Fold in Gemini (round-3, third model family) auth findings

- Gemini-BLOCK-1: AllowedOAuthScopes strictly filtering a V2 pre-token Lambda's output
  is unverified -> fatal Phase-0a check (§6 #8a); if it fails, pre-token fail-closed
  becomes the primary boundary.
- Gemini-BLOCK-2: Cognito access tokens carry client_id/scopes, not native aud -> align
  §1h + facade/server checks to client_id allow-list / scope-prefix audience proxy.
- Gemini-Q: 0a spike must run on production-equivalent Enterprise Grid + real licenses.
- Gemini-NIT (path-corrected): project memory is a private store at ~/.claude/.../memory/,
  not the repo and not Gemini's own ~/.gemini path.
Three model families now converge: structural plan sound; only open risk is the auth
token-mint mechanism, fully spike-gated in Phase 0a.

docs/agentforce-plan.md

@@ -46,17 +46,27 @@ off the per-user hop, so the risk is mitigated rather than load-bearing.
 | D8 | Proactive jobs (`fetch-classify`, `daily-digest`, `reminder`, `notion-sync`) **stay as our scheduled Lambdas**, not Agentforce; HIGH-priority alerts continue as **Slack DMs** | No conversational equivalent; keeps Haiku classifier in our Bedrock account; cheapest reliable path | design.md §5; §1f below |
 | D9 | New separate **`sh-agentforce` SFDX repo** for agent metadata (Bot/GenAiPlannerBundle/GenAiPlugin/GenAiFunction) under Agentforce DX | Different toolchain (sf CLI, scratch orgs, deploy-to-org) than the CDK monorepo; one deploy target per repo | `FACT` developer.salesforce.com Agent DX metadata; handbook |
 | D10 | Build **Ops + Finance agents now**; HR/Gusto, SA8000 Q&A, IT/onboarding **later, corpus-gated**; add near-term capabilities as **Topics**, not new agents | Front/ops corpus is rich and current; HR/Amazon/SA8000 corpus is thin/stale/missing | Notion (below); design.md corpus notes |
-| D11 | Keep the **Bedrock guardrail on the BYOLLM model path** + MCP-layer PII redaction (defense in depth) | Agentforce Trust Layer does not redact OUR tool-response payloads | design.md §2.5, §11.2 |
+| D11 | **REVISED (2026-06-11, §0.1):** guardrail (prompt-attack + PII redaction) lives **entirely at the MCP/action layer**, not on any model path; the Einstein Trust Layer covers planner-path moderation | The planner runs AWS-Hosted Claude inside Salesforce's boundary (D5) — there is no BYOLLM model path to attach our guardrail to; Trust Layer does not redact OUR tool-response payloads, so MCP-layer redaction is authoritative | design.md §2.5, §11.2; §0.1 |
+| D12 | **RESOLVED (2026-06-11, §0.1):** **OpenAPI-first, MCP-ready transport-agnostic core.** Tool handlers + the shared auth/scope/PII/audit guard are built independent of transport; ship the **OpenAPI adapter now** (Agentforce External Service actions; Apex only where an action needs request/response shaping); **defer the MCP adapter** to a named trigger. | Agentforce's per-user hop needs OpenAPI regardless (D4); no committed MCP consumer today, so a second public interface + its conformance/hardening cost isn't justified yet; a transport-agnostic core makes the MCP adapter a cheap later add, not a re-platform; deferring it also drops the IDE-session trifecta nuance until then. | Adam 2026-06-11; research wf_1bf9e142 (D4) |
 
 **Agent roster (the answer to "how many"):** **3** — Seahaven Ops, Seahaven Finance, Lauren Exec (§1a, §2).
 
-**Top 5 decisions for Adam (§6):** (1) confirm Agentforce-in-Slack as the surface + accept Agentforce/Data
-Cloud licensing; (2) BYOLLM-on-our-Bedrock vs AWS-Hosted Claude Sonnet 4; (3) accept D3 (strip finance from
-Lauren's exec agent); (4) accept the Apex/External-Service per-user wrapper (D4) rather than waiting for native
-MCP per-user GA; (5) fund authoring the missing SA8000 + employee-handbook corpus.
+**Top 5 decisions for Adam — ALL RESOLVED 2026-06-11 (§0.1):** (1) Agentforce-in-Slack + licensing **accepted**;
+(2) reasoning model = **AWS-Hosted Claude** (BYOLLM ruled out for the planner); (3) **D3 accepted** (strip finance
+from Lauren Exec); (4) **D4** per-user auth = ES/Apex actions + Per-User Browser Flow → Cognito; (5) corpus
+authoring **deferred** (fund when needed).
 
-**Capability-gap count: 11** (§5). Severity: **2 critical** (G1 per-user MCP auth, G2 remote-MCP Beta), **6
-medium**, **3 low**.
+**Capability-gap count: 15 registered** (§5). Severity: **1 critical** (G1 per-user auth — mitigation chosen,
+spike-gated, **unverified**), **9 medium** (G3, G7–G13, G15), **3 low** (G4, G5, G14), **2 resolved/avoided**
+(G2, G6). (The dropped BYOLLM ~30% cost claim is not a registered gap.)
+
+> **REVISION — plan-review remediation (2026-06-11, §0.3).** This plan was audited by the `sh-plan-review` Fable
+> gate; §0.3 logs every BLOCK/FIX addressed. Key structural changes since the first commit: teardown moved wholly
+> to Phase 4 with a shared-consumer audit (was contradictory); §0.1 propagated into D5/D11/§1d/§2.x/§3/G6/G9/§6
+> (model/guardrail consistency); D12 transport pinned to **one facade per trust tier** (per-server audience
+> preserved); per-agent External Credential / Cognito app-client scoping specified (token-layer trifecta);
+> Phase 0 split so the auth spike gates the rest, with a **custom-Bolt fallback** if it fails; a platform-build
+> phase added; new gaps G12–G15 registered.
 
 ---
 
@@ -77,23 +87,175 @@ provisional D4/D5 wording above and the open items in §6.
 **Two consequences that ripple into the design (must be honored downstream):**
 
 1. **The Agentforce→tool hop is NOT MCP.** Because per-user identity is only achievable on the GA External
-   Service/Apex action path (not the Beta MCP connector), Agentforce reaches our tools through an **OpenAPI/Apex
-   facade in front of each MCP server**, authenticated per-user to Cognito. The `sh-mcp-ops`/`-finance` servers,
-   their JWT validation, scopes, audience-binding, and PII redaction are **unchanged** — only the Agentforce-side
-   transport changes from MCP to OpenAPI/Apex actions. (Other MCP clients can still speak MCP to the same servers.)
-   Browser Flow requires an interactive first-auth per user (fine for Slack users; the proactive Lambdas in §1f
-   are unaffected — they use offline creds).
+   Service/Apex action path (not the Beta MCP connector), Agentforce reaches our tools over **OpenAPI/Apex
+   actions** authenticated per-user to Cognito. **Day-one architecture (B3-resolved):** there is NO MCP wire
+   protocol at launch — the trust-tier servers (`sh-mcp-ops`, `sh-mcp-finance`) expose their tools as **OpenAPI
+   endpoints** via the transport-agnostic core (D12); the MCP adapter is deferred (D12 trigger). The servers'
+   JWT validation, per-tool scope enforcement, audience-binding, PII redaction, and audit are **unchanged** —
+   they sit below the adapter and are transport-agnostic. Browser Flow requires an interactive first-auth per
+   user (fine for Slack users; the proactive Lambdas in §1f are unaffected — they use offline creds).
 2. **Our Bedrock guardrail cannot sit on the planner path.** Both AWS-Hosted and BYOLLM keep Salesforce in the
    inference path, so keeping inference + our own guardrail in account `328440206208` is **unsatisfiable on the
    planner path today**. The Einstein **Trust Layer** covers planner-path moderation; **our guardrail + PII
    redaction move entirely to the MCP/action layer** (already the plan for PII — design.md §2.5). This **revises
    D11**: the guardrail is applied at the MCP/action layer, not "on the BYOLLM model path."
 
