sh-mcp/packages/tasks/test/tasks.test.ts

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Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2) * Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers. - Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate), eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu). - @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry, redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2. - 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base, gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact(). Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4). * Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1 work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5). * ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet) The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the server CDK stubs.
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/**
* @sh-mcp/tasks — unit tests
*
* All tests use:
* - A mock AuthContext (no real JWT; the auth layer is DEFERRED — see TODO
* in src/client.ts). requireScope() from @sh-mcp/shared is exercised as
* the live implementation so that scope-guard behaviour is tested.
* - A mock TasksClient (no DynamoDB, no AWS credentials, no network).
*
* Coverage targets:
* - Happy path for each of the four tools.
* - Empty result from listTasks.
* - Client error propagation (the tool must not swallow errors).
* - Throttle / transient-error retry surface (the tool propagates the error
* upward; retry policy lives at the transport layer, not in tool handlers).
* - Scope guard: a caller without ops:tasks is rejected before the client
* is ever called.
* - ABAC isolation: the client always receives ctx.sub, not an override from
* the input payload.
*/
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from 'vitest';
import { buildTaskTools } from '../src/tools.js';
import type { TasksClient, Task } from '../src/client.js';
import type { AuthContext } from '@sh-mcp/shared';
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Test fixtures
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
const MOCK_CTX: AuthContext = {
sub: 'lauren@seahavenind.com',
scopes: ['ops:read', 'ops:tasks'],
aud: 'sh-mcp-ops',
};
const CTX_NO_TASKS: AuthContext = {
sub: 'staff@seahavenind.com',
scopes: ['ops:read'], // no ops:tasks
aud: 'sh-mcp-ops',
};
const TASK_1: Task = {
taskId: 'task-001',
sub: 'lauren@seahavenind.com',
title: 'Review vendor invoices',
description: 'Check against PO log before EOD',
completed: false,
createdAt: '2026-06-11T09:00:00.000Z',
};
const TASK_1_COMPLETED: Task = {
...TASK_1,
completed: true,
completedAt: '2026-06-11T10:00:00.000Z',
};
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Mock client factory
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
function makeMockClient(overrides: Partial<TasksClient> = {}): TasksClient {
return {
createTask: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(TASK_1),
listTasks: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue([TASK_1]),
completeTask: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(TASK_1_COMPLETED),
deleteTask: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
...overrides,
};
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Helpers
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
function getHandler(tools: ReturnType<typeof buildTaskTools>, name: string) {
const tool = tools.find((t) => t.name === name);
if (!tool) throw new Error(`Tool '${name}' not found`);
// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
return (input: any, ctx: AuthContext) => tool.handler(input, ctx);
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// create_task
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
describe('create_task', () => {
let client: TasksClient;
let tools: ReturnType<typeof buildTaskTools>;
beforeEach(() => {
client = makeMockClient();
tools = buildTaskTools(client);
});
it('happy path: creates a task and returns the expected shape', async () => {
const call = getHandler(tools, 'create_task');
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3) * Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3): - dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path. - audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions. - mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and tools/call routed through executeTool. - http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz. - openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full OpenAPI 3.1 document. - local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6). * Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/ tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask. Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools) so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load (build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages. * Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3): - ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress). - config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs (aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5). - index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder is exported but not depended on. - synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app (build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector. * Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3): tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls), audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data), rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1 validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass. Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented). Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the updated package-lock.json. * Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code: - npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b; Dependabot will bump). - gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch. The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR) was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body. * Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR: - dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path. - http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp, /tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable), returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub + per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge. Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not 401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean. * Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos) extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space, so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char (/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests. * Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums) Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review: - Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset, so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin). Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME / AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag. - Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}}) escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net. +4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green. Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash, unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
const result = await call(
{ title: 'Review vendor invoices', description: 'Check against PO log' },
MOCK_CTX,
);
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2) * Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers. - Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate), eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu). - @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry, redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2. - 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base, gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact(). Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4). * Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1 work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5). * ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet) The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
expect(result).toMatchObject({
task: {
taskId: 'task-001',
title: 'Review vendor invoices',
completed: false,
createdAt: '2026-06-11T09:00:00.000Z',
},
});
});
it('passes ctx.sub as the owner, not any caller-supplied override', async () => {
const call = getHandler(tools, 'create_task');
await call({ title: 'Test ABAC' }, MOCK_CTX);
