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seahaven-org-baseline/lib/terraform-substrate/terraform-substrate.template.yaml
Adam Moussa cc068f3c8d
chore(terraform-substrate): forget deleted openswe traces roles (PLAT-147) (#163) 
The IAM roles are already gone. Removing the logical IDs while DeletionPolicy stays Retain lets CloudFormation drop them without updating missing roles.
2026-09-28 19:30:14 +00:00

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AWSTemplateFormatVersion: "2010-09-09"
Description: >-
Per-account HCP Terraform deploy substrate for Sea Haven Industries:
the app.terraform.io OIDC identity provider and the shared boundary-gated
IAM guardrail policy used by prod/dev apply roles, plus exact per-workspace
role pairs appended at each stack's migration time. External-dev SHOC roles
use environment-scoped inline policies instead of the shared IAM manager.
# PROVENANCE / DESIGN SOURCE
# Authored fresh 2026-07-30 (the mgmt Terraform POC's CLI-created provider and
# hcptf-* roles were rolled back the same day, so there is no deployed source
# to vendor). HcptfIamManagementPolicy DERIVES FROM the reviewed
# seahaven-cfn-exec-iam-management pattern in
# lib/deploy-substrate/deploy-substrate.template.yaml (boundary-gated
# CreateRole/AttachRolePolicy/PutRolePolicy/PutRolePermissionsBoundary +
# DenyBoundaryTampering / DenyBoundaryPolicyEdit / DenySelfMutation) but is
# DELIBERATELY STRICTER — it is NOT a byte-identical mirror. Do not "reconcile"
# the two by copying this file's statements back, or vice versa; the divergences
# below are load-bearing and were required by the 2026-07-30 security review
# (findings C1-C5, one confirmed critical + one high):
#
# 1. ROLE PATH SCOPING (review finding C2). The SAM copy's Resource
# `role/*` on the boundary-gated statements is justified there by SAM
# auto-generating execution roles at path / with no settable RolePath —
# a path condition would break every SAM deploy. THAT RATIONALE DOES NOT
# TRANSFER: Terraform's aws_iam_role supports `path` and `name_prefix`.
# So every role-WRITE statement here is scoped to the Terraform-owned path
# `role/tf-managed/*`. Terraform configs MUST set path = "/tf-managed/" on
# every role they create; a role created anywhere else is denied. The path
# is deliberately NOT `hcptf-*`, which would collide with the substrate's
# own hcptf-* apply/plan roles under DenySelfMutation's wildcard.
# 2. READ AND WRITE SPLIT (review findings C1, C3, C4). The SAM copy's
# IAMRoleReadAndDelete grants iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy / DeleteRole /
# DetachRolePolicy / DeleteRolePolicy / UpdateRole on Resource "*"
# unconditioned — a confirmed privilege-escalation primitive (repoint the
# AdministratorAccess CDK bootstrap role's trust policy, then assume it
# cross-account) that DenySelfMutation's three name patterns do not cover.
# Here those actions are split: reads stay on "*" (Terraform data sources
# need them), every destructive/mutating action is confined to
# `role/tf-managed/*`. This closes the escalation at the root instead of
# chasing it with a denylist.
# 3. PASSROLE SCOPING (review finding C5). The SAM copy passes any role to
# Lambda (its comment claims SAM-role scoping the Resource does not
# express). Here PassRole is confined to `role/tf-managed/*`, so one
# workspace cannot attach another workspace's execution role to a function
# it controls — that path performs no IAM write and would otherwise evade
# every boundary gate and Deny in this document.
# 4. DENYSELFMUTATION SCOPE. Extended beyond the substrate's own principals to
# cdk-hnb659fds-* (AdministratorAccess bootstrap roles),
# OrganizationAccountAccessRole, and seahaven-* (detective-control roles
# such as the Config recorder role, which no SCP on prod/nonprod protects
# from iam:DeleteRole). Defense in depth behind the path scoping above.
