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Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4) * Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against (SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google secrets); CI synthesizes the stack. infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth: - Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined). - Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance), finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d. - Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin. - sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt'). - Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync). auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale. auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min (jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda failing closed. 37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass; tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled. App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision. Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys. * Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out + proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker → fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated: - C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative. - C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d. - C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented "nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address. Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous (it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b, cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
{
"name": "@sh-mcp/infra",
"version": "0.1.0",
"private": true,
"description": "Sea Haven MCP CDK app — auth substrate stack (Phase 2a)",
"type": "module",
"scripts": {
"synth": "cdk synth >/dev/null",
"typecheck": "tsc --noEmit",
"test": "vitest run",
"test:watch": "vitest"
},
"devDependencies": {
fix(deps): update npm minor and patch (#86) Co-authored-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-28 16:06:52 +00:00
"@types/node": "^26.6.2",
"aws-cdk": "2.1143.0",
chore(deps): update npm minor and patch (#81) Co-authored-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-21 16:12:18 +00:00
"aws-cdk-lib": "2.270.0",
chore(deps-dev): bump the minor-and-patch group in /infra with 3 updates (#50) Bumps the minor-and-patch group in /infra with 3 updates: [aws-cdk](https://github.com/aws/aws-cdk-cli/tree/HEAD/packages/aws-cdk), [constructs](https://github.com/aws/constructs) and [tsx](https://github.com/privatenumber/tsx). Updates `aws-cdk` from 2.1134.0 to 2.1135.1 - [Release notes](https://github.com/aws/aws-cdk-cli/releases) - [Commits](https://github.com/aws/aws-cdk-cli/commits/aws-cdk@v2.1135.1/packages/aws-cdk) Updates `constructs` from 10.7.2 to 10.8.1 - [Release notes](https://github.com/aws/constructs/releases) - [Commits](https://github.com/aws/constructs/compare/v10.7.2...v10.8.1) Updates `tsx` from 4.23.1 to 4.23.11 - [Release notes](https://github.com/privatenumber/tsx/releases) - [Changelog](https://github.com/privatenumber/tsx/blob/master/release.config.cjs) - [Commits](https://github.com/privatenumber/tsx/compare/v4.23.1...v4.23.11) --- updated-dependencies: - dependency-name: aws-cdk dependency-version: 2.1135.1 dependency-type: direct:development update-type: version-update:semver-minor dependency-group: minor-and-patch - dependency-name: constructs dependency-version: 10.8.1 dependency-type: direct:development update-type: version-update:semver-minor dependency-group: minor-and-patch - dependency-name: tsx dependency-version: 4.23.11 dependency-type: direct:development update-type: version-update:semver-patch dependency-group: minor-and-patch ... Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com> Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-11 16:10:26 +00:00
"constructs": "10.8.1",
fix(deps): update npm minor and patch (#86) Co-authored-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-28 16:06:52 +00:00
"tsx": "4.23.15",
chore(deps-dev): bump typescript from 6.0.3 to 7.0.2 in /infra (#27) Bumps [typescript](https://github.com/microsoft/TypeScript) from 6.0.3 to 7.0.2. - [Release notes](https://github.com/microsoft/TypeScript/releases) - [Commits](https://github.com/microsoft/TypeScript/commits) --- updated-dependencies: - dependency-name: typescript dependency-version: 7.0.2 dependency-type: direct:development update-type: version-update:semver-major ... Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com> Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-14 11:22:09 -04:00
"typescript": "^7.0.2",
chore(deps): update dependency vitest to v5 (#82) * chore(deps): update dependency vitest to v5 * chore(deps): bump @vitest/coverage-v8 to v5 Keep coverage-v8 on the same major as vitest so npm can resolve peers and regenerate the lockfile. --------- Co-authored-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Adam Moussa <adam@seahavenind.com>
2026-09-25 20:19:36 +00:00
"vitest": "5.0.1"
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4) * Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against (SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google secrets); CI synthesizes the stack. infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth: - Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined). - Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance), finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d. - Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin. - sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt'). - Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync). auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale. auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min (jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda failing closed. 37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass; tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled. App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision. Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys. * Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out + proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker → fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated: - C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative. - C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d. - C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented "nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address. Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous (it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b, cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
},
"engines": {
chore(deps): update npm minor and patch (#78) Co-authored-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-17 15:22:58 +00:00
"node": ">=24.21.0"
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4) * Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against (SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google secrets); CI synthesizes the stack. infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth: - Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined). - Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance), finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d. - Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin. - sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt'). - Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync). auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale. auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min (jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda failing closed. 37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass; tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled. App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision. Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys. * Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out + proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker → fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated: - C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative. - C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d. - C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented "nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address. Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous (it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b, cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
}
}
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