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3) * Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3): - dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path. - audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions. - mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and tools/call routed through executeTool. - http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz. - openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full OpenAPI 3.1 document. - local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6). * Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/ tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask. Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools) so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load (build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages. * Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3): - ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress). - config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs (aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5). - index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder is exported but not depended on. - synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app (build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector. * Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3): tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls), audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data), rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1 validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass. Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented). Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the updated package-lock.json. * Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code: - npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b; Dependabot will bump). - gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch. The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR) was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body. * Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR: - dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path. - http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp, /tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable), returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub + per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge. Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not 401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean. * Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos) extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space, so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char (/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests. * Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums) Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review: - Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset, so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin). Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME / AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag. - Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}}) escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net. +4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green. Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash, unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
expect(client.createTask).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.objectContaining({ sub: MOCK_CTX.sub }));
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2) * Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers. - Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate), eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu). - @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry, redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2. - 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base, gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact(). Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4). * Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1 work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5). * ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet) The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
});
it('propagates client errors without swallowing them', async () => {
client = makeMockClient({
createTask: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(new Error('DynamoDB write failed')),
});
tools = buildTaskTools(client);
const call = getHandler(tools, 'create_task');
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3) * Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3): - dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path. - audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions. - mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and tools/call routed through executeTool. - http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz. - openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full OpenAPI 3.1 document. - local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6). * Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/ tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask. Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools) so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load (build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages. * Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3): - ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress). - config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs (aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5). - index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder is exported but not depended on. - synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app (build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector. * Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3): tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls), audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data), rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1 validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass. Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented). Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the updated package-lock.json. * Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code: - npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b; Dependabot will bump). - gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch. The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR) was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body. * Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR: - dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path. - http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp, /tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable), returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub + per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge. Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not 401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean. * Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos) extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space, so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char (/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests. * Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums) Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review: - Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset, so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin). Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME / AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag. - Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}}) escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net. +4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green. Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash, unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
await expect(call({ title: 'Failing task' }, MOCK_CTX)).rejects.toThrow(
'DynamoDB write failed',
);
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2) * Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers. - Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate), eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu). - @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry, redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2. - 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base, gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact(). Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4). * Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1 work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5). * ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet) The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
});
it('scope guard: rejects callers without ops:tasks before touching the client', async () => {
const call = getHandler(tools, 'create_task');
await expect(call({ title: 'Sneaky task' }, CTX_NO_TASKS)).rejects.toThrow();
expect(client.createTask).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('tool metadata: name, tier, requiredScope are correct', () => {
const tool = tools.find((t) => t.name === 'create_task')!;
expect(tool.tier).toBe('ops');
expect(tool.requiredScope).toBe('ops:tasks');
});
});
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// list_tasks
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
describe('list_tasks', () => {
let client: TasksClient;
let tools: ReturnType<typeof buildTaskTools>;
beforeEach(() => {
client = makeMockClient();
tools = buildTaskTools(client);
});
it('happy path: returns tasks with expected fields', async () => {
const call = getHandler(tools, 'list_tasks');
const result = await call({}, MOCK_CTX);
expect(result.tasks).toHaveLength(1);
expect(result.tasks[0]).toMatchObject({
taskId: 'task-001',
title: 'Review vendor invoices',
completed: false,
});
});
it('empty result: returns an empty array without error', async () => {
client = makeMockClient({ listTasks: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue([]) });
tools = buildTaskTools(client);
const call = getHandler(tools, 'list_tasks');
const result = await call({}, MOCK_CTX);
expect(result.tasks).toEqual([]);
});
it('passes includeCompleted: false by default', async () => {
const call = getHandler(tools, 'list_tasks');
await call({}, MOCK_CTX);
expect(client.listTasks).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({ includeCompleted: false }),
);
});
it('passes includeCompleted: true when requested', async () => {
