Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
{
"name" : "sh-mcp" ,
"version" : "0.0.1" ,
"lockfileVersion" : 3 ,
"requires" : true ,
"packages" : {
"" : {
"name" : "sh-mcp" ,
"version" : "0.0.1" ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"workspaces" : [
"packages/*" ,
"servers/*" ,
"jobs/*" ,
"auth/*"
] ,
"devDependencies" : {
2026-07-06 18:17:11 -04:00
"@types/node" : "26.1.0" ,
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"@typescript-eslint/eslint-plugin" : "8.63.0" ,
"@typescript-eslint/parser" : "8.63.0" ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"@vitest/coverage-v8" : "3.2.7" ,
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"aws-cdk" : "2.1129.0" ,
"aws-cdk-lib" : "2.261.0" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"constructs" : "10.6.0" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"eslint" : "9.14.0" ,
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"prettier" : "3.9.4" ,
"tsx" : "4.23.0" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"typescript" : "5.6.3" ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"vitest" : "3.2.7"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=24.0.0"
}
} ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"auth/group-sync" : {
"name" : "@sh-mcp/auth-group-sync" ,
"version" : "0.1.0" ,
"dependencies" : {
"jose" : "^6.2.3"
} ,
"devDependencies" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"@aws-sdk/client-cognito-identity-provider" : "^3.1080.0" ,
"@aws-sdk/client-dynamodb" : "^3.1080.0" ,
"@aws-sdk/client-secrets-manager" : "^3.1080.0" ,
"@aws-sdk/lib-dynamodb" : "^3.1080.0" ,
2026-07-06 18:17:11 -04:00
"@types/node" : "26.1.0" ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"@vitest/coverage-v8" : "3.2.7" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"typescript" : "^5.5.0" ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"vitest" : "3.2.7"
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=24.0.0"
}
} ,
"auth/pre-token-gen" : {
"name" : "@sh-mcp/auth-pre-token-gen" ,
"version" : "0.1.0" ,
"devDependencies" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"@aws-sdk/client-dynamodb" : "^3.1080.0" ,
"@aws-sdk/lib-dynamodb" : "^3.1080.0" ,
2026-07-06 18:17:11 -04:00
"@types/node" : "26.1.0" ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"@vitest/coverage-v8" : "3.2.7" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"typescript" : "^5.5.0" ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"vitest" : "3.2.7"
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=24.0.0"
}
} ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"node_modules/@ampproject/remapping" : {
"version" : "2.3.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@ampproject/remapping/-/remapping-2.3.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-30iZtAPgz+LTIYoeivqYo853f02jBYSd5uGnGpkFV0M3xOt9aN73erkgYAmZU43x4VfqcnLxW9Kpg3R5LC4YYw==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "Apache-2.0" ,
"dependencies" : {
"@jridgewell/gen-mapping" : "^0.3.5" ,
"@jridgewell/trace-mapping" : "^0.3.24"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=6.0.0"
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/@aws-cdk/asset-awscli-v1" : {
"version" : "2.2.282" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@aws-cdk/asset-awscli-v1/-/asset-awscli-v1-2.2.282.tgz" ,
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"dev" : true ,
"license" : "Apache-2.0"
} ,
"node_modules/@aws-cdk/asset-node-proxy-agent-v6" : {
"version" : "2.1.2" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@aws-cdk/asset-node-proxy-agent-v6/-/asset-node-proxy-agent-v6-2.1.2.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-pDiuqH+qY3zM9lhhLjbKJ1tnKOHzQ2V4Wr/3qsxyKeKAkuPMI/BVGvZG1PbrikUw949cGVTfVEt4ETKKYnrj0Q==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "Apache-2.0"
} ,
"node_modules/@aws-cdk/cloud-assembly-schema" : {
"version" : "54.5.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@aws-cdk/cloud-assembly-schema/-/cloud-assembly-schema-54.5.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-X37oRfMQYO/wXBBDotbW8msJ6AgrcMio/W6TpDR/9To9TUWld1KtY/jveHpU58nZyLVPTYEhDgFP548w3JJGsQ==" ,
"bundleDependencies" : [
"jsonschema" ,
"semver"
] ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "Apache-2.0" ,
"dependencies" : {
"jsonschema" : "^1.5.0" ,
"semver" : "^7.8.4"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">= 18.0.0"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@aws-cdk/cloud-assembly-schema/node_modules/jsonschema" : {
"version" : "1.5.0" ,
"dev" : true ,
"inBundle" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"engines" : {
"node" : "*"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@aws-cdk/cloud-assembly-schema/node_modules/semver" : {
"version" : "7.8.4" ,
"dev" : true ,
"inBundle" : true ,
"license" : "ISC" ,
"bin" : {
"semver" : "bin/semver.js"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=10"
}
} ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"node_modules/@aws-sdk/client-cognito-identity-provider" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"version" : "3.1080.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@aws-sdk/client-cognito-identity-provider/-/client-cognito-identity-provider-3.1080.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-hSG6V86U8FXcol7pyCy4LoyIsfCtf/YdO11E6W8Y8UfOQ+BIUnNnu9fBXaeylTHihCtevyeRn3AFcnOZUKiUWg==" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "Apache-2.0" ,
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"@aws-sdk/core" : "^3.974.28" ,
"@aws-sdk/credential-provider-node" : "^3.972.63" ,
"@aws-sdk/types" : "^3.973.15" ,
"@smithy/core" : "^3.29.0" ,
"@smithy/fetch-http-handler" : "^5.6.2" ,
"@smithy/node-http-handler" : "^4.9.2" ,
"@smithy/types" : "^4.15.1" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"tslib" : "^2.6.2"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=20.0.0"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@aws-sdk/client-dynamodb" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"version" : "3.1080.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@aws-sdk/client-dynamodb/-/client-dynamodb-3.1080.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-OZf8CihjhBljoD1EW08ObfqrLuqSpvu8JfSSL2Db6Mup2kV+RiTQNKBat30V/HBnkjcqbTbZLSy6lvZ17EGY8A==" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "Apache-2.0" ,
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"@aws-sdk/core" : "^3.974.28" ,
"@aws-sdk/credential-provider-node" : "^3.972.63" ,
"@aws-sdk/dynamodb-codec" : "^3.973.28" ,
"@aws-sdk/middleware-endpoint-discovery" : "^3.972.22" ,
"@aws-sdk/types" : "^3.973.15" ,
"@smithy/core" : "^3.29.0" ,
"@smithy/fetch-http-handler" : "^5.6.2" ,
"@smithy/node-http-handler" : "^4.9.2" ,
"@smithy/types" : "^4.15.1" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"tslib" : "^2.6.2"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=20.0.0"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@aws-sdk/client-secrets-manager" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"version" : "3.1080.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@aws-sdk/client-secrets-manager/-/client-secrets-manager-3.1080.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-lgrJFeDMdFz7ly0Jn7sTs2wNODJrvq8s1oiiCJFfCiRmMgS2IKk7b73zCC9y0ofKHtp+P+AbqnqUsMabXijmMw==" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "Apache-2.0" ,
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"@aws-sdk/core" : "^3.974.28" ,
"@aws-sdk/credential-provider-node" : "^3.972.63" ,
"@aws-sdk/types" : "^3.973.15" ,
"@smithy/core" : "^3.29.0" ,
"@smithy/fetch-http-handler" : "^5.6.2" ,
"@smithy/node-http-handler" : "^4.9.2" ,
"@smithy/types" : "^4.15.1" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"tslib" : "^2.6.2"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=20.0.0"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@aws-sdk/core" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"version" : "3.974.28" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@aws-sdk/core/-/core-3.974.28.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-4/1DtLwgLqzIg2uFzkFaFjMQHhhhwHIZN4PfziIVqXYX7koO78omuchQlLHyzQBw80l255dtmTA/J4W5yhb7zw==" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "Apache-2.0" ,
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"@aws-sdk/types" : "^3.973.15" ,
"@aws-sdk/xml-builder" : "^3.972.33" ,
"@aws/lambda-invoke-store" : "^0.3.0" ,
"@smithy/core" : "^3.29.0" ,
"@smithy/signature-v4" : "^5.6.1" ,
"@smithy/types" : "^4.15.1" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"bowser" : "^2.11.0" ,
"tslib" : "^2.6.2"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=20.0.0"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@aws-sdk/credential-provider-env" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"version" : "3.972.54" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@aws-sdk/credential-provider-env/-/credential-provider-env-3.972.54.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-F4WQCG8GULIt+XrMHsqUM9dZc0eTwZM3HUWByOjIKOwBqJSzUxX8CFAtbgMvWfCua52FS1oi5FXarH3+khFq8A==" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "Apache-2.0" ,
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"@aws-sdk/core" : "^3.974.28" ,
"@aws-sdk/types" : "^3.973.15" ,
"@smithy/core" : "^3.29.0" ,
"@smithy/types" : "^4.15.1" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"tslib" : "^2.6.2"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=20.0.0"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@aws-sdk/credential-provider-http" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"version" : "3.972.56" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@aws-sdk/credential-provider-http/-/credential-provider-http-3.972.56.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-PiwHgEK2srdfi/lFveyQ+3w/qikyh6MKvuZAdlMC+dwQi4K5iVBr32oh7cugnYw+jA8iGtnQMhCGvLm/mqplmw==" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "Apache-2.0" ,
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"@aws-sdk/core" : "^3.974.28" ,
"@aws-sdk/types" : "^3.973.15" ,
"@smithy/core" : "^3.29.0" ,
"@smithy/fetch-http-handler" : "^5.6.2" ,
"@smithy/node-http-handler" : "^4.9.2" ,
"@smithy/types" : "^4.15.1" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"tslib" : "^2.6.2"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=20.0.0"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@aws-sdk/credential-provider-ini" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"version" : "3.972.61" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@aws-sdk/credential-provider-ini/-/credential-provider-ini-3.972.61.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-9CZWMjhBlgfKlqJk40R7kvMOLEIoOr3HJ1J/ELjAH9H5LzR4bCxLujPVM/1PKAEjzSZKZCxWOalm7JUGZbhQqw==" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "Apache-2.0" ,
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"@aws-sdk/core" : "^3.974.28" ,
"@aws-sdk/credential-provider-env" : "^3.972.54" ,
"@aws-sdk/credential-provider-http" : "^3.972.56" ,
"@aws-sdk/credential-provider-login" : "^3.972.60" ,
"@aws-sdk/credential-provider-process" : "^3.972.54" ,
"@aws-sdk/credential-provider-sso" : "^3.972.60" ,
"@aws-sdk/credential-provider-web-identity" : "^3.972.60" ,
"@aws-sdk/nested-clients" : "^3.997.28" ,
"@aws-sdk/types" : "^3.973.15" ,
"@smithy/core" : "^3.29.0" ,
"@smithy/credential-provider-imds" : "^4.4.5" ,
"@smithy/types" : "^4.15.1" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"tslib" : "^2.6.2"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=20.0.0"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@aws-sdk/credential-provider-login" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"version" : "3.972.60" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@aws-sdk/credential-provider-login/-/credential-provider-login-3.972.60.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-Ak6OOrCbXvACyxLFIP1mcS+JTLS9ZpW1ZqyBtqu6axvdpsbG1gVNhUlAfQq8TK/gar/h2w35LrzlQU0PcUzJpw==" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "Apache-2.0" ,
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"@aws-sdk/core" : "^3.974.28" ,
"@aws-sdk/nested-clients" : "^3.997.28" ,
"@aws-sdk/types" : "^3.973.15" ,
"@smithy/core" : "^3.29.0" ,
"@smithy/types" : "^4.15.1" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"tslib" : "^2.6.2"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=20.0.0"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@aws-sdk/credential-provider-node" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"version" : "3.972.63" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@aws-sdk/credential-provider-node/-/credential-provider-node-3.972.63.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-YmgWtTPZDStyT74ApSHpApD3r7W9znsc+WEZjW0vceom+NAxRx9/F3TyukOKix8kJkPaa49aIREQJdpGeLDiEw==" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "Apache-2.0" ,
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"@aws-sdk/credential-provider-env" : "^3.972.54" ,
"@aws-sdk/credential-provider-http" : "^3.972.56" ,
"@aws-sdk/credential-provider-ini" : "^3.972.61" ,
"@aws-sdk/credential-provider-process" : "^3.972.54" ,
"@aws-sdk/credential-provider-sso" : "^3.972.60" ,
"@aws-sdk/credential-provider-web-identity" : "^3.972.60" ,
"@aws-sdk/types" : "^3.973.15" ,
"@smithy/core" : "^3.29.0" ,
"@smithy/credential-provider-imds" : "^4.4.5" ,
"@smithy/types" : "^4.15.1" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"tslib" : "^2.6.2"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=20.0.0"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@aws-sdk/credential-provider-process" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"version" : "3.972.54" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@aws-sdk/credential-provider-process/-/credential-provider-process-3.972.54.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-UNmUjtTnp3wH3YTZcctN7yK17S2AdaJpiNIdIf0l70hHOdGuDfdMxk62P5rt64GwGm6qkFOYG0js/cU6cdZDdg==" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "Apache-2.0" ,
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"@aws-sdk/core" : "^3.974.28" ,
"@aws-sdk/types" : "^3.973.15" ,
"@smithy/core" : "^3.29.0" ,
"@smithy/types" : "^4.15.1" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"tslib" : "^2.6.2"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=20.0.0"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@aws-sdk/credential-provider-sso" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"version" : "3.972.60" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@aws-sdk/credential-provider-sso/-/credential-provider-sso-3.972.60.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-zH8SvJkTRw1Kb7GARjGPjzkQPfL3jDi/OxK32I5SQq7bgwgFHJZaoDEwkEvFlfNfpByM6n4Rs20Y1mLyOdb6ag==" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "Apache-2.0" ,
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"@aws-sdk/core" : "^3.974.28" ,
"@aws-sdk/nested-clients" : "^3.997.28" ,
"@aws-sdk/token-providers" : "3.1080.0" ,
"@aws-sdk/types" : "^3.973.15" ,
"@smithy/core" : "^3.29.0" ,
"@smithy/types" : "^4.15.1" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"tslib" : "^2.6.2"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=20.0.0"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@aws-sdk/credential-provider-web-identity" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"version" : "3.972.60" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@aws-sdk/credential-provider-web-identity/-/credential-provider-web-identity-3.972.60.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-q2rJSQ/AMjemUS18OtQqczqSo2R6VjOCLmLVmLVcdrP5/AKoj632lGCrMUWQ6EgnaLMEHbq0UO4mWh/u6gjPhA==" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "Apache-2.0" ,
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"@aws-sdk/core" : "^3.974.28" ,
"@aws-sdk/nested-clients" : "^3.997.28" ,
"@aws-sdk/types" : "^3.973.15" ,
"@smithy/core" : "^3.29.0" ,
"@smithy/types" : "^4.15.1" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"tslib" : "^2.6.2"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=20.0.0"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@aws-sdk/dynamodb-codec" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"version" : "3.973.28" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@aws-sdk/dynamodb-codec/-/dynamodb-codec-3.973.28.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-fPbYdoZqvQpKgYnLtizhSlNujBPKJJCBI5a1KhG/Lqut7s5YFjzfi8+CZaG61OditIq2OesVVjlinYiPL/VCXQ==" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "Apache-2.0" ,
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"@aws-sdk/core" : "^3.974.28" ,
"@smithy/core" : "^3.29.0" ,
"@smithy/types" : "^4.15.1" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"tslib" : "^2.6.2"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=20.0.0"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@aws-sdk/endpoint-cache" : {
"version" : "3.972.8" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@aws-sdk/endpoint-cache/-/endpoint-cache-3.972.8.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-bBmkG0Dnhfq0/T4Z0PpUr7HkncBVaWvvCbvafeaUM+yC9wa8GGjLJmonq0QL17REB9WivgGeYgWQ5A80Uw5UnQ==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "Apache-2.0" ,
"dependencies" : {
"mnemonist" : "0.38.3" ,
"tslib" : "^2.6.2"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=20.0.0"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@aws-sdk/lib-dynamodb" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"version" : "3.1080.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@aws-sdk/lib-dynamodb/-/lib-dynamodb-3.1080.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-4qdJ66hRRGA4QKSYPbAxN/buAo2cBbR4nr49aj3+GuThtidYD+akxBQr2vWSA96fy03Go9bBysqeaAuL5VAbwg==" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "Apache-2.0" ,
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"@aws-sdk/core" : "^3.974.28" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"@aws-sdk/util-dynamodb" : "^3.996.5" ,
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"@smithy/core" : "^3.29.0" ,
"@smithy/types" : "^4.15.1" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"tslib" : "^2.6.2"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=20.0.0"
} ,
"peerDependencies" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"@aws-sdk/client-dynamodb" : "^3.1080.0"
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
}
} ,
