seahaven-org-baseline/lib/account-baseline-stack.ts
Adam Moussa e9a184cf96
[INFRA-91/89/16/88/73] Reconcile out-of-band baseline changes + add missing detective controls (#18)
* Codify primary vault lock + add backups (INFRA-89, INFRA-88)

INFRA-89: codify the GOVERNANCE Vault Lock applied out-of-band on the
seahaven-primary vault (MinRetention 1d, MaxRetention 2555d, no
changeableFor = admin-removable) so it lives in IaC. Values match the
live lock exactly, so the deploy is a no-op adoption.

Add a scoped vault access policy that denies manual recovery-point
deletion and lock/policy tampering to all principals except the AWS
Backup service role and the break-glass SSO AdministratorAccess role,
so automatic lifecycle expiry still works but humans cannot prune
recovery points by hand.

Cross-review (GPT-4.1) BLOCK: NotPrincipal does not support wildcard
ARN matching, so the SSO exemption is expressed as Effect DENY with
Principal * and a StringNotLike condition on aws:PrincipalArn, which
does support wildcards. This avoids an unrecoverable vault lockout.

INFRA-88: add 6 S3 buckets (kb-docs, payroll-emails [PII], amazon-po,
extracted-amazon-po, proposal-system uploads + generated) to the
phase2-offsite-everything selection. Versioning verified enabled on
all 6 against the live account (S3 backup requires versioning).

Refs: INFRA-89, INFRA-88

* Promote account trail to organization trail (INFRA-73)

INFRA-73: set isOrganizationTrail on seahaven-org-trail and pass orgId
(o-9kufuzz6b4) so the L2 Trail attaches the AWSLogs/<org-id>/* bucket
PutObject statement for member-account delivery. CloudTrail org
trusted-access is already enabled on the management account.

Broaden the KMS key policy with an org-scoped GenerateDataKey/DescribeKey
statement for member-account trail delivery, guarded by
aws:PrincipalOrgID. The existing single-account statements are
preserved so management-account delivery is unaffected.

Cross-review (GPT-4.1) BLOCK: the member KMS SourceArn and encryption
context must be wildcarded across accounts (org-trail shadow trails
present the member account id), not pinned to the management account,
or member delivery silently fails. Fixed before checkpoint.

CHECKPOINT: delicate org-trail KMS/bucket-policy change — code +
diff captured for review, NOT deployed.

Refs: INFRA-73

* Add secondary-region baseline stacks (INFRA-91, INFRA-16)

INFRA-91: codify the Bedrock model-invocation logging applied
out-of-band in us-west-2 and us-east-2 (per-region delivery role
seahaven-bedrock-invocation-logging-<region> + log group
/aws/bedrock/model-invocations 90d, CloudWatch-only). The account-level
logging config itself has no CFN resource type and is applied via CLI
(already live), same as us-east-1.

INFRA-16: add the still-missing us-east-2 detective controls — AWS
Config recorder role + delivery bucket (recorder/channel via CLI to
avoid the CFN stabilization deadlock seen in us-east-1) and Security
Hub with FSBP + CIS v3.0. GuardDuty + flow logs already live in
us-east-2 and are left for a follow-up adoption to keep this change
non-destructive.

The us-east-1 baseline stays region-pinned; these are separate
RegionalBaselineStack instances composed opt-in per region.

CHECKPOINT: new multi-region stacks. The live Bedrock role + log group
already exist (CLI-created), so a plain deploy would collide — these
need cdk import / changeset adoption, not cdk deploy. Code + diff
captured for review, NOT deployed.

Refs: INFRA-91, INFRA-16

* Drop vault access policy from this deploy; tracked in INFRA-94 (kept governance lock codify + selection)
2026-06-08 17:03:18 -04:00