+**Transport architecture (D12) — OpenAPI-first, MCP-ready core.** design.md §4 framed each server as a remote
+**MCP** server because the assumed consumer was Slack's built-in MCP client. That consumer is gone, and the chosen
+Agentforce per-user path (D4) is OpenAPI/Apex, not MCP. Decision:
+
+- **Build a transport-agnostic core.** The tool handlers and the shared auth/scope/PII-redaction/audit guard
+  (design.md §4 `shared` package) are written independent of wire protocol. The OpenAPI spec **and** any future MCP
+  tool list are generated from one tool registry, so the two can never drift.
+- **Ship the OpenAPI adapter now** — Agentforce **External Service (OpenAPI) actions** are the primary transport;
+  use **Apex `@InvocableMethod`** only for actions needing request/response shaping (e.g. extra redaction,
+  pagination).
+- **One facade per trust tier (B3-resolved — audience rejected EARLY at the edge; the server remains the
+  boundary, FIX-3/CR-1).** Deploy a **separate API Gateway + authorizer per server**: the `sh-mcp-ops` facade
+  rejects non-ops tokens, the `sh-mcp-finance` facade rejects non-finance tokens (mechanism per BLOCK-1 above —
+  scope-prefix / `client_id` allow-list / custom `aud`). The edge is an early-reject convenience; it does **not**
+  move the boundary off the server (next bullet). A **shared AWS WAF web ACL** fronts both (WAF is rate-limit/IP
+  defense-in-depth ONLY, never an authz boundary — CR-7).
+- **Audience validated at the edge AND the server (defense in depth — CR-1, design.md §2.5).** The per-tier
+  authorizer is NOT the only check: every server **independently re-validates issuer + `aud` + required scope on
+  every call** (design.md §2.5 makes server-side enforcement authoritative — the edge does not replace it). The
+  per-tier gateway adds an early-reject layer; it does not move the boundary off the server. **Alarm on any token
+  presented to the wrong audience** (a finance-aud token at the ops endpoint, or vice-versa) — that signature
+  means either a misconfig or an attack.
+- **Defer the MCP adapter** until a **named trigger**: (a) Claude Code / IDE consumption becomes a real recurring
+  workflow (not nice-to-have), **or** (b) Salesforce native remote-MCP per-user binding reaches GA (then MCP-native
+  could also collapse the Agentforce-side OpenAPI facade). When triggered, the MCP adapter is a thin add over the
+  same core/auth/scopes/audit — not a re-platform.
+- **Security note (why deferral is also a simplification):** an MCP/IDE consumer lets one human wire multiple
+  servers into one session (e.g. `ops`-with-Gmail **and** `finance`), softening the session-layer trifecta
+  separation that Agentforce's separate agents give for free. The token-layer guarantee still holds (separate
+  audiences → no single token spans tiers), but not shipping the IDE/MCP path removes the session-layer concern
+  entirely for now. If/when the MCP adapter ships, restrict IDE/MCP `finance` access to the admin tier and document
+  "don't co-connect finance with Gmail-read in one IDE session." The `sh-mcp` name stays accurate — MCP remains the
+  strategic protocol, just not the day-one transport.
+
+**Per-agent credential & token-layer trifecta (B4-resolved — the guarantee is designed, not asserted).** The
+claim "separate audiences → no single token spans tiers" is only true if each agent's tokens are minted from a
+credential that requests **only its tier's scopes**. Mechanism (specified, testable):
+
+- **PRIMARY mechanism — per-app-client scope restriction (vendor-supported, airtight regardless of group union,
+  BLOCK-1-resolved).** Each agent gets **one Cognito app client + one External Credential**, and the app client's
+  **`AllowedOAuthScopes` is set to only its tier's resource-server scopes**: Ops client → `ops:read [ops:tasks]`;
+  Finance client → `finance:read`; Lauren Exec client → `ops:read ops:tasks gmail:self calendar:self` (**never
+  finance**). Cognito's token endpoint **cannot issue a scope outside a client's `AllowedOAuthScopes`** — so even
+  though Lauren-the-person holds `finance:read` (via `-finance@`), the Exec client can never obtain a token
+  carrying it. This is the intended boundary — independent of design.md §2.3's group→scope union.
+  **CAVEAT (Gemini round-3 BLOCK — UNVERIFIED, fatal Phase-0a check):** this rests on Cognito **strictly
+  filtering the issued token's scopes to the client's `AllowedOAuthScopes` even when a pre-token V2 Lambda
+  runs**. In some Cognito configs a V2 pre-token Lambda can *return scopes exceeding* the client's allow-list — if
+  so, the app-client control is soft and the pre-token Lambda becomes load-bearing after all. Verify "issued
+  scopes ⊆ `AllowedOAuthScopes` regardless of Lambda output" as a **fatal** 0a gate item (§6 #8); if it does NOT
+  hold, the pre-token fail-closed suppression below is promoted from backstop to primary and gets the heavier test.
+- **AMENDS design.md §2.3 (BLOCK-1 / F2).** §2.3 describes a plain **union** of a user's group-scopes (and even
+  shows Lauren's token *with* `finance:read`); the substrate is ambiguous on per-audience subsetting. This plan
+  **amends** §2.3: group→scope mapping still defines what a user *may* hold, but the **issued token is bounded by
+  the requesting app client's allowed scopes** (per-tier). Added to the §4 amendment list; not attributed to
+  locked text.
+- **BACKSTOP — pre-token suppression, fail-closed.** The pre-token Lambda additionally suppresses any scope not
+  belonging to the requested resource server and **fails closed + alarms** if a cross-audience scope ever appears
+  (CR-3) — defense in depth behind the app-client control, not the primary boundary. **Per-server IAM/authz
+  behavior → mandatory cross-review (GPT-4.1) before commit** (design.md §8/§10).
+- **UNVERIFIED-LOAD-BEARING — the `aud`/authorizer mechanism (BLOCK-1, spike-gated like G1).** Cognito access
+  tokens natively carry `client_id` + resource-server-prefixed scopes, **not a per-resource-server `aud` claim by
+  default**, and customizing the *access* token (pre-token **V2** trigger) may require a paid Cognito feature
+  plan. So "the per-tier authorizer validates `aud=sh-mcp-ops`" needs a **concrete, chosen mechanism** — scope-
+  prefix check at the authorizer, `client_id` allow-list per gateway, or a custom `aud` injected via pre-token V2
+  — and confirmation the trigger version is available. **Verify in Phase-0 (new §6 #8); on the 0b exit gate.**
+- **Backend `sub` validation (CR-2).** Do not assume Salesforce's External Credential forwards the Google `sub`
+  unchanged — verify in Phase-0a that the JWT our endpoint receives carries the **Google Workspace `sub`** (not a
+  Salesforce/Cognito-internal id), and have each server **reject any token whose `sub` is not a valid Workspace
+  user**. Force short token lifetimes; watch for Salesforce-side token caching/reuse across agents.
+- **Gmail/Calendar segregation is defense-in-depth, not just credential-shaped (CR-6).** The Finance agent's
+  credential never carries `gmail:self`/`calendar:self`, but the servers must **also** refuse Gmail/Calendar tool
+  calls unless the token carries the matching `*:self` scope AND the Google token is ABAC-partitioned by `sub`
+  (design.md §2.4) — so a finance-audience token can never reach a mailbox even if something upstream misfires.
+- **Pre-token + group-sync are the auth SPOF (CR-5).** Alarm on group-sync failure (design.md §2.3 already) AND on
+  pre-token Lambda error rate / any cross-audience-scope event. **Freshness-bound mechanism (Q2):** the group-sync
+  Lambda writes a `last_successful_sync` timestamp; the pre-token Lambda reads it and **fails closed** (denies the
+  token, or drops to base `ops:read` only) if the sync is older than a hard bound (e.g. 30 min) — a stale sync can
+  never silently *widen* scope. (This bounds *widening*; revocation latency is separately handled by the design.md
+  §2.3 deny-list + finance 15-min TTL.)
+- Tested by (§1h): "per-agent credential mints only its tier's scopes" (a token via the Exec credential never
+  contains `finance:read`); "wrong-audience token rejected at edge AND server"; "finance token cannot reach a
+  Gmail/Calendar tool"; "pre-token fails closed on a cross-audience scope."
+
 **Dropped claim:** the "BYOLLM = ~30% fewer Einstein Requests" figure was **not corroborated** by any verified
 source — removed from cost modeling.
 