"node_modules/@aws-sdk/middleware-endpoint-discovery" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"version" : "3.972.22" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@aws-sdk/middleware-endpoint-discovery/-/middleware-endpoint-discovery-3.972.22.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-GMoLg4XAnkiwevqcOfgz0lOTYmIdM7MJK/BL9EAvsoMFqKIGRpyNIvuSNg5gdFzP57yB+EklMlK0+TwBqj1tCg==" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "Apache-2.0" ,
"dependencies" : {
"@aws-sdk/endpoint-cache" : "^3.972.8" ,
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"@aws-sdk/types" : "^3.973.15" ,
"@smithy/core" : "^3.29.0" ,
"@smithy/types" : "^4.15.1" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"tslib" : "^2.6.2"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=20.0.0"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@aws-sdk/nested-clients" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"version" : "3.997.28" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@aws-sdk/nested-clients/-/nested-clients-3.997.28.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-1oG/mM3jmE2M3kad2zWJS6IKIY8hjRV4l5kAgg+xTQdLMTtehhcSucL/y4WqQpcHmQwi6+gRK8E46GYl1NBW9Q==" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "Apache-2.0" ,
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"@aws-sdk/core" : "^3.974.28" ,
"@aws-sdk/signature-v4-multi-region" : "^3.996.38" ,
"@aws-sdk/types" : "^3.973.15" ,
"@smithy/core" : "^3.29.0" ,
"@smithy/fetch-http-handler" : "^5.6.2" ,
"@smithy/node-http-handler" : "^4.9.2" ,
"@smithy/types" : "^4.15.1" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"tslib" : "^2.6.2"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=20.0.0"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@aws-sdk/signature-v4-multi-region" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"version" : "3.996.38" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@aws-sdk/signature-v4-multi-region/-/signature-v4-multi-region-3.996.38.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-C379Sk+MiFZCfWZphKlMyLHKxV22OjoGM5KJjj5IJNJcOCWL4IGIpnEGzv1FQiRwhYXfq55SJMfxlqPE08JJ9g==" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "Apache-2.0" ,
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"@aws-sdk/types" : "^3.973.15" ,
"@smithy/signature-v4" : "^5.6.1" ,
"@smithy/types" : "^4.15.1" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"tslib" : "^2.6.2"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=20.0.0"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@aws-sdk/token-providers" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"version" : "3.1080.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@aws-sdk/token-providers/-/token-providers-3.1080.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-8PufAQvncWXvdZUvODbuyXa8l3aszefEzwSMBUcgheNbZOmJMcNn388Ebt/piVrUHyxKN1MlxnR2OonzTyZaGw==" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "Apache-2.0" ,
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"@aws-sdk/core" : "^3.974.28" ,
"@aws-sdk/nested-clients" : "^3.997.28" ,
"@aws-sdk/types" : "^3.973.15" ,
"@smithy/core" : "^3.29.0" ,
"@smithy/types" : "^4.15.1" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"tslib" : "^2.6.2"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=20.0.0"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@aws-sdk/types" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"version" : "3.973.15" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@aws-sdk/types/-/types-3.973.15.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-IULn8uBV/SMtmOIANsm4WHXIOtVPBWfOWs3WGL0j/sI+KhaYehvOw0ET+9urnn8MBpiijuU/0JOpuwKOE451PQ==" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "Apache-2.0" ,
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"@smithy/types" : "^4.15.1" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"tslib" : "^2.6.2"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=20.0.0"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@aws-sdk/util-dynamodb" : {
"version" : "3.996.5" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@aws-sdk/util-dynamodb/-/util-dynamodb-3.996.5.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-m9bdmYq3WtbMHAKGALw9XWiMBfKu5T8ukgdJT7Mc/d2oOwDGNFmhsnnkQ18xomoXo/ZHxAuIDi3Y6slsblW1Mg==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "Apache-2.0" ,
"dependencies" : {
"tslib" : "^2.6.2"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=20.0.0"
} ,
"peerDependencies" : {
"@aws-sdk/client-dynamodb" : "^3.1069.0"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@aws-sdk/xml-builder" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"version" : "3.972.33" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@aws-sdk/xml-builder/-/xml-builder-3.972.33.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-ezbwz9WpuLctm6o7P2t2naDhVVPI5jFGrVefVybhcKGjU57VIyT46pQVO0RI2RYkUdhdj2Z9uSIlAzGZE9NW9A==" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "Apache-2.0" ,
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"@smithy/types" : "^4.15.1" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"tslib" : "^2.6.2"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=20.0.0"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@aws/lambda-invoke-store" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"version" : "0.3.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@aws/lambda-invoke-store/-/lambda-invoke-store-0.3.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-sl4Bm6yiMNYrZKkqqDFWN0UfnWhlS8ivKxrYl+6t0gCLrqr8y3B2IqZZbFRkfaVVp7C/baApyh71P+LeE1A2sQ==" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "Apache-2.0" ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=18.0.0"
}
} ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"node_modules/@babel/helper-string-parser" : {
"version" : "7.29.7" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@babel/helper-string-parser/-/helper-string-parser-7.29.7.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-Pb5ijPrZ89GDH8223L4UP8i6QApWxs04RbPQJTeWDV0/keR2E36MeKnyr6LYmUUvqRRI+Iv87SuF1W6ErINzYw==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=6.9.0"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@babel/helper-validator-identifier" : {
"version" : "7.29.7" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@babel/helper-validator-identifier/-/helper-validator-identifier-7.29.7.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-qehxGkRj55h/ff8EMaJ+cYhyaKlHIxqYDn682wQD7RNp9UujOQsHog2uS0r2vzr4pW+sXf90NeeayjcNaX3fFg==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=6.9.0"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@babel/parser" : {
"version" : "7.29.7" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@babel/parser/-/parser-7.29.7.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-hnORnjP/1P/zFEndoeX+n+t1RwWRJiJpM/jO7FW32Kn9r5+sJB2JWOdYo4L6k78j15eCwY3Gm/7364B1EMwtNg==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
"@babel/types" : "^7.29.7"
} ,
"bin" : {
"parser" : "bin/babel-parser.js"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=6.0.0"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@babel/types" : {
"version" : "7.29.7" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@babel/types/-/types-7.29.7.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-4zBIxpPzowiZpusoFkyGVwakdRJUyuH5PxQ/PrqghfdFWWasvnCdPfQXHrenDai+gyLARulZjZowCOj6fjT4pA==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
"@babel/helper-string-parser" : "^7.29.7" ,
"@babel/helper-validator-identifier" : "^7.29.7"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=6.9.0"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@esbuild/aix-ppc64" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"version" : "0.25.12" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/aix-ppc64/-/aix-ppc64-0.25.12.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-Hhmwd6CInZ3dwpuGTF8fJG6yoWmsToE+vYgD4nytZVxcu1ulHpUQRAB1UJ8+N1Am3Mz4+xOByoQoSZf4D+CpkA==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"cpu" : [
"ppc64"
] ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"aix"
] ,
"engines" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
"node_modules/@esbuild/android-arm" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"version" : "0.25.12" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/android-arm/-/android-arm-0.25.12.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-VJ+sKvNA/GE7Ccacc9Cha7bpS8nyzVv0jdVgwNDaR4gDMC/2TTRc33Ip8qrNYUcpkOHUT5OZ0bUcNNVZQ9RLlg==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"cpu" : [
"arm"
] ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"android"
] ,
"engines" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
"node_modules/@esbuild/android-arm64" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"version" : "0.25.12" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/android-arm64/-/android-arm64-0.25.12.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-6AAmLG7zwD1Z159jCKPvAxZd4y/VTO0VkprYy+3N2FtJ8+BQWFXU+OxARIwA46c5tdD9SsKGZ/1ocqBS/gAKHg==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"cpu" : [
"arm64"
] ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"android"
] ,
"engines" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
"node_modules/@esbuild/android-x64" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"version" : "0.25.12" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/android-x64/-/android-x64-0.25.12.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-5jbb+2hhDHx5phYR2By8GTWEzn6I9UqR11Kwf22iKbNpYrsmRB18aX/9ivc5cabcUiAT/wM+YIZ6SG9QO6a8kg==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"cpu" : [
"x64"
] ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"android"
] ,
"engines" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
"node_modules/@esbuild/darwin-arm64" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"version" : "0.25.12" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/darwin-arm64/-/darwin-arm64-0.25.12.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-N3zl+lxHCifgIlcMUP5016ESkeQjLj/959RxxNYIthIg+CQHInujFuXeWbWMgnTo4cp5XVHqFPmpyu9J65C1Yg==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"cpu" : [
"arm64"
] ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"darwin"
] ,
"engines" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
"node_modules/@esbuild/darwin-x64" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"version" : "0.25.12" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/darwin-x64/-/darwin-x64-0.25.12.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-HQ9ka4Kx21qHXwtlTUVbKJOAnmG1ipXhdWTmNXiPzPfWKpXqASVcWdnf2bnL73wgjNrFXAa3yYvBSd9pzfEIpA==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"cpu" : [
"x64"
] ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"darwin"
] ,
"engines" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
"node_modules/@esbuild/freebsd-arm64" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"version" : "0.25.12" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/freebsd-arm64/-/freebsd-arm64-0.25.12.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-gA0Bx759+7Jve03K1S0vkOu5Lg/85dou3EseOGUes8flVOGxbhDDh/iZaoek11Y8mtyKPGF3vP8XhnkDEAmzeg==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"cpu" : [
"arm64"
] ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"freebsd"
] ,
"engines" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
"node_modules/@esbuild/freebsd-x64" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"version" : "0.25.12" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/freebsd-x64/-/freebsd-x64-0.25.12.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-TGbO26Yw2xsHzxtbVFGEXBFH0FRAP7gtcPE7P5yP7wGy7cXK2oO7RyOhL5NLiqTlBh47XhmIUXuGciXEqYFfBQ==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"cpu" : [
"x64"
] ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"freebsd"
] ,
"engines" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
"node_modules/@esbuild/linux-arm" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"version" : "0.25.12" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/linux-arm/-/linux-arm-0.25.12.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-lPDGyC1JPDou8kGcywY0YILzWlhhnRjdof3UlcoqYmS9El818LLfJJc3PXXgZHrHCAKs/Z2SeZtDJr5MrkxtOw==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"cpu" : [
"arm"
] ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"linux"
] ,
"engines" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
"node_modules/@esbuild/linux-arm64" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"version" : "0.25.12" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/linux-arm64/-/linux-arm64-0.25.12.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-8bwX7a8FghIgrupcxb4aUmYDLp8pX06rGh5HqDT7bB+8Rdells6mHvrFHHW2JAOPZUbnjUpKTLg6ECyzvas2AQ==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"cpu" : [
"arm64"
] ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"linux"
] ,
"engines" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
"node_modules/@esbuild/linux-ia32" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"version" : "0.25.12" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/linux-ia32/-/linux-ia32-0.25.12.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-0y9KrdVnbMM2/vG8KfU0byhUN+EFCny9+8g202gYqSSVMonbsCfLjUO+rCci7pM0WBEtz+oK/PIwHkzxkyharA==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"cpu" : [
"ia32"
] ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"linux"
] ,
"engines" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
"node_modules/@esbuild/linux-loong64" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"version" : "0.25.12" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/linux-loong64/-/linux-loong64-0.25.12.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-h///Lr5a9rib/v1GGqXVGzjL4TMvVTv+s1DPoxQdz7l/AYv6LDSxdIwzxkrPW438oUXiDtwM10o9PmwS/6Z0Ng==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"cpu" : [
"loong64"
] ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"linux"
] ,
"engines" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
"node_modules/@esbuild/linux-mips64el" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"version" : "0.25.12" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/linux-mips64el/-/linux-mips64el-0.25.12.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-iyRrM1Pzy9GFMDLsXn1iHUm18nhKnNMWscjmp4+hpafcZjrr2WbT//d20xaGljXDBYHqRcl8HnxbX6uaA/eGVw==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"cpu" : [
"mips64el"
] ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"linux"
] ,
"engines" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
"node_modules/@esbuild/linux-ppc64" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"version" : "0.25.12" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/linux-ppc64/-/linux-ppc64-0.25.12.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-9meM/lRXxMi5PSUqEXRCtVjEZBGwB7P/D4yT8UG/mwIdze2aV4Vo6U5gD3+RsoHXKkHCfSxZKzmDssVlRj1QQA==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"cpu" : [
"ppc64"
] ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"linux"
] ,
"engines" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
"node_modules/@esbuild/linux-riscv64" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"version" : "0.25.12" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/linux-riscv64/-/linux-riscv64-0.25.12.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-Zr7KR4hgKUpWAwb1f3o5ygT04MzqVrGEGXGLnj15YQDJErYu/BGg+wmFlIDOdJp0PmB0lLvxFIOXZgFRrdjR0w==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"cpu" : [
"riscv64"
] ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"linux"
] ,
"engines" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
"node_modules/@esbuild/linux-s390x" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"version" : "0.25.12" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/linux-s390x/-/linux-s390x-0.25.12.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-MsKncOcgTNvdtiISc/jZs/Zf8d0cl/t3gYWX8J9ubBnVOwlk65UIEEvgBORTiljloIWnBzLs4qhzPkJcitIzIg==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"cpu" : [
"s390x"
] ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"linux"
] ,
"engines" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
"node_modules/@esbuild/linux-x64" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"version" : "0.25.12" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/linux-x64/-/linux-x64-0.25.12.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-uqZMTLr/zR/ed4jIGnwSLkaHmPjOjJvnm6TVVitAa08SLS9Z0VM8wIRx7gWbJB5/J54YuIMInDquWyYvQLZkgw==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"cpu" : [
"x64"
] ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"linux"
] ,
"engines" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/@esbuild/netbsd-arm64" : {
"version" : "0.28.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/netbsd-arm64/-/netbsd-arm64-0.28.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-oks0DYbLwWMmaakTsCb+zL4E+aHRVLom9IJZOAthMQEPiQmydXHkziYEsGYRx0uNV/IjEKGAV941JzH02pflqw==" ,
"cpu" : [
"arm64"
] ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"netbsd"
] ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=18"
}
} ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"node_modules/@esbuild/netbsd-x64" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"version" : "0.25.12" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/netbsd-x64/-/netbsd-x64-0.25.12.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-Ld5pTlzPy3YwGec4OuHh1aCVCRvOXdH8DgRjfDy/oumVovmuSzWfnSJg+VtakB9Cm0gxNO9BzWkj6mtO1FMXkQ==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"cpu" : [
"x64"
] ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"netbsd"
] ,
"engines" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/@esbuild/openbsd-arm64" : {
"version" : "0.28.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/openbsd-arm64/-/openbsd-arm64-0.28.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-MEFJe5C3R8pwXdZ5Y21oo6m7ePiS0d9pWucn99O/wvyJZChoIQKrQDxKrGeW8F5+T0okTHesAmDeiHDTIq0V/Q==" ,
"cpu" : [
"arm64"
] ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"openbsd"
] ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=18"
}
} ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"node_modules/@esbuild/openbsd-x64" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"version" : "0.25.12" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/openbsd-x64/-/openbsd-x64-0.25.12.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-MZyXUkZHjQxUvzK7rN8DJ3SRmrVrke8ZyRusHlP+kuwqTcfWLyqMOE3sScPPyeIXN/mDJIfGXvcMqCgYKekoQw==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"cpu" : [
