Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
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/**
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* Concrete `AuthProvider` for Amazon Cognito access tokens.
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*
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* This is the real implementation the 0a spike unblocked. The spike proved the
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* exact token shape we receive (see SPIKE findings / design.md §2): a Cognito
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* **access** token carries `sub`, `client_id`, `scope` (a space-separated,
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* resource-server-prefixed string), `iss`, `token_use`, `iat`, `exp` — and
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* crucially **no native `aud` claim and no `email`**. Two consequences drive
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* this implementation:
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*
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* 1. Audience binding cannot use the JWT `aud` claim. Instead the
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* **`client_id` allow-list IS the audience boundary** — each trust tier
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* gets its own Cognito app client, and a server only accepts tokens minted
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* by app clients on its `allowedClientIds`. An ops token presented to the
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* finance server is rejected because the ops app-client id is not on
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* finance's allow-list (design.md §2.5).
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* 2. Scopes arrive prefixed with the resource server ("sh-mcp-ops/ops:read").
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* We accept only scopes carrying this server's `scopePrefix`, strip the
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* prefix to the internal `Scope` ("ops:read"), and drop everything else —
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* so a cross-tier scope can never leak into an AuthContext.
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*
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* The class verifies the JWT signature against the pool's JWKS, validates the
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* issuer, enforces the client_id allow-list, applies the optional finance TTL
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* ceiling and deny-list, and returns a populated `AuthContext`. Scope-per-tool
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* enforcement still happens in each handler via `requireScope()` (see auth.ts).
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*
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* Config (client_id allow-list, audience, scope prefix, TTL rule) is INJECTED,
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* never hardcoded — it comes from each server's SSM/CDK env (design.md §2,
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* memory: "the client/audience matrix is config, not hardcoded into the core").
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*/
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import { jwtVerify, createRemoteJWKSet, type JWTVerifyGetKey, type JWTPayload } from 'jose';
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import type { AuthContext, Scope } from './types.js';
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import type { AuthProvider } from './auth.js';
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// AuthError
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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/**
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* Reason an inbound token was rejected. Distinct from `ScopeError`
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* (auth.ts): an `AuthError` is an authentication failure (→ HTTP 401),
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* whereas a `ScopeError` is an authorization failure on a valid identity
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* (→ HTTP 403).
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*/
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export type AuthErrorCode =
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| 'missing_token' // no / malformed Authorization header
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| 'invalid_token' // bad signature, wrong issuer, not an access token, no sub
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| 'client_not_allowed' // client_id absent from this server's allow-list (audience boundary)
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| 'ttl_exceeded' // token lifetime exceeds the ceiling for a guarded scope (finance)
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| 'revoked'; // user is on the deny-list
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/** Thrown by `CognitoAuthProvider.authenticate()` on any authentication failure. */
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export class AuthError extends Error {
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readonly code: AuthErrorCode;
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constructor(code: AuthErrorCode, message: string) {
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super(message);
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this.name = 'AuthError';
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this.code = code;
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// Maintain proper prototype chain for `instanceof` checks.
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Object.setPrototypeOf(this, new.target.prototype);
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}
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}
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Config
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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/** Optional immediate-revocation check (design.md §2.3 — Cognito-backed deny-list). */
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export interface DenyListChecker {
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/** Resolve `true` if `sub` has been hard-revoked and must be rejected now. */
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isDenied(sub: string): Promise<boolean>;
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}
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/**
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* Per-server configuration for {@link CognitoAuthProvider}. Injected from each
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* server's environment — never hardcoded into the shared core.
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*/
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export interface CognitoAuthConfig {
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/**
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* Expected token issuer — the Cognito user pool URL,
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* e.g. `https://cognito-idp.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/us-east-1_GsDbGe0pa`.
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* Tokens with any other `iss` are rejected. Use {@link cognitoIssuer}.
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*/
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issuer: string;
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/**
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* This server's resource-server identifier, written into `AuthContext.aud`
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* after the client_id allow-list passes (e.g. `"sh-mcp-ops"`). Because the
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* token carries no native `aud`, this is the server's asserted audience, not
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* a value read from the token.
