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Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3) * Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3): - dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path. - audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions. - mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and tools/call routed through executeTool. - http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz. - openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full OpenAPI 3.1 document. - local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6). * Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/ tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask. Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools) so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load (build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages. * Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3): - ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress). - config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs (aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5). - index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder is exported but not depended on. - synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app (build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector. * Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3): tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls), audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data), rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1 validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass. Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented). Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the updated package-lock.json. * Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code: - npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b; Dependabot will bump). - gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch. The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR) was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body. * Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR: - dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path. - http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp, /tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable), returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub + per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge. Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not 401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean. * Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos) extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space, so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char (/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests. * Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums) Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review: - Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset, so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin). Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME / AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag. - Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}}) escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net. +4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green. Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash, unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
{
"name": "@sh-mcp/server-finance",
"version": "0.1.0",
"description": "Sea Haven MCP finance-tier server — MCP (Streamable HTTP) + OpenAPI 3.1 over the finance tool registry, fully audited",
"license": "UNLICENSED",
"private": true,
"type": "module",
"main": "dist/index.js",
"types": "dist/index.d.ts",
"scripts": {
"dev": "tsx watch src/index.ts",
"start": "node dist/index.js",
"build": "tsc --project tsconfig.json",
"typecheck": "tsc --noEmit",
"test": "vitest run",
"test:watch": "vitest",
"synth": "cdk synth >/dev/null"
},
"engines": {
chore(deps): update npm minor and patch (#73) Co-authored-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-31 15:50:18 +00:00
"node": ">=24.20.0"
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3) * Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3): - dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path. - audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions. - mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and tools/call routed through executeTool. - http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz. - openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full OpenAPI 3.1 document. - local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6). * Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/ tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask. Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools) so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load (build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages. * Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3): - ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress). - config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs (aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5). - index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder is exported but not depended on. - synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app (build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector. * Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3): tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls), audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data), rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1 validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass. Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented). Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the updated package-lock.json. * Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code: - npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b; Dependabot will bump). - gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch. The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR) was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body. * Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR: - dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path. - http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp, /tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable), returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub + per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge. Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not 401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean. * Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos) extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space, so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char (/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests. * Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums) Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review: - Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset, so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin). Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME / AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag. - Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}}) escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net. +4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green. Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash, unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
},
"dependencies": {
"@sh-mcp/payments": "*",
"@sh-mcp/qbo": "*",
"@sh-mcp/shared": "*",
"express": "5.2.1"
},
"devDependencies": {
fix(deps): update npm minor and patch (#75) Co-authored-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-09 18:48:04 +00:00
"@types/node": "^26.4.1",
"aws-cdk-lib": "2.268.0",
chore(deps): bump the minor-and-patch group (#51) Bumps the minor-and-patch group with 13 updates in the / directory: | Package | From | To | | --- | --- | --- | | [@types/node](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/tree/HEAD/types/node) | `26.1.2` | `26.2.0` | | [@typescript-eslint/eslint-plugin](https://github.com/typescript-eslint/typescript-eslint/tree/HEAD/packages/eslint-plugin) | `8.65.0` | `8.66.0` | | [@typescript-eslint/parser](https://github.com/typescript-eslint/typescript-eslint/tree/HEAD/packages/parser) | `8.65.0` | `8.66.0` | | [aws-cdk](https://github.com/aws/aws-cdk-cli/tree/HEAD/packages/aws-cdk) | `2.1134.0` | `2.1135.1` | | [constructs](https://github.com/aws/constructs) | `10.7.2` | `10.8.1` | | [eslint](https://github.com/eslint/eslint) | `10.8.0` | `10.8.1` | | [tsx](https://github.com/privatenumber/tsx) | `4.23.1` | `4.23.11` | | [express-rate-limit](https://github.com/express-rate-limit/express-rate-limit) | `8.6.1` | `8.6.2` | | [jose](https://github.com/panva/jose) | `6.2.6` | `6.2.8` | | [@aws-sdk/client-cognito-identity-provider](https://github.com/aws/aws-sdk-js-v3/tree/HEAD/clients/client-cognito-identity-provider) | `3.1101.0` | `3.1106.0` | | [@aws-sdk/client-dynamodb](https://github.com/aws/aws-sdk-js-v3/tree/HEAD/clients/client-dynamodb) | `3.1101.0` | `3.1106.0` | | [@aws-sdk/client-secrets-manager](https://github.com/aws/aws-sdk-js-v3/tree/HEAD/clients/client-secrets-manager) | `3.1101.0` | `3.1106.0` | | [@aws-sdk/lib-dynamodb](https://github.com/aws/aws-sdk-js-v3/tree/HEAD/lib/lib-dynamodb) | `3.1101.0` | `3.1106.0` | Updates `@types/node` from 26.1.2 to 26.2.0 - [Release notes](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/releases) - [Commits](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/commits/HEAD/types/node) Updates `@typescript-eslint/eslint-plugin` from 8.65.0 to 8.66.0 - [Release notes](https://github.com/typescript-eslint/typescript-eslint/releases) - [Changelog](https://github.com/typescript-eslint/typescript-eslint/blob/main/packages/eslint-plugin/CHANGELOG.md) - [Commits](https://github.com/typescript-eslint/typescript-eslint/commits/v8.66.0/packages/eslint-plugin) Updates `@typescript-eslint/parser` from 8.65.0 to 8.66.0 - [Release notes](https://github.com/typescript-eslint/typescript-eslint/releases) - [Changelog](https://github.com/typescript-eslint/typescript-eslint/blob/main/packages/parser/CHANGELOG.md) - [Commits](https://github.com/typescript-eslint/typescript-eslint/commits/v8.66.0/packages/parser) Updates `aws-cdk` from 2.1134.0 to 2.1135.1 - [Release notes](https://github.com/aws/aws-cdk-cli/releases) - [Commits](https://github.com/aws/aws-cdk-cli/commits/aws-cdk@v2.1135.1/packages/aws-cdk) Updates `constructs` from 10.7.2 to 10.8.1 - [Release notes](https://github.com/aws/constructs/releases) - [Commits](https://github.com/aws/constructs/compare/v10.7.2...v10.8.1) Updates `eslint` from 10.8.0 to 10.8.1 - [Release notes](https://github.com/eslint/eslint/releases) - [Commits](https://github.com/eslint/eslint/compare/v10.8.0...v10.8.1) Updates `tsx` from 4.23.1 to 4.23.11 - [Release notes](https://github.com/privatenumber/tsx/releases) - [Changelog](https://github.com/privatenumber/tsx/blob/master/release.config.cjs) - [Commits](https://github.com/privatenumber/tsx/compare/v4.23.1...v4.23.11) Updates `express-rate-limit` from 8.6.1 to 8.6.2 - [Release notes](https://github.com/express-rate-limit/express-rate-limit/releases) - [Commits](https://github.com/express-rate-limit/express-rate-limit/compare/v8.6.1...v8.6.2) Updates `jose` from 6.2.6 to 6.2.8 - [Release notes](https://github.com/panva/jose/releases) - [Changelog](https://github.com/panva/jose/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md) - [Commits](https://github.com/panva/jose/compare/v6.2.6...v6.2.8) Updates `@aws-sdk/client-cognito-identity-provider` from 3.1101.0 to 3.1106.0 - [Release notes](https://github.com/aws/aws-sdk-js-v3/releases) - [Changelog](https://github.com/aws/aws-sdk-js-v3/blob/main/clients/client-cognito-identity-provider/CHANGELOG.md) - [Commits](https://github.com/aws/aws-sdk-js-v3/commits/v3.1106.0/clients/client-cognito-identity-provider) Updates `@aws-sdk/client-dynamodb` from 3.1101.0 to 3.1106.0 - [Release notes](https://github.com/aws/aws-sdk-js-v3/releases) - [Changelog](https://github.com/aws/aws-sdk-js-v3/blob/main/clients/client-dynamodb/CHANGELOG.md) - [Commits](https://github.com/aws/aws-sdk-js-v3/commits/v3.1106.0/clients/client-dynamodb) Updates `@aws-sdk/client-secrets-manager` from 3.1101.0 to 3.1106.0 - [Release notes](https://github.com/aws/aws-sdk-js-v3/releases) - [Changelog](https://github.com/aws/aws-sdk-js-v3/blob/main/clients/client-secrets-manager/CHANGELOG.md) - [Commits](https://github.com/aws/aws-sdk-js-v3/commits/v3.1106.0/clients/client-secrets-manager) Updates `@aws-sdk/lib-dynamodb` from 3.1101.0 to 3.1106.0 - [Release notes](https://github.com/aws/aws-sdk-js-v3/releases) - [Changelog](https://github.com/aws/aws-sdk-js-v3/blob/main/lib/lib-dynamodb/CHANGELOG.md) - [Commits](https://github.com/aws/aws-sdk-js-v3/commits/v3.1106.0/lib/lib-dynamodb) --- updated-dependencies: - dependency-name: "@aws-sdk/client-cognito-identity-provider" dependency-version: 3.1106.0 dependency-type: direct:development update-type: version-update:semver-minor