215 lines
9.3 KiB
TypeScript

import * as cdk from "aws-cdk-lib";
import * as s3 from "aws-cdk-lib/aws-s3";
import * as kms from "aws-cdk-lib/aws-kms";
import * as iam from "aws-cdk-lib/aws-iam";
import * as logs from "aws-cdk-lib/aws-logs";
import * as cloudtrail from "aws-cdk-lib/aws-cloudtrail";
import { Construct } from "constructs";
import { DetectiveControls } from "./detective-controls";
import { GovernanceToggles } from "./governance-toggles";
import { BedrockLogging } from "./bedrock-logging";
import { CisMonitoring } from "./cis-monitoring";
import { FlowLogs } from "./flow-logs";
import { SesMonitoring } from "./ses-monitoring";
import { AppWebAcl } from "./web-acl";
/**
* Account-level security baseline for Sea Haven (account 328440206208).
*
* First resident: a multi-region CloudTrail with log-file validation, KMS
* encryption, an Object-Lock'd S3 log bucket, and CloudWatch Logs delivery.
* Closes audit finding C-1 and CIS 3.1/3.2/3.4/3.6/3.7 (+3.8 via key rotation),
* and provides the CloudWatch Logs group that the CIS Section 4 metric filters
* (H-1) attach to.
*
* Future residents (same stack): AWS Config (H-2), GuardDuty (H-3),
* Security Hub (H-4), IAM Access Analyzer (M-5), Inspector2 (M-6).
*/
export interface AccountBaselineStackProps extends cdk.StackProps {
/** Monthly cost budget ceiling in USD (M-10). */
readonly monthlyBudgetUsd: number;
/** Email for budget threshold alerts (M-10). */
readonly budgetAlertEmail: string;
}
export class AccountBaselineStack extends cdk.Stack {
constructor(scope: Construct, id: string, props: AccountBaselineStackProps) {
super(scope, id, props);
const trailName = "seahaven-org-trail";
// AWS Organizations org id (o-9kufuzz6b4). CloudTrail org trusted-access is
// already enabled on the management account; promoting this trail to an org
// trail (INFRA-73) makes it collect member-account events into this bucket.
const orgId = "o-9kufuzz6b4";
// Static trail ARN (built from name, not trail.trailArn) so the key policy
// does not create a circular dependency with the Trail resource.
const trailArn = cdk.Arn.format(
{ service: "cloudtrail", resource: "trail", resourceName: trailName },
this
);
// ── KMS CMK ── encrypts CloudTrail log files (CIS 3.7); rotation = CIS 3.8.
const trailKey = new kms.Key(this, "TrailKey", {
alias: "cloudtrail-logs",
description: "Encrypts CloudTrail log files for the account-wide trail",
enableKeyRotation: true,
removalPolicy: cdk.RemovalPolicy.RETAIN,
});
// The L2 Trail construct does NOT grant the CloudTrail service principal use
// of a customer-provided key, so delivery of encrypted logs would fail.
// Grant it explicitly, scoped to this account's trail via SourceArn and the
// CloudTrail encryption context. (Caught by cross-review 2026-05-29.)
trailKey.addToResourcePolicy(
new iam.PolicyStatement({
sid: "AllowCloudTrailEncrypt",
effect: iam.Effect.ALLOW,
principals: [new iam.ServicePrincipal("cloudtrail.amazonaws.com")],
actions: ["kms:GenerateDataKey*"],
resources: ["*"],
conditions: {
StringEquals: { "aws:SourceArn": trailArn },
StringLike: {
"kms:EncryptionContext:aws:cloudtrail:arn": `arn:${this.partition}:cloudtrail:*:${this.account}:trail/*`,
},
},
})
);
// INFRA-73 (org trail): member accounts deliver their CloudTrail events to
// this CMK-encrypted bucket, so the CloudTrail service principal must be able
// to GenerateDataKey using each member trail's own encryption context.
//
// Cross-review BLOCK (GPT-4.1): the SourceArn must NOT be pinned to the
// management account 328440206208 — org-trail shadow trails in member
// accounts present their OWN account id in both the SourceArn and the
// encryption-context arn, so pinning to the management account would silently
// block all member-account delivery. Both are wildcarded across accounts and
// the statement is org-scoped by aws:PrincipalOrgID so only accounts in
// o-9kufuzz6b4 — not arbitrary CloudTrail principals — can use the key.
trailKey.addToResourcePolicy(
new iam.PolicyStatement({
sid: "AllowOrgMemberCloudTrailEncrypt",
effect: iam.Effect.ALLOW,
principals: [new iam.ServicePrincipal("cloudtrail.amazonaws.com")],
actions: ["kms:GenerateDataKey*", "kms:DescribeKey"],
resources: ["*"],
conditions: {