#
# The SAM copy retains its adjudicated accepted risks because SAM's constraints
# are real; this file has no such excuse. KNOWN OPEN ITEM (pre-existing, not
# introduced here): the org's ProtectPrivilegedRoles SCP encodes exactly the
# protection in (4) but is attached ONLY to the security OU — extending it to
# prod/nonprod is the durable org-level fix and is tracked separately.
#
# COUPLING (frozen, PLAT-143/PLAT-149): the enumerated StringEquals list below
# is the last prod/dev HCP allow-list this document will carry. Do not append
# another seahaven-lambda-execution-boundary-<workload> ARN here. New HCP
# Lambda ceilings are policy/tf-managed/<stack> created by hcptf-bootstrap
# (CLI, PLAT-145). CreatePolicy lives only on that bootstrap role. Do not
# put ArnLike on this list, and do not add ArnLike to the SAM copy in
# deploy-substrate (PLAT-52 AC1: githubdeploy-seahaven-org-baseline can
# CreatePolicy via CFN). Existing eight workloads keep these ARNs until their
# consumer Terraform imports detach seahaven-hcptf-iam-management and this
# stack is deleted in prod/dev (PLAT-147). External-dev SHOC roles below do
# not attach this policy.
#
# SIZE BUDGET: this document is at the 6,144-character wall (4693 compact /
# 10 statements after eight workload ARNs). That accumulator is why prod/dev
# per-workspace IAM is leaving this file. Do not grow it.
#
# PER-WORKSPACE ROLE ACCUMULATOR — CLOSED FOR PROD/DEV
# Do not append new hcptf-<stack> pairs for prod or dev. App Terraform owns
# those roles (PLAT-144/PLAT-146). Six prod pairs stay here with
# DeletionPolicy: Retain until the Retain-remove, then the prod/dev stacks
# delete (PLAT-147). hcptf-sh-openswe-traces and -plan are omitted: the IAM
# roles are already gone (PLAT-196), so this update forgets the logical IDs.
# seahaven-site lives in seahaven-site-hcptf. External-dev
# SHOC roles below remain in this template (PLAT-148). All remaining subs are
# exact StringEquals (never StringLike, never a wildcarded run_phase).
#
# This template is deployed via lib/terraform-substrate-stack.ts
# (cloudformation-include) as stack seahaven-terraform-substrate, once per
# member account that hosts Terraform-managed workloads (currently
# seahaven-prod 011934824531, seahaven-dev 710827005802, and external-dev
# 396287094661; NEVER mgmt — mgmt stays SAM until its stacks migrate out).
Parameters:
CreateOIDCProvider:
Type: String
Default: "true"
AllowedValues: ["true", "false"]
Description: >-
Set to false if the app.terraform.io OIDC provider already exists in this
account. An account holds exactly ONE provider per URL, so an unconditional
create collides. Because the provider is Retain, a FIRST-create rollback
(caused by any other resource in this stack failing) leaves the provider
behind as an orphan and the stack in ROLLBACK_COMPLETE — which cannot be
updated. Recovery: delete the stack, then either
`aws iam delete-open-id-connect-provider --open-id-connect-provider-arn
arn:aws:iam::<acct>:oidc-provider/app.terraform.io` before retrying, or
redeploy with this parameter false. Same idempotency affordance the sibling
deploy-substrate template carries for the GitHub provider.
EnableShocBackendPocRoles:
Type: String
Default: "false"
AllowedValues: ["true", "false"]
Description: >-
External-dev tf-poc gate. Keep false for the base-stack create, then set
true on the reviewed normal update that creates the new tf-poc role pair.
EnableShocBackendLiveRoles:
Type: String
Default: "false"
AllowedValues: ["true", "false"]
Description: >-
External-dev live-role collision guard. Keep false until the four existing
dev/staging roles have been removed from Terraform state with destroy=false.
Set true only in the CloudFormation IMPORT change set that adopts them.