 ---
 
+## 0.3 Plan-review remediation log — 2026-06-11 (Fable `sh-plan-review` gate)
+
+The first commit of this plan was audited by the Fable adversarial gate (verdict: REQUEST CHANGES). Every BLOCK
+and FIX is addressed below; this revision supersedes the pre-audit text wherever they differ.
+
+| Finding | Resolution (where) |
+|---------|--------------------|
+| **B1** Teardown self-contradiction (Alex deleted Phase 1 *and* the Phase 2 rollback target; shared AOSS deleted before exec-aide retires; KB starved during parallel run) | §3 rewritten: **all** teardown moved to Phase 4 with a shared-consumer audit; legacy bots + KB + AOSS + all sync jobs run untouched through Phase 3; `notion-sync` **dual-feeds** (Bedrock KB + Data Cloud) until Phase 4; rollback never targets a deleted resource. |
+| **B2** Plan body still stated pre-resolution decisions (BYOLLM preferred; ~30%; guardrail-on-BYOLLM-path; "decide D4") | §0.1 propagated into **D5, D11, §1d, §2.1–2.3 model lines, §3 guardrail-teardown condition, G6, G9, §6, Phase 0**. |
+| **B3** D12 launch architecture ambiguous; one-gateway vs per-server audience | §0.1: **no MCP at launch**; **one facade (API GW + Cognito authorizer) per trust tier**, audience rejection at the edge; §1h list_tools test moved to deferred set. |
+| **B4** Token-layer trifecta asserted, not designed | §0.1 per-agent credential block above; §2 Connections name each per-agent app client/credential; new §1h test. |
+| **B5** Phase-0 spike "gates everything" but no fallback; spend precedes it; G1 overstated | §3 **Phase 0 split (0a auth spike → 0b platform/Data-Cloud/SFDX)**; explicit **custom-Bolt fallback** if the spike fails (design.md §12); G1 relabelled "mitigation chosen — UNVERIFIED, spike-gated." |
+| **F1** Parity gate runs on Beta tooling; Testing-Center identity under per-user creds | §6 verify-#5 added; **G12** registers the Beta/identity dependency. |
+| **F2** design.md "annotation, not reopening" inaccurate | §4 reframed as **amendments to locked decisions** (design.md §1 item 4 now false; D3 reverses §12). |
+| **F3** `sh-agentforce` new-repo obligations + `cd-sfdx` Salesforce auth missing | §1g + §4 expanded: full new-repo checklist; **JWT-bearer connected-app cert/key in Secrets Manager**, sandbox/prod-scoped, rotation; `cd-sfdx` gets its own design/verify story. |
+| **F4** No phase builds the servers | §3 **Phase 0b "Platform build"** added with deploy-role-first, CI/CD, coverage-gate exit criteria. |
+| **F5** New trust boundary: Salesforce now processes tool payloads | **G13** registered (Trust Layer / Data Cloud as new data processor; verify retention + zero-training). |
+| **F6** Memory/README obligations omitted | §4 **Repo docs** expanded: `sh-agentforce` project memory, `project_sh_mcp.md` update, cross-project refs, both READMEs. |
+| **F7** Per-user tool visibility degraded with no replacement | §1h states it; behavioral test + graceful-refusal UX added; **G14**. |
+| **N1/N2/N3** | §1f ingestion pinned to **S3 → Data Cloud**; ALARM-only monitoring for the facades + repointed `notion-sync`; Salesforce DevName/kebab boundary noted. |
+| **Q1/Q2/Q3** | **G15** (Slack plan supports Employee Agents; per-employee Agentforce licensing; `$User.GoogleGroups`/`$Session.Channel` existence) — all unverified-load-bearing, on the §6 verify gate. |
+
+**Round 2 (Fable re-gate + GPT-4.1 cross-review, 2026-06-11).** Second-pass findings folded in:
+- **BLOCK-1** (per-audience token mint was unverified + misattributed to design.md §2.3): **inverted the layering**
+  — per-app-client `AllowedOAuthScopes` is now the PRIMARY, vendor-supported boundary; pre-token suppression is a
+  fail-closed backstop; the `aud`/authorizer mechanism is flagged unverified-load-bearing and put on the §6 #8
+  verify gate; §2.3 amendment added to §4. → §0.1 B4, §4, §6 #8.
+- **FIX-1** §1f notion-sync "repointed" → **dual-feeds via S3** (matched to N1/B1). **FIX-2** 0a exit gate split
+  into fatal (`sub`/consent/refresh/`aud`) vs decision-input (Testing-Center identity). **FIX-3** removed stale
+  "boundary stays in infrastructure" phrasing. **FIX-4** parallel-run double-spend bounded (G9 + §3 time-box).
+  **FIX-5** minimal throwaway 0a kit specified + Slack-plan dependency. **FIX-6** dangling "(O3)" removed.
+- **NITs:** severity arithmetic corrected; Ops welcome no longer oversells tasks; wrong-audience alarm named;
+  flip-point clarified as operational re-announce. **Q1** fallback-scope honesty + **Q2** freshness-bound
+  mechanism documented.
+
+**Round 3 (Gemini `scanner`, third model family — 2026-06-11).** Triangulated the auth nerve all three families
+flagged; two sharp BLOCKs folded in:
+- **Gemini-BLOCK-1:** `AllowedOAuthScopes` strictly filtering a V2 pre-token Lambda's output is **unverified** —
+  added as a fatal Phase-0a check (§6 #8a); if it doesn't hold, pre-token fail-closed becomes the primary boundary.
+  (Sharpens BLOCK-1: neither layer is *independently* guaranteed until this interaction is proven.)
+- **Gemini-BLOCK-2:** Cognito access tokens carry `client_id`/scopes, **not a native `aud`** — aligned §1h and the
+  facade/server checks to a **`client_id` allow-list / scope-prefix audience proxy** (§0.1, §1h, §6 #8c).
+- **Gemini-Q:** the 0a spike must run on a **production-equivalent Enterprise Grid org with real licenses**, not a
+  Dev/non-Grid Slack (false-positive risk) — §6 #6.
+- **Gemini-NIT (path-corrected):** project memory is a private store at `~/.claude/projects/.../memory/`, distinct
+  from repo READMEs — §4. (Gemini cited its own `~/.gemini/...` path; corrected — a cross-family infra-fact
+  assertion to verify, not adopt, per `feedback_fable_review_gates`.)
+Gemini APPROVED the rest: B1/B5 parallel-run dual-feed + Bolt fallback sound; §1a identity segregation coherently
+integrated with the token-layer mechanism. **All three families (Claude/Fable, GPT-4.1, Gemini) now converge: the
+structural plan is sound; the only open risk is the auth token-mint mechanism, fully spike-gated in Phase 0a.**
+
+**Cross-family review (GPT-4.1 `cross_reviewer`, 2026-06-11) — auth/trifecta sections.** Run per the mandatory
+cross-review gate for auth/IAM design (Fable is Claude-family, not a substitute). Findings folded in:
+- **CR-1 (BLOCK):** validate `aud` at the edge **AND** server-side (defense in depth) — the per-tier authorizer
+  does not replace design.md §2.5 server-side enforcement; alarm on wrong-audience tokens. → §0.1 B3, §1h.
+- **CR-6 (BLOCK):** a finance-audience token must not reach Gmail/Calendar even with a valid Google token — backend
+  refuses unless `*:self` scope present + Google token ABAC-partitioned by `sub`. → §0.1 B4, §1h.
+- **CR-2 (FIX):** verify + enforce that the received `sub` is the Google Workspace `sub` (not a Salesforce/Cognito
+  id); reject otherwise; watch Salesforce token caching. → §0.1 B4, Phase-0a.
+- **CR-3 (FIX):** pre-token Lambda fails closed + alarms if any cross-audience scope would appear. → §0.1 B4, §1h.
+- **CR-5 (FIX):** pre-token + group-sync are the auth SPOF — alarms + freshness bound on group claims. → §0.1 B4, §4.
+- **CR-4/CR-7 (NIT):** restrict each Cognito app client's allowed scopes; WAF is defense-in-depth only. → §0.1.
+Re-run `cross_reviewer` on the concrete pre-token Lambda + IAM/Cognito resource-server config once written
+(design.md §10 asked for the real artifacts).
+
+---
+
 ## 1. Platform-level design
 
 ### 1a. Agent roster — how many, and why
@@ -121,8 +283,8 @@ fewer would collapse a trust boundary.
   `finance:read` and Gmail in the same exec agent (the exact Gmail-read + sensitive-read + calendar-egress
   exfiltration path). Lauren-the-person keeps `finance:read` (she's in `-finance@`); she uses the **Finance
   agent** for payment lookups, in a separate session with no Gmail. The person's scopes ≠ any one agent's
-  connection scopes. `ASSUMPTION`: Adam accepts the minor UX cost of "switch agents for finance" in exchange for
-  a hard, not monitored-soft, trifecta boundary (Open Decision O3).
+  connection scopes. **Adam accepted (D3, §0.1)** the minor UX cost of "switch agents for finance" for a hard, not
+  monitored-soft, trifecta boundary.
 
 ### 1b. Additional employee-facing agent types — build now vs later (corpus-gated)
 
@@ -158,26 +320,28 @@ Physical tier (`physical:*`) remains **deferred / admin-out-of-band**, no scope
 
 ### 1d. AI models — which, and where
 
-`FACT` (developer.salesforce.com supported-models; Salesforce "Agentforce 360 for AWS"; Salesforce×Anthropic
-Oct-2025 partnership): Agentforce's **Atlas reasoning engine is model-agnostic**; the default is a
-Salesforce-managed mix (incl. GPT-4o); an **AWS-Hosted option runs Anthropic Claude Sonnet 4 on Amazon Bedrock**
-and can power Atlas; **BYOLLM** (Models API) supports **Amazon Bedrock, Azure OpenAI, OpenAI, Vertex**, runs on
-your own credentials/instance, keeps the **Trust Layer**, and consumes **~30% fewer Einstein Requests**.
+`FACT` (research wf_1bf9e142, 25/25 verified; developer.salesforce.com supported-models; "Agentforce 360 for
+AWS"; Salesforce×Anthropic Oct-2025): Agentforce's reasoning engine/planner is driven by the **org/agent model
+selection**, whose **only two documented options are "Salesforce Default"** (managed mix, currently GPT-4o) **and
+"AWS-Hosted"** (Anthropic Claude Sonnet 4 on Bedrock, **inside the Salesforce Trust Boundary**, not our account).
+**BYOLLM (Models API) is documented ONLY for custom actions** (prompt templates/Apex/Models-API calls), is **not a
+reasoning-engine option**, and even on its action path inference still routes **through Salesforce's Models API /
+Trust Layer** — so BYOLLM cannot keep inference in our boundary either.
 
-**Decision (D5):**
-- **Agent reasoning / planner model = Anthropic Claude on Bedrock.** Preferred path: **BYOLLM pointed at our
-  Bedrock** (account `328440206208`, `us-east-1`) so inference stays in our trust boundary, we keep our own
-  guardrail on the model path (D11), and we cut Einstein-Request spend. **Gap G6:** confirm a BYOLLM endpoint can
-  be the *agent reasoning model* (Atlas planner), not only a prompt-template/Models-API call. If not, fall back
-  to the **AWS-Hosted Claude Sonnet 4** managed option (confirmed to power Atlas) — same model family, less
-  control. Either way we retain the Claude lineage of the legacy bots (Sonnet 4.5 for Alex, Sonnet 4.6 for
-  Lauren's conversation loop).
+**Decision (D5) — RESOLVED, §0.1:**
+- **Agent reasoning/planner model = AWS-Hosted Claude (Salesforce-managed on Bedrock).** This is the **only**
+  documented way to keep Claude as the planner. **BYOLLM is ruled out for the planner** (G6, resolved). Consequence:
+  inference and our own Bedrock guardrail **cannot sit on the planner path** (it runs in Salesforce's boundary) —
+  our guardrail + PII redaction move **entirely to the MCP/action layer** (D11) and the **Einstein Trust Layer**
+  covers planner-path moderation. We still retain the Claude lineage of the legacy bots (Sonnet 4.5/4.6).
+  `ASSUMPTION`: AWS-Hosted's model name is drifting (Sonnet 4 → 4.6 / Haiku 4.5 as of May 2026) — pin the current
+  name in the Phase-0 spike (§6 verify #4); the structural fact (Claude as planner, SF-managed) holds.
 - **Classification stays out of Agentforce.** The 15-min `fetch-classify` job keeps using **Bedrock Haiku 4.5**
-  in our account (design.md §5, D8). It is proactive/event-driven, has no conversational surface, and shouldn't
-  consume Einstein Requests.
-- **Per-agent model selection** is set in Setup → Agentforce Agents (`FACT`). All three agents use the same
-  Claude reasoning model; Finance's lower latency tolerance is fine.
-- Licensing/capability flag: BYOLLM and Data Cloud both carry consumption/licensing cost (Gap G9, O5).
+  in our account (design.md §5, D8) — proactive/event-driven, no conversational surface, no Einstein-Request spend.
+- **Per-agent model selection** is set in Setup → Agentforce Agents / `model_config` in Agent Script (`FACT`).
+  All three agents use the AWS-Hosted Claude reasoning model.
+- Licensing/capability flag: Agentforce + Data Cloud carry consumption/licensing cost (Gap G9). The earlier
+  "~30% fewer Einstein Requests" figure is **dropped — uncorroborated** (§0.1).
 
