoDB record shapes returned from each table
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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export interface WorkOrderRecord {
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workOrderId: string;
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title: string;
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status: string;
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siteId?: string;
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assignedTo?: string;
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createdAt: string;
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updatedAt: string;
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description?: string;
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[key: string]: unknown;
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}
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export interface PurchaseOrderRecord {
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purchaseOrderId: string;
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vendor: string;
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status: string;
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totalAmount?: number;
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currency?: string;
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issuedAt: string;
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updatedAt: string;
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lineItems?: Array<{ description: string; quantity: number; unitPrice: number }>;
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[key: string]: unknown;
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}
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export interface SiteRecord {
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siteId: string;
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name: string;
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address?: string;
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region?: string;
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status: string;
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assignedTechnicians?: string[];
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[key: string]: unknown;
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}
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Client interface — inject this everywhere; never import the AWS SDK directly
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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export interface InternalDataClient {
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getWorkOrder(workOrderId: string): Promise<WorkOrderRecord | null>;
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getPurchaseOrder(purchaseOrderId: string): Promise<PurchaseOrderRecord | null>;
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getSite(siteId: string): Promise<SiteRecord | null>;
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}
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Real (AWS SDK-backed) implementation
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//
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// The AWS SDK import lives here — behind this class — so that:
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// a) Nothing happens at module load time (no credential resolution, no env reads).
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// b) Tests never reach this code; they inject a mock that satisfies the interface.
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//
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// TODO (DEFERRED auth layer): When the Gateway layer is built, the Lambda execution
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// role will supply credentials via the standard AWS environment variables. At that
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// point ensure the DocumentClient is constructed with the correct region and that
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// the table names are injected via environment variables (WORK_ORDERS_TABLE,
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// PURCHASE_ORDERS_TABLE, SITE_ASSIGNMENTS_TABLE) rather than hard-coded.
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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export class RealDynamoClient implements InternalDataClient {
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// Table names — override via environment variables at Lambda deploy time.
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private readonly workOrdersTable: string;
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private readonly purchaseOrdersTable: string;
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private readonly siteAssignmentsTable: string;
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// The DocumentClient is typed as `unknown` here to avoid importing the AWS SDK
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// at module scope. It is cast when needed inside each method.
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// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
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private readonly ddb: any;
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private constructor(
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// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
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ddb: any,
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workOrdersTable: string,
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purchaseOrdersTable: string,
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siteAssignmentsTable: string,
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) {
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this.ddb = ddb;
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this.workOrdersTable = workOrdersTable;
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this.purchaseOrdersTable = purchaseOrdersTable;
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this.siteAssignmentsTable = siteAssignmentsTable;
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}
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/**
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* Factory — the only place the AWS SDK DocumentClient is instantiated.
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* Calling this from a Lambda handler (not at module scope) is the correct pattern.
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*
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* NOTE: @aws-sdk/client-dynamodb and @aws-sdk/lib-dynamodb are intentionally absent
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* from package.json until the Lambda runtime bundle is assembled (see TODO above).
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* The module specifiers are stored in runtime variables so TypeScript does not attempt
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* static module-resolution at build time.
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*/
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static async create(): Promise<RealDynamoClient> {
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// Store specifiers in variables to prevent TypeScript static module resolution.
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// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
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const dynImport = (s: string): Promise<any> => import(/* @vite-ignore */ s);
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// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
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const { DynamoDBClient } = (await dynImport('@aws-sdk/client-dynamodb')) as {
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DynamoDBClient: new (cfg: { region: string }) => any;
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};
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// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
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const { DynamoDBDocumentClient } = (await dynImport('@aws-sdk/lib-dynamodb')) as {
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DynamoDBDocumentClient: { from: (c: any) => any };
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};
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const region = process.env['AWS_REGION'] ?? 'us-east-1';
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// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-unsafe-call, @typescript-eslint/no-unsafe-assignment
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const raw = new DynamoDBClient({ region });
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// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-unsafe-call, @typescript-eslint/no-unsafe-member-access, @typescript-eslint/no-unsafe-assignment
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const ddb = DynamoDBDocumentClient.from(raw);
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return new RealDynamoClient(
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ddb,
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process.env['WORK_ORDERS_TABLE'] ?? 'WorkOrders',
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process.env['PURCHASE_ORDERS_TABLE'] ?? 'purchase-orders',
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process.env['SITE_ASSIGNMENTS_TABLE'] ?? 'SiteAssignments',
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);
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}
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async getWorkOrder(workOrderId: string): Promise<WorkOrderRecord | null> {
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// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
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const dynImport = (s: string): Promise<any> => import(/* @vite-ignore */ s);
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// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
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const { GetCommand } = (await dynImport('@aws-sdk/lib-dynamodb')) as {
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GetCommand: new (i: any) => any;
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};
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// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-unsafe-call, @typescript-eslint/no-unsafe-assignment
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const result = await this.ddb.send(
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// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-unsafe-call
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new GetCommand({ TableName: this.workOrdersTable, Key: { workOrderId } }),
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);
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// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-unsafe-member-access
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return (result.Item as WorkOrderRecord) ?? null;
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}
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async getPurchaseOrder(purchaseOrderId: string): Promise<PurchaseOrderRecord | null> {
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// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
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const dynImport = (s: string): Promise<any> => import(/* @vite-ignore */ s);
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// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
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const { GetCommand } = (await dynImport('@aws-sdk/lib-dynamodb')) as {
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GetCommand: new (i: any) => any;
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};
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// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-unsafe-call, @typescript-eslint/no-unsafe-assignment
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const result = await this.ddb.send(
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// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-unsafe-call
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new GetCommand({ TableName: this.purchaseOrdersTable, Key: { purchaseOrderId } }),
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);
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// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-unsafe-member-access
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return (result.Item as PurchaseOrderRecord) ?? null;
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}
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async getSite(siteId: string): Promise<SiteRecord | null> {
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// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
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const dynImport = (s: string): Promise<any> => import(/* @vite-ignore */ s);
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// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
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const { GetCommand } = (await dynImport('@aws-sdk/lib-dynamodb')) as {
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GetCommand: new (i: any) => any;
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};
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// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-unsafe-call, @typescript-eslint/no-unsafe-assignment
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const result = await this.ddb.send(
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// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-unsafe-call
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new GetCommand({ TableName: this.siteAssignmentsTable, Key: { siteId } }),
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);
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// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-unsafe-member-access
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return (result.Item as SiteRecord) ?? null;
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}
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}
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