sh-mcp/packages/shared/src/cognito-auth.test.ts

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Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2) * Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers. - Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate), eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu). - @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry, redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2. - 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base, gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact(). Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4). * Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1 work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5). * ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet) The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the server CDK stubs.
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/**
* Security-weighted tests for the Cognito auth layer.
*
* The token claims here mirror the shape the 0a spike actually observed from
* live Cognito (access token: prefixed `scope` string, `client_id`, `token_use`,
* no native `aud`). The audience-boundary, scope-isolation, TTL-ceiling and
* revocation cases are the trust-tier guarantees from design.md §2 — they are
* the reason this file carries the heaviest coverage in the platform.
*/
import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
import { generateKeyPair, SignJWT, type JWTVerifyGetKey } from 'jose';
import {
CognitoAuthProvider,
AuthError,
extractScopes,
extractBearerToken,
cognitoIssuer,
type CognitoAuthConfig,
} from './cognito-auth.js';
import { requireScope } from './auth.js';
type KeyPair = Awaited<ReturnType<typeof generateKeyPair>>;
const ISSUER = cognitoIssuer('us-east-1', 'us-east-1_TESTPOOL');
const OPS_CLIENT = 'ops-app-client-id';
const FIN_CLIENT = 'finance-app-client-id';
// Signing keys for the suite, plus a second pair to forge bad signatures.
const signing: KeyPair = await generateKeyPair('RS256');
const attacker: KeyPair = await generateKeyPair('RS256');
/** A JWKS resolver that returns our test public key (stands in for the pool's JWKS). */
const jwks: JWTVerifyGetKey = async () => signing.publicKey;
function baseConfig(overrides: Partial<CognitoAuthConfig> = {}): CognitoAuthConfig {
return {
issuer: ISSUER,
audience: 'sh-mcp-ops',
allowedClientIds: [OPS_CLIENT],
scopePrefix: 'sh-mcp-ops',
jwks,
...overrides,
};
}
function financeConfig(overrides: Partial<CognitoAuthConfig> = {}): CognitoAuthConfig {
return baseConfig({
audience: 'sh-mcp-finance',
allowedClientIds: [FIN_CLIENT],
scopePrefix: 'sh-mcp-finance',
maxTtlSeconds: 900,
ttlGuardedScopes: ['finance:read', 'finance:admin'],
...overrides,
});
}
interface MintOpts {
issuer?: string;
clientId?: string;
scope?: string;
tokenUse?: string;
sub?: string;
iat?: number;
ttlSeconds?: number;
signer?: KeyPair['privateKey'];
}
async function mint(opts: MintOpts = {}): Promise<string> {
const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
const iat = opts.iat ?? now;
const ttl = opts.ttlSeconds ?? 3600;
return new SignJWT({
token_use: opts.tokenUse ?? 'access',
client_id: opts.clientId ?? OPS_CLIENT,
scope: opts.scope ?? 'sh-mcp-ops/ops:read sh-mcp-ops/ops:tasks openid email',
})
.setProtectedHeader({ alg: 'RS256' })
.setSubject(opts.sub ?? 'user-sub-123')
.setIssuer(opts.issuer ?? ISSUER)
.setIssuedAt(iat)
.setExpirationTime(iat + ttl)
.sign(opts.signer ?? signing.privateKey);