 ### 1e. Prompt Builder / Template Library structure
 
@@ -208,7 +372,7 @@ content to **Data Cloud**, which **auto-creates a search index** (chunked + vect
 
 | Corpus | → Data Library | → Retriever | Notes |
 |--------|----------------|-------------|-------|
-| Notion How-To/Front SOPs + intake SOPs (unstructured) | **Seahaven Ops Knowledge** | `Seahaven_Ops_Knowledge_Retriever` | Highest-value, current. Source via `notion-sync` repointed to Data Cloud ingestion (S3 → Data Cloud, or Notion connector) |
+| Notion How-To/Front SOPs + intake SOPs (unstructured) | **Seahaven Ops Knowledge** | `Seahaven_Ops_Knowledge_Retriever` | Highest-value, current. **Ingestion = S3 → Data Cloud (N1, pinned):** `notion-sync` keeps writing `s3://seahaven-kb-docs-328440206208` and Data Cloud ingests from S3 — reuses the existing sync write path, avoids a new Notion-connector dependency, and lets the **same S3 dual-feed** the legacy Bedrock KB during parallel run (B1). |
 | Amazon/AMOC subtree (unstructured, **stale**) | same library, separate index segment or tagged | same | Audience-restrict AMOC content; flag staleness (Gap G7) |
 | SA8000 docs + employee handbook + company policies | **must be authored**, then ingested | same | **Not in Notion** (Gap G8) — stage in `s3://seahaven-kb-docs-328440206208` or Drive, then ingest |
 | WorkOrders / purchase-orders / SiteAssignments / payments (**structured, live**) | **NOT a Data Library** | n/a | Stay **MCP lookup tools** over DDB (design.md §3); Data Libraries can't hold structured data (D7) |
@@ -217,11 +381,14 @@ content to **Data Cloud**, which **auto-creates a search index** (chunked + vect
 - The **Bedrock KB `LSDCNHTH6O`** + **OpenSearch Serverless `gv1540frh1crb79gtr4b`** + **Titan Embed V2** are
   **replaced** by the Data Cloud search index + Salesforce-managed embeddings. (We lose control of the embedding
   model — Gap G5, low.)
-- **`notion-sync`** is **kept but repointed**: Notion → Data Cloud ingestion (instead of Notion → S3 → Bedrock
-  KB). Still a scheduled Lambda in `sh-mcp/jobs` (design.md §5).
-- **`po-sync` / `workorder-sync` are retired** as KB feeds: POs/WOs are structured and are served live by the
-  MCP lookup tools, not searched as text. The only thing lost is free-text search over WO *comments* that Alex's
-  KB allowed — Gap G4 (low; workaround: a small dedicated retriever or `lookup`-by-id only).
+- **`notion-sync`** is **kept and DUAL-FEEDS via S3 until Phase 4** (FIX-1/N1/B1): it keeps writing
+  `s3://seahaven-kb-docs-328440206208`; the **legacy Bedrock KB** ingests from that S3 (unchanged) AND **Data
+  Cloud** ingests from the same S3. It does NOT stop feeding the Bedrock KB until teardown (§3) — repointing it
+  away early would starve the rollback target. Still a scheduled Lambda in `sh-mcp/jobs` (design.md §5).
+- **`po-sync` / `workorder-sync` keep feeding the legacy KB until Phase 4** (B1); they are retired as KB feeds at
+  teardown because the NEW platform serves POs/WOs live via MCP lookup tools (D7). The only thing lost post-cutover
+  is free-text search over WO *comments* that Alex's KB allowed — Gap G4 (low; workaround: a small dedicated
+  retriever or `lookup`-by-id only).
 
 **SA8000 / handbook sourcing gap (explicit):** these are referenced as KB inputs but were **not found as Notion
 pages** (design.md corpus notes). Resolution: **author them** (Jira stories §4), stage in S3/Drive, ingest into
@@ -243,12 +410,25 @@ handbook is one-deploy-target-per-repo. Coexistence:
 - `sh-mcp` (existing): MCP servers, Cognito/auth, jobs — TypeScript/CDK, OIDC-into-AWS, `ci / ci` required check
   (design.md §7). Unchanged.
 - `sh-agentforce` (new): agent metadata. CI runs `sf` validate-deploy against a scratch org; CD does
-  **deploy-then-merge** to sandbox → prod org. **Gap G10:** the org's reusable workflows are AWS/CDK-shaped;
-  we need a **new reusable `cd-sfdx` workflow** (Jira story). Naming kebab-case; Dependabot N/A (no npm), but pin
-  `@salesforce/cli` version.
+  **deploy-then-merge** to sandbox → prod org.
+- **`sh-agentforce` new-repo checklist (F3 — was missing; per `feedback_new_repo_checklist`):** private repo in
+  org; **branch protection + a required check** (the SFDX analog of `ci / ci`); **enable vulnerability-alerts +
+  `dependabot_security_updates` + secret_scanning** — Dependabot is **NOT N/A** (the `github-actions` ecosystem
+  applies even without npm; also watch `@salesforce/cli`); pin `@salesforce/cli`; kebab-case repo/workflow names.
+- **`cd-sfdx` deploy auth (F3 — the prod-deploy key for the entire agent surface; design/verify story of its
+  own, NOT one Jira bullet).** Salesforce has **no OIDC**; CD authenticates via the **JWT-bearer flow of a
+  connected app** using a private key + cert. That key is a **long-lived secret** — store it in **AWS Secrets
+  Manager** (`sh-agentforce/sfdx-jwt-key`, per secrets-and-config.md; NOT a GitHub secret blob, NOT an env var),
+  pull it in the workflow, **scope separate connected apps for sandbox vs prod**, and define a **rotation cadence**.
+  `cd-sfdx` is a brand-new org-wide reusable workflow (Gap G10) implementing deploy-then-merge against
+  sandbox→prod orgs — it gets its **own design + verification step** before any agent metadata depends on it.
 - **Cross-review gate extends to Agentforce metadata** that changes tool exposure, audience, or scope binding —
-  those are security-relevant just like an IAM diff (design.md §8). `ASSUMPTION`: GenAiPlannerBundle/connection
-  changes go through `cross_reviewer` the same as IAM.
+  security-relevant just like an IAM diff (design.md §8). `ASSUMPTION`: GenAiPlannerBundle/connection changes and
+  the `cd-sfdx` connected-app trust go through `cross_reviewer` (GPT-4.1) the same as IAM.
+- **Naming boundary (N3):** Salesforce Developer/API names (`Seahaven_Ops`, Flex template names) **cannot contain
+  hyphens** and conventionally use PascalCase/snake. The handbook kebab-case rule governs **AWS resources + repo
+  names** (the repo `sh-agentforce` IS kebab); it does NOT apply to Salesforce-side metadata API names. Recorded so
+  a future compliance pass doesn't "fix" a non-violation.
 
 ### 1h. Test suite — Agentforce Testing Center + the MCP-layer security tests
 
@@ -276,15 +456,42 @@ real home:
 8. **Parity golden-transcripts** — replay real Alex/Lauren interactions; assert equivalent answers **before**
    deprecating each bot (design.md §6, §7.3 parity gate).
 
-**MCP-layer security tests (authoritative, in `sh-mcp`, design.md §7.3 — unchanged):**
-audience-binding rejection (an `ops` token rejected by `finance`); per-tool **server-side** scope enforcement;
-`list_tools` tool-hiding reflects caller scopes; deny-list **hard revocation**; minimal-scope Google client
-(a `gmail:self` token can't mint a Calendar token); **per-user refresh-token ABAC isolation**;
-**finance PII redaction** (bank/routing/card/SSN masked before egress) **while leaving vendor names/contacts
-UNMASKED** (legacy Alex deliberately left names unmasked — Trust Layer must not re-mask them, Gap G3); per-tool
-rate limit + per-session cap; finance audit-record shape.
+**Core security tests (authoritative, transport-agnostic, in `sh-mcp`, design.md §7.3):**
+**audience-binding rejection at the per-tier facade AND re-validated server-side** — bound on the chosen
+audience proxy (**`client_id` allow-list per gateway, or resource-server scope-prefix**, since Cognito access
+tokens carry `client_id`/scopes, **not a native `aud` claim** unless injected via pre-token V2 — Gemini round-3):
+an ops-tier token is rejected by the `sh-mcp-finance` gateway authorizer *and* by the finance server itself
+(B3/CR-1, defense in depth); per-tool **server-side** scope enforcement; **per-agent credential mints only its tier's scopes** (a
+token obtained via the Lauren Exec app client never contains `finance:read`, even though the person holds it —
+B4); **pre-token fails closed on a cross-audience scope** (CR-3); **a finance-audience token cannot reach a
+Gmail/Calendar tool** (CR-6); **backend rejects a token whose `sub` is not a valid Google Workspace user** (CR-2);
+deny-list **hard revocation**; minimal-scope Google client (a `gmail:self`
+token can't mint a Calendar token); **per-user refresh-token ABAC isolation**; **finance PII redaction**
+(bank/routing/card/SSN masked before egress) **while leaving vendor names/contacts UNMASKED** (legacy Alex
+deliberately left names unmasked — Trust Layer must not re-mask them, Gap G3); per-tool rate limit + per-session
+cap; finance audit-record shape.
 