StringEquals: { "aws:PrincipalOrgID": orgId },
StringLike: {
"kms:EncryptionContext:aws:cloudtrail:arn": `arn:${this.partition}:cloudtrail:*:*:trail/*`,
"aws:SourceArn": `arn:${this.partition}:cloudtrail:*:*:trail/*`,
},
},
})
);
trailKey.addToResourcePolicy(
new iam.PolicyStatement({
sid: "AllowCloudTrailDescribeKey",
effect: iam.Effect.ALLOW,
principals: [new iam.ServicePrincipal("cloudtrail.amazonaws.com")],
actions: ["kms:DescribeKey"],
resources: ["*"],
})
);
// Central, pre-existing access-logs bucket (manually created, imported
// read-only) — receives S3 server access logs for the trail bucket (CIS 3.6).
const accessLogsBucket = s3.Bucket.fromBucketName(
this,
"AccessLogsBucket",
"seahaven-s3-access-logs"
);
// ── Hardened, tamper-resistant log bucket ──
// Private (BPA all on), KMS-encrypted, versioned, TLS-only, Object-Lock
// GOVERNANCE 365d so logs cannot be silently deleted/overwritten.
const logBucket = new s3.Bucket(this, "TrailLogBucket", {
bucketName: `seahaven-cloudtrail-logs-${this.account}`,
encryption: s3.BucketEncryption.KMS,
encryptionKey: trailKey,
bucketKeyEnabled: true,
blockPublicAccess: s3.BlockPublicAccess.BLOCK_ALL,
enforceSSL: true,
versioned: true,
objectLockEnabled: true,
objectLockDefaultRetention: s3.ObjectLockRetention.governance(
cdk.Duration.days(365)
),
serverAccessLogsBucket: accessLogsBucket,
serverAccessLogsPrefix: "cloudtrail-bucket-access/",
lifecycleRules: [
{
id: "transition-and-expire",
transitions: [
{
storageClass: s3.StorageClass.GLACIER,
transitionAfter: cdk.Duration.days(90),
},
],
expiration: cdk.Duration.days(365),
abortIncompleteMultipartUploadAfter: cdk.Duration.days(7),
},
],
removalPolicy: cdk.RemovalPolicy.RETAIN,
});
// ── Multi-region trail ──
// Management events (read + write), log-file validation, global service
// events, delivered to the KMS-encrypted bucket and to CloudWatch Logs.
// Data events (CIS 3.10/3.11) intentionally deferred — management events
// only for now to control cost (see README).
const trail = new cloudtrail.Trail(this, "Trail", {
trailName,
bucket: logBucket,
encryptionKey: trailKey,
isMultiRegionTrail: true,
// INFRA-73: promote to an organization trail. CloudTrail org
// trusted-access is already enabled on the management account; this makes
// the trail collect every member account's events into this bucket.
// Passing orgId lets the L2 construct auto-attach the AWSLogs/<orgId>/*
// bucket-policy PutObject statement (scoped to this trail's SourceArn).
isOrganizationTrail: true,
orgId,
includeGlobalServiceEvents: true,
enableFileValidation: true,
sendToCloudWatchLogs: true,
cloudWatchLogsRetention: logs.RetentionDays.ONE_YEAR,
managementEvents: cloudtrail.ReadWriteType.ALL,
});
// ── Day 1 detective layer + governance toggles ──
// Config (H-2), GuardDuty (H-3), Security Hub (H-4), Access Analyzer (M-5).
new DetectiveControls(this, "DetectiveControls");
// Monthly cost budget (M-10). Other governance toggles are CLI + documented.
new GovernanceToggles(this, "GovernanceToggles", {
monthlyLimitUsd: props.monthlyBudgetUsd,
alertEmail: props.budgetAlertEmail,
});
// ── Day 2 monitoring + logging ──
// CIS Section 4 metric filters/alarms (H-1), VPC flow logs (H-14),
// SES bounce/complaint config set (M-13).
new CisMonitoring(this, "CisMonitoring", {
alarmEmail: props.budgetAlertEmail,
});
new FlowLogs(this, "FlowLogs");
new SesMonitoring(this, "SesMonitoring");
// Shared CloudFront WAF WebACL (M-17); ARN published to SSM for app stacks.
new AppWebAcl(this, "AppWebAcl");
// ── Day 5 AI governance ──
// Bedrock model invocation logging destinations + delivery role (H-20).
// The account-level logging configuration itself has no CFN resource type;
// applied via CLI post-deploy (see lib/bedrock-logging.ts header).
new BedrockLogging(this, "BedrockLogging");
cdk.Tags.of(this).add("Project", "account-baseline");
cdk.Tags.of(this).add("Owner", "adam@seahavenind.com");
cdk.Tags.of(this).add("Environment", "prod");
cdk.Tags.of(this).add("ManagedBy", "cdk");
new cdk.CfnOutput(this, "TrailArn", { value: trail.trailArn });
new cdk.CfnOutput(this, "LogBucketName", { value: logBucket.bucketName });
new cdk.CfnOutput(this, "TrailKmsKeyArn", { value: trailKey.keyArn });
}
}