const call = getHandler(tools, 'list_tasks');
await call({ includeCompleted: true }, MOCK_CTX);
expect(client.listTasks).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({ includeCompleted: true }),
);
});
it('always passes ctx.sub to the client for ABAC', async () => {
const call = getHandler(tools, 'list_tasks');
await call({}, MOCK_CTX);
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3) * Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3): - dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path. - audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions. - mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and tools/call routed through executeTool. - http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz. - openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full OpenAPI 3.1 document. - local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6). * Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/ tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask. Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools) so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load (build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages. * Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3): - ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress). - config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs (aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5). - index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder is exported but not depended on. - synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app (build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector. * Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3): tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls), audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data), rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1 validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass. Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented). Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the updated package-lock.json. * Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code: - npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b; Dependabot will bump). - gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch. The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR) was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body. * Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR: - dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path. - http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp, /tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable), returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub + per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge. Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not 401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean. * Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos) extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space, so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char (/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests. * Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums) Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review: - Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset, so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin). Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME / AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag. - Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}}) escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net. +4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green. Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash, unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
expect(client.listTasks).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.objectContaining({ sub: MOCK_CTX.sub }));
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2) * Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers. - Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate), eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu). - @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry, redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2. - 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base, gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact(). Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4). * Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1 work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5). * ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet) The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
});
it('propagates client errors', async () => {
client = makeMockClient({
listTasks: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(new Error('DynamoDB query failed')),
});
tools = buildTaskTools(client);
const call = getHandler(tools, 'list_tasks');
await expect(call({}, MOCK_CTX)).rejects.toThrow('DynamoDB query failed');
});
it('simulates a throttle error (ProvisionedThroughputExceededException)', async () => {
const throttleError = Object.assign(
new Error('ProvisionedThroughputExceededException: rate exceeded'),
{ name: 'ProvisionedThroughputExceededException', $retryable: { throttling: true } },
);
client = makeMockClient({ listTasks: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(throttleError) });
tools = buildTaskTools(client);
const call = getHandler(tools, 'list_tasks');
// The tool handler propagates the error; retry logic belongs at the transport layer.
const err = await call({}, MOCK_CTX).catch((e) => e);
expect(err.name).toBe('ProvisionedThroughputExceededException');
});
it('scope guard: rejects callers without ops:tasks', async () => {
const call = getHandler(tools, 'list_tasks');
await expect(call({}, CTX_NO_TASKS)).rejects.toThrow();
expect(client.listTasks).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('tool metadata: name, tier, requiredScope are correct', () => {
const tool = tools.find((t) => t.name === 'list_tasks')!;
expect(tool.tier).toBe('ops');
expect(tool.requiredScope).toBe('ops:tasks');
});
});
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// complete_task
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
describe('complete_task', () => {
let client: TasksClient;
let tools: ReturnType<typeof buildTaskTools>;
beforeEach(() => {
client = makeMockClient();
tools = buildTaskTools(client);
});
it('happy path: returns the completed task shape', async () => {
const call = getHandler(tools, 'complete_task');
const result = await call({ taskId: 'task-001' }, MOCK_CTX);
expect(result.task).toMatchObject({
taskId: 'task-001',
completed: true,
completedAt: '2026-06-11T10:00:00.000Z',
});
});
it('passes ctx.sub for ownership enforcement (ABAC)', async () => {
const call = getHandler(tools, 'complete_task');
await call({ taskId: 'task-001' }, MOCK_CTX);
expect(client.completeTask).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({ sub: MOCK_CTX.sub, taskId: 'task-001' }),
);
});
it('propagates a ConditionalCheckFailedException (task not owned by caller)', async () => {
const ownershipError = Object.assign(
new Error('ConditionalCheckFailedException: condition not met'),
{ name: 'ConditionalCheckFailedException' },
);
client = makeMockClient({ completeTask: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(ownershipError) });
tools = buildTaskTools(client);
const call = getHandler(tools, 'complete_task');
const err = await call({ taskId: 'task-999' }, MOCK_CTX).catch((e) => e);
expect(err.name).toBe('ConditionalCheckFailedException');
});
it('propagates a throttle error', async () => {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3) * Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3): - dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path. - audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions. - mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and tools/call routed through executeTool. - http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz. - openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full OpenAPI 3.1 document. - local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6). * Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/ tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask. Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools) so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load (build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages. * Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3): - ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress). - config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs (aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5). - index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder is exported but not depended on. - synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app (build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector. * Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3): tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls), audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data), rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1 validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass. Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented). Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the updated package-lock.json. * Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code: - npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b; Dependabot will bump). - gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch. The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR) was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body. * Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR: - dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path. - http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp, /tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable), returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub + per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge. Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not 401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean. * Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos) extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space, so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char (/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests. * Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums) Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review: - Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset, so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin). Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME / AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag. - Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}}) escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net. +4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green. Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash, unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
