Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
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/**
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* Task tools — ops tier, scope: ops:tasks
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*
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* All four tools (create_task, list_tasks, complete_task, delete_task) are
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* scoped to ops:tasks and operate on the calling user's tasks only (ABAC:
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* partition key = ctx.sub). The injected TasksClient is the only I/O path;
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* no AWS SDK or network call is made directly here.
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*
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* Finance-tier note: this is an ops-tier package. No finance fields are
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* present, so redact() is not called here. If this package is ever promoted
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* or a finance field is added, every sensitive field MUST be wrapped in
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* redact() before it is included in the tool output.
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*/
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import { defineTool, requireScope, type AuthContext } from '@sh-mcp/shared';
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import type { TasksClient } from './client.js';
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Tool factory — accepts an injected TasksClient so tests can pass a mock.
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// The MCP server entry point calls buildTaskTools(new DynamoDBTasksClient()).
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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export function buildTaskTools(client: TasksClient) {
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// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// create_task
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// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
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const createTask = defineTool<
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{ title: string; description?: string },
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Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
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{
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task: {
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taskId: string;
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title: string;
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description?: string;
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completed: boolean;
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createdAt: string;
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};
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}
|
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
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>({
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name: 'create_task',
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description:
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'Create a new task for the calling user. Tasks are private — only the user who created a task can see or modify it.',
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tier: 'ops',
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requiredScope: 'ops:tasks',
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inputSchema: {
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type: 'object',
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properties: {
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title: {
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type: 'string',
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minLength: 1,
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maxLength: 256,
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description: 'Short title for the task (required).',
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},
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description: {
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type: 'string',
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maxLength: 2048,
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description: 'Optional longer description or notes for the task.',
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},
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},
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required: ['title'],
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additionalProperties: false,
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},
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handler: async (input, ctx: AuthContext) => {
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requireScope(ctx, 'ops:tasks');
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const task = await client.createTask({
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sub: ctx.sub,
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title: input.title,
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description: input.description,
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});
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return {
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task: {
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taskId: task.taskId,
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title: task.title,
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description: task.description,
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completed: task.completed,
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createdAt: task.createdAt,
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},
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};
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},
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});
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// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// list_tasks
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// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
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const listTasks = defineTool<
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{ includeCompleted?: boolean },
|
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
tasks: Array<{
|
|
|
|
|
taskId: string;
|
|
|
|
|
title: string;
|
|
|
|
|
description?: string;
|
|
|
|
|
completed: boolean;
|
|
|
|
|
createdAt: string;
|
|
|
|
|
completedAt?: string;
|
|
|
|
|
}>;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + @sh-mcp/shared core + integration packages (#2)
* Phase 0b slice: monorepo scaffold + shared core + integration packages
The 0a-INDEPENDENT code slice (one-shot via af-0b-package-slice workflow: Haiku
scaffold + Sonnet packages, Sonnet fix-to-green). Nothing deploys; no CDK/servers.
- Monorepo scaffold: npm workspaces, strict TS (NodeNext), vitest (80% gate),
eslint 9 flat config, prettier; ci.yaml/deploy.yaml callers (Node 24, enable-qemu).
- @sh-mcp/shared: transport-agnostic core — Scope/AuthContext/ToolDef, ToolRegistry,
redact()+maskValue() (PII), OpenAPI 3.1 generator. AUTH STUBBED behind an AuthProvider
interface (TODO auth-layer-0a); JWT/aud/client_id/JWKS/deny-list deferred per design.md §2.
- 9 integration packages (qbo, google-maps, internal-data, payments, knowledge-base,
gmail, calendar, tasks, reminders): tools against shared, external deps mocked behind
injected client interfaces; finance handlers call redact().
Verified green: tsc -b clean, vitest 245/245, eslint 0 errors. Auth mechanism intentionally
deferred until the 0a spike resolves it (G16/§0.4).
* Complete Cognito auth provider + Phase 1 build brief
Finish the WIP CognitoAuthProvider (client_id allow-list as audience
boundary, finance TTL ceiling, deny-list, scope-prefix stripping) with
its test suite, and check in docs/build-plan-phase-1.md so the Phase 1
work has its governing brief in-tree (design.md §2.5).
* ci: disable cdk synth for Phase 0b (no CDK app yet)
The reusable ci-typescript-cdk workflow defaults run-cdk-synth: true, but
the Phase 0b package scaffold has no cdk.json or stacks, so cdk synth fails
with '--app is required'. Disable it here; Phase 1 re-enables it with the
server CDK stubs.