dependency-group: minor-and-patch - dependency-name: "@aws-sdk/client-dynamodb" dependency-version: 3.1106.0 dependency-type: direct:development update-type: version-update:semver-minor dependency-group: minor-and-patch - dependency-name: "@aws-sdk/client-secrets-manager" dependency-version: 3.1106.0 dependency-type: direct:development update-type: version-update:semver-minor dependency-group: minor-and-patch - dependency-name: "@aws-sdk/lib-dynamodb" dependency-version: 3.1106.0 dependency-type: direct:development update-type: version-update:semver-minor dependency-group: minor-and-patch - dependency-name: "@types/node" dependency-version: 26.2.0 dependency-type: direct:development update-type: version-update:semver-minor dependency-group: minor-and-patch - dependency-name: "@typescript-eslint/eslint-plugin" dependency-version: 8.66.0 dependency-type: direct:development update-type: version-update:semver-minor dependency-group: minor-and-patch - dependency-name: "@typescript-eslint/parser" dependency-version: 8.66.0 dependency-type: direct:development update-type: version-update:semver-minor dependency-group: minor-and-patch - dependency-name: aws-cdk dependency-version: 2.1135.1 dependency-type: direct:development update-type: version-update:semver-minor dependency-group: minor-and-patch - dependency-name: constructs dependency-version: 10.8.1 dependency-type: direct:development update-type: version-update:semver-minor dependency-group: minor-and-patch - dependency-name: eslint dependency-version: 10.8.1 dependency-type: direct:development update-type: version-update:semver-patch dependency-group: minor-and-patch - dependency-name: express-rate-limit dependency-version: 8.6.2 dependency-type: direct:production update-type: version-update:semver-patch dependency-group: minor-and-patch - dependency-name: jose dependency-version: 6.2.8 dependency-type: direct:production update-type: version-update:semver-patch dependency-group: minor-and-patch - dependency-name: tsx dependency-version: 4.23.11 dependency-type: direct:development update-type: version-update:semver-patch dependency-group: minor-and-patch ... Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com> Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-11 16:12:05 +00:00
"constructs": "10.8.1",
fix(deps): update npm minor and patch (#75) Co-authored-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-09 18:48:04 +00:00
"tsx": "4.23.13",
chore(deps-dev): bump typescript from 5.6.3 to 6.0.3 (#23) Bumps [typescript](https://github.com/microsoft/TypeScript) from 5.6.3 to 6.0.3. - [Release notes](https://github.com/microsoft/TypeScript/releases) - [Commits](https://github.com/microsoft/TypeScript/compare/v5.6.3...v6.0.3) --- updated-dependencies: - dependency-name: typescript dependency-version: 6.0.3 dependency-type: direct:development update-type: version-update:semver-major ... Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com> Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-06 23:54:04 +00:00
"typescript": "^6.0.3",
fix(deps): update npm minor and patch (#68)
2026-08-25 16:12:59 +00:00
"vitest": "^4.1.11"
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3) * Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3): - dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path. - audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions. - mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and tools/call routed through executeTool. - http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz. - openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full OpenAPI 3.1 document. - local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6). * Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/ tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask. Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools) so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load (build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages. * Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3): - ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress). - config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs (aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5). - index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder is exported but not depended on. - synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app (build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector. * Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3): tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls), audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data), rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1 validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass. Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented). Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the updated package-lock.json. * Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code: - npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b; Dependabot will bump). - gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch. The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR) was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body. * Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR: - dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path. - http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp, /tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable), returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub + per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge. Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not 401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean. * Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos) extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space, so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char (/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests. * Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums) Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review: - Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset, so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin). Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME / AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag. - Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}}) escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net. +4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green. Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash, unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
}
}
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