"x64"
] ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"openbsd"
] ,
"engines" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/@esbuild/openharmony-arm64" : {
"version" : "0.28.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/openharmony-arm64/-/openharmony-arm64-0.28.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-ge+Z7EXFNt2BO1oAMsVpiQ8EwndV9i1xXerAeTIK7AtPs3bKFXQM7nlRxDSIUIMeueR1CNXxqztLzdNeReKBJg==" ,
"cpu" : [
"arm64"
] ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"openharmony"
] ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=18"
}
} ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"node_modules/@esbuild/sunos-x64" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"version" : "0.25.12" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/sunos-x64/-/sunos-x64-0.25.12.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-3wGSCDyuTHQUzt0nV7bocDy72r2lI33QL3gkDNGkod22EsYl04sMf0qLb8luNKTOmgF/eDEDP5BFNwoBKH441w==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"cpu" : [
"x64"
] ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"sunos"
] ,
"engines" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
"node_modules/@esbuild/win32-arm64" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"version" : "0.25.12" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/win32-arm64/-/win32-arm64-0.25.12.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-rMmLrur64A7+DKlnSuwqUdRKyd3UE7oPJZmnljqEptesKM8wx9J8gx5u0+9Pq0fQQW8vqeKebwNXdfOyP+8Bsg==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"cpu" : [
"arm64"
] ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"win32"
] ,
"engines" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
"node_modules/@esbuild/win32-ia32" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"version" : "0.25.12" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/win32-ia32/-/win32-ia32-0.25.12.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-HkqnmmBoCbCwxUKKNPBixiWDGCpQGVsrQfJoVGYLPT41XWF8lHuE5N6WhVia2n4o5QK5M4tYr21827fNhi4byQ==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"cpu" : [
"ia32"
] ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"win32"
] ,
"engines" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
"node_modules/@esbuild/win32-x64" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"version" : "0.25.12" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/win32-x64/-/win32-x64-0.25.12.tgz" ,
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Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"cpu" : [
"x64"
] ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"win32"
] ,
"engines" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
"node_modules/@eslint-community/eslint-utils" : {
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} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
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Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
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Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
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Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
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Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"node_modules/@sh-mcp/auth-group-sync" : {
"resolved" : "auth/group-sync" ,
"link" : true
} ,
"node_modules/@sh-mcp/auth-pre-token-gen" : {
"resolved" : "auth/pre-token-gen" ,
"link" : true
} ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"node_modules/@sh-mcp/calendar" : {
"resolved" : "packages/calendar" ,
"link" : true
} ,
"node_modules/@sh-mcp/gmail" : {
"resolved" : "packages/gmail" ,
"link" : true
} ,
"node_modules/@sh-mcp/google-maps" : {
"resolved" : "packages/google-maps" ,
"link" : true
} ,
"node_modules/@sh-mcp/internal-data" : {
"resolved" : "packages/internal-data" ,
"link" : true
} ,
"node_modules/@sh-mcp/knowledge-base" : {
"resolved" : "packages/knowledge-base" ,
"link" : true
} ,
"node_modules/@sh-mcp/payments" : {
"resolved" : "packages/payments" ,
"link" : true
} ,
"node_modules/@sh-mcp/qbo" : {
"resolved" : "packages/qbo" ,
"link" : true
} ,
"node_modules/@sh-mcp/reminders" : {
"resolved" : "packages/reminders" ,
"link" : true
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/@sh-mcp/server-finance" : {
"resolved" : "servers/sh-mcp-finance" ,
"link" : true
} ,
"node_modules/@sh-mcp/server-ops" : {
"resolved" : "servers/sh-mcp-ops" ,
"link" : true
} ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"node_modules/@sh-mcp/shared" : {
"resolved" : "packages/shared" ,
"link" : true
} ,
"node_modules/@sh-mcp/tasks" : {
"resolved" : "packages/tasks" ,
"link" : true
} ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"node_modules/@smithy/core" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"version" : "3.29.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@smithy/core/-/core-3.29.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-qoiY4nrk5OCu1+eIR1VB8l5DmON/oKiqrd5zZFAhXJXjJlLWQusKEW/SkBDAtGDcPaz86m9kfcE1lngU0GlM6A==" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "Apache-2.0" ,
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"@smithy/types" : "^4.15.1" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"tslib" : "^2.6.2"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=18.0.0"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@smithy/credential-provider-imds" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"version" : "4.4.6" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@smithy/credential-provider-imds/-/credential-provider-imds-4.4.6.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-B2WQ/PV/H6Jeg3lrIq6bKUfa6Hy01mtK7CGs6lhjzHA6k4aagldH6T6eEjnzKl4HI0cJnAsxfJ19pgb5PV+CVQ==" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "Apache-2.0" ,
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"@smithy/core" : "^3.29.1" ,
"@smithy/types" : "^4.15.1" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"tslib" : "^2.6.2"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=18.0.0"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@smithy/fetch-http-handler" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"version" : "5.6.3" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@smithy/fetch-http-handler/-/fetch-http-handler-5.6.3.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-CwCc/7SMTj45y97MUnDTbTaxvtAsiNNRm81z3abROIuMbMsC2Iy5EKfkkVdsKrz8WExQAAMx1EJapq+9j4fFTQ==" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "Apache-2.0" ,
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"@smithy/core" : "^3.29.1" ,
"@smithy/types" : "^4.15.1" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"tslib" : "^2.6.2"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=18.0.0"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@smithy/node-http-handler" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"version" : "4.9.3" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@smithy/node-http-handler/-/node-http-handler-4.9.3.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-qZTa4gQFUo8RM02rk6q5UVTDLNrQ1oS20LsepBzqq1QBVc/EHJ03OOUADcqMZiXHArW+Y7+OGY0BpdTwZRq/Yg==" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "Apache-2.0" ,
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"@smithy/core" : "^3.29.1" ,
"@smithy/types" : "^4.15.1" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"tslib" : "^2.6.2"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=18.0.0"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@smithy/signature-v4" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"version" : "5.6.2" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@smithy/signature-v4/-/signature-v4-5.6.2.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-QgHflghMoPxCJ9axiCVh8KZfbC9fuP6vkXXyK//E3cq7nLaSSyyLj0GAoqVWezYeDQmXIZhmlRvLE16jsqDK6g==" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "Apache-2.0" ,
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"@smithy/core" : "^3.29.1" ,
"@smithy/types" : "^4.15.1" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"tslib" : "^2.6.2"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=18.0.0"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@smithy/types" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"version" : "4.15.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@smithy/types/-/types-4.15.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-x3L0XSACF6UYzKpa9biqiRMgvH5+wnFFew9Tm/grFYqgaupPwx/+ojDPpPJM8dZON3S9tjz5U+PQYsCBd1Mw5Q==" ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "Apache-2.0" ,
"dependencies" : {
"tslib" : "^2.6.2"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=18.0.0"
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/@types/body-parser" : {
"version" : "1.19.6" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@types/body-parser/-/body-parser-1.19.6.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-HLFeCYgz89uk22N5Qg3dvGvsv46B8GLvKKo1zKG4NybA8U2DiEO3w9lqGg29t/tfLRJpJ6iQxnVw4OnB7MoM9g==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
"@types/connect" : "*" ,
"@types/node" : "*"
}
} ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"node_modules/@types/chai" : {
"version" : "5.2.3" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@types/chai/-/chai-5.2.3.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-Mw558oeA9fFbv65/y4mHtXDs9bPnFMZAL/jxdPFUpOHHIXX91mcgEHbS5Lahr+pwZFR8A7GQleRWeI6cGFC2UA==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
"@types/deep-eql" : "*" ,
"assertion-error" : "^2.0.1"
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/@types/connect" : {
"version" : "3.4.38" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@types/connect/-/connect-3.4.38.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-K6uROf1LD88uDQqJCktA4yzL1YYAK6NgfsI0v/mTgyPKWsX1CnJ0XPSDhViejru1GcRkLWb8RlzFYJRqGUbaug==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
"@types/node" : "*"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@types/cookiejar" : {
"version" : "2.1.5" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@types/cookiejar/-/cookiejar-2.1.5.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-he+DHOWReW0nghN24E1WUqM0efK4kI9oTqDm6XmK8ZPe2djZ90BSNdGnIyCLzCPw7/pogPlGbzI2wHGGmi4O/Q==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT"
} ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"node_modules/@types/deep-eql" : {
"version" : "4.0.2" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@types/deep-eql/-/deep-eql-4.0.2.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-c9h9dVVMigMPc4bwTvC5dxqtqJZwQPePsWjPlpSOnojbor6pGqdk541lfA7AqFQr5pB1BRdq0juY9db81BwyFw==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT"
} ,
"node_modules/@types/estree" : {
"version" : "1.0.9" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@types/estree/-/estree-1.0.9.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-GhdPgy1el4/ImP05X05Uw4cw2/M93BCUmnEvWZNStlCzEKME4Fkk+YpoA5OiHNQmoS7Cafb8Xa3Pya8m1Qrzeg==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT"
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/@types/express" : {
"version" : "5.0.6" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@types/express/-/express-5.0.6.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-sKYVuV7Sv9fbPIt/442koC7+IIwK5olP1KWeD88e/idgoJqDm3JV/YUiPwkoKK92ylff2MGxSz1CSjsXelx0YA==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
"@types/body-parser" : "*" ,
"@types/express-serve-static-core" : "^5.0.0" ,
"@types/serve-static" : "^2"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@types/express-serve-static-core" : {
"version" : "5.1.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@types/express-serve-static-core/-/express-serve-static-core-5.1.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-v4zIMr/cX7/d2BpAEX3KNKL/JrT1s43s96lLvvdTmza1oEvDudCqK9aF/djc/SWgy8Yh0h30TZx5VpzqFCxk5A==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
"@types/node" : "*" ,
"@types/qs" : "*" ,
"@types/range-parser" : "*" ,
"@types/send" : "*"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@types/http-errors" : {
"version" : "2.0.5" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@types/http-errors/-/http-errors-2.0.5.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-r8Tayk8HJnX0FztbZN7oVqGccWgw98T/0neJphO91KkmOzug1KkofZURD4UaD5uH8AqcFLfdPErnBod0u71/qg==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT"
} ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"node_modules/@types/json-schema" : {
"version" : "7.0.15" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@types/json-schema/-/json-schema-7.0.15.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-5+fP8P8MFNC+AyZCDxrB2pkZFPGzqQWUzpSeuuVLvm8VMcorNYavBqoFcxK8bQz4Qsbn4oUEEem4wDLfcysGHA==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT"
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/@types/methods" : {
"version" : "1.1.4" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@types/methods/-/methods-1.1.4.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-ymXWVrDiCxTBE3+RIrrP533E70eA+9qu7zdWoHuOmGujkYtzf4HQF96b8nwHLqhuf4ykX61IGRIB38CC6/sImQ==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT"
} ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"node_modules/@types/node" : {
2026-07-06 18:17:11 -04:00
"version" : "26.1.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@types/node/-/node-26.1.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-O0A1G3xPGy4w7AgQdAQYUlQ+BKk2Oovw8eRpofyp5KdBZULnbe+WqaOVNrm705SHphCiG4XHsACrSmPu1f+Kgw==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 18:17:11 -04:00
"undici-types" : "~8.3.0"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/@types/qs" : {
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"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT"
} ,
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"license" : "MIT"
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"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
"@types/node" : "*"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@types/serve-static" : {
"version" : "2.2.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@types/serve-static/-/serve-static-2.2.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-8mam4H1NHLtu7nmtalF7eyBH14QyOASmcxHhSfEoRyr0nP/YdoesEtU+uSRvMe96TW/HPTtkoKqQLl53N7UXMQ==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
"@types/http-errors" : "*" ,
"@types/node" : "*"
}
} ,
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"@types/node" : "*" ,
"form-data" : "^4.0.0"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@types/supertest" : {
"version" : "7.2.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@types/supertest/-/supertest-7.2.0.tgz" ,
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"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
"@types/methods" : "^1.1.4" ,
"@types/superagent" : "^8.1.0"
}
} ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"node_modules/@typescript-eslint/eslint-plugin" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"version" : "8.63.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@typescript-eslint/eslint-plugin/-/eslint-plugin-8.63.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-rvwSgqT+DHpWdzfSzPatRLm02a0GlESt++9iy3hLCDY4BgkaLcl8LBi9Yh7XGFBpwcBE/K3024QuXWTpbz4FfQ==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"@eslint-community/regexpp" : "^4.12.2" ,
"@typescript-eslint/scope-manager" : "8.63.0" ,
"@typescript-eslint/type-utils" : "8.63.0" ,
"@typescript-eslint/utils" : "8.63.0" ,
"@typescript-eslint/visitor-keys" : "8.63.0" ,
"ignore" : "^7.0.5" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"natural-compare" : "^1.4.0" ,
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"ts-api-utils" : "^2.5.0"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : "^18.18.0 || ^20.9.0 || >=21.1.0"
} ,
"funding" : {
"type" : "opencollective" ,
"url" : "https://opencollective.com/typescript-eslint"
} ,
"peerDependencies" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"@typescript-eslint/parser" : "8.63.0" ,
"eslint" : "^8.57.0 || ^9.0.0 || ^10.0.0" ,
"typescript" : ">=4.8.4 <6.1.0"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@typescript-eslint/eslint-plugin/node_modules/ignore" : {
"version" : "7.0.5" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/ignore/-/ignore-7.0.5.tgz" ,
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"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">= 4"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
"node_modules/@typescript-eslint/parser" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"version" : "8.63.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@typescript-eslint/parser/-/parser-8.63.0.tgz" ,
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Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"license" : "MIT" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"@typescript-eslint/scope-manager" : "8.63.0" ,
"@typescript-eslint/types" : "8.63.0" ,
"@typescript-eslint/typescript-estree" : "8.63.0" ,
"@typescript-eslint/visitor-keys" : "8.63.0" ,
"debug" : "^4.4.3"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : "^18.18.0 || ^20.9.0 || >=21.1.0"
} ,
"funding" : {
"type" : "opencollective" ,
"url" : "https://opencollective.com/typescript-eslint"
} ,
"peerDependencies" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"eslint" : "^8.57.0 || ^9.0.0 || ^10.0.0" ,
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}
} ,
"node_modules/@typescript-eslint/project-service" : {
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"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
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"@typescript-eslint/types" : "^8.63.0" ,
"debug" : "^4.4.3"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"engines" : {
"node" : "^18.18.0 || ^20.9.0 || >=21.1.0"
} ,
"funding" : {
"type" : "opencollective" ,
"url" : "https://opencollective.com/typescript-eslint"
} ,
"peerDependencies" : {
"typescript" : ">=4.8.4 <6.1.0"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
"node_modules/@typescript-eslint/scope-manager" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"version" : "8.63.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@typescript-eslint/scope-manager/-/scope-manager-8.63.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-uUyfMWCnDSN8bCpcrY8nGP2BLkQ9Xn0GsipcONcpIDWhwhO4ZSyHvyS14U3X75mzxWxL3I2UZIrenTzdzcJO8A==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"@typescript-eslint/types" : "8.63.0" ,