-Eval criteria: behavioral suite ≥ agreed pass rate before each cutover; MCP suite at design.md coverage gate
+**Transport-test note (D12, B3-reconciled):** the active interface is the **OpenAPI adapter**, so the design.md
+§7.3 "Contract / MCP conformance" layer is split — **OpenAPI contract tests** (schema validation, the generated
+spec matches the tool registry) run now; **MCP `list_tools` tool-hiding and MCP protocol-conformance tests defer
+WITH the MCP adapter** (not in the launch suite — they were MCP-only). On the OpenAPI path the per-*user* tool
+visibility that `list_tools` gave is replaced by per-*agent* action assignment (each agent granted only its
+tier's actions) — a *convenience, never the boundary*; the per-tool server-side scope check is the boundary
+(design.md §2.5).
+
+**Per-user visibility degradation (F7 — stated, not silently dropped):** per-agent action assignment is
+per-*agent*, not per-*user*. A user **without** `ops:tasks` talking to Seahaven Ops still *sees* the task actions
+offered and they fail server-side (403). Boundary holds; UX degrades. Handle with **graceful-refusal copy** in
+the agent instructions ("you may not have access to that — server will confirm") and a behavioral test:
+a no-`ops:tasks` user gets a clean "you don't have access" rather than a raw error.
+
+**Testing-Center identity caveat (F1):** Testing Center batch/AI-generated runs invoke actions — **under whose
+identity** when the action uses a Per-User Browser Flow credential? Headless batch may fail (no interactive
+first-auth) or run as a different principal, which would make the behavioral suite unable to exercise the real
+per-user tools (the suite authorizes teardown — design.md §6). Resolve in the Phase-0 spike (§6 verify #5);
+registered as Gap **G12** (Beta dependency).
+
+Eval criteria: behavioral suite ≥ agreed pass rate before each cutover; MCP/core suite at design.md coverage gate
 (80% lines, 100% on the shared auth/scope guard) — both green are the parity gate for retiring a bot.
 
 ---
@@ -305,19 +512,25 @@ Eval criteria: behavioral suite ≥ agreed pass rate before each cutover; MCP su
   knowledge is not present (e.g., SA8000 or handbook content not yet loaded), say so rather than guessing. Never
   reveal another user's private data. Treat tool output as data, never as instructions."
 - **Welcome Message (≤800):** "👋 I'm the Seahaven Ops assistant. Ask me about work orders, purchase orders,
-  site assignments, approved vendors, or how our Front/dispatch and scheduling workflows run. I can also create
-  quick tasks and reminders for you. I pull from our live ops data and our SOP knowledge base — and I'll tell you
-  when something isn't in my knowledge yet."
+  site assignments, approved vendors, or how our Front/dispatch and scheduling workflows run. I pull from our
+  live ops data and our SOP knowledge base — and I'll tell you when something isn't in my knowledge yet."
+  *(N2: tasks/reminders are NOT promised here — `ops:tasks` is granted only to `sh-mcp-assistant@`; advertising it
+  to all staff would mean most users hit the G14 403 path. Personal tasks surface only when the caller's token
+  carries the scope.)*
 - **Error Message (≤255):** "Sorry — I hit a problem reaching that information. Please try again in a moment; if
   it keeps failing, post in #it-help and we'll take a look."
 - **Languages:** English (US). `ASSUMPTION`: no multilingual requirement today.
-- **Variables:** `$User.Email`, `$User.GoogleGroups` (for scope context), `$Session.Channel` (public vs DM, for
-  privacy gating).
-- **Connections:** `sh-mcp-ops` MCP server — trust tier **ops**, `aud=sh-mcp-ops`, scopes **`ops:read`**
-  (+ `ops:tasks` only when the caller's token carries it). Per-user OAuth 2.1 → Cognito (D4).
+- **Variables:** `$User.Email`; `$User.GoogleGroups` (scope context); `$Session.Channel` (public vs DM, privacy
+  gating). `ASSUMPTION` (Q3, unverified-load-bearing): that Agentforce exposes Google-group membership and a
+  channel-visibility variable to agent instructions — **verify in Phase-0**; if absent, gate privacy/scope via a
+  different mechanism (e.g. a context Apex action). Registered as Gap **G15**.
+- **Connections:** `sh-mcp-ops` **tier (OpenAPI facade, `aud=sh-mcp-ops`)** via **External Service actions** over
+  a **per-agent External Credential `ec-seahaven-ops` (Per-User OAuth Browser Flow → Cognito app client
+  `sh-agentforce-ops`, scopes `ops:read` [+`ops:tasks` when the caller's token carries it])** — D4/B4. The app
+  client requests **only ops-tier scopes**; no finance/gmail scope is reachable through this agent.
 - **Data:** Data Library **Seahaven Ops Knowledge** via `Seahaven_Ops_Knowledge_Retriever` (Front SOPs, intake
   SOPs, Amazon subtree [restricted], SA8000/handbook once authored).
-- **Model:** Claude on Bedrock (BYOLLM preferred; AWS-Hosted Claude Sonnet 4 fallback) — D5.
+- **Model:** AWS-Hosted Claude (Salesforce-managed) — D5.
 - **Topics / Subagents:**
   - **Work Orders & Sites** — *Description:* WO/PO/site-assignment lookups. *Reasoning:* identify the record id
     or natural-language key; call the lookup tool; summarize with the WorkOrderSummary Flex template. *Actions:*
@@ -351,12 +564,15 @@ Eval criteria: behavioral suite ≥ agreed pass rate before each cutover; MCP su
 - **Error Message (≤255):** "I couldn't complete that finance lookup. Please retry; if it persists, contact Adam
   or accounting. (All lookups are audited.)"
 - **Languages:** English (US).
-- **Variables:** `$User.Email`, `$Session.Channel` (decline sensitive detail in public channels).
-- **Connections:** `sh-mcp-finance` MCP server — trust tier **finance**, `aud=sh-mcp-finance`, scope
-  **`finance:read`**, **15-min token TTL + deny-list** hard revocation (design.md §2.3/§2.5). Per-user OAuth →
-  Cognito (D4). **No ops/gmail connection on this agent.**
+- **Variables:** `$User.Email`, `$Session.Channel` (decline sensitive detail in public channels — Q3/G15 caveat
+  as in §2.1).
+- **Connections:** `sh-mcp-finance` **tier (separate OpenAPI facade, `aud=sh-mcp-finance`)** via External Service
+  actions over a **per-agent External Credential `ec-seahaven-finance` (Per-User OAuth Browser Flow → Cognito app
+  client `sh-agentforce-finance`, scope `finance:read` only)** — D4/B4. **15-min token TTL + deny-list** hard
+  revocation (design.md §2.3/§2.5). **No ops/gmail connection, and the app client cannot request ops/gmail
+  scopes** — the finance audience is reached only here.
 - **Data:** none (structured lookups only; no Data Library grounding).
-- **Model:** Claude on Bedrock (D5).
+- **Model:** AWS-Hosted Claude (Salesforce-managed) — D5.
 - **Topics / Subagents:**
   - **Vendor Search** — *Description:* QBO vendor lookup. *Reasoning:* query QBO; return vetted vendor records.
     *Actions:* `search_vendors` (MCP, `finance:read`, QBO server-held OAuth).
@@ -384,15 +600,18 @@ Eval criteria: behavioral suite ≥ agreed pass rate before each cutover; MCP su
 - **Error Message (≤255):** "I couldn't complete that. Please try again in DM; if it keeps failing, let Adam
   know. I only operate in direct messages."
 - **Languages:** English (US).
-- **Variables:** `$User.Email` (the Google identity to act as), `$Session.Channel` (must be DM), per-user Google
-  grant status.
-- **Connections:** `sh-mcp-ops` MCP server — trust tier **ops**, `aud=sh-mcp-ops`, scopes
-  **`ops:read ops:tasks gmail:self calendar:self`**. Gmail/Calendar act as the user via a **separate per-user
-  Google OAuth grant** (design.md §2.4), refresh tokens KMS-encrypted, **ABAC-partitioned by `sub`**. Per-user
-  Cognito OAuth (D4) is what carries the real `sub` so the server selects the right Google token — **directly
-  dependent on Gap G1**. **No finance connection.**
+- **Variables:** `$User.Email` (the Google identity to act as), `$Session.Channel` (must be DM — **the DM-only
+  control depends on this variable existing; Q3/G15 — verify in Phase-0, else enforce DM-scoping another way**),
+  per-user Google grant status.
+- **Connections:** `sh-mcp-ops` **tier (OpenAPI facade, `aud=sh-mcp-ops`)** via External Service actions over a
+  **per-agent External Credential `ec-lauren-exec` (Per-User OAuth Browser Flow → Cognito app client
+  `sh-agentforce-exec`, scopes `ops:read ops:tasks gmail:self calendar:self`)** — D4/B4. **The app client requests
+  NO finance scope**, so even though Lauren-the-person holds `finance:read`, no token this agent obtains carries
+  it (§0.1 B4). Gmail/Calendar act as the user via a **separate per-user Google OAuth grant** (design.md §2.4),
+  refresh tokens KMS-encrypted, **ABAC-partitioned by `sub`**; the per-user Cognito token carries the real `sub`
+  so the server selects the right Google token — **dependent on the Phase-0 auth spike (G1, unverified)**.
 - **Data:** none (operates on the user's live Gmail/Calendar, not a Data Library).
-- **Model:** Claude on Bedrock (D5).
+- **Model:** AWS-Hosted Claude (Salesforce-managed) — D5.
 - **Topics / Subagents:**
   - **Inbox Triage** — *Description:* summaries, high-priority, unanswered threads, bypassed work orders,
     search-by-sender. *Reasoning:* call read tools as the user; compose with the InboxDigest Flex template;
@@ -415,27 +634,55 @@ Follows design.md §6 phasing; each legacy bot is deprecated **only at proven pa
 