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*/
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audience: string;
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/**
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* Cognito app-client ids permitted to call THIS server. This list IS the
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* audience boundary (the token has no `aud`): a token minted for another
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* tier's app client is rejected. Each tier has its own app client.
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*/
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allowedClientIds: readonly string[];
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/**
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* Resource-server prefix for this tier, e.g. `"sh-mcp-ops"`. Cognito scopes
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* arrive as `"sh-mcp-ops/ops:read"`; only scopes with this prefix are
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* accepted, the prefix is stripped to the internal `Scope`, and all other
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* (cross-tier or standard `openid`/`email`) scopes are dropped.
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*/
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scopePrefix: string;
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/**
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* JWKS key resolver used to verify the token signature. In production build
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* it with {@link cognitoJwks}; tests inject a local key set.
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*/
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jwks: JWTVerifyGetKey;
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/**
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* If set, a token whose lifetime (`exp - iat`) exceeds this many seconds is
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* rejected when it carries any scope in {@link ttlGuardedScopes}. design.md
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* §2.5 requires `finance:*` tokens to be ≤ 15 min (900s).
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*/
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maxTtlSeconds?: number;
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/** Scopes that trigger the {@link maxTtlSeconds} ceiling (e.g. the finance scopes). */
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ttlGuardedScopes?: readonly Scope[];
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/** Optional deny-list for immediate hard revocation of a `sub`. */
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denyList?: DenyListChecker;
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/** Clock skew tolerance in seconds for `exp`/`nbf` (default 5). */
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clockToleranceSeconds?: number;
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}
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// JWKS / issuer helpers
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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/** The Cognito issuer URL for a pool — use for {@link CognitoAuthConfig.issuer}. */
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export function cognitoIssuer(region: string, userPoolId: string): string {
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return `https://cognito-idp.${region}.amazonaws.com/${userPoolId}`;
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}
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/**
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* Build a cached remote JWKS resolver for a Cognito user pool. The resolver
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* fetches and caches the pool's signing keys, refreshing on unknown `kid`.
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*/
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export function cognitoJwks(region: string, userPoolId: string): JWTVerifyGetKey {
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return createRemoteJWKSet(new URL(`${cognitoIssuer(region, userPoolId)}/.well-known/jwks.json`));
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}
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Pure helpers (exported for unit testing)
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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/** Every internal scope the platform recognizes (cross-checked from types.ts). */
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const KNOWN_SCOPES: readonly Scope[] = [
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'ops:read',
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'ops:tasks',
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'gmail:self',
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'calendar:self',
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'finance:read',
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'finance:admin',
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];
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/**
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* Parse a Cognito `scope` string into validated internal `Scope`s for one tier.
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*
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* Keeps only entries prefixed `"<scopePrefix>/"`, strips the prefix, and admits
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* the result only if it is a {@link KNOWN_SCOPES} value. Standard scopes
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* (`openid`, `email`) and other tiers' scopes are dropped. Order-preserving and
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* de-duplicated.
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*/
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export function extractScopes(rawScope: unknown, scopePrefix: string): Scope[] {
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if (typeof rawScope !== 'string' || rawScope.length === 0) return [];
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const wanted = `${scopePrefix}/`;
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const out: Scope[] = [];
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for (const entry of rawScope.split(/\s+/)) {
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if (!entry.startsWith(wanted)) continue;
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const bare = entry.slice(wanted.length);
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if ((KNOWN_SCOPES as readonly string[]).includes(bare) && !out.includes(bare as Scope)) {
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out.push(bare as Scope);
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}
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}
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return out;
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}
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/**
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* Pull the bearer token out of a transport-agnostic request. Accepts the raw
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* Authorization header string, a Fetch `Headers`-like object, or a plain
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* `{ headers: { authorization } }` shape (Node `IncomingMessage`, Lambda event).
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*
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* @throws {AuthError} `missing_token` if no usable Bearer token is present.
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*/
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export function extractBearerToken(req: unknown): string {
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const header = getAuthorizationHeader(req);
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if (!header) {
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throw new AuthError('missing_token', 'No Authorization header present.');
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}
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Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
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// `\s+(\S.*)` — NOT `\s+(.+)`: requiring the capture to start with a
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// non-whitespace char removes the quantifier overlap (both `\s` and `.`
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// match a space), which otherwise allows polynomial backtracking on a
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// crafted all-whitespace header (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos). Linear now.