"@typescript-eslint/visitor-keys" : "8.63.0"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : "^18.18.0 || ^20.9.0 || >=21.1.0"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"funding" : {
"type" : "opencollective" ,
"url" : "https://opencollective.com/typescript-eslint"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@typescript-eslint/tsconfig-utils" : {
"version" : "8.63.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@typescript-eslint/tsconfig-utils/-/tsconfig-utils-8.63.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-sUAbkulqBAsncKnbRP3+7CtQFRKicexnj7ZwNC6ddCR7EmrXvjvdCYMJbUIqMd6lwoEriZjwLo08aS5tSjVMHg==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"engines" : {
"node" : "^18.18.0 || ^20.9.0 || >=21.1.0"
} ,
"funding" : {
"type" : "opencollective" ,
"url" : "https://opencollective.com/typescript-eslint"
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
} ,
"peerDependencies" : {
"typescript" : ">=4.8.4 <6.1.0"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
"node_modules/@typescript-eslint/type-utils" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"version" : "8.63.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@typescript-eslint/type-utils/-/type-utils-8.63.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-Nzzh/OGxVCOjObjaj1CQF2RUasyYy2Jfuh+zZ3PjLzG2fYRriAiZLib9UKtO+CpQAS3YHiAS+ckZDclwqI1TPA==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"@typescript-eslint/types" : "8.63.0" ,
"@typescript-eslint/typescript-estree" : "8.63.0" ,
"@typescript-eslint/utils" : "8.63.0" ,
"debug" : "^4.4.3" ,
"ts-api-utils" : "^2.5.0"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : "^18.18.0 || ^20.9.0 || >=21.1.0"
} ,
"funding" : {
"type" : "opencollective" ,
"url" : "https://opencollective.com/typescript-eslint"
} ,
"peerDependencies" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"eslint" : "^8.57.0 || ^9.0.0 || ^10.0.0" ,
"typescript" : ">=4.8.4 <6.1.0"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
"node_modules/@typescript-eslint/types" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"version" : "8.63.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@typescript-eslint/types/-/types-8.63.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-xyLtl9DUBBFrcJS4x2pIqGLH68/tC2uOa4Z7pUteW09D3bXnnXUom4dyPikzWgB7llmIc1zoeI3aoUdC4rPK/Q==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"engines" : {
"node" : "^18.18.0 || ^20.9.0 || >=21.1.0"
} ,
"funding" : {
"type" : "opencollective" ,
"url" : "https://opencollective.com/typescript-eslint"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@typescript-eslint/typescript-estree" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"version" : "8.63.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@typescript-eslint/typescript-estree/-/typescript-estree-8.63.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-ygBkU+B7ex5UI/gKhaqexWev79uISfIv7XQCRNYO/jmD8rGLPyWLAb3KMRT6nd8Gt9bmUBi9+iX6tBdYfOY81Q==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"license" : "MIT" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"@typescript-eslint/project-service" : "8.63.0" ,
"@typescript-eslint/tsconfig-utils" : "8.63.0" ,
"@typescript-eslint/types" : "8.63.0" ,
"@typescript-eslint/visitor-keys" : "8.63.0" ,
"debug" : "^4.4.3" ,
"minimatch" : "^10.2.2" ,
"semver" : "^7.7.3" ,
"tinyglobby" : "^0.2.15" ,
"ts-api-utils" : "^2.5.0"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : "^18.18.0 || ^20.9.0 || >=21.1.0"
} ,
"funding" : {
"type" : "opencollective" ,
"url" : "https://opencollective.com/typescript-eslint"
} ,
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"peerDependencies" : {
"typescript" : ">=4.8.4 <6.1.0"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@typescript-eslint/typescript-estree/node_modules/balanced-match" : {
"version" : "4.0.4" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/balanced-match/-/balanced-match-4.0.4.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-BLrgEcRTwX2o6gGxGOCNyMvGSp35YofuYzw9h1IMTRmKqttAZZVU67bdb9Pr2vUHA8+j3i2tJfjO6C6+4myGTA==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"engines" : {
"node" : "18 || 20 || >=22"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@typescript-eslint/typescript-estree/node_modules/brace-expansion" : {
"version" : "5.0.7" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/brace-expansion/-/brace-expansion-5.0.7.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-7oFy703dxfY3/NLxC1fh2SUCQ0H9rmAY+5EpDVfXjUTTs+HEwR2nYaqLv+GWcTsumwxPfiz6CzCNkwXwBUwqCA==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
"balanced-match" : "^4.0.2"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : "18 || 20 || >=22"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@typescript-eslint/typescript-estree/node_modules/minimatch" : {
"version" : "10.2.5" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/minimatch/-/minimatch-10.2.5.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-MULkVLfKGYDFYejP07QOurDLLQpcjk7Fw+7jXS2R2czRQzR56yHRveU5NDJEOviH+hETZKSkIk5c+T23GjFUMg==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "BlueOak-1.0.0" ,
"dependencies" : {
"brace-expansion" : "^5.0.5"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : "18 || 20 || >=22"
} ,
"funding" : {
"url" : "https://github.com/sponsors/isaacs"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
"node_modules/@typescript-eslint/utils" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"version" : "8.63.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@typescript-eslint/utils/-/utils-8.63.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-fUKaeAvrTuQg/Tgt3nliAUSZHJM6DlCcfyEmxCvlX8kieWSStBX+5O5Fnidtc3i2JrH+9c/GL4RY2iasd/GPTA==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"@eslint-community/eslint-utils" : "^4.9.1" ,
"@typescript-eslint/scope-manager" : "8.63.0" ,
"@typescript-eslint/types" : "8.63.0" ,
"@typescript-eslint/typescript-estree" : "8.63.0"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : "^18.18.0 || ^20.9.0 || >=21.1.0"
} ,
"funding" : {
"type" : "opencollective" ,
"url" : "https://opencollective.com/typescript-eslint"
} ,
"peerDependencies" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"eslint" : "^8.57.0 || ^9.0.0 || ^10.0.0" ,
"typescript" : ">=4.8.4 <6.1.0"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
"node_modules/@typescript-eslint/visitor-keys" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"version" : "8.63.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@typescript-eslint/visitor-keys/-/visitor-keys-8.63.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-UexrHGnGTpbuQHct2ExOc2ZcFbGUS9FOesCxxqdBGcpI1BxYu/LZ6U8Aq6/72XtF/qRBk9nhuGHFJIXXMhPMdw==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"@typescript-eslint/types" : "8.63.0" ,
"eslint-visitor-keys" : "^5.0.0"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : "^18.18.0 || ^20.9.0 || >=21.1.0"
} ,
"funding" : {
"type" : "opencollective" ,
"url" : "https://opencollective.com/typescript-eslint"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@typescript-eslint/visitor-keys/node_modules/eslint-visitor-keys" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"version" : "5.0.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/eslint-visitor-keys/-/eslint-visitor-keys-5.0.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-tD40eHxA35h0PEIZNeIjkHoDR4YjjJp34biM0mDvplBe//mB+IHCqHDGV7pxF+7MklTvighcCPPZC7ynWyjdTA==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "Apache-2.0" ,
"engines" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"node" : "^20.19.0 || ^22.13.0 || >=24"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
"funding" : {
"url" : "https://opencollective.com/eslint"
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/@vitest/coverage-v8" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"version" : "3.2.7" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@vitest/coverage-v8/-/coverage-v8-3.2.7.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-NEGWJS2XNu2PfRLQwOO3CTKj1tTETxNBdk454vDxVBhxJYhPaA/eS0nAI0c+1El1P7a60z8+i+ZrQoGESweGKg==" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
"@ampproject/remapping" : "^2.3.0" ,
"@bcoe/v8-coverage" : "^1.0.2" ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"ast-v8-to-istanbul" : "^0.3.3" ,
"debug" : "^4.4.1" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"istanbul-lib-coverage" : "^3.2.2" ,
"istanbul-lib-report" : "^3.0.1" ,
"istanbul-lib-source-maps" : "^5.0.6" ,
"istanbul-reports" : "^3.1.7" ,
"magic-string" : "^0.30.17" ,
"magicast" : "^0.3.5" ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"std-env" : "^3.9.0" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"test-exclude" : "^7.0.1" ,
"tinyrainbow" : "^2.0.0"
} ,
"funding" : {
"url" : "https://opencollective.com/vitest"
} ,
"peerDependencies" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"@vitest/browser" : "3.2.7" ,
"vitest" : "3.2.7"
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
} ,
"peerDependenciesMeta" : {
"@vitest/browser" : {
"optional" : true
}
}
} ,
"node_modules/@vitest/coverage-v8/node_modules/@bcoe/v8-coverage" : {
"version" : "1.0.2" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@bcoe/v8-coverage/-/v8-coverage-1.0.2.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-6zABk/ECA/QYSCQ1NGiVwwbQerUCZ+TQbp64Q3AgmfNvurHH0j8TtXa1qbShXA6qqkpAj4V5W8pP6mLe1mcMqA==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=18"
}
} ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"node_modules/@vitest/expect" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"version" : "3.2.7" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@vitest/expect/-/expect-3.2.7.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-E8eBXaKibuvH2pSZErOjdVb5vF4PbKYcrnluBTYxEk1l/VhhwZg1kZQsdtjq+CsF5CFydf2Rdkz7jDHKSisi3w==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"@types/chai" : "^5.2.2" ,
"@vitest/spy" : "3.2.7" ,
"@vitest/utils" : "3.2.7" ,
"chai" : "^5.2.0" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"tinyrainbow" : "^2.0.0"
} ,
"funding" : {
"url" : "https://opencollective.com/vitest"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@vitest/pretty-format" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"version" : "3.2.7" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@vitest/pretty-format/-/pretty-format-3.2.7.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-KUHlwqVu0sRlhCdyPdQ/wBoTfRahjUky1MubOmYw9fWfIZy1gNoHpuaaQBPAaMaVYdQYHJLurzj8ECCj5OwTqA==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
"tinyrainbow" : "^2.0.0"
} ,
"funding" : {
"url" : "https://opencollective.com/vitest"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@vitest/runner" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"version" : "3.2.7" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@vitest/runner/-/runner-3.2.7.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-sB9y4ovltoQP+WaUPwmSxO9WIg9Ig694Di5PalVPsYHklAdE027mehpWF2SQSVq+k6sFgaivbTjTJwZLSHbedA==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"@vitest/utils" : "3.2.7" ,
"pathe" : "^2.0.3" ,
"strip-literal" : "^3.0.0"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
"funding" : {
"url" : "https://opencollective.com/vitest"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@vitest/snapshot" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"version" : "3.2.7" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@vitest/snapshot/-/snapshot-3.2.7.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-7C+MwShwtBSI5Buwoyg3s/iY1eHL9PKAf+O1wVh/TdnjXUtkoL/9YQtre90i4MtNXM6edP1wJ2zOBpfCyhIS7g==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"@vitest/pretty-format" : "3.2.7" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"magic-string" : "^0.30.17" ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"pathe" : "^2.0.3"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
"funding" : {
"url" : "https://opencollective.com/vitest"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@vitest/spy" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"version" : "3.2.7" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@vitest/spy/-/spy-3.2.7.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-Q2eQGI6d2L/hBtZ0qNuKcAGid68XK6cv1xsoaIma6PaJhHPoqcEJhYpXZ/5myCMqkNgtP6UKuBhbc0nHKnrkuQ==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"tinyspy" : "^4.0.3"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
"funding" : {
"url" : "https://opencollective.com/vitest"
}
} ,
"node_modules/@vitest/utils" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"version" : "3.2.7" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@vitest/utils/-/utils-3.2.7.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-x6BDOd7dyo3PFLY3I9/HJ25X/6OurhGXk2/B9gOZNPF7XDVjeBK4k01lQE5uvDpbuheErh91qYuE1E2OEjK3Rw==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"@vitest/pretty-format" : "3.2.7" ,
"loupe" : "^3.1.4" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"tinyrainbow" : "^2.0.0"
} ,
"funding" : {
"url" : "https://opencollective.com/vitest"
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/accepts" : {
"version" : "2.0.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/accepts/-/accepts-2.0.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-5cvg6CtKwfgdmVqY1WIiXKc3Q1bkRqGLi+2W/6ao+6Y7gu/RCwRuAhGEzh5B4KlszSuTLgZYuqFqo5bImjNKng==" ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
"mime-types" : "^3.0.0" ,
"negotiator" : "^1.0.0"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">= 0.6"
}
} ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"node_modules/acorn" : {
"version" : "8.17.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/acorn/-/acorn-8.17.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-xRQbDb9BnwDafYNn6Vwl839DYVjqXYb1XVGtWAZ1kcDc6iwAL4hg3B1dZlRiuENFeO2H53gFG3in621AdERVAg==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"bin" : {
"acorn" : "bin/acorn"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=0.4.0"
}
} ,
"node_modules/acorn-jsx" : {
"version" : "5.3.2" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/acorn-jsx/-/acorn-jsx-5.3.2.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-rq9s+JNhf0IChjtDXxllJ7g41oZk5SlXtp0LHwyA5cejwn7vKmKp4pPri6YEePv2PU65sAsegbXtIinmDFDXgQ==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"peerDependencies" : {
"acorn" : "^6.0.0 || ^7.0.0 || ^8.0.0"
}
} ,
"node_modules/ajv" : {
"version" : "6.15.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/ajv/-/ajv-6.15.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-fgFx7Hfoq60ytK2c7DhnF8jIvzYgOMxfugjLOSMHjLIPgenqa7S7oaagATUq99mV6IYvN2tRmC0wnTYX6iPbMw==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
"fast-deep-equal" : "^3.1.1" ,
"fast-json-stable-stringify" : "^2.0.0" ,
"json-schema-traverse" : "^0.4.1" ,
"uri-js" : "^4.2.2"
} ,
"funding" : {
"type" : "github" ,
"url" : "https://github.com/sponsors/epoberezkin"
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/ajv-formats" : {
"version" : "3.0.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/ajv-formats/-/ajv-formats-3.0.1.tgz" ,
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"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
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}
}
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"require-from-string" : "^2.0.2"
} ,
"funding" : {
"type" : "github" ,
"url" : "https://github.com/sponsors/epoberezkin"
}
} ,
"node_modules/ajv-formats/node_modules/json-schema-traverse" : {
"version" : "1.0.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/json-schema-traverse/-/json-schema-traverse-1.0.0.tgz" ,
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"license" : "MIT"
} ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"node_modules/ansi-regex" : {
"version" : "6.2.2" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/ansi-regex/-/ansi-regex-6.2.2.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-Bq3SmSpyFHaWjPk8If9yc6svM8c56dB5BAtW4Qbw5jHTwwXXcTLoRMkpDJp6VL0XzlWaCHTXrkFURMYmD0sLqg==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=12"
} ,
"funding" : {
"url" : "https://github.com/chalk/ansi-regex?sponsor=1"
}
} ,
"node_modules/ansi-styles" : {
"version" : "4.3.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/ansi-styles/-/ansi-styles-4.3.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-zbB9rCJAT1rbjiVDb2hqKFHNYLxgtk8NURxZ3IZwD3F6NtxbXZQCnnSi1Lkx+IDohdPlFp222wVALIheZJQSEg==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
"color-convert" : "^2.0.1"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=8"
} ,
"funding" : {
"url" : "https://github.com/chalk/ansi-styles?sponsor=1"
}
} ,
"node_modules/argparse" : {
"version" : "2.0.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/argparse/-/argparse-2.0.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-8+9WqebbFzpX9OR+Wa6O29asIogeRMzcGtAINdpMHHyAg10f05aSFVBbcEqGf/PXw1EjAZ+q2/bEBg3DvurK3Q==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "Python-2.0"
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/asap" : {
"version" : "2.0.6" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/asap/-/asap-2.0.6.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-BSHWgDSAiKs50o2Re8ppvp3seVHXSRM44cdSsT9FfNEUUZLOGWVCsiWaRPWM1Znn+mqZ1OfVZ3z3DWEzSp7hRA==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT"
} ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"node_modules/assertion-error" : {
"version" : "2.0.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/assertion-error/-/assertion-error-2.0.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-Izi8RQcffqCeNVgFigKli1ssklIbpHnCYc6AknXGYoB6grJqyeby7jv12JUQgmTAnIDnbck1uxksT4dzN3PWBA==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=12"
}
} ,
"node_modules/ast-v8-to-istanbul" : {
"version" : "0.3.12" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/ast-v8-to-istanbul/-/ast-v8-to-istanbul-0.3.12.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-BRRC8VRZY2R4Z4lFIL35MwNXmwVqBityvOIwETtsCSwvjl0IdgFsy9NhdaA6j74nUdtJJlIypeRhpDam19Wq3g==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
"@jridgewell/trace-mapping" : "^0.3.31" ,
"estree-walker" : "^3.0.3" ,
"js-tokens" : "^10.0.0"
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/asynckit" : {
"version" : "0.4.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/asynckit/-/asynckit-0.4.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-Oei9OH4tRh0YqU3GxhX79dM/mwVgvbZJaSNaRk+bshkj0S5cfHcgYakreBjrHwatXKbz+IoIdYLxrKim2MjW0Q==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT"