const throttleError = Object.assign(new Error('ProvisionedThroughputExceededException'), {
name: 'ProvisionedThroughputExceededException',
$retryable: { throttling: true },
});
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2) * Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers. - Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate), eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu). - @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry, redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2. - 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base, gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact(). Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4). * Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1 work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5). * ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet) The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
client = makeMockClient({ completeTask: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(throttleError) });
tools = buildTaskTools(client);
const call = getHandler(tools, 'complete_task');
const err = await call({ taskId: 'task-001' }, MOCK_CTX).catch((e) => e);
expect(err.name).toBe('ProvisionedThroughputExceededException');
});
it('scope guard: rejects callers without ops:tasks', async () => {
const call = getHandler(tools, 'complete_task');
await expect(call({ taskId: 'task-001' }, CTX_NO_TASKS)).rejects.toThrow();
expect(client.completeTask).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('tool metadata: tier and requiredScope', () => {
const tool = tools.find((t) => t.name === 'complete_task')!;
expect(tool.tier).toBe('ops');
expect(tool.requiredScope).toBe('ops:tasks');
});
});
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// delete_task
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
describe('delete_task', () => {
let client: TasksClient;
let tools: ReturnType<typeof buildTaskTools>;
beforeEach(() => {
client = makeMockClient();
tools = buildTaskTools(client);
});
it('happy path: returns deleted: true and the taskId', async () => {
const call = getHandler(tools, 'delete_task');
const result = await call({ taskId: 'task-001' }, MOCK_CTX);
expect(result).toEqual({ deleted: true, taskId: 'task-001' });
});
it('passes ctx.sub for ownership enforcement (ABAC)', async () => {
const call = getHandler(tools, 'delete_task');
await call({ taskId: 'task-001' }, MOCK_CTX);
expect(client.deleteTask).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({ sub: MOCK_CTX.sub, taskId: 'task-001' }),
);
});
it('propagates client errors', async () => {
client = makeMockClient({
deleteTask: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(new Error('DynamoDB delete failed')),
});
tools = buildTaskTools(client);
const call = getHandler(tools, 'delete_task');
await expect(call({ taskId: 'task-001' }, MOCK_CTX)).rejects.toThrow('DynamoDB delete failed');
});
it('propagates a throttle error', async () => {
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3) * Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3): - dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path. - audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions. - mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and tools/call routed through executeTool. - http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz. - openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full OpenAPI 3.1 document. - local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6). * Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/ tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask. Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools) so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load (build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages. * Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3): - ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress). - config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs (aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5). - index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder is exported but not depended on. - synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app (build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector. * Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3): tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls), audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data), rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1 validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass. Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented). Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the updated package-lock.json. * Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code: - npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b; Dependabot will bump). - gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch. The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR) was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body. * Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR: - dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path. - http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp, /tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable), returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub + per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge. Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not 401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean. * Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos) extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space, so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char (/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests. * Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums) Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review: - Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset, so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin). Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME / AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag. - Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}}) escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net. +4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green. Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash, unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
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const throttleError = Object.assign(new Error('ProvisionedThroughputExceededException'), {
name: 'ProvisionedThroughputExceededException',
$retryable: { throttling: true },
});
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2) * Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers. - Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate), eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu). - @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry, redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2. - 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base, gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact(). Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4). * Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1 work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5). * ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet) The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the server CDK stubs.
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client = makeMockClient({ deleteTask: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(throttleError) });
tools = buildTaskTools(client);
const call = getHandler(tools, 'delete_task');
const err = await call({ taskId: 'task-001' }, MOCK_CTX).catch((e) => e);
expect(err.name).toBe('ProvisionedThroughputExceededException');
});
it('scope guard: rejects callers without ops:tasks', async () => {
const call = getHandler(tools, 'delete_task');
await expect(call({ taskId: 'task-001' }, CTX_NO_TASKS)).rejects.toThrow();
expect(client.deleteTask).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('tool metadata: tier and requiredScope', () => {
const tool = tools.find((t) => t.name === 'delete_task')!;
expect(tool.tier).toBe('ops');
expect(tool.requiredScope).toBe('ops:tasks');
});
});