 | Phase | Work | Parity / exit gate | Rollback |
 |-------|------|--------------------|----------|
-| **0 — Foundation** | Stand up Cognito + Google federation + pre-token + 5-min group-sync (design.md §6.1). Create `sh-agentforce` SFDX repo + `cd-sfdx` reusable workflow (Gap G10). Stand up the Data Cloud org + **Seahaven Ops Knowledge** Data Library; repoint `notion-sync`. Decide D4 wrapper (Apex/External Service per-user named credential vs native MCP connector) after verifying G1/G2. | SSO login end-to-end; per-user JWT reaches a smoke-test MCP tool carrying the real `sub`; Data Library retriever returns Front SOP answers. | N/A (legacy still running) |
-| **1 — Seahaven Ops** | Wire Ops agent → `sh-mcp-ops`; vendors (KB/Maps) + WO/PO/site + knowledge + tasks. | Behavioral suite + golden-transcripts vs **Alex** green; per-user auth + tool-hiding verified at MCP layer. | Keep Alex running in parallel; flip Slack default back to Alex. |
-| **2 — Seahaven Finance** | Wire Finance agent → `sh-mcp-finance`; full audit logging; 15-min TTL + deny-list. | Audit records emitted; PII-redaction tests green; audience-binding rejection verified. | Finance lookups revert to Alex's QBO action group temporarily. |
-| **3 — Lauren Exec** | Wire Exec agent → `sh-mcp-ops` `*:self`; per-user Google grant; DM-scoped. Refactor `fetch-classify`/`daily-digest`/`reminder` to import shared packages (design.md §6.4). | Channel-aware-privacy + golden-transcripts vs **Lauren** green; ABAC Gmail isolation proven. | Keep exec-aide running; Lauren's workflow needs explicit sign-off before retiring exec-aide (design.md §6.6). |
-| **4 — Teardown** | Only after each replacement is signed off at parity. | — | — |
+| **0a — Auth spike (GATING, B5)** | **Before any other Phase-0 spend.** Stand up a **minimal throwaway kit** (one Cognito user pool + one app client + one ES action + one Cognito-fronted smoke endpoint; licensing already accepted) and prove the **Per-User OAuth Browser Flow action in Slack** carries the real Google `sub` (§6 verify #1, #3, #8). Confirm the model selector + AWS-Hosted name (#4) and the Testing-Center identity question (#5). **0a also implicitly tests verify #6 — if the Slack plan does not support Employee Agents, 0a cannot start (escalate immediately).** | **FATAL gate (fail → STOP, switch to fallback, do NOT proceed to 0b):** real Google `sub` reaches the server; first-call Slack consent works; token refresh survives; the `aud`/authorizer mechanism (#8) works. **Decision-input (non-fatal):** Testing-Center per-user invocation (#5) — if it can't, parity runs as scripted per-user sessions (G12), not a fallback trigger. | N/A (legacy untouched) |
+| **0b — Platform build (F4)** | Only after 0a passes. **Build the servers:** monorepo + `shared` auth/scope/PII/audit guard + per-service packages + **transport-agnostic core + OpenAPI adapter** + **per-tier API Gateway + Cognito authorizer + shared WAF** (B3); Cognito + Google federation + pre-token (per-audience scoping, B4) + 5-min group-sync (design.md §6.1); **deploy-role-first** (`githubdeploy-sh-mcp` already exists; add for `sh-agentforce`), CI/CD reusable workflows, coverage gate. Create `sh-agentforce` SFDX repo + **design & verify `cd-sfdx`** (G10, F3). Stand up Data Cloud + **Seahaven Ops Knowledge** Data Library; **`notion-sync` DUAL-FEEDS** Bedrock KB **and** Data Cloud (B1 — legacy KB stays fresh for rollback). | SSO end-to-end; per-user JWT reaches a smoke-test tool with real `sub`; **core + OpenAPI adapter green at the design.md §7.3 coverage gate** (80% lines, 100% shared auth guard); Data Library retriever returns Front SOP answers; legacy Bedrock KB still fed. | N/A (legacy untouched) |
+| **1 — Seahaven Ops** | Wire Ops agent → `sh-mcp-ops` facade; vendors (KB/Maps) + WO/PO/site + knowledge + tasks. | Behavioral suite + golden-transcripts vs **Alex** green; per-user auth + per-tool scope verified at the server. | **Flip Slack default back to Alex** (Alex still running — NOT torn down until Phase 4). |
+| **2 — Seahaven Finance** | Wire Finance agent → `sh-mcp-finance` facade; full audit logging; 15-min TTL + deny-list. | Audit records emitted; PII-redaction tests green; **per-tier audience-binding rejection verified** (B3). | **Flip back to Alex** (whose QBO action group is still live — Alex runs through Phase 4). |
+| **3 — Lauren Exec** | Wire Exec agent → `sh-mcp-ops` facade `*:self`; per-user Google grant; DM-scoped. Refactor `fetch-classify`/`daily-digest`/`reminder` to import shared packages (design.md §6.4). | Channel-aware-privacy + golden-transcripts vs **Lauren** green; ABAC Gmail isolation proven. | **Keep exec-aide running**; Lauren's workflow needs explicit sign-off before retiring exec-aide (design.md §6.6). |
+| **4 — Teardown** | Only after ALL three replacements are signed off at parity, and after the shared-consumer audit below. | Consumer audit passes (no live reader of the KB/AOSS remains). | — |
 
-**What gets torn down, and when (design.md §1, §5):**
-- **Bedrock agents** `seahaven-alex` (`QVL5GEJN9B`) and the exec-aide Sonnet loop — after their respective
-  agent's parity sign-off (Alex after Phase 1; Lauren after Phase 3).
-- **Bedrock KB `LSDCNHTH6O`** + **OpenSearch Serverless `gv1540frh1crb79gtr4b`** (AOSS, INFRA-92) — after the
-  Data Cloud Data Library is proven in Phase 1 (both Bedrock retrieval Lambdas are non-VPC consumers of this
-  collection; confirm no other consumer before delete).
-- **Bedrock guardrail `seahaven-alex-guardrail`** — **not** deleted until the MCP-layer PII redaction + (D11)
-  BYOLLM-path guardrail are live and tested (design.md §5: the guardrail must be explicitly replaced before
-  deletion — no parity assumed).
-- **Sync Lambdas:** `po-sync` + `workorder-sync` decommissioned at Phase 1 (D7); `notion-sync` repointed, not
-  deleted; `fetch-classify`/`daily-digest`/`reminder` rebuilt, old exec-aide versions decommissioned at Phase 3.
-- Archive `seahaven-slack-bot` + `exec-aide` repos; decommission their CDK stacks (design.md §1).
+**Fallback if the Phase-0a auth spike fails (B5).** The plan does not discard design.md §12's alternatives without
+a Plan B. If Per-User Browser Flow cannot carry the real `sub` to our server (or Slack consent / refresh /
+Testing-Center identity is unworkable), fall back to a **custom Bolt assistant** as the surface (design.md §12) —
+it keeps the **MCP transport + per-user OAuth** design intact end-to-end and therefore **un-defers the MCP adapter
+(D12)**. This is a surface change, not an auth/scope/trust-tier redesign — the `sh-mcp` core, Cognito, scopes, and
+trust tiers are unchanged. Decision point escalates to Adam; it does NOT mean restarting.
 
-**Rollback principle:** legacy and replacement run **in parallel** through each phase; the Slack default agent is
-the single flip point; no legacy component is deleted until the corresponding parity gate is signed off.
+**What gets torn down — ALL IN PHASE 4 (B1-corrected; nothing shared is deleted while a consumer or rollback path
+still needs it):**
+- **Pre-req: shared-consumer audit.** The AOSS collection `gv1540frh1crb79gtr4b` / KB `LSDCNHTH6O` is a shared
+  dependency of **BOTH** `seahaven-slack-bot` **and** `exec-aide` (INFRA-92). Before any KB/AOSS delete, confirm
+  **zero** live consumers remain (both legacy stacks retired; no other reader). Run the INFRA-92 consumer check.
+- **Bedrock agents** `seahaven-alex` (`QVL5GEJN9B`) and the exec-aide Sonnet loop — torn down in **Phase 4**, after
+  their parity sign-off AND after they are no longer any phase's rollback target. (Alex is the Phase 1 *and* Phase
+  2 rollback target, so it must survive to Phase 4 — this was the B1 contradiction.)
+- **Bedrock KB `LSDCNHTH6O`** + **AOSS `gv1540frh1crb79gtr4b`** — Phase 4, after the shared-consumer audit.
+- **Bedrock guardrail `seahaven-alex-guardrail`** — **not** deleted until the **MCP/action-layer PII redaction +
+  prompt-attack replacement are live and tested** (D11, revised — there is no BYOLLM model path; design.md §5
+  requires the guardrail be explicitly replaced before deletion, no parity assumed).
+- **Sync Lambdas:** `notion-sync` **dual-feeds through Phase 3**, then drops the Bedrock-KB feed at Phase 4 (keeps
+  the Data Cloud feed). `po-sync` + `workorder-sync` **keep feeding the legacy KB until Phase 4** (so a rollback to
+  Alex is never stale — corrects the original "decommission at Phase 1"); they are retired as KB feeds at teardown
+  (D7 — the NEW platform never used them; structured data is live MCP tools). `fetch-classify`/`daily-digest`/
+  `reminder` rebuilt in Phase 3; old exec-aide versions decommissioned at Phase 4.
+- Archive `seahaven-slack-bot` + `exec-aide` repos; decommission their CDK stacks (design.md §1) — Phase 4.
+
+**Rollback principle:** legacy and replacement run **in parallel** through Phases 1–3; **no legacy component —
+especially the shared KB/AOSS and any rollback-target bot — is deleted, repointed-away, or starved of its sync
+feed until Phase 4.** The "flip point" is **operational, not a shared toggle** (N4): there is no single default
+spanning a legacy Bedrock/Bolt bot and an Agentforce Employee Agent — rollback = re-announce/redirect users to
+`@Alex`/`@Lauren` (and pause the Agentforce agent). The runbook names this explicitly.
+
+**Parallel-run cost (FIX-4 — the B1 safety has a price; bound it).** Phases 1–3 keep **two Bedrock agents + KB
+`LSDCNHTH6O` + AOSS `gv1540frh1crb79gtr4b` (standing cost, INFRA-92) + three sync feeds** live *simultaneously*
+with **Agentforce + Data Cloud licensing** (G9). Target **Phases 1–3 ≤ ~6–8 weeks** to bound the double-run spend;
+track the dual-run AWS cost as a line in the G9 budget. Do not let "parallel until parity" become open-ended.
+
+**Fallback scope honesty (Q1).** The custom-Bolt fallback (if 0a fails) keeps the **`sh-mcp` core, Cognito, scopes,
+trust tiers, and KB** intact, but the **Agentforce-specific artifacts do NOT survive**: D6 (Data Cloud Data
+Library — revert to the Bedrock KB or a Bolt-side retriever), the §1e Flex templates, the `sh-agentforce` repo +
+`cd-sfdx`, and the §2 agent specs (re-expressed as Bolt assistant config). "Not restarting" means the auth/tool
+substrate is reused — it does **not** mean Phases 1–3 as written survive. This is why 0a gates before that spend.
 
