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Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2) * Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers. - Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate), eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu). - @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry, redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2. - 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base, gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact(). Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4). * Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1 work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5). * ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet) The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
{
"name": "@sh-mcp/shared",
"version": "0.1.0",
"type": "module",
"description": "Transport-agnostic core — types, registry, auth interface, redaction, OpenAPI generation",
"exports": {
".": {
"import": "./dist/index.js",
"types": "./dist/index.d.ts"
}
},
"main": "./dist/index.js",
"types": "./dist/index.d.ts",
"engines": {
"node": ">=24.0.0"
},
"scripts": {
"build": "tsc --project tsconfig.json",
"typecheck": "tsc --noEmit --project tsconfig.json",
"test": "vitest run",
"test:watch": "vitest",
"test:coverage": "vitest run --coverage"
},
"devDependencies": {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3) * Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3): - dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path. - audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions. - mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and tools/call routed through executeTool. - http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz. - openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full OpenAPI 3.1 document. - local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6). * Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/ tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask. Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools) so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load (build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages. * Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3): - ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress). - config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs (aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5). - index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder is exported but not depended on. - synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app (build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector. * Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3): tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls), audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data), rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1 validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass. Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented). Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the updated package-lock.json. * Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code: - npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b; Dependabot will bump). - gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch. The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR) was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body. * Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR: - dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path. - http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp, /tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable), returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub + per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge. Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not 401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean. * Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos) extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space, so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char (/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests. * Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums) Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review: - Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset, so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin). Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME / AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag. - Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}}) escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net. +4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green. Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash, unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"@types/express": "5.0.6",
"@types/supertest": "7.2.0",
chore(deps): patch vitest/vite advisories and add dependabot (#6) Upgrade vitest to 3.2.7 across the monorepo, override vite to 6.4.3 for the high-severity fs.deny advisory, and add weekly grouped Dependabot for npm workspaces and GitHub Actions.
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"@vitest/coverage-v8": "^3.2.6",
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3) * Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3): - dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path. - audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions. - mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and tools/call routed through executeTool. - http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz. - openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full OpenAPI 3.1 document. - local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6). * Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/ tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask. Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools) so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load (build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages. * Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3): - ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress). - config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs (aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5). - index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder is exported but not depended on. - synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app (build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector. * Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3): tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls), audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data), rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1 validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass. Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented). Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the updated package-lock.json. * Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code: - npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b; Dependabot will bump). - gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch. The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR) was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body. * Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR: - dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path. - http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp, /tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable), returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub + per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge. Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not 401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean. * Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos) extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space, so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char (/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests. * Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums) Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review: - Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset, so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin). Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME / AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag. - Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}}) escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net. +4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green. Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash, unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"supertest": "7.2.2",
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2) * Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers. - Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate), eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu). - @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry, redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2. - 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base, gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact(). Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4). * Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1 work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5). * ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet) The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"typescript": "^5.5.0",
chore(deps): patch vitest/vite advisories and add dependabot (#6) Upgrade vitest to 3.2.7 across the monorepo, override vite to 6.4.3 for the high-severity fs.deny advisory, and add weekly grouped Dependabot for npm workspaces and GitHub Actions.
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"vitest": "^3.2.6"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2) * Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers. - Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate), eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu). - @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry, redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2. - 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base, gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact(). Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4). * Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1 work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5). * ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet) The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
},
"dependencies": {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3) * Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3): - dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path. - audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions. - mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and tools/call routed through executeTool. - http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz. - openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full OpenAPI 3.1 document. - local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6). * Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/ tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask. Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools) so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load (build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages. * Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3): - ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress). - config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs (aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5). - index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder is exported but not depended on. - synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app (build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector. * Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3): tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls), audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data), rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1 validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass. Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented). Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the updated package-lock.json. * Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code: - npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b; Dependabot will bump). - gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch. The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR) was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body. * Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR: - dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path. - http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp, /tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable), returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub + per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge. Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not 401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean. * Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos) extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space, so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char (/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests. * Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums) Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review: - Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset, so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin). Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME / AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag. - Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}}) escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net. +4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green. Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash, unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "1.29.0",
"ajv": "8.20.0",
"ajv-formats": "3.0.1",
"express": "5.2.1",
"express-rate-limit": "^8.2.1",
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2) * Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers. - Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate), eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu). - @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry, redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2. - 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base, gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact(). Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4). * Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1 work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5). * ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet) The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"jose": "^6.2.3"
}
}
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