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/aws-cdk" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"version" : "2.1129.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/aws-cdk/-/aws-cdk-2.1129.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-M0EWbjeKW+baUsirjtKuWh7w/9dPxF8taEi2hqo9ecCjGeQxV1dzyosJf+caR3Jh7dFyyT3J8zEtRb/cU971Rw==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"license" : "Apache-2.0" ,
"bin" : {
"cdk" : "bin/cdk"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">= 18.0.0"
}
} ,
"node_modules/aws-cdk-lib" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"version" : "2.261.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/aws-cdk-lib/-/aws-cdk-lib-2.261.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-e52e3Abjg0HkuRWlWwtSv5+ZiMW1rhCDdL9ff7lzWXInU8xdfLJpuoimfa0IJwjiNGyphppgg52Azx9M80OA0g==" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"bundleDependencies" : [
"@balena/dockerignore" ,
"@aws-cdk/cloud-assembly-api" ,
"case" ,
"fs-extra" ,
"ignore" ,
"jsonschema" ,
"minimatch" ,
"punycode" ,
"semver" ,
"yaml" ,
"mime-types"
] ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "Apache-2.0" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dependencies" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"@aws-cdk/asset-awscli-v1" : "2.2.282" ,
"@aws-cdk/asset-node-proxy-agent-v6" : "^2.1.2" ,
"@aws-cdk/cloud-assembly-api" : "^2.2.5" ,
"@aws-cdk/cloud-assembly-schema" : "^54.0.0" ,
"@balena/dockerignore" : "^1.0.2" ,
"case" : "1.6.3" ,
"fs-extra" : "^11.3.5" ,
"ignore" : "^5.3.2" ,
"jsonschema" : "^1.5.0" ,
"mime-types" : "^2.1.35" ,
"minimatch" : "^10.2.5" ,
"punycode" : "^2.3.1" ,
"semver" : "^7.8.1" ,
"yaml" : "1.10.3"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">= 20.0.0"
} ,
"peerDependencies" : {
"constructs" : "^10.5.0"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/aws-cdk-lib/node_modules/@aws-cdk/cloud-assembly-api" : {
"version" : "2.2.5" ,
"dev" : true ,
"inBundle" : true ,
"license" : "Apache-2.0" ,
"dependencies" : {
"jsonschema" : "^1.5.0" ,
"semver" : "^7.8.0"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">= 18.0.0"
} ,
"peerDependencies" : {
"@aws-cdk/cloud-assembly-schema" : ">=53.28.0"
}
} ,
"node_modules/aws-cdk-lib/node_modules/@balena/dockerignore" : {
"version" : "1.0.2" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"inBundle" : true ,
"license" : "Apache-2.0"
} ,
"node_modules/aws-cdk-lib/node_modules/balanced-match" : {
"version" : "4.0.4" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"inBundle" : true ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"license" : "MIT" ,
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : "18 || 20 || >=22"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/aws-cdk-lib/node_modules/brace-expansion" : {
"version" : "5.0.6" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"inBundle" : true ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"balanced-match" : "^4.0.2"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : "18 || 20 || >=22"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/aws-cdk-lib/node_modules/case" : {
"version" : "1.6.3" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"inBundle" : true ,
"license" : "(MIT OR GPL-3.0-or-later)" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">= 0.8.0"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/aws-cdk-lib/node_modules/fs-extra" : {
"version" : "11.3.5" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"inBundle" : true ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"graceful-fs" : "^4.2.0" ,
"jsonfile" : "^6.0.1" ,
"universalify" : "^2.0.0"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">=14.14"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/aws-cdk-lib/node_modules/graceful-fs" : {
"version" : "4.2.11" ,
"dev" : true ,
"inBundle" : true ,
"license" : "ISC"
} ,
"node_modules/aws-cdk-lib/node_modules/ignore" : {
"version" : "5.3.2" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"inBundle" : true ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"license" : "MIT" ,
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">= 4"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/aws-cdk-lib/node_modules/jsonfile" : {
"version" : "6.2.1" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"inBundle" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
"universalify" : "^2.0.0"
} ,
"optionalDependencies" : {
"graceful-fs" : "^4.1.6"
}
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/aws-cdk-lib/node_modules/jsonschema" : {
"version" : "1.5.0" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"inBundle" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"engines" : {
"node" : "*"
}
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/aws-cdk-lib/node_modules/mime-db" : {
"version" : "1.52.0" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"inBundle" : true ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"license" : "MIT" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"engines" : {
"node" : ">= 0.6"
}
} ,
"node_modules/aws-cdk-lib/node_modules/mime-types" : {
"version" : "2.1.35" ,
"dev" : true ,
"inBundle" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
"mime-db" : "1.52.0"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">= 0.6"
}
} ,
"node_modules/aws-cdk-lib/node_modules/minimatch" : {
"version" : "10.2.5" ,
"dev" : true ,
"inBundle" : true ,
"license" : "BlueOak-1.0.0" ,
"dependencies" : {
"brace-expansion" : "^5.0.5"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"engines" : {
"node" : "18 || 20 || >=22"
} ,
"funding" : {
"url" : "https://github.com/sponsors/isaacs"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/aws-cdk-lib/node_modules/punycode" : {
"version" : "2.3.1" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"inBundle" : true ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"license" : "MIT" ,
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">=6"
}
} ,
"node_modules/aws-cdk-lib/node_modules/semver" : {
"version" : "7.8.1" ,
"dev" : true ,
"inBundle" : true ,
"license" : "ISC" ,
"bin" : {
"semver" : "bin/semver.js"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=10"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/aws-cdk-lib/node_modules/universalify" : {
"version" : "2.0.1" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"inBundle" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">= 10.0.0"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/aws-cdk-lib/node_modules/yaml" : {
"version" : "1.10.3" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"inBundle" : true ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"license" : "ISC" ,
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">= 6"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/balanced-match" : {
"version" : "1.0.2" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/balanced-match/-/balanced-match-1.0.2.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-3oSeUO0TMV67hN1AmbXsK4yaqU7tjiHlbxRDZOpH0KW9+CeX4bRAaX0Anxt0tx2MrpRpWwQaPwIlISEJhYU5Pw==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"license" : "MIT"
} ,
"node_modules/body-parser" : {
"version" : "2.3.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/body-parser/-/body-parser-2.3.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-2cGmJupaNgg+QUwVLAucDuWuoMZ6EX9iHDRswZ5lsNYEmwPaRknMPCLZz07yTzVq/83p4o/wzbDZbBrTvGGTIw==" ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dependencies" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"bytes" : "^3.1.2" ,
"content-type" : "^2.0.0" ,
"debug" : "^4.4.3" ,
"http-errors" : "^2.0.1" ,
"iconv-lite" : "^0.7.2" ,
"on-finished" : "^2.4.1" ,
"qs" : "^6.15.2" ,
"raw-body" : "^3.0.2" ,
"type-is" : "^2.1.0"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
"funding" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"type" : "opencollective" ,
"url" : "https://opencollective.com/express"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/body-parser/node_modules/content-type" : {
"version" : "2.0.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/content-type/-/content-type-2.0.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-j/O/d7GcZCyNl7/hwZAb606rzqkyvaDctLmckbxLzHvFBzTJHuGEdodATcP3yIRoDrLHkIATJuvzbFlp/ki2cQ==" ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
"funding" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"type" : "opencollective" ,
"url" : "https://opencollective.com/express"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"node_modules/bowser" : {
"version" : "2.14.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/bowser/-/bowser-2.14.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-tzPjzCxygAKWFOJP011oxFHs57HzIhOEracIgAePE4pqB3LikALKnSzUyU4MGs9/iCEUuHlAJTjTc5M+u7YEGg==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT"
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/brace-expansion" : {
"version" : "2.1.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/brace-expansion/-/brace-expansion-2.1.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-WR1cURNjuvBLMZBMbqM0UoE+WAfdUcEV1ccD8PVBVOI+Z3ND4+SZbN8RsfT2bMuG1qwz5RFvPukSZm5fF2D5eA==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"license" : "MIT" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dependencies" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"balanced-match" : "^1.0.0"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/bytes" : {
"version" : "3.1.2" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/bytes/-/bytes-3.1.2.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-/Nf7TyzTx6S3yRJObOAV7956r8cr2+Oj8AC5dt8wSP3BQAoeX58NoHyCU8P8zGkNXStjTSi6fzO6F0pBdcYbEg==" ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">= 0.8"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/cac" : {
"version" : "6.7.14" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/cac/-/cac-6.7.14.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-b6Ilus+c3RrdDk+JhLKUAQfzzgLEPy6wcXqS7f/xe1EETvsDP6GORG7SFuOs6cID5YkqchW/LXZbX5bc8j7ZcQ==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=8"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/call-bind-apply-helpers" : {
"version" : "1.0.2" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/call-bind-apply-helpers/-/call-bind-apply-helpers-1.0.2.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-Sp1ablJ0ivDkSzjcaJdxEunN5/XvksFJ2sMBFfq6x0ryhQV/2b/KwFe21cMpmHtPOSij8K99/wSfoEuTObmuMQ==" ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
"es-errors" : "^1.3.0" ,
"function-bind" : "^1.1.2"
} ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">= 0.4"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/call-bound" : {
"version" : "1.0.4" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/call-bound/-/call-bound-1.0.4.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-+ys997U96po4Kx/ABpBCqhA9EuxJaQWDQg7295H4hBphv3IZg0boBKuwYpt4YXp6MZ5AmZQnU/tyMTlRpaSejg==" ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
"call-bind-apply-helpers" : "^1.0.2" ,
"get-intrinsic" : "^1.3.0"
} ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">= 0.4"
} ,
"funding" : {
"url" : "https://github.com/sponsors/ljharb"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/callsites" : {
"version" : "3.1.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/callsites/-/callsites-3.1.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-P8BjAsXvZS+VIDUI11hHCQEv74YT67YUi5JJFNWIqL235sBmjX4+qx9Muvls5ivyNENctx46xQLQ3aTuE7ssaQ==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"license" : "MIT" ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=6"
}
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/chai" : {
"version" : "5.3.3" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/chai/-/chai-5.3.3.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-4zNhdJD/iOjSH0A05ea+Ke6MU5mmpQcbQsSOkgdaUMJ9zTlDTD/GYlwohmIE2u0gaxHYiVHEn1Fw9mZ/ktJWgw==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"assertion-error" : "^2.0.1" ,
"check-error" : "^2.1.1" ,
"deep-eql" : "^5.0.1" ,
"loupe" : "^3.1.0" ,
"pathval" : "^2.0.0"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/chalk" : {
"version" : "4.1.2" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/chalk/-/chalk-4.1.2.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-oKnbhFyRIXpUuez8iBMmyEa4nbj4IOQyuhc/wy9kY7/WVPcwIO9VA668Pu8RkO7+0G76SLROeyw9CpQ061i4mA==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"license" : "MIT" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dependencies" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"ansi-styles" : "^4.1.0" ,
"supports-color" : "^7.1.0"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">=10"
} ,
"funding" : {
"url" : "https://github.com/chalk/chalk?sponsor=1"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/check-error" : {
"version" : "2.1.3" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/check-error/-/check-error-2.1.3.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-PAJdDJusoxnwm1VwW07VWwUN1sl7smmC3OKggvndJFadxxDRyFJBX/ggnu/KE4kQAB7a3Dp8f/YXC1FlUprWmA==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"license" : "MIT" ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">= 16"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/color-convert" : {
"version" : "2.0.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/color-convert/-/color-convert-2.0.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-RRECPsj7iu/xb5oKYcsFHSppFNnsj/52OVTRKb4zP5onXwVF3zVmmToNcOfGC+CRDpfK/U584fMg38ZHCaElKQ==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"color-name" : "~1.1.4"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">=7.0.0"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/color-name" : {
"version" : "1.1.4" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/color-name/-/color-name-1.1.4.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-dOy+3AuW3a2wNbZHIuMZpTcgjGuLU/uBL/ubcZF9OXbDo8ff4O8yVp5Bf0efS8uEoYo5q4Fx7dY9OgQGXgAsQA==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT"
} ,
"node_modules/combined-stream" : {
"version" : "1.0.8" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/combined-stream/-/combined-stream-1.0.8.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-FQN4MRfuJeHf7cBbBMJFXhKSDq+2kAArBlmRBvcvFE5BB1HZKXtSFASDhdlz9zOYwxh8lDdnvmMOe/+5cdoEdg==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"delayed-stream" : "~1.0.0"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">= 0.8"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/component-emitter" : {
"version" : "1.3.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/component-emitter/-/component-emitter-1.3.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-T0+barUSQRTUQASh8bx02dl+DhF54GtIDY13Y3m9oWTklKbb3Wv974meRpeZ3lp1JpLVECWWNHC4vaG2XHXouQ==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"funding" : {
"url" : "https://github.com/sponsors/sindresorhus"
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/concat-map" : {
"version" : "0.0.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/concat-map/-/concat-map-0.0.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-/Srv4dswyQNBfohGpz9o6Yb3Gz3SrUDqBH5rTuhGR7ahtlbYKnVxw2bCFMRljaA7EXHaXZ8wsHdodFvbkhKmqg==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"license" : "MIT"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/constructs" : {
"version" : "10.6.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/constructs/-/constructs-10.6.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-TxHOnBO5zMo/G76ykzGF/wMpEHu257TbWiIxP9K0Yv/+t70UzgBQiTqjkAsWOPC6jW91DzJI0+ehQV6xDRNBuQ==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"license" : "Apache-2.0"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/content-disposition" : {
"version" : "1.1.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/content-disposition/-/content-disposition-1.1.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-5jRCH9Z/+DRP7rkvY83B+yGIGX96OYdJmzngqnw2SBSxqCFPd0w2km3s5iawpGX8krnwSGmF0FW5Nhr0Hfai3g==" ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
"funding" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"type" : "opencollective" ,
"url" : "https://opencollective.com/express"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/content-type" : {
"version" : "1.0.5" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/content-type/-/content-type-1.0.5.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-nTjqfcBFEipKdXCv4YDQWCfmcLZKm81ldF0pAopTvyrFGVbcR6P/VAAd5G7N+0tTr8QqiU0tFadD6FK4NtJwOA==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"license" : "MIT" ,
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">= 0.6"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/cookie" : {
"version" : "0.7.2" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/cookie/-/cookie-0.7.2.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-yki5XnKuf750l50uGTllt6kKILY4nQ1eNIQatoXEByZ5dWgnKqbnqmTrBE5B4N7lrMJKQ2ytWMiTO2o0v6Ew/w==" ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">= 0.6"
}
} ,
"node_modules/cookie-signature" : {
"version" : "1.2.2" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/cookie-signature/-/cookie-signature-1.2.2.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-D76uU73ulSXrD1UXF4KE2TMxVVwhsnCgfAyTg9k8P6KGZjlXKrOLe4dJQKI3Bxi5wjesZoFXJWElNWBjPZMbhg==" ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=6.6.0"
}
} ,
"node_modules/cookiejar" : {
"version" : "2.1.4" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/cookiejar/-/cookiejar-2.1.4.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-LDx6oHrK+PhzLKJU9j5S7/Y3jM/mUHvD/DeI1WQmJn652iPC5Y4TBzC9l+5OMOXlyTTA+SmVUPm0HQUwpD5Jqw==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"license" : "MIT"
} ,
"node_modules/cors" : {
"version" : "2.8.6" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/cors/-/cors-2.8.6.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-tJtZBBHA6vjIAaF6EnIaq6laBBP9aq/Y3ouVJjEfoHbRBcHBAHYcMh/w8LDrk2PvIMMq8gmopa5D4V8RmbrxGw==" ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dependencies" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"object-assign" : "^4" ,
"vary" : "^1"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"engines" : {
"node" : ">= 0.10"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
"funding" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"type" : "opencollective" ,
"url" : "https://opencollective.com/express"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/cross-spawn" : {