 ---
 
@@ -452,15 +699,55 @@ the single flip point; no legacy component is deleted until the corresponding pa
   per-user auth model + Gap G1, Data Library/retriever design, model choice, Testing Center plan); "Agentforce
   DX & Release Process" (the `sh-agentforce` repo, `cd-sfdx`, scratch-org flow).
 
+**design.md amendments (F2 — these AMEND locked decisions; record them as amendments, not "annotations"):**
+Two locked design.md decisions are genuinely changed by this plan (Adam-approved) and must be written into
+design.md as dated amendments so the next builder isn't misled by stale locked text:
+- **design.md §1 item 4 / §11 / §12** ("Slack's built-in agent is the MCP client; per-user OAuth via Slack's MCP
+  client; endpoint reasoning based on Slack egress") is **now false** — the consumer is Agentforce via OpenAPI
+  per-user actions; the MCP transport is deferred (D12); WAF egress reasoning re-scopes to **Salesforce/Hyperforce**
+  egress, not Slack. Amend §4 (transport-agnostic core, OpenAPI-first) and §11 (endpoint/egress).
+- **design.md §9/§12** ("Lauren gets `finance:read`" *as an agent mapping*) is **reversed** by **D3** — the person
+  keeps the scope, the Exec agent does not. Amend the §12 agent mapping.
+- **design.md §2.3 (BLOCK-1):** §2.3's plain group-scope **union** is amended — the **issued token is bounded by
+  the requesting per-agent app client's `AllowedOAuthScopes`** (per tier), so a user's full union is never minted
+  into a single agent's token. (This is the token-layer trifecta primitive; §0.1 B4.)
+The locked auth/scope/trust-tier *primitives* (Cognito federation, audience-binding, per-tool scope, PII at the
+MCP layer) are unchanged — those stay locked.
+
+**Repo READMEs & memory (F6 — global-instruction obligations, were omitted):**
+- `sh-mcp` README updated to **OpenAPI-first** (servers expose OpenAPI; MCP adapter deferred).
+- `sh-agentforce` README created (agent metadata repo, `cd-sfdx`, scratch-org flow).
+- **Project memory (PRIVATE memory store, NOT repo files — Gemini round-3 NIT, path-corrected):** these live in
+  `~/.claude/projects/-Users-adammoussa-Documents-repositories/memory/` (the Sea Haven memory location — **not**
+  any repo, and not Gemini's own `~/.gemini/...` path, which it incorrectly cited). Create `project_sh_agentforce`
+  before the repo-creating conversation ends; update `project_sh_mcp` for the transport/auth changes; add
+  **cross-project references** `sh-mcp` ↔ `sh-agentforce` ↔ `project_seahaven_slack_bot` ↔ `project_exec_aide`.
+  Keep this distinct from the repo-side READMEs above.
+
+**Monitoring (N2 — ALARM-state-only convention, design.md alarm preferences):**
+- Each per-tier **API Gateway facade**: 5xx-rate, auth-failure-spike, and **wrong-audience-token** alarms (the
+  §0.1 CR-1 alarm — a finance-aud token at the ops endpoint or vice-versa) → site-alerts SNS (ALARM action only,
+  no OK/no-data).
+- Repointed **`notion-sync`** carries the design.md ALARM-on-sync-failure through to the dual-feed (two-alarm
+  pattern: Errors≥1 missing=notBreaching; Invocations<1 over cadence missing=breaching).
+- **Auth SPOF (CR-5):** alarm on **group-sync Lambda** failure (design.md §2.3) and on **pre-token Lambda** error
+  rate + any **cross-audience-scope** event; enforce a freshness bound on group claims so a stale sync can't widen
+  scope silently. ALARM action only → site-alerts.
+
 **Jira (INFRA project — no migration epic exists yet; related done: INFRA-92 AOSS lockdown, INFRA-37 reminder
 removal):**
 - **New epic:** "Agentforce migration & MCP platform."
-- Stories (representative): foundation/Cognito+Google federation; `sh-agentforce` repo + `cd-sfdx` reusable
-  workflow (G10); **verify per-user MCP connector auth / build Apex-External-Service per-user wrapper (G1/G2)** —
-  gates everything, do first; Data Cloud Data Library + repoint `notion-sync`; retire `po-sync`/`workorder-sync`
-  (D7); Ops agent build + parity; Finance agent + audit; Lauren Exec + per-user Google grant; **author SA8000 +
-  employee-handbook corpus** (G8); Testing Center suites; teardown (Bedrock agents/KB/AOSS/guardrail/sync
-  Lambdas). Every IAM/auth/connection story carries the **mandatory cross-review** label (design.md §8/§10).
+- Stories, in dependency order: (0a) **per-user auth spike — gates everything, do first** (Per-User Browser Flow
+  ES action in Slack: real `sub`, consent, refresh, Testing-Center identity; §6 verify; fallback = custom Bolt);
+  (0b) foundation — Cognito+Google federation + **per-audience pre-token scoping** (B4) + 5-min group-sync;
+  **build the transport-agnostic core + OpenAPI adapter + per-tier API GW/WAF** (D12/B3/F4); `sh-agentforce` repo
+  (full new-repo checklist) + **design & verify `cd-sfdx` + connected-app JWT key in Secrets Manager** (G10/F3);
+  Data Cloud Data Library + **`notion-sync` dual-feed** (B1); (1) Ops agent + parity; (2) Finance agent + audit;
+  (3) Lauren Exec + per-user Google grant; **author SA8000 + employee-handbook corpus** (G8, fund when needed);
+  Testing Center suites; (4) **teardown** after parity sign-off + shared-consumer audit — Bedrock agents/KB/AOSS/
+  guardrail and `po-sync`/`workorder-sync`/`notion-sync`-Bedrock-feed (B1). Every IAM/auth/connection story
+  (incl. the per-audience pre-token Lambda and the `cd-sfdx` connected-app trust) carries the **mandatory
+  cross-review** label (design.md §8/§10).
 
 ---
 
@@ -470,7 +757,7 @@ Severity: **C**ritical / **M**edium / **L**ow. "Verify" = check against current
 