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const match = /^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/i.exec(header.trim());
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Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
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const token = match?.[1]?.trim();
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if (!token) {
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throw new AuthError('missing_token', 'Authorization header is not a Bearer token.');
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}
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return token;
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}
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function getAuthorizationHeader(req: unknown): string | undefined {
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if (typeof req === 'string') return req;
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if (req === null || typeof req !== 'object') return undefined;
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const headers = (req as { headers?: unknown }).headers;
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if (!headers || typeof headers !== 'object') return undefined;
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// Fetch `Headers`-like (has a .get method).
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const get = (headers as { get?: unknown }).get;
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if (typeof get === 'function') {
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const v = (headers as Headers).get('authorization');
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return v ?? undefined;
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}
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// Plain object headers (case-insensitive lookup, array-valued allowed).
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const h = headers as Record<string, unknown>;
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const v = h['authorization'] ?? h['Authorization'];
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if (typeof v === 'string') return v;
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if (Array.isArray(v) && typeof v[0] === 'string') return v[0];
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return undefined;
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}
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// CognitoAuthProvider
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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/**
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* Verifies a Cognito access token and resolves it to an {@link AuthContext}.
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*
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* Each server constructs one with its own config and calls `authenticate(req)`
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* once per inbound request, before any tool handler runs.
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*/
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export class CognitoAuthProvider implements AuthProvider {
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constructor(private readonly config: CognitoAuthConfig) {}
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async authenticate(req: unknown): Promise<AuthContext> {
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const token = extractBearerToken(req);
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let payload: JWTPayload & {
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token_use?: unknown;
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client_id?: unknown;
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scope?: unknown;
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};
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try {
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const result = await jwtVerify(token, this.config.jwks, {
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issuer: this.config.issuer,
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clockTolerance: this.config.clockToleranceSeconds ?? 5,
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});
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payload = result.payload;
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} catch (err) {
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throw new AuthError('invalid_token', `Token verification failed: ${(err as Error).message}`);
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}
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// Must be an access token — id tokens carry different claims and are not
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// the credential the agent callout presents.
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if (payload.token_use !== 'access') {
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throw new AuthError(
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'invalid_token',
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`Expected token_use "access", got "${String(payload.token_use)}".`,
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);
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}
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// client_id allow-list == audience boundary (token has no native aud).
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const clientId = typeof payload.client_id === 'string' ? payload.client_id : undefined;
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if (!clientId || !this.config.allowedClientIds.includes(clientId)) {
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throw new AuthError(
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'client_not_allowed',
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`client_id "${clientId ?? '(none)'}" is not permitted for audience "${this.config.audience}".`,
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);
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}
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const sub = typeof payload.sub === 'string' ? payload.sub : undefined;
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if (!sub) {
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throw new AuthError('invalid_token', 'Token has no "sub" claim.');
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}
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const scopes = extractScopes(payload.scope, this.config.scopePrefix);
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// Finance TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5): a token bearing a guarded scope must
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// be short-lived. exp/iat are validated numbers here (jwtVerify checked exp).
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if (this.config.maxTtlSeconds != null && this.config.ttlGuardedScopes?.length) {
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const carriesGuarded = scopes.some((s) => this.config.ttlGuardedScopes!.includes(s));
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if (carriesGuarded) {
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const iat = typeof payload.iat === 'number' ? payload.iat : undefined;
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const exp = typeof payload.exp === 'number' ? payload.exp : undefined;
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if (iat == null || exp == null || exp - iat > this.config.maxTtlSeconds) {
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throw new AuthError(
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'ttl_exceeded',
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`Token lifetime exceeds the ${this.config.maxTtlSeconds}s ceiling required for ` +
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`${this.config.ttlGuardedScopes!.join('/')} scopes.`,
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);
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}
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}
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}
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// Immediate hard revocation (checked last — most expensive, may hit DynamoDB).
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if (this.config.denyList && (await this.config.denyList.isDenied(sub))) {
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throw new AuthError('revoked', `User "${sub}" is on the deny-list (revoked).`);
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}
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return { sub, scopes, aud: this.config.audience };
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}
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}
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