"version" : "7.0.6" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/cross-spawn/-/cross-spawn-7.0.6.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-uV2QOWP2nWzsy2aMp8aRibhi9dlzF5Hgh5SHaB9OiTGEyDTiJJyx0uy51QXdyWbtAHNua4XJzUKca3OzKUd3vA==" ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dependencies" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"path-key" : "^3.1.0" ,
"shebang-command" : "^2.0.0" ,
"which" : "^2.0.1"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">= 8"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/debug" : {
"version" : "4.4.3" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/debug/-/debug-4.4.3.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-RGwwWnwQvkVfavKVt22FGLw+xYSdzARwm0ru6DhTVA3umU5hZc28V3kO4stgYryrTlLpuvgI9GiijltAjNbcqA==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"license" : "MIT" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"dependencies" : {
"ms" : "^2.1.3"
} ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">=6.0"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"peerDependenciesMeta" : {
"supports-color" : {
"optional" : true
}
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/deep-eql" : {
"version" : "5.0.2" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/deep-eql/-/deep-eql-5.0.2.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-h5k/5U50IJJFpzfL6nO9jaaumfjO/f2NjK/oYB2Djzm4p9L+3T9qWpZqZ2hAbLPuuYq9wrU08WQyBTL5GbPk5Q==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">=6"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/deep-is" : {
"version" : "0.1.4" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/deep-is/-/deep-is-0.1.4.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-oIPzksmTg4/MriiaYGO+okXDT7ztn/w3Eptv/+gSIdMdKsJo0u4CfYNFJPy+4SKMuCqGw2wxnA+URMg3t8a/bQ==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT"
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/delayed-stream" : {
"version" : "1.0.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/delayed-stream/-/delayed-stream-1.0.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-ZySD7Nf91aLB0RxL4KGrKHBXl7Eds1DAmEdcoVawXnLD7SDhpNgtuII2aAkg7a7QS41jxPSZ17p4VdGnMHk3MQ==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">=0.4.0"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/depd" : {
"version" : "2.0.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/depd/-/depd-2.0.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-g7nH6P6dyDioJogAAGprGpCtVImJhpPk/roCzdb3fIh61/s/nPsfR6onyMwkCAR/OlC3yBC0lESvUoQEAssIrw==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"license" : "MIT" ,
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">= 0.8"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/dezalgo" : {
"version" : "1.0.4" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/dezalgo/-/dezalgo-1.0.4.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-rXSP0bf+5n0Qonsb+SVVfNfIsimO4HEtmnIpPHY8Q1UCzKlQrDMfdobr8nJOOsRgWCyMRqeSBQzmWUMq7zvVig==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"license" : "ISC" ,
"dependencies" : {
"asap" : "^2.0.0" ,
"wrappy" : "1"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/dunder-proto" : {
"version" : "1.0.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/dunder-proto/-/dunder-proto-1.0.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-KIN/nDJBQRcXw0MLVhZE9iQHmG68qAVIBg9CqmUYjmQIhgij9U5MFvrqkUL5FbtyyzZuOeOt0zdeRe4UY7ct+A==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"license" : "MIT" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"dependencies" : {
"call-bind-apply-helpers" : "^1.0.1" ,
"es-errors" : "^1.3.0" ,
"gopd" : "^1.2.0"
} ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">= 0.4"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
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2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
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Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"hasInstallScript" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"bin" : {
"esbuild" : "bin/esbuild"
} ,
"engines" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
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2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
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Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
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Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"node_modules/mnemonist" : {
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} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
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} ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"node_modules/obliterator" : {
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Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
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2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
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Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
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"dev" : true ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"license" : "MIT" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"dependencies" : {
"ansi-regex" : "^5.0.1"
} ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=8"
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/strip-ansi" : {
"version" : "7.2.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/strip-ansi/-/strip-ansi-7.2.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-yDPMNjp4WyfYBkHnjIRLfca1i6KMyGCtsVgoKe/z1+6vukgaENdgGBZt+ZmKPc4gavvEZ5OgHfHdrazhgNyG7w==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"ansi-regex" : "^6.2.2"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">=12"
} ,
"funding" : {
"url" : "https://github.com/chalk/strip-ansi?sponsor=1"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/strip-ansi-cjs" : {
"name" : "strip-ansi" ,
"version" : "6.0.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/strip-ansi/-/strip-ansi-6.0.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-Y38VPSHcqkFrCpFnQ9vuSXmquuv5oXOKpGeT6aGrr3o3Gc9AlVa6JBfUSOCnbxGGZF+/0ooI7KrPuUSztUdU5A==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"dependencies" : {
"ansi-regex" : "^5.0.1"
} ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">=8"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/strip-ansi-cjs/node_modules/ansi-regex" : {
"version" : "5.0.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/ansi-regex/-/ansi-regex-5.0.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-quJQXlTSUGL2LH9SUXo8VwsY4soanhgo6LNSm84E1LBcE8s3O0wpdiRzyR9z/ZZJMlMWv37qOOb9pdJlMUEKFQ==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"license" : "MIT" ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=8"
}
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/strip-json-comments" : {
"version" : "3.1.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/strip-json-comments/-/strip-json-comments-3.1.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-6fPc+R4ihwqP6N/aIv2f1gMH8lOVtWQHoqC4yK6oSDVVocumAsfCqjkXnqiYMhmMwS/mEHLp7Vehlt3ql6lEig==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"license" : "MIT" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=8"
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
} ,
"funding" : {
"url" : "https://github.com/sponsors/sindresorhus"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/strip-literal" : {
"version" : "3.1.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/strip-literal/-/strip-literal-3.1.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-8r3mkIM/2+PpjHoOtiAW8Rg3jJLHaV7xPwG+YRGrv6FP0wwk/toTpATxWYOW0BKdWwl82VT2tFYi5DlROa0Mxg==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"license" : "MIT" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dependencies" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"js-tokens" : "^9.0.1"
} ,
"funding" : {
"url" : "https://github.com/sponsors/antfu"
}
} ,
"node_modules/strip-literal/node_modules/js-tokens" : {
"version" : "9.0.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/js-tokens/-/js-tokens-9.0.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-mxa9E9ITFOt0ban3j6L5MpjwegGz6lBQmM1IJkWeBZGcMxto50+eWdjC/52xDbS2vy0k7vIMK0Fe2wfL9OQSpQ==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT"
} ,
"node_modules/superagent" : {
"version" : "10.3.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/superagent/-/superagent-10.3.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-B+4Ik7ROgVKrQsXTV0Jwp2u+PXYLSlqtDAhYnkkD+zn3yg8s/zjA2MeGayPoY/KICrbitwneDHrjSotxKL+0XQ==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
"component-emitter" : "^1.3.1" ,
"cookiejar" : "^2.1.4" ,
"debug" : "^4.3.7" ,
"fast-safe-stringify" : "^2.1.1" ,
"form-data" : "^4.0.5" ,
"formidable" : "^3.5.4" ,
"methods" : "^1.1.2" ,
"mime" : "2.6.0" ,
"qs" : "^6.14.1"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">=14.18.0"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/supertest" : {
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Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"version" : "5.0.6" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/brace-expansion/-/brace-expansion-5.0.6.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-kLpxurY4Z4r9sgMsyG0Z9uzsBlgiU/EFKhj/h91/8yHu0edo7XuixOIH3VcJ8kkxs6/jPzoI6U9Vj3WqbMQ94g==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"license" : "MIT" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dependencies" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"balanced-match" : "^4.0.2"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : "18 || 20 || >=22"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/test-exclude/node_modules/minimatch" : {
"version" : "10.2.5" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/minimatch/-/minimatch-10.2.5.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-MULkVLfKGYDFYejP07QOurDLLQpcjk7Fw+7jXS2R2czRQzR56yHRveU5NDJEOviH+hETZKSkIk5c+T23GjFUMg==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"license" : "BlueOak-1.0.0" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dependencies" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"brace-expansion" : "^5.0.5"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : "18 || 20 || >=22"
} ,
"funding" : {
"url" : "https://github.com/sponsors/isaacs"
}
} ,
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"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/text-table/-/text-table-0.2.0.tgz" ,
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"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT"
} ,
"node_modules/tinybench" : {
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"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/tinybench/-/tinybench-2.9.0.tgz" ,
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} ,
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"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/tinyexec/-/tinyexec-0.3.2.tgz" ,
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"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT"
} ,
"node_modules/tinyglobby" : {
"version" : "0.2.17" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/tinyglobby/-/tinyglobby-0.2.17.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-wXR/dYpcqKmfWpEdZjiKJOwCNFndD0DMnrW/cYjVGttEkBfVgcLFHoNrlj47mjOVic9yyNu65alsgF4NQyTa2g==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
"fdir" : "^6.5.0" ,
"picomatch" : "^4.0.4"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=12.0.0"
} ,
"funding" : {
"url" : "https://github.com/sponsors/SuperchupuDev"
}
} ,
"node_modules/tinyglobby/node_modules/fdir" : {
"version" : "6.5.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/fdir/-/fdir-6.5.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-tIbYtZbucOs0BRGqPJkshJUYdL+SDH7dVM8gjy+ERp3WAUjLEFJE+02kanyHtwjWOnwrKYBiwAmM0p4kLJAnXg==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=12.0.0"
} ,
"peerDependencies" : {
"picomatch" : "^3 || ^4"
} ,
"peerDependenciesMeta" : {
"picomatch" : {
"optional" : true
}
}
} ,
"node_modules/tinyglobby/node_modules/picomatch" : {
"version" : "4.0.4" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/picomatch/-/picomatch-4.0.4.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-QP88BAKvMam/3NxH6vj2o21R6MjxZUAd6nlwAS/pnGvN9IVLocLHxGYIzFhg6fUQ+5th6P4dv4eW9jX3DSIj7A==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=12"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"funding" : {
"url" : "https://github.com/sponsors/jonschlinkert"
}
} ,
"node_modules/tinypool" : {
"version" : "1.1.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/tinypool/-/tinypool-1.1.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-Zba82s87IFq9A9XmjiX5uZA/ARWDrB03OHlq+Vw1fSdt0I+4/Kutwy8BP4Y/y/aORMo61FQ0vIb5j44vSo5Pkg==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"engines" : {
"node" : "^18.0.0 || >=20.0.0"
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} ,
"node_modules/tinyspy" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"version" : "4.0.4" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/tinyspy/-/tinyspy-4.0.4.tgz" ,
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Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">=14.0.0"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/toidentifier" : {
"version" : "1.0.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/toidentifier/-/toidentifier-1.0.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-o5sSPKEkg/DIQNmH43V0/uerLrpzVedkUh8tGNvaeXpfpuwjKenlSox/2O/BTlZUtEe+JG7s5YhEz608PlAHRA==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"license" : "MIT" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=0.6"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/ts-api-utils" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"version" : "2.5.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/ts-api-utils/-/ts-api-utils-2.5.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-OJ/ibxhPlqrMM0UiNHJ/0CKQkoKF243/AEmplt3qpRgkW8VG7IfOS41h7V8TjITqdByHzrjcS/2si+y4lIh8NA==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"license" : "MIT" ,
"engines" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"node" : ">=18.12"
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
} ,
"peerDependencies" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"typescript" : ">=4.8.4"
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
}
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
"node_modules/tslib" : {
"version" : "2.8.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/tslib/-/tslib-2.8.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-oJFu94HQb+KVduSUQL7wnpmqnfmLsOA/nAh6b6EH0wCEoK0/mPeXU6c3wKDV83MkOuHPRHtSXKKU99IBazS/2w==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "0BSD"
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/tsx" : {
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"version" : "4.23.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/tsx/-/tsx-4.23.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-eUdUIaCr963q2h5u3+QwvYp0+eqPvn+egeqZUm0hwERCqqx1E3kK5ehbGCvqSE5MQAULr67ww0cA3jKc3YkM1w==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"esbuild" : "~0.28.0"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
"bin" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"tsx" : "dist/cli.mjs"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=18.0.0"
} ,
"optionalDependencies" : {
"fsevents" : "~2.3.3"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/tsx/node_modules/@esbuild/aix-ppc64" : {
"version" : "0.28.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/aix-ppc64/-/aix-ppc64-0.28.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-Svl7tq8k/08+p6CXPpRjQ1fKX+1odH/BQbb48fV6fj3CWHhsoIOoY87w1oHXm0qEpkIK3ZfVgp0hed3XBXzXMQ==" ,
"cpu" : [
"ppc64"
] ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"license" : "MIT" ,
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"aix"
] ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=18"
}
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/tsx/node_modules/@esbuild/android-arm" : {
"version" : "0.28.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/android-arm/-/android-arm-0.28.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-0k2F129Xdio1TdJfzJ8sy1Q47vUD2NnwdhiAf7drUN1EBTfPf4hsFCtmMgu/6m8JSzsBrlmVjudMBQqOfG8usQ==" ,
"cpu" : [
"arm"
] ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"android"
] ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/tsx/node_modules/@esbuild/android-arm64" : {
"version" : "0.28.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/android-arm64/-/android-arm64-0.28.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-34EGEbCIAgosYz6goLcopX6Mo7NyGv9tfwEM2/7Ce2VcVRk568iSvniGWcUXIy7wEDR1wzolcxcriFVrWYcwBg==" ,
"cpu" : [
"arm64"
] ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"android"
] ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/tsx/node_modules/@esbuild/android-x64" : {
"version" : "0.28.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/android-x64/-/android-x64-0.28.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-dbwY7ltSMDWsRatcRpCnES4F+im88OCUgGZjy52shC7GqHRE/cYlxNbB4Z4UpJswpcc4Qxd2oE/ufM0p61IKng==" ,
"cpu" : [
"x64"
] ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"android"
] ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/tsx/node_modules/@esbuild/darwin-arm64" : {
"version" : "0.28.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/darwin-arm64/-/darwin-arm64-0.28.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-TZbWkQY7kvTAXbXUT7uVACR5cMHsDiSz9z7ZKAX/RTq/WJEk3QyRr0wZpNhBDX+/0CtdqUIJlOiodQcta6tY3Q==" ,
"cpu" : [
"arm64"
] ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"license" : "MIT" ,
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"darwin"
] ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=18"
}
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/tsx/node_modules/@esbuild/darwin-x64" : {
"version" : "0.28.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/darwin-x64/-/darwin-x64-0.28.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-zfdzgK9ACBNZLI/CyHTOx81SyNbM6YXn7rxSgX97VjyiPl9W1i4Ka4fgKECEoFCKGpvBj5qArWIGgQjOwkgskQ==" ,
"cpu" : [
"x64"
] ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"license" : "MIT" ,
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"darwin"
] ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=18"
}