2026-06-26 12:42:17 -04:00
|
|
|
>({
|
|
|
|
|
name: 'list_tasks',
|
|
|
|
|
description:
|
|
|
|
|
'List tasks belonging to the calling user. By default only incomplete tasks are returned; pass includeCompleted: true to see all.',
|
|
|
|
|
tier: 'ops',
|
|
|
|
|
requiredScope: 'ops:tasks',
|
|
|
|
|
inputSchema: {
|
|
|
|
|
type: 'object',
|
|
|
|
|
properties: {
|
|
|
|
|
includeCompleted: {
|
|
|
|
|
type: 'boolean',
|
|
|
|
|
description: 'When true, completed tasks are included in the results. Defaults to false.',
|
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
|
additionalProperties: false,
|
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
|
handler: async (input, ctx: AuthContext) => {
|
|
|
|
|
requireScope(ctx, 'ops:tasks');
|
|
|
|
|
const tasks = await client.listTasks({
|
|
|
|
|
sub: ctx.sub,
|
|
|
|
|
includeCompleted: input.includeCompleted ?? false,
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
return {
|
|
|
|
|
tasks: tasks.map((t) => ({
|
|
|
|
|
taskId: t.taskId,
|
|
|
|
|
title: t.title,
|
|
|
|
|
description: t.description,
|
|
|
|
|
completed: t.completed,
|
|
|
|
|
createdAt: t.createdAt,
|
|
|
|
|
completedAt: t.completedAt,
|
|
|
|
|
})),
|
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
|
// complete_task
|
|
|
|
|
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
|
const completeTask = defineTool<
|
|
|
|
|
{ taskId: string },
|
|
|
|
|
{ task: { taskId: string; title: string; completed: boolean; completedAt: string } }
|
|
|
|
|
>({
|
|
|
|
|
name: 'complete_task',
|
|
|
|
|
description:
|
|
|
|
|
"Mark a task as completed. The task must belong to the calling user; completing another user's task is not permitted.",
|
|
|
|
|
tier: 'ops',
|
|
|
|
|
requiredScope: 'ops:tasks',
|
|
|
|
|
inputSchema: {
|
|
|
|
|
type: 'object',
|
|
|
|
|
properties: {
|
|
|
|
|
taskId: {
|
|
|
|
|
type: 'string',
|
|
|
|
|
minLength: 1,
|
|
|
|
|
description: 'The ID of the task to mark as completed.',
|
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
|
required: ['taskId'],
|
|
|
|
|
additionalProperties: false,
|
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
|
handler: async (input, ctx: AuthContext) => {
|
|
|
|
|
requireScope(ctx, 'ops:tasks');
|
|
|
|
|
const task = await client.completeTask({
|
|
|
|
|
sub: ctx.sub,
|
|
|
|
|
taskId: input.taskId,
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
return {
|
|
|
|
|
task: {
|
|
|
|
|
taskId: task.taskId,
|
|
|
|
|
title: task.title,
|
|
|
|
|
completed: task.completed,
|
|
|
|
|
completedAt: task.completedAt as string,
|
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
|
// delete_task
|
|
|
|
|
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
|
const deleteTask = defineTool<{ taskId: string }, { deleted: true; taskId: string }>({
|
|
|
|
|
name: 'delete_task',
|
|
|
|
|
description:
|
|
|
|
|
'Permanently delete a task belonging to the calling user. This action is irreversible.',
|
|
|
|
|
tier: 'ops',
|
|
|
|
|
requiredScope: 'ops:tasks',
|
|
|
|
|
inputSchema: {
|
|
|
|
|
type: 'object',
|
|
|
|
|
properties: {
|
|
|
|
|
taskId: {
|
|
|
|
|
type: 'string',
|
|
|
|
|
minLength: 1,
|
|
|
|
|
description: 'The ID of the task to delete.',
|
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
|
required: ['taskId'],
|
|
|
|
|
additionalProperties: false,
|
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
|
handler: async (input, ctx: AuthContext) => {
|
|
|
|
|
requireScope(ctx, 'ops:tasks');
|
|
|
|
|
await client.deleteTask({
|
|
|
|
|
sub: ctx.sub,
|
|
|
|
|
taskId: input.taskId,
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
return { deleted: true, taskId: input.taskId };
|
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return [createTask, listTasks, completeTask, deleteTask] as const;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|