}
describe('CognitoAuthProvider.authenticate', () => {
it('accepts a valid access token and extracts sub + this tier’s scopes', async () => {
const provider = new CognitoAuthProvider(baseConfig());
const ctx = await provider.authenticate(`Bearer ${await mint()}`);
expect(ctx.sub).toBe('user-sub-123');
expect(ctx.aud).toBe('sh-mcp-ops');
expect(ctx.scopes).toEqual(['ops:read', 'ops:tasks']);
});
it('drops cross-tier and standard (openid/email) scopes', async () => {
const provider = new CognitoAuthProvider(baseConfig());
const token = await mint({
scope: 'sh-mcp-ops/ops:read sh-mcp-finance/finance:read openid email',
});
const ctx = await provider.authenticate(`Bearer ${token}`);
expect(ctx.scopes).toEqual(['ops:read']);
});
it('rejects a token from the wrong issuer', async () => {
const provider = new CognitoAuthProvider(baseConfig());
const token = await mint({ issuer: 'https://evil.example.com/pool' });
await expect(provider.authenticate(`Bearer ${token}`)).rejects.toMatchObject({
code: 'invalid_token',
});
});
it('AUDIENCE BOUNDARY: rejects an ops token presented to the finance server', async () => {
const finance = new CognitoAuthProvider(financeConfig());
const opsToken = await mint({ clientId: OPS_CLIENT, scope: 'sh-mcp-ops/ops:read' });
await expect(finance.authenticate(`Bearer ${opsToken}`)).rejects.toMatchObject({
code: 'client_not_allowed',
});
});
it('rejects an id token (token_use !== "access")', async () => {
const provider = new CognitoAuthProvider(baseConfig());
const token = await mint({ tokenUse: 'id' });
await expect(provider.authenticate(`Bearer ${token}`)).rejects.toMatchObject({
code: 'invalid_token',
});
});
it('rejects an expired token', async () => {
const provider = new CognitoAuthProvider(baseConfig());
const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
const token = await mint({ iat: now - 7200, ttlSeconds: 3600 }); // expired ~1h ago
await expect(provider.authenticate(`Bearer ${token}`)).rejects.toMatchObject({
code: 'invalid_token',
});
});
it('rejects a token signed by an unknown key (forged signature)', async () => {
const provider = new CognitoAuthProvider(baseConfig());
const token = await mint({ signer: attacker.privateKey });
await expect(provider.authenticate(`Bearer ${token}`)).rejects.toMatchObject({
code: 'invalid_token',
});
});
it('rejects a missing Authorization header', async () => {
const provider = new CognitoAuthProvider(baseConfig());
await expect(provider.authenticate({ headers: {} })).rejects.toMatchObject({
code: 'missing_token',
});
});
it('FINANCE TTL: rejects a finance-scoped token whose lifetime exceeds the ceiling', async () => {
const finance = new CognitoAuthProvider(financeConfig());
const longToken = await mint({
clientId: FIN_CLIENT,
scope: 'sh-mcp-finance/finance:read',
ttlSeconds: 3600,
});
await expect(finance.authenticate(`Bearer ${longToken}`)).rejects.toMatchObject({
code: 'ttl_exceeded',
});
});
it('FINANCE TTL: accepts a finance-scoped token within the ceiling', async () => {
const finance = new CognitoAuthProvider(financeConfig());
const shortToken = await mint({
clientId: FIN_CLIENT,
scope: 'sh-mcp-finance/finance:read',
ttlSeconds: 600,
});
const ctx = await finance.authenticate(`Bearer ${shortToken}`);
expect(ctx.scopes).toEqual(['finance:read']);
});
it('does not apply the TTL ceiling to non-guarded scopes', async () => {
const finance = new CognitoAuthProvider(financeConfig());
// ops:read carried under the finance prefix is known but not TTL-guarded.