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/tsx/node_modules/@esbuild/freebsd-arm64" : {
"version" : "0.28.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/freebsd-arm64/-/freebsd-arm64-0.28.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-wG2EA8ENdEI0qhkSZMjfqrdY+ziCYCPMmtZjjIwOmXFjmyzEHn+UUxk5of+SYsjtfs3VpnlC7QLzSI5hY/rOAw==" ,
"cpu" : [
"arm64"
] ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"license" : "MIT" ,
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"freebsd"
] ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=18"
}
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/tsx/node_modules/@esbuild/freebsd-x64" : {
"version" : "0.28.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/freebsd-x64/-/freebsd-x64-0.28.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-i7dZ9vQgnvSCzi/rYCXNgtF/U+eKZNJBzu3eTQbRgHnM7tNSizLOkRFAl3qzVc/Op/u5YkHHa4pf/3DOYHthLQ==" ,
"cpu" : [
"x64"
] ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"freebsd"
] ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/tsx/node_modules/@esbuild/linux-arm" : {
"version" : "0.28.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/linux-arm/-/linux-arm-0.28.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-qVXBOHQS+d5Y722GwJzJUtOLlX7km3CraOaGormF1pDtPd2C/l1SHRPgjLunLGe51Sh5YYWKMFDyV4SxgMQYTQ==" ,
"cpu" : [
"arm"
] ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"linux"
] ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/tsx/node_modules/@esbuild/linux-arm64" : {
"version" : "0.28.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/linux-arm64/-/linux-arm64-0.28.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-yHs+0uc8+nvEAfAfxrWQKK5peSNzBc4PegcMO0EJ2hT71uA7vB8Ihg2e77R2P7SG5uYjPbHlLLmve4LLLRCf0g==" ,
"cpu" : [
"arm64"
] ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"linux"
] ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
} ,
"node_modules/tsx/node_modules/@esbuild/linux-ia32" : {
"version" : "0.28.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/linux-ia32/-/linux-ia32-0.28.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-d1z4ZuP0ajrfz/FhGT4vv278rX8KnPPJx8i5+AtK7TYbx9Le9F1hyzurZpkEyjkGa9dUGhQow4C1NmeGvqxN2w==" ,
"cpu" : [
"ia32"
] ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"linux"
] ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/tsx/node_modules/@esbuild/linux-loong64" : {
"version" : "0.28.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/linux-loong64/-/linux-loong64-0.28.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-M5sRjUVZrkm1OAPR3dlOYzNmN+loZKGVi1VUQGrwuqLcbR6qeAz+famMhjASeH3YVKvZz+zT1jlh/keC3Rj/lg==" ,
"cpu" : [
"loong64"
] ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"linux"
] ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/tsx/node_modules/@esbuild/linux-mips64el" : {
"version" : "0.28.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/linux-mips64el/-/linux-mips64el-0.28.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-mRObBZeHh2OxcBFPWE/FjylkRgZdYuiTR3vaTozquCGOH14iP9oN4x4Ge81CoIDYQrXmIxpFumJBu5MtZpnQJQ==" ,
"cpu" : [
"mips64el"
] ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"license" : "MIT" ,
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"linux"
] ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/tsx/node_modules/@esbuild/linux-ppc64" : {
"version" : "0.28.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/linux-ppc64/-/linux-ppc64-0.28.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-slScBsMAb3GFDcdrCgLwZtPYRoH2H/youv10QiZyRjmsP48fznoveWytSgCI/R0ZcUgpc0ZhIUEx6LHts8yrfQ==" ,
"cpu" : [
"ppc64"
] ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"license" : "MIT" ,
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"linux"
] ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/tsx/node_modules/@esbuild/linux-riscv64" : {
"version" : "0.28.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/linux-riscv64/-/linux-riscv64-0.28.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-kw0owk1o0GFETUJyW0jc0G4Yzs0BHZn0JDZ8JRT088vjJYX777BAs1fDGxAC+q831qOs2DTC96mNsG2opdfyyQ==" ,
"cpu" : [
"riscv64"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
] ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"license" : "MIT" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"linux"
] ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/tsx/node_modules/@esbuild/linux-s390x" : {
"version" : "0.28.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/linux-s390x/-/linux-s390x-0.28.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-/lAIjX8aYFRByhh6L5rYtPEDRqa9de/4V/juOXcta5frjvzXO4/sqEtyytse0g3zZFuWu5cDN0MkLz2qRDD2Ag==" ,
"cpu" : [
"s390x"
] ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"linux"
] ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/tsx/node_modules/@esbuild/linux-x64" : {
"version" : "0.28.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/linux-x64/-/linux-x64-0.28.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-u/anNYF2mmVOEDwLtnQ1wOr3EZ9sTNGLWrsYGYwHWzGA3Si84IOkHXlbWTD1NB+9/1lcnweYKO54uhxZydNzfA==" ,
"cpu" : [
"x64"
] ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"linux"
] ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/tsx/node_modules/@esbuild/netbsd-x64" : {
"version" : "0.28.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/netbsd-x64/-/netbsd-x64-0.28.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-aeL6lAnN89Hz43Mlh1G8ARasbuoYvSITDEx0tHh5b7jJnHcssqgjy9Yx430GDpmCa6OyrKoS0aNRjKundRizGg==" ,
"cpu" : [
"x64"
] ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"netbsd"
] ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/tsx/node_modules/@esbuild/openbsd-x64" : {
"version" : "0.28.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/openbsd-x64/-/openbsd-x64-0.28.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-i/ZLIOafE0Z8cI/XANJAixoJL/uRAoS2xOA3rb0xN+KK0K177cMAsQYkzHtBrtMXAKuAc7HGgcWiZ/sRC1Nxgw==" ,
"cpu" : [
"x64"
] ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"openbsd"
] ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/tsx/node_modules/@esbuild/sunos-x64" : {
"version" : "0.28.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/sunos-x64/-/sunos-x64-0.28.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-BEjgtECkL3vY+SaSQ6nzVfiALUeFxpawyp8Jmf5PtYhf1Ug40N1h/hxlhts+f1FvSvarEigdxS3BlSMI2PJLcQ==" ,
"cpu" : [
"x64"
] ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"sunos"
] ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/tsx/node_modules/@esbuild/win32-arm64" : {
"version" : "0.28.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/win32-arm64/-/win32-arm64-0.28.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-lCv9eK/H6ZJWbE7bh2nw54CZ9M2nupBxJcTsdk/QQnWkdSjKGuxmmH8/GWrlT1eMmZfn4dGcCjRte397WqfQXA==" ,
"cpu" : [
"arm64"
] ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"win32"
] ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/tsx/node_modules/@esbuild/win32-ia32" : {
"version" : "0.28.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/win32-ia32/-/win32-ia32-0.28.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-zvb/mB2bSCoJOpoCBgYKKpX6YM6mJBlBUVUtVj41DlZJVEB6/0CKlRYxP5wWl1C1ILiCoAU5wZZ4q1P3qeS6Eg==" ,
"cpu" : [
"ia32"
] ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"license" : "MIT" ,
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"win32"
] ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/tsx/node_modules/@esbuild/win32-x64" : {
"version" : "0.28.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/win32-x64/-/win32-x64-0.28.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-bm4Mowrv+GXMlpWX++EcXw/iLyd1o3+bJkC2DkWXYVvgZCqD/bSj9ctZeAMC3cIxgjRVR2Dufaiu4YPxr5gW1A==" ,
"cpu" : [
"x64"
] ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"optional" : true ,
"os" : [
"win32"
] ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/tsx/node_modules/esbuild" : {
"version" : "0.28.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/esbuild/-/esbuild-0.28.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-HrJrvZv5ayxBzPfwphOoNzkzOIIlifzk0KJrGK2c8R4+LKpMtpYLQeUdjnwjWv/LZlkH2laZk+4w78pi99D4Vw==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"hasInstallScript" : true ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"license" : "MIT" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"bin" : {
"esbuild" : "bin/esbuild"
} ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"optionalDependencies" : {
"@esbuild/aix-ppc64" : "0.28.1" ,
"@esbuild/android-arm" : "0.28.1" ,
"@esbuild/android-arm64" : "0.28.1" ,
"@esbuild/android-x64" : "0.28.1" ,
"@esbuild/darwin-arm64" : "0.28.1" ,
"@esbuild/darwin-x64" : "0.28.1" ,
"@esbuild/freebsd-arm64" : "0.28.1" ,
"@esbuild/freebsd-x64" : "0.28.1" ,
"@esbuild/linux-arm" : "0.28.1" ,
"@esbuild/linux-arm64" : "0.28.1" ,
"@esbuild/linux-ia32" : "0.28.1" ,
"@esbuild/linux-loong64" : "0.28.1" ,
"@esbuild/linux-mips64el" : "0.28.1" ,
"@esbuild/linux-ppc64" : "0.28.1" ,
"@esbuild/linux-riscv64" : "0.28.1" ,
"@esbuild/linux-s390x" : "0.28.1" ,
"@esbuild/linux-x64" : "0.28.1" ,
"@esbuild/netbsd-arm64" : "0.28.1" ,
"@esbuild/netbsd-x64" : "0.28.1" ,
"@esbuild/openbsd-arm64" : "0.28.1" ,
"@esbuild/openbsd-x64" : "0.28.1" ,
"@esbuild/openharmony-arm64" : "0.28.1" ,
"@esbuild/sunos-x64" : "0.28.1" ,
"@esbuild/win32-arm64" : "0.28.1" ,
"@esbuild/win32-ia32" : "0.28.1" ,
"@esbuild/win32-x64" : "0.28.1"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/type-check" : {
"version" : "0.4.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/type-check/-/type-check-0.4.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-XleUoc9uwGXqjWwXaUTZAmzMcFZ5858QA2vvx1Ur5xIcixXIP+8LnFDgRplU30us6teqdlskFfu+ae4K79Ooew==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"prelude-ls" : "^1.2.1"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">= 0.8.0"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/type-is" : {
"version" : "2.1.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/type-is/-/type-is-2.1.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-faYHw0anBbc/kWF3zFTEnxSFOAGUX9GFbOBthvDdLsIlEoWOFOtS0zgCiQYwIskL9iGXZL3kAXD8OoZ4GmMATA==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"license" : "MIT" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"dependencies" : {
"content-type" : "^2.0.0" ,
"media-typer" : "^1.1.0" ,
"mime-types" : "^3.0.0"
} ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">= 18"
} ,
"funding" : {
"type" : "opencollective" ,
"url" : "https://opencollective.com/express"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/type-is/node_modules/content-type" : {
"version" : "2.0.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/content-type/-/content-type-2.0.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-j/O/d7GcZCyNl7/hwZAb606rzqkyvaDctLmckbxLzHvFBzTJHuGEdodATcP3yIRoDrLHkIATJuvzbFlp/ki2cQ==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"license" : "MIT" ,
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">=18"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
"funding" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"type" : "opencollective" ,
"url" : "https://opencollective.com/express"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/typescript" : {
"version" : "5.6.3" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/typescript/-/typescript-5.6.3.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-hjcS1mhfuyi4WW8IWtjP7brDrG2cuDZukyrYrSauoXGNgx0S7zceP07adYkJycEr56BOUTNPzbInooiN3fn1qw==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"license" : "Apache-2.0" ,
"bin" : {
"tsc" : "bin/tsc" ,
"tsserver" : "bin/tsserver"
} ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">=14.17"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/undici-types" : {
2026-07-06 18:17:11 -04:00
"version" : "8.3.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/undici-types/-/undici-types-8.3.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-j375ScV60dom+YkPFIfTLcOiPxkN/buHz5GobjLhixFuANaNs3C9l4GmrWqejgXWJ7BbJcFYpTEUkS1Ge8bpZQ==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT"
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/unpipe" : {
"version" : "1.0.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/unpipe/-/unpipe-1.0.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-pjy2bYhSsufwWlKwPc+l3cN7+wuJlK6uz0YdJEOlQDbl6jo/YlPi4mb8agUkVC8BF7V8NuzeyPNqRksA3hztKQ==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"license" : "MIT" ,
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">= 0.8"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/uri-js" : {
"version" : "4.4.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/uri-js/-/uri-js-4.4.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-7rKUyy33Q1yc98pQ1DAmLtwX109F7TIfWlW1Ydo8Wl1ii1SeHieeh0HHfPeL2fMXK6z0s8ecKs9frCuLJvndBg==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"license" : "BSD-2-Clause" ,
"dependencies" : {
"punycode" : "^2.1.0"
}
} ,
"node_modules/vary" : {
"version" : "1.1.2" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/vary/-/vary-1.1.2.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-BNGbWLfd0eUPabhkXUVm0j8uuvREyTh5ovRa/dyow/BqAbZJyC+5fU+IzQOzmAKzYqYRAISoRhdQr3eIZ/PXqg==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"license" : "MIT" ,
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">= 0.8"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/vite" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"version" : "6.4.3" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/vite/-/vite-6.4.3.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-NTKlcQjlAK7MlQoyb6LgaqHc8sso/pVyUJYWMws3jg21uTJw/LddqIFPcPqP6PzpgbIcZyKI85sFE4HBrQDA8A==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"esbuild" : "^0.25.0" ,
"fdir" : "^6.4.4" ,
"picomatch" : "^4.0.2" ,
"postcss" : "^8.5.3" ,
"rollup" : "^4.34.9" ,
"tinyglobby" : "^0.2.13"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
"bin" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"vite" : "bin/vite.js"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
"engines" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"node" : "^18.0.0 || ^20.0.0 || >=22.0.0"
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
} ,
"funding" : {
"url" : "https://github.com/vitejs/vite?sponsor=1"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
"optionalDependencies" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"fsevents" : "~2.3.3"
} ,
"peerDependencies" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"@types/node" : "^18.0.0 || ^20.0.0 || >=22.0.0" ,
"jiti" : ">=1.21.0" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"less" : "*" ,
"lightningcss" : "^1.21.0" ,
"sass" : "*" ,
"sass-embedded" : "*" ,
"stylus" : "*" ,
"sugarss" : "*" ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"terser" : "^5.16.0" ,
"tsx" : "^4.8.1" ,
"yaml" : "^2.4.2"
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
} ,
"peerDependenciesMeta" : {
"@types/node" : {
"optional" : true
} ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"jiti" : {
"optional" : true
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"less" : {
"optional" : true
} ,
"lightningcss" : {
"optional" : true
} ,
"sass" : {
"optional" : true
} ,
"sass-embedded" : {
"optional" : true
} ,
"stylus" : {
"optional" : true
} ,
"sugarss" : {
"optional" : true
} ,
"terser" : {
"optional" : true
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
} ,
"tsx" : {
"optional" : true
} ,
"yaml" : {
"optional" : true
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
}
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/vite-node" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"version" : "3.2.4" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/vite-node/-/vite-node-3.2.4.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-EbKSKh+bh1E1IFxeO0pg1n4dvoOTt0UDiXMd/qn++r98+jPO1xtJilvXldeuQ8giIB5IkpjCgMleHMNEsGH6pg==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
"cac" : "^6.7.14" ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"debug" : "^4.4.1" ,
"es-module-lexer" : "^1.7.0" ,
"pathe" : "^2.0.3" ,
"vite" : "^5.0.0 || ^6.0.0 || ^7.0.0-0"
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
} ,
"bin" : {
"vite-node" : "vite-node.mjs"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : "^18.0.0 || ^20.0.0 || >=22.0.0"
} ,
"funding" : {
"url" : "https://opencollective.com/vitest"
}
} ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"node_modules/vite/node_modules/fdir" : {
"version" : "6.5.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/fdir/-/fdir-6.5.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-tIbYtZbucOs0BRGqPJkshJUYdL+SDH7dVM8gjy+ERp3WAUjLEFJE+02kanyHtwjWOnwrKYBiwAmM0p4kLJAnXg==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=12.0.0"
} ,
"peerDependencies" : {
"picomatch" : "^3 || ^4"
} ,
"peerDependenciesMeta" : {
"picomatch" : {
"optional" : true
}
}
} ,
"node_modules/vite/node_modules/picomatch" : {
"version" : "4.0.5" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/picomatch/-/picomatch-4.0.5.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-RvwwcruNjI1ncT5xRakeyS9Lf8lcItv34KD+aif+VH9kduAyfYBipGh12274xtenIPZ119/R9BdTBa8gAwSh0A==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=12"
} ,
"funding" : {
"url" : "https://github.com/sponsors/jonschlinkert"
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/vitest" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"version" : "3.2.7" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/vitest/-/vitest-3.2.7.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-KrxIJ62Fd89gfysR4WotlgZABiz2dqFPgqGzX7s+CwsqLFomRH7777ZcrOD6+WVAh7khPQP41A+BKbpcJFrdEg==" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"@types/chai" : "^5.2.2" ,
"@vitest/expect" : "3.2.7" ,
"@vitest/mocker" : "3.2.7" ,
"@vitest/pretty-format" : "^3.2.7" ,
"@vitest/runner" : "3.2.7" ,
"@vitest/snapshot" : "3.2.7" ,
"@vitest/spy" : "3.2.7" ,
"@vitest/utils" : "3.2.7" ,
"chai" : "^5.2.0" ,
"debug" : "^4.4.1" ,
"expect-type" : "^1.2.1" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"magic-string" : "^0.30.17" ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"pathe" : "^2.0.3" ,
"picomatch" : "^4.0.2" ,
"std-env" : "^3.9.0" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"tinybench" : "^2.9.0" ,
"tinyexec" : "^0.3.2" ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"tinyglobby" : "^0.2.14" ,
"tinypool" : "^1.1.1" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"tinyrainbow" : "^2.0.0" ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"vite" : "^5.0.0 || ^6.0.0 || ^7.0.0-0" ,
