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https://github.com/Sea-Haven-Industries/seahaven-org-baseline.git
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e9a184cf96
* Codify primary vault lock + add backups (INFRA-89, INFRA-88) INFRA-89: codify the GOVERNANCE Vault Lock applied out-of-band on the seahaven-primary vault (MinRetention 1d, MaxRetention 2555d, no changeableFor = admin-removable) so it lives in IaC. Values match the live lock exactly, so the deploy is a no-op adoption. Add a scoped vault access policy that denies manual recovery-point deletion and lock/policy tampering to all principals except the AWS Backup service role and the break-glass SSO AdministratorAccess role, so automatic lifecycle expiry still works but humans cannot prune recovery points by hand. Cross-review (GPT-4.1) BLOCK: NotPrincipal does not support wildcard ARN matching, so the SSO exemption is expressed as Effect DENY with Principal * and a StringNotLike condition on aws:PrincipalArn, which does support wildcards. This avoids an unrecoverable vault lockout. INFRA-88: add 6 S3 buckets (kb-docs, payroll-emails [PII], amazon-po, extracted-amazon-po, proposal-system uploads + generated) to the phase2-offsite-everything selection. Versioning verified enabled on all 6 against the live account (S3 backup requires versioning). Refs: INFRA-89, INFRA-88 * Promote account trail to organization trail (INFRA-73) INFRA-73: set isOrganizationTrail on seahaven-org-trail and pass orgId (o-9kufuzz6b4) so the L2 Trail attaches the AWSLogs/<org-id>/* bucket PutObject statement for member-account delivery. CloudTrail org trusted-access is already enabled on the management account. Broaden the KMS key policy with an org-scoped GenerateDataKey/DescribeKey statement for member-account trail delivery, guarded by aws:PrincipalOrgID. The existing single-account statements are preserved so management-account delivery is unaffected. Cross-review (GPT-4.1) BLOCK: the member KMS SourceArn and encryption context must be wildcarded across accounts (org-trail shadow trails present the member account id), not pinned to the management account, or member delivery silently fails. Fixed before checkpoint. CHECKPOINT: delicate org-trail KMS/bucket-policy change — code + diff captured for review, NOT deployed. Refs: INFRA-73 * Add secondary-region baseline stacks (INFRA-91, INFRA-16) INFRA-91: codify the Bedrock model-invocation logging applied out-of-band in us-west-2 and us-east-2 (per-region delivery role seahaven-bedrock-invocation-logging-<region> + log group /aws/bedrock/model-invocations 90d, CloudWatch-only). The account-level logging config itself has no CFN resource type and is applied via CLI (already live), same as us-east-1. INFRA-16: add the still-missing us-east-2 detective controls — AWS Config recorder role + delivery bucket (recorder/channel via CLI to avoid the CFN stabilization deadlock seen in us-east-1) and Security Hub with FSBP + CIS v3.0. GuardDuty + flow logs already live in us-east-2 and are left for a follow-up adoption to keep this change non-destructive. The us-east-1 baseline stays region-pinned; these are separate RegionalBaselineStack instances composed opt-in per region. CHECKPOINT: new multi-region stacks. The live Bedrock role + log group already exist (CLI-created), so a plain deploy would collide — these need cdk import / changeset adoption, not cdk deploy. Code + diff captured for review, NOT deployed. Refs: INFRA-91, INFRA-16 * Drop vault access policy from this deploy; tracked in INFRA-94 (kept governance lock codify + selection)
56 lines
2.3 KiB
JavaScript
56 lines
2.3 KiB
JavaScript
#!/usr/bin/env node
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import "source-map-support/register";
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import * as cdk from "aws-cdk-lib";
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import { AccountBaselineStack } from "../lib/account-baseline-stack";
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import { BackupOffsiteStack } from "../lib/backup-offsite-stack";
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import { BackupStack } from "../lib/backup-stack";
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import { RegionalBaselineStack } from "../lib/regional-baseline-stack";
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const ACCOUNT = "328440206208";
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const app = new cdk.App();
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new AccountBaselineStack(app, "account-baseline", {
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stackName: "seahaven-account-baseline",
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env: { account: ACCOUNT, region: "us-east-1" },
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monthlyBudgetUsd: 1200,
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budgetAlertEmail: "adam@seahavenind.com",
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});
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// ── Secondary-region baselines (INFRA-16, INFRA-91) ──────────────────────────
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// The us-east-1 baseline above is region-pinned by design. These stacks extend
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// a minimal detective/logging footprint into the secondary regions, codifying
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// state applied out-of-band this week so it lives in IaC.
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// us-west-2: Bedrock invocation logging only (INFRA-91). Shares the region with
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// the offsite backup vault but is an independent concern (separate stack).
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new RegionalBaselineStack(app, "regional-baseline-us-west-2", {
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stackName: "seahaven-regional-baseline-us-west-2",
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env: { account: ACCOUNT, region: "us-west-2" },
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bedrockLogging: true,
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});
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// us-east-2: Bedrock invocation logging (INFRA-91) + the still-missing AWS
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// Config recorder and Security Hub (INFRA-16). GuardDuty + flow logs already
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// live here (adopted as a follow-up, see lib/regional-baseline-stack.ts).
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new RegionalBaselineStack(app, "regional-baseline-us-east-2", {
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stackName: "seahaven-regional-baseline-us-east-2",
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env: { account: ACCOUNT, region: "us-east-2" },
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bedrockLogging: true,
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configRecorder: true,
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securityHub: true,
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});
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// AWS Backup (audit C-7). Offsite vault (us-west-2) must exist before the
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// primary plan that copies to it, hence the explicit dependency.
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const backupOffsite = new BackupOffsiteStack(app, "backup-offsite", {
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stackName: "seahaven-backup-offsite",
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env: { account: "328440206208", region: "us-west-2" },
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});
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const backupPrimary = new BackupStack(app, "backup", {
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stackName: "seahaven-backup",
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env: { account: "328440206208", region: "us-east-1" },
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});
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backupPrimary.addDependency(backupOffsite);
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