const longToken = await mint({
clientId: FIN_CLIENT,
scope: 'sh-mcp-finance/ops:read',
ttlSeconds: 3600,
});
const ctx = await finance.authenticate(`Bearer ${longToken}`);
expect(ctx.scopes).toEqual(['ops:read']);
});
it('rejects a revoked (deny-listed) user', async () => {
const provider = new CognitoAuthProvider(
baseConfig({ denyList: { isDenied: async (sub) => sub === 'revoked-user' } }),
);
const token = await mint({ sub: 'revoked-user' });
await expect(provider.authenticate(`Bearer ${token}`)).rejects.toMatchObject({
code: 'revoked',
});
});
it('returns a context that satisfies requireScope for granted scopes only', async () => {
const provider = new CognitoAuthProvider(baseConfig());
const ctx = await provider.authenticate(`Bearer ${await mint()}`);
expect(() => requireScope(ctx, 'ops:read')).not.toThrow();
expect(() => requireScope(ctx, 'finance:read')).toThrow();
});
});
describe('extractScopes', () => {
it('strips the tier prefix and keeps known scopes in order', () => {
expect(extractScopes('sh-mcp-ops/ops:read sh-mcp-ops/ops:tasks', 'sh-mcp-ops')).toEqual([
'ops:read',
'ops:tasks',
]);
});
it('drops other tiers and standard scopes', () => {
expect(
extractScopes('sh-mcp-ops/ops:read sh-mcp-finance/finance:read openid email', 'sh-mcp-ops'),
).toEqual(['ops:read']);
});
it('drops prefixed-but-unknown scopes', () => {
expect(extractScopes('sh-mcp-ops/bogus:scope', 'sh-mcp-ops')).toEqual([]);
});
it('de-duplicates', () => {
expect(extractScopes('sh-mcp-ops/ops:read sh-mcp-ops/ops:read', 'sh-mcp-ops')).toEqual([
'ops:read',
]);
});
it('handles empty / non-string input', () => {
expect(extractScopes('', 'sh-mcp-ops')).toEqual([]);
expect(extractScopes(undefined, 'sh-mcp-ops')).toEqual([]);
expect(extractScopes(null, 'sh-mcp-ops')).toEqual([]);
});
});
describe('extractBearerToken', () => {
it('reads a raw Authorization header string', () => {
expect(extractBearerToken('Bearer abc.def.ghi')).toBe('abc.def.ghi');
});
it('is case-insensitive on the scheme', () => {
expect(extractBearerToken('bearer abc')).toBe('abc');
});
it('reads a plain headers object (either header casing)', () => {
expect(extractBearerToken({ headers: { authorization: 'Bearer xyz' } })).toBe('xyz');
expect(extractBearerToken({ headers: { Authorization: 'Bearer XYZ' } })).toBe('XYZ');
});
it('reads a Fetch Headers-like object', () => {
const headers = new Headers({ authorization: 'Bearer fetchtoken' });
expect(extractBearerToken({ headers })).toBe('fetchtoken');
});
it('throws AuthError on a missing header', () => {
expect(() => extractBearerToken({ headers: {} })).toThrow(AuthError);
});
it('throws AuthError on a non-Bearer header', () => {
expect(() => extractBearerToken('Basic abc')).toThrow(AuthError);
});
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3) * Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3): - dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path. - audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions. - mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and tools/call routed through executeTool. - http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz. - openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full OpenAPI 3.1 document. - local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6). * Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/ tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask. Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools) so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load (build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages. * Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3): - ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress). - config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs (aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5). - index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder is exported but not depended on. - synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app (build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector. * Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3): tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls), audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data), rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1 validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass. Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented). Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the updated package-lock.json. * Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code: - npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b; Dependabot will bump). - gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch. The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR) was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body. * Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR: - dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path. - http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp, /tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable), returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub + per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge. Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not 401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean. * Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos) extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space, so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char (/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests. * Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums) Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review: - Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset, so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin). Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME / AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag. - Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}}) escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net. +4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green. Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash, unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
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// ReDoS guard (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos): the matcher is /\s+(\S.*)/, not
// the ambiguous /\s+(.+)/. These pin the behavior that the `\S` fix preserves.
it('still captures a token that follows multiple separating spaces', () => {
expect(extractBearerToken('Bearer abc.def')).toBe('abc.def');
});
it('rejects a "Bearer" header with no token after the whitespace', () => {
expect(() => extractBearerToken(`Bearer ${' '.repeat(5_000)}`)).toThrow(AuthError);
});
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2) * Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers. - Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate), eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu). - @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry, redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2. - 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base, gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact(). Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4). * Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1 work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5). * ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet) The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the server CDK stubs.
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});