"vite-node" : "3.2.4" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"why-is-node-running" : "^2.3.0"
} ,
"bin" : {
"vitest" : "vitest.mjs"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : "^18.0.0 || ^20.0.0 || >=22.0.0"
} ,
"funding" : {
"url" : "https://opencollective.com/vitest"
} ,
"peerDependencies" : {
"@edge-runtime/vm" : "*" ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"@types/debug" : "^4.1.12" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"@types/node" : "^18.0.0 || ^20.0.0 || >=22.0.0" ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"@vitest/browser" : "3.2.7" ,
"@vitest/ui" : "3.2.7" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"happy-dom" : "*" ,
"jsdom" : "*"
} ,
"peerDependenciesMeta" : {
"@edge-runtime/vm" : {
"optional" : true
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"@types/debug" : {
"optional" : true
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"@types/node" : {
"optional" : true
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"@vitest/browser" : {
"optional" : true
} ,
"@vitest/ui" : {
"optional" : true
} ,
"happy-dom" : {
"optional" : true
} ,
"jsdom" : {
"optional" : true
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
}
} ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"node_modules/vitest/node_modules/@vitest/mocker" : {
"version" : "3.2.7" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/@vitest/mocker/-/mocker-3.2.7.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-Trr0hYO9CM3Wj6ksWHRhK9IZpIY6wTMO5u/MqXurMxT57sWBaOPEtP3Oq60ihZuh5JsiagKfz95OcxdEP6dBrA==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
"@vitest/spy" : "3.2.7" ,
"estree-walker" : "^3.0.3" ,
"magic-string" : "^0.30.17"
} ,
"funding" : {
"url" : "https://opencollective.com/vitest"
} ,
"peerDependencies" : {
"msw" : "^2.4.9" ,
"vite" : "^5.0.0 || ^6.0.0 || ^7.0.0-0"
} ,
"peerDependenciesMeta" : {
"msw" : {
"optional" : true
} ,
"vite" : {
"optional" : true
}
}
} ,
"node_modules/vitest/node_modules/picomatch" : {
"version" : "4.0.5" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/picomatch/-/picomatch-4.0.5.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-RvwwcruNjI1ncT5xRakeyS9Lf8lcItv34KD+aif+VH9kduAyfYBipGh12274xtenIPZ119/R9BdTBa8gAwSh0A==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=12"
} ,
"funding" : {
"url" : "https://github.com/sponsors/jonschlinkert"
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/which" : {
"version" : "2.0.2" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/which/-/which-2.0.2.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-BLI3Tl1TW3Pvl70l3yq3Y64i+awpwXqsGBYWkkqMtnbXgrMD+yj7rhW0kuEDxzJaYXGjEW5ogapKNMEKNMjibA==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"license" : "ISC" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"dependencies" : {
"isexe" : "^2.0.0"
} ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"bin" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node-which" : "bin/node-which"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">= 8"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/why-is-node-running" : {
"version" : "2.3.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/why-is-node-running/-/why-is-node-running-2.3.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-hUrmaWBdVDcxvYqnyh09zunKzROWjbZTiNy8dBEjkS7ehEDQibXJ7XvlmtbwuTclUiIyN+CyXQD4Vmko8fNm8w==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"siginfo" : "^2.0.0" ,
"stackback" : "0.0.2"
} ,
"bin" : {
"why-is-node-running" : "cli.js"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=8"
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/word-wrap" : {
"version" : "1.2.5" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/word-wrap/-/word-wrap-1.2.5.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-BN22B5eaMMI9UMtjrGd5g5eCYPpCPDUy0FJXbYsaT5zYxjFOckS53SQDE3pWkVoWpHXVb3BrYcEN4Twa55B5cA==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=0.10.0"
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/wrap-ansi" : {
"version" : "8.1.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/wrap-ansi/-/wrap-ansi-8.1.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-si7QWI6zUMq56bESFvagtmzMdGOtoxfR+Sez11Mobfc7tm+VkUckk9bW2UeffTGVUbOksxmSw0AA2gs8g71NCQ==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"ansi-styles" : "^6.1.0" ,
"string-width" : "^5.0.1" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"strip-ansi" : "^7.0.1"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=12"
} ,
"funding" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"url" : "https://github.com/chalk/wrap-ansi?sponsor=1"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/wrap-ansi-cjs" : {
"name" : "wrap-ansi" ,
"version" : "7.0.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/wrap-ansi/-/wrap-ansi-7.0.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-YVGIj2kamLSTxw6NsZjoBxfSwsn0ycdesmc4p+Q21c5zPuZ1pl+NfxVdxPtdHvmNVOQ6XSYG4AUtyt/Fi7D16Q==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"ansi-styles" : "^4.0.0" ,
"string-width" : "^4.1.0" ,
"strip-ansi" : "^6.0.0"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">=10"
} ,
"funding" : {
"url" : "https://github.com/chalk/wrap-ansi?sponsor=1"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/wrap-ansi-cjs/node_modules/ansi-regex" : {
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"version" : "5.0.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/ansi-regex/-/ansi-regex-5.0.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-quJQXlTSUGL2LH9SUXo8VwsY4soanhgo6LNSm84E1LBcE8s3O0wpdiRzyR9z/ZZJMlMWv37qOOb9pdJlMUEKFQ==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=8"
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/wrap-ansi-cjs/node_modules/emoji-regex" : {
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"version" : "8.0.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/emoji-regex/-/emoji-regex-8.0.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-MSjYzcWNOA0ewAHpz0MxpYFvwg6yjy1NG3xteoqz644VCo/RPgnr1/GGt+ic3iJTzQ8Eu3TdM14SawnVUmGE6A==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT"
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/wrap-ansi-cjs/node_modules/string-width" : {
"version" : "4.2.3" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/string-width/-/string-width-4.2.3.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-wKyQRQpjJ0sIp62ErSZdGsjMJWsap5oRNihHhu6G7JVO/9jIB6UyevL+tXuOqrng8j/cxKTWyWUwvSTriiZz/g==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
"emoji-regex" : "^8.0.0" ,
"is-fullwidth-code-point" : "^3.0.0" ,
"strip-ansi" : "^6.0.1"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=8"
}
} ,
"node_modules/wrap-ansi-cjs/node_modules/strip-ansi" : {
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"version" : "6.0.1" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/strip-ansi/-/strip-ansi-6.0.1.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-Y38VPSHcqkFrCpFnQ9vuSXmquuv5oXOKpGeT6aGrr3o3Gc9AlVa6JBfUSOCnbxGGZF+/0ooI7KrPuUSztUdU5A==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"dependencies" : {
"ansi-regex" : "^5.0.1"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=8"
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node_modules/wrap-ansi/node_modules/ansi-styles" : {
"version" : "6.2.3" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/ansi-styles/-/ansi-styles-6.2.3.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-4Dj6M28JB+oAH8kFkTLUo+a2jwOFkuqb3yucU0CANcRRUbxS0cP0nZYCGjcc3BNXwRIsUVmDGgzawme7zvJHvg==" ,
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=12"
} ,
"funding" : {
"url" : "https://github.com/chalk/ansi-styles?sponsor=1"
}
} ,
"node_modules/wrappy" : {
"version" : "1.0.2" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/wrappy/-/wrappy-1.0.2.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-l4Sp/DRseor9wL6EvV2+TuQn63dMkPjZ/sp9XkghTEbV9KlPS1xUsZ3u7/IQO4wxtcFB4bgpQPRcR3QCvezPcQ==" ,
"license" : "ISC"
} ,
"node_modules/yocto-queue" : {
"version" : "0.1.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/yocto-queue/-/yocto-queue-0.1.0.tgz" ,
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Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=10"
} ,
"funding" : {
"url" : "https://github.com/sponsors/sindresorhus"
}
} ,
"node_modules/zod" : {
"version" : "4.4.3" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/zod/-/zod-4.4.3.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-ytENFjIJFl2UwYglde2jchW2Hwm4GJFLDiSXWdTrJQBIN9Fcyp7n4DhxJEiWNAJMV1/BqWfW/kkg71UDcHJyTQ==" ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"funding" : {
"url" : "https://github.com/sponsors/colinhacks"
}
} ,
"node_modules/zod-to-json-schema" : {
"version" : "3.25.2" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/zod-to-json-schema/-/zod-to-json-schema-3.25.2.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-O/PgfnpT1xKSDeQYSCfRI5Gy3hPf91mKVDuYLUHZJMiDFptvP41MSnWofm8dnCm0256ZNfZIM7DSzuSMAFnjHA==" ,
"license" : "ISC" ,
"peerDependencies" : {
"zod" : "^3.25.28 || ^4"
}
} ,
"packages/calendar" : {
"name" : "@sh-mcp/calendar" ,
"version" : "0.1.0" ,
"license" : "UNLICENSED" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dependencies" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"@sh-mcp/shared" : "*"
} ,
"devDependencies" : {
2026-07-06 18:17:11 -04:00
"@types/node" : "26.1.0" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"typescript" : "^5.5.0" ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"vitest" : "^3.2.6"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
"engines" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"node" : ">=24"
}
} ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"packages/gmail" : {
"name" : "@sh-mcp/gmail" ,
"version" : "0.1.0" ,
"license" : "UNLICENSED" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"@sh-mcp/shared" : "*"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"devDependencies" : {
"@vitest/coverage-v8" : "^3.2.6" ,
"typescript" : "^5.5.0" ,
"vitest" : "^3.2.6"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=24"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"packages/google-maps" : {
"name" : "@sh-mcp/google-maps" ,
"version" : "0.1.0" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"@sh-mcp/shared" : "*"
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
} ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"devDependencies" : {
2026-07-06 18:17:11 -04:00
"@types/node" : "26.1.0" ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"typescript" : "^5.5.0" ,
"vitest" : "^3.2.6"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=24.0.0"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"packages/internal-data" : {
"name" : "@sh-mcp/internal-data" ,
"version" : "0.1.0" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"@sh-mcp/shared" : "*"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"devDependencies" : {
2026-07-06 18:17:11 -04:00
"@types/node" : "26.1.0" ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"@vitest/coverage-v8" : "^3.2.6" ,
"typescript" : "^5.5.0" ,
"vitest" : "^3.2.6"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=24.0.0"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"packages/knowledge-base" : {
"name" : "@sh-mcp/knowledge-base" ,
"version" : "0.1.0" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"@sh-mcp/shared" : "*"
} ,
"devDependencies" : {
2026-07-06 18:17:11 -04:00
"@types/node" : "26.1.0" ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"@vitest/coverage-v8" : "^3.2.6" ,
"typescript" : "^5.5.0" ,
"vitest" : "^3.2.6"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
"engines" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"node" : ">=24.0.0"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"packages/payments" : {
"name" : "@sh-mcp/payments" ,
"version" : "0.1.0" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"@sh-mcp/shared" : "*"
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
} ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"devDependencies" : {
2026-07-06 18:17:11 -04:00
"@types/node" : "26.1.0" ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"@vitest/coverage-v8" : "^3.2.6" ,
"typescript" : "^5.5.0" ,
"vitest" : "^3.2.6"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
"engines" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"node" : ">=24.0.0"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"packages/qbo" : {
"name" : "@sh-mcp/qbo" ,
"version" : "0.1.0" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"@sh-mcp/shared" : "*"
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
} ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"devDependencies" : {
2026-07-06 18:17:11 -04:00
"@types/node" : "26.1.0" ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"@vitest/coverage-v8" : "^3.2.6" ,
"typescript" : "^5.7.0" ,
"vitest" : "^3.2.6"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
"engines" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"node" : ">=24.0.0"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"packages/qbo/node_modules/typescript" : {
"version" : "5.9.3" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/typescript/-/typescript-5.9.3.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-jl1vZzPDinLr9eUt3J/t7V6FgNEw9QjvBPdysz9KfQDD41fQrC2Y4vKQdiaUpFT4bXlb1RHhLpp8wtm6M5TgSw==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dev" : true ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"license" : "Apache-2.0" ,
"bin" : {
"tsc" : "bin/tsc" ,
"tsserver" : "bin/tsserver"
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
} ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=14.17"
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
}
} ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"packages/reminders" : {
"name" : "@sh-mcp/reminders" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"version" : "0.1.0" ,
"license" : "UNLICENSED" ,
"dependencies" : {
"@sh-mcp/shared" : "*"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"devDependencies" : {
2026-07-06 18:17:11 -04:00
"@types/node" : "26.1.0" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"typescript" : "^5.5.0" ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"vitest" : "^3.2.6"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=24"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"packages/shared" : {
"name" : "@sh-mcp/shared" ,
"version" : "0.1.0" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"@modelcontextprotocol/sdk" : "1.29.0" ,
"ajv" : "8.20.0" ,
"ajv-formats" : "3.0.1" ,
"express" : "5.2.1" ,
"express-rate-limit" : "^8.2.1" ,
"jose" : "^6.2.3"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"devDependencies" : {
"@types/express" : "5.0.6" ,
"@types/supertest" : "7.2.0" ,
"@vitest/coverage-v8" : "^3.2.6" ,
"supertest" : "7.2.2" ,
"typescript" : "^5.5.0" ,
"vitest" : "^3.2.6"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=24.0.0"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"packages/shared/node_modules/ajv" : {
"version" : "8.20.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/ajv/-/ajv-8.20.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-Thbli+OlOj+iMPYFBVBfJ3OmCAnaSyNn4M1vz9T6Gka5Jt9ba/HIR56joy65tY6kx/FCF5VXNB819Y7/GUrBGA==" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"license" : "MIT" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"fast-deep-equal" : "^3.1.3" ,
"fast-uri" : "^3.0.1" ,
"json-schema-traverse" : "^1.0.0" ,
"require-from-string" : "^2.0.2"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
"funding" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"type" : "github" ,
"url" : "https://github.com/sponsors/epoberezkin"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"packages/shared/node_modules/json-schema-traverse" : {
"version" : "1.0.0" ,
"resolved" : "https://registry.npmjs.org/json-schema-traverse/-/json-schema-traverse-1.0.0.tgz" ,
"integrity" : "sha512-NM8/P9n3XjXhIZn1lLhkFaACTOURQXjWhV4BA/RnOv8xvgqtqpAX9IO4mRQxSx1Rlo4tqzeqb0sOlruaOy3dug==" ,
"license" : "MIT"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"packages/tasks" : {
"name" : "@sh-mcp/tasks" ,
"version" : "0.1.0" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"@sh-mcp/shared" : "*"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"devDependencies" : {
"typescript" : "^5.5.0" ,
"vitest" : "^3.2.6"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=24"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"servers/sh-mcp-finance" : {
"name" : "@sh-mcp/server-finance" ,
"version" : "0.1.0" ,
"license" : "UNLICENSED" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"dependencies" : {
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"@sh-mcp/payments" : "*" ,
"@sh-mcp/qbo" : "*" ,
"@sh-mcp/shared" : "*" ,
"express" : "5.2.1"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"devDependencies" : {
2026-07-06 18:17:11 -04:00
"@types/node" : "26.1.0" ,
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"aws-cdk-lib" : "2.261.0" ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"constructs" : "10.6.0" ,
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"tsx" : "4.23.0" ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"typescript" : "^5.5.0" ,
"vitest" : "^3.2.6"
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=24"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
}
} ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"servers/sh-mcp-ops" : {
"name" : "@sh-mcp/server-ops" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"version" : "0.1.0" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"license" : "UNLICENSED" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"dependencies" : {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"@sh-mcp/calendar" : "*" ,
"@sh-mcp/gmail" : "*" ,
"@sh-mcp/google-maps" : "*" ,
"@sh-mcp/internal-data" : "*" ,
"@sh-mcp/knowledge-base" : "*" ,
"@sh-mcp/reminders" : "*" ,
"@sh-mcp/shared" : "*" ,
"@sh-mcp/tasks" : "*" ,
"express" : "5.2.1"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
"devDependencies" : {
2026-07-06 18:17:11 -04:00
"@types/node" : "26.1.0" ,
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"aws-cdk-lib" : "2.261.0" ,
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
"constructs" : "10.6.0" ,
2026-07-06 22:02:03 +00:00
"tsx" : "4.23.0" ,
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
"typescript" : "^5.5.0" ,
2026-07-06 16:54:50 -04:00
"vitest" : "^3.2.6"
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
} ,
"engines" : {
"node" : ">=24"
}
}
}
}