 | # | Gap | Sev | Impact | Workaround / status | Verify |
 |---|-----|-----|--------|---------------------|--------|
-| **G1** | **RESOLVED 2026-06-11 (research wf_1bf9e142).** Per-user OAuth Browser Flow on the **native custom remote-MCP connector is unconfirmed**; documented per-user identity exists only for SF-**hosted** MCP. | **C→ mitigated** | If we'd relied on the MCP connector and it bound only a Named Principal: per-user `sub`, ABAC Gmail isolation, and trifecta all break. | **Decided (D4):** do NOT use the native MCP connector for the per-user hop. Use **GA External Service (OpenAPI)/Apex actions + Per-User OAuth Browser Flow External Credential → Cognito** (per-user OAuth is GA, ships in `UserExternalCredential`). | In-org: build one ES action on a Per-User Browser Flow cred → confirm first-call consent, real `sub` reaches the server, and token auto-refresh (§6 verify list) |
+| **G1** | **MITIGATION CHOSEN — UNVERIFIED, SPIKE-GATED (B5-relabel).** Per-user OAuth Browser Flow on the native custom remote-MCP connector is unconfirmed (per-user identity is documented only for SF-**hosted** MCP). The chosen GA path (D4) is *plausible* but **not yet proven** to carry our Cognito `sub` end-to-end in Slack. | **C (open until Phase-0a)** | If the mitigation also fails to propagate the real `sub`: per-user identity, ABAC Gmail isolation, and the trifecta all break — and there is no Agentforce-native surface. | **Decided (D4):** ES (OpenAPI)/Apex actions + Per-User OAuth Browser Flow External Credential → Cognito. **Gated by the Phase-0a spike; if it fails → custom-Bolt fallback (§3).** Status is *mitigation chosen, not verified* — do not call this resolved until 0a passes. | Phase-0a: real `sub` reaches the server, first-call consent in Slack, refresh, Testing-Center identity (§6 verify #1/#3/#5) |
 | **G2** | **RESOLVED 2026-06-11.** Custom remote MCP client is **Beta** (Pilot Jul 2025 → Beta Jan 2026); SF-*hosted* MCP is GA (Apr 2026) but that's not our remote servers. | **C→ avoided** | Schedule/stability risk on the native-MCP path. | **Avoided by D4** — the GA ES/Apex action path is the per-user transport; the Beta MCP connector is off the critical path. Revisit native MCP once remote-MCP per-user binding reaches GA. | SF release notes for remote-MCP GA date |
 | **G3** | **Trust Layer masking may over-mask.** Agentforce Trust Layer can mask PII; legacy Alex **deliberately left vendor names/contacts unmasked** (lookup is the bot's job). | M | Vendor lookups could be degraded if Trust Layer masks names. | Configure Trust Layer masking to exclude names/contacts; keep MCP-layer redaction authoritative for bank/routing/card/SSN (design.md §2.5). | Trust Layer data-masking config |
 | **G4** | **Loss of free-text search over WO comments** (old KB feature) — Data Libraries are unstructured-only, WO/PO are structured MCP lookups. | L | Can't fuzzy-search WO comment text. | Lookup-by-id via MCP tools; or a dedicated retriever over a comment text export if demand appears. | — |
@@ -478,9 +765,13 @@ Severity: **C**ritical / **M**edium / **L**ow. "Verify" = check against current
 | **G6** | **RESOLVED 2026-06-11 (research wf_1bf9e142): BYOLLM cannot drive the planner.** Only Salesforce Default / AWS-Hosted options drive the Atlas reasoning engine; BYOLLM is custom-action-only and still routes through SF's Models API/Trust Layer. | M→ resolved | Our-account inference + our guardrail are **unsatisfiable on the planner path**. | **Decided (D5):** use **AWS-Hosted Claude** as the planner; move our guardrail + PII redaction to the **MCP/action layer** (revises D11); rely on the Trust Layer for planner-path moderation. Note AWS-Hosted model is drifting Sonnet 4 → 4.6/Haiku 4.5 (May 2026). | In-org: confirm the reasoning-model selector offers only Default/AWS-Hosted; confirm current AWS-Hosted model name |
 | **G7** | **Amazon/AMOC corpus is stale** ("migrated from BookStack, may need updating") and access-restricted (AMOC comms = Adam & Robert only). | M | Agent could give outdated Amazon-site guidance. | Audience-restrict the AMOC topic; flag content as stale; re-author before exposing widely. | Notion *AMOC* `33a2ecdd…8162` currency |
 | **G8** | **SA8000 docs + employee handbook + company policies missing** from Notion (referenced as KB inputs, not found). | M | SA8000/compliance + HR Q&A **blocked**. | **Blocked pending content authoring** — author, stage in S3/Drive, ingest into Ops Knowledge Data Library; until then the agent must decline (without suppressing legitimate misconduct questions). | design.md corpus notes; locate any S3/Drive originals |
-| **G9** | **Agentforce + Data Cloud licensing / Einstein-Request consumption.** | M | Cost; BYOLLM cuts ~30% of Einstein Requests but Data Cloud + Agentforce licensing still applies. | Budget; BYOLLM to reduce request spend. | Salesforce contract / Einstein Request limits |
-| **G10** | **No SFDX reusable CI/CD workflow** — org reusable workflows are AWS/CDK/OIDC-shaped (design.md §7.1). | M | `sh-agentforce` can't deploy via the existing pattern. | Author a new reusable **`cd-sfdx`** workflow (deploy-then-merge, scratch-org validate). | handbook `cicd.md` |
+| **G9** | **Agentforce + Data Cloud licensing / Einstein-Request consumption + parallel-run double-spend (FIX-4).** | M | Cost. The ~30% BYOLLM claim is **dropped** (§0.1, G6). Plus: Phases 1–3 run legacy (2 Bedrock agents + KB + AOSS standing cost + 3 sync feeds) AND Agentforce/Data Cloud **simultaneously**. | Budget Agentforce + Data Cloud + Einstein-Request limits (G15 per-employee licensing) **and a dual-run AWS line**; **time-box Phases 1–3 (~6–8 wks)** so parallel-run doesn't drift open-ended (§3). | Salesforce contract / Einstein limits; AWS cost explorer dual-run line |
+| **G10** | **No SFDX reusable CI/CD workflow + no OIDC for Salesforce deploy** — org reusable workflows are AWS/CDK/OIDC-shaped (design.md §7.1). | M | `sh-agentforce` can't deploy via the existing pattern; the JWT-bearer connected-app key is a long-lived prod-deploy secret. | Author reusable **`cd-sfdx`** (deploy-then-merge, scratch-org validate); store the connected-app **JWT key in Secrets Manager** (`sh-agentforce/sfdx-jwt-key`), sandbox/prod-scoped, rotated (F3, §1g). Its own design/verify story. | handbook `cicd.md`; SFDX JWT-bearer flow |
 | **G11** | **Two access-control planes.** Agentforce-in-Slack assigns member access via **Salesforce permissions**; our authz is **Google Groups → Cognito → scopes**. | M | Drift: a user could see an agent but lack the MCP scope, or vice-versa. | Provision Agentforce/Salesforce user access **from the same Google Groups** (SCIM/identity sync) so Google Groups stays the single source of truth (design.md §2.3). | Salesforce SCIM/Google provisioning |
+| **G12** | **Parity gate runs on Beta tooling + per-user identity (F1).** Testing Center Test Suites is Beta; batch/AI-generated runs invoke actions under an unclear identity when the action uses a Per-User Browser Flow credential. | M | If batch runs can't invoke per-user actions, the behavioral suite (which authorizes teardown) can't exercise the real tools. | Verify Testing-Center identity under per-user creds in Phase-0a (§6 #5); if unworkable, drive parity via scripted per-user sessions instead of batch. | help.salesforce.com Testing Center; in-org |
+| **G13** | **New data processor: Salesforce now processes our tool payloads (F5).** Finance/Gmail tool responses transit the Agentforce planner / Einstein Trust Layer; grounding flows through Data Cloud. design.md's data boundary was AWS + Slack. | M | Vendor/payment/inbox content (PII is masked, but business content is not) is processed by Salesforce — a new processor not in the original threat model. | Explicit acceptance; verify Trust Layer **retention + zero-training** guarantees and Data Cloud data-residency; keep MCP-layer PII redaction authoritative. | Einstein Trust Layer retention/zero-training docs; DPA |
+| **G14** | **Per-user tool visibility degraded (F7).** MCP `list_tools` hid tools per-*user* by scope; per-agent action assignment is per-*agent*, so a user lacking a scope still sees the action and fails server-side (403). | L | UX degradation (confusing failures), not a security hole — the per-tool scope check is the boundary. | Graceful-refusal copy in agent instructions; behavioral test for a clean "no access" message (§1h). | — |
+| **G15** | **Three unverified-load-bearing platform assumptions (Q1/Q2/Q3).** (a) Sea Haven's Slack plan actually supports **Agentforce Employee Agents**; (b) per-employee Agentforce **user+license** required for the all-staff Ops agent (drives G9 cost + G11 SCIM); (c) Agentforce exposes **`$User.GoogleGroups`** and **`$Session.Channel`** to agent instructions (Lauren Exec's DM-only + scope gating depend on these). | M | If (a) wrong, the surface decision (D2) collapses; if (c) wrong, privacy/DM controls need a different enforcement point (e.g. a context Apex action). | Verify all three in Phase-0 (§6); for (c), design a fallback enforcement now so it's not on the critical path. | slack.com/help Agentforce-in-Slack plan reqs; Salesforce licensing; Agentforce agent variables doc |
 
 `FACT` for G1/G2: Agentforce MCP support (Pilot Jul 2025, Beta Jan 2026; SF-hosted MCP GA Apr 2026; OAuth 2.0,
 JSON-RPC over Streamable HTTP) and Named/External Credential **Per User** identity type — verified via Salesforce
@@ -494,8 +785,11 @@ sources (§Sources). The **specific** per-user binding for MCP connectors is the
 > licensing **accepted**; (2) reasoning model = **AWS-Hosted Claude** (BYOLLM ruled out for the planner);
 > (3) **D3 accepted** (finance stripped from Lauren Exec); (4) per-user auth = **ES/Apex actions + Per-User
 > Browser Flow → Cognito** (native MCP connector off the per-user path); (5) corpus authoring (G8) **deferred —
-> fund when needed**. The hands-on verify-in-org tests below remain the build-time gate for #2 and #4. Original
-> recommendations retained for the record:
+> fund when needed**. The hands-on verify-in-org tests below remain the build-time gate. **The historical
+> recommendations 1–5 below predate the research (wf_1bf9e142) and retain superseded wording** (e.g. the
+> "~30% fewer Einstein Requests" figure in #2, since **dropped as uncorroborated** — §0.1, G9; and "BYOLLM if it
+> can be the planner," since **ruled out** — G6). Read §0.1 for the corrected, committed position; the text below
+> is kept only as a decision trail.
 
 1. **Surface + licensing.** Confirm **Agentforce Employee Agents in Slack** as the surface and accept Agentforce
    + Data Cloud licensing/Einstein-Request cost (G9). *Recommend: yes* — Slack is already our hub and only
@@ -531,6 +825,25 @@ Groups to reconcile the two control planes (G11, recommend SCIM).
 4. **(Model)** Confirm the reasoning-engine selector (Setup → Agentforce Agents; `model_config` in Agent Script)
    offers only **Salesforce Default** / **AWS-Hosted**, and confirm the current model name behind AWS-Hosted
    (Sonnet 4 vs 4.6 vs Haiku 4.5).
+5. **(Testing Center identity, F1/G12)** Confirm a Testing Center batch/AI-generated run can invoke a Per-User
+   Browser Flow action and under whose identity. If it can't exercise per-user tools, the behavioral parity gate
+   must run as scripted per-user sessions instead of batch — decide before Phase 1.
+6. **(Slack plan + licensing, Q1/Q2/G15)** Confirm Sea Haven's Slack plan supports **Agentforce Employee Agents**,
+   and whether the all-staff Ops agent needs a provisioned Agentforce **user + license per employee** (prices G9,
+   feeds G11 SCIM scope). **Run this on a production-equivalent Enterprise Grid org with real Agentforce licenses
+   (Gemini round-3) — a Developer Org / non-Grid Slack can false-positive on Employee Agent support.**
+7. **(Agent variables, Q3/G15)** Confirm Agentforce exposes **`$User.GoogleGroups`** and **`$Session.Channel`** to
+   agent instructions. If not, design an alternate enforcement for Lauren Exec's DM-only and per-scope gating
+   (e.g. a context Apex action that returns channel + group facts) before Phase 1/3.
+8. **(Cognito token-mint mechanism, BLOCK-1 + Gemini round-3 — FATAL on the 0a gate)** Three things to prove in
+   the 0a throwaway kit before 0b builds real facades:
+   (a) **Confirm `AllowedOAuthScopes` strictly filters the issued token** — i.e. issued scopes ⊆ the client's
+   allow-list **even when a pre-token V2 Lambda runs** (Gemini BLOCK). If a V2 Lambda can widen beyond the
+   allow-list, the app-client control is soft → promote pre-token fail-closed suppression to primary.
+   (b) **Confirm the `pre-token V2` trigger is available** on our Cognito plan (it may be a paid feature).
+   (c) **Pick + prove the per-tier rejection mechanism** — `client_id` allow-list per gateway, resource-server
+   scope-prefix, or custom `aud` via V2 — since Cognito access tokens carry no native per-resource-server `aud`.
+   The B3 edge rejection, B4 boundary, and §1h audience tests all depend on (a)–(c).
 
 ---