Conditions:
ShouldCreateOIDCProvider: !Equals [!Ref CreateOIDCProvider, "true"]
# Per-workspace hcptf-* roles for afi-backup-monitor-prod (PLAT-56) must only
# exist in seahaven-prod. The same template deploys to seahaven-dev; creating
# prod-workspace trust there would leave dead credentials in the wrong account.
IsProdAccount: !Equals [!Ref "AWS::AccountId", "011934824531"]
IsExternalDevAccount: !Equals [!Ref "AWS::AccountId", "396287094661"]
IsSharedIamManagementAccount: !Or
- !Equals [!Ref "AWS::AccountId", "011934824531"]
- !Equals [!Ref "AWS::AccountId", "710827005802"]
ShouldManageShocBackendPocRoles: !And
- !Condition IsExternalDevAccount
- !Equals [!Ref EnableShocBackendPocRoles, "true"]
ShouldManageShocBackendLiveRoles: !And
- !Condition IsExternalDevAccount
- !Equals [!Ref EnableShocBackendLiveRoles, "true"]
Resources:
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# HCP Terraform OIDC provider
#
# Created by default: Phase-0 checks (2026-07-30) confirmed neither prod nor
# dev has an app.terraform.io provider (the mgmt POC's copy was deleted in the
# same-day rollback and never existed in the member accounts). An account
# holds exactly ONE provider per URL — see the parameter above for the
# first-create rollback trap this condition exists to make recoverable.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
TerraformCloudOIDCProvider:
Type: AWS::IAM::OIDCProvider
Condition: ShouldCreateOIDCProvider
Properties:
Url: https://app.terraform.io
ClientIdList:
# Default audience of HCP Terraform dynamic provider credentials
# (TFC_AWS_WORKLOAD_IDENTITY_AUDIENCE). Trust policies pin this via
# StringEquals on app.terraform.io:aud.
- aws.workload.identity
ThumbprintList:
# AWS ignores thumbprints for issuers signed by a trusted root CA
# (app.terraform.io qualifies) and secures trust via the CA bundle;
# the property is populated because CloudFormation requires a value.
# This is the thumbprint HashiCorp's own AWS setup documentation uses.
- 9e99a48a9960b14926bb7f3b02e22da2b0ab7280
# Every future hcptf-* role trusts this provider. Retain so deleting the
# stack can never delete the account's Terraform federation anchor out
# from under live workspaces.
DeletionPolicy: Retain
UpdateReplacePolicy: Retain
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Shared boundary-gated IAM guardrail policy (attached managed policy)
#
# Attached by every per-workspace Terraform APPLY role (hcptf-<stack>);
# NEVER by plan roles (hcptf-<stack>-plan are read-only and hold no IAM
# writes at all). Defined once here so all apply roles carry the identical
# reviewed escalation control instead of per-role copies that can drift.
#
# PRIMARY ESCALATION CONTROL (same design as INFRA-97 on the SAM side):
# every iam:CreateRole / AttachRolePolicy / PutRolePolicy is conditioned on
# the target role carrying seahaven-lambda-execution-boundary, so a role
# created by a Terraform apply can never exceed the boundary ceiling. The
# POC security review confirmed the unconditioned alternative is critical:
# iam:PutRolePolicy on Lambda exec roles + lambda:UpdateFunctionCode reads
# every secret in the account.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
HcptfIamManagementPolicy:
Type: AWS::IAM::ManagedPolicy
Condition: IsSharedIamManagementAccount
Properties:
# Fixed name: future hcptf-* roles reference it by ARN, and a rename
# would detach-and-replace mid-update. Treat a rename as a coordinated
# migration, not an edit.
ManagedPolicyName: seahaven-hcptf-iam-management
Description: >-
Boundary-gated IAM role lifecycle for per-workspace Terraform apply
roles (hcptf-*), plus the explicit Deny backstops that keep the
permissions boundary from being detached or rewritten and the deploy
substrates' own principals from being mutated. Mirrors
seahaven-cfn-exec-iam-management; reconcile changes across both.
PolicyDocument:
Version: "2012-10-17"
Statement:
# Create role — MUST attach boundary AND land on the Terraform-owned
# path. Two independent gates: the boundary caps what the role can do,
# the path caps which roles this policy can touch at all. Terraform
# configs set path = "/tf-managed/" on every aws_iam_role.
- Sid: IAMCreateRoleWithBoundary
Effect: Allow
Action:
- iam:CreateRole
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/tf-managed/*"
Condition:
StringEquals:
"iam:PermissionsBoundary": &acceptableLambdaBoundaries
- !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:policy/seahaven-lambda-execution-boundary"
- !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:policy/seahaven-lambda-execution-boundary-afi-backup-monitor"
- !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:policy/seahaven-lambda-execution-boundary-front-integrations"
- !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:policy/seahaven-lambda-execution-boundary-procurement-ingest"
- !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:policy/seahaven-lambda-execution-boundary-meal-order-manager"
- !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:policy/seahaven-lambda-execution-boundary-seahaven-site"
- !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:policy/seahaven-lambda-execution-boundary-seahaven-door-unlock-api"
- !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:policy/seahaven-lambda-execution-boundary-paychex-integrations"
# Attach managed policies — MUST have boundary already on role
- Sid: IAMAttachPolicyWithBoundary
Effect: Allow
Action:
- iam:AttachRolePolicy
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/tf-managed/*"
Condition:
StringEquals:
"iam:PermissionsBoundary": *acceptableLambdaBoundaries
# Put inline policy — MUST have boundary already on role
- Sid: IAMPutRolePolicyWithBoundary
Effect: Allow
Action:
- iam:PutRolePolicy
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/tf-managed/*"
Condition:
StringEquals:
"iam:PermissionsBoundary": *acceptableLambdaBoundaries
# Boundary management — SET only, never DELETE. For a delete, the
# iam:PermissionsBoundary condition key resolves to the boundary
# CURRENTLY on the target role, so a StringEquals grant would match
# exactly the roles the gate protects and self-defeat it (verified
# live against the mgmt SAM copy 2026-07-27). Terraform never needs
# the delete: it SETS the boundary on roles it creates, and destroy
# calls DeleteRole.
# Path-scoped as well as boundary-pinned: the condition constrains WHICH
# boundary may be set, not WHICH role receives it. Unscoped (as in the
# SAM copy) this is a one-way denial-of-service — applying the Lambda
# runtime boundary to the CDK bootstrap execution role collapses its
# permissions, and DenyBoundaryTampering below then blocks removal by
# this same principal (2026-07-30 review finding C3).
- Sid: IAMPutPermissionsBoundary
Effect: Allow
Action:
- iam:PutRolePermissionsBoundary
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/tf-managed/*"
Condition:
StringEquals:
"iam:PermissionsBoundary": *acceptableLambdaBoundaries
# Explicit Deny backstop (AWS's NoBoundaryPolicyEdit/NoBoundaryDelete
# delegation pattern). A Deny is required, not merely omitting the
# Allow — any future Allow added to an apply role silently reopens
# the escalation otherwise.
- Sid: DenyBoundaryTampering
Effect: Deny
Action:
- iam:DeleteRolePermissionsBoundary
- iam:DeleteUserPermissionsBoundary
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:user/*"
# Whole seahaven-* policy family: this policy carries the Denies, so
# it is a higher-value target than the boundary it protects. Safe to
# scope broadly — no Terraform stack manages a seahaven-* managed
# policy, and apply roles hold no iam:CreatePolicy.
- Sid: DenyBoundaryPolicyEdit
Effect: Deny
Action:
- iam:CreatePolicyVersion
- iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion
- iam:DeletePolicyVersion
- iam:DeletePolicy
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:policy/seahaven-*"
# Self-protection for BOTH deploy substrates' principals. Without
# this the control is one API call from being undone —
# IAMRoleReadAndDelete below grants iam:DetachRolePolicy on
# Resource "*" unconditioned, so an apply role could detach this
# very policy from itself. Scope covers the Terraform substrate's
# own roles (hcptf-*) AND the GitHub Actions substrate's
# (github-cfn-execution-role, githubdeploy-*): a Terraform apply
# never legitimately manages any of them — hcptf-* roles are
# managed by THIS stack via the CDK bootstrap execution role, the
# GitHub-side roles by their own substrate/onboarding — so the Deny
# costs nothing operationally and closes the same
# UpdateAssumeRolePolicy-on-* repoint risk the SAM-side review
# flagged, for every substrate principal reachable from this path.
- Sid: DenySelfMutation
Effect: Deny
Action:
- iam:AttachRolePolicy
- iam:DeleteRole
- iam:DeleteRolePolicy
- iam:DeleteRolePermissionsBoundary
- iam:DetachRolePolicy
- iam:PutRolePolicy
- iam:PutRolePermissionsBoundary
- iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy
- iam:UpdateRole
- iam:UpdateRoleDescription
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/hcptf-*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/github-cfn-execution-role"
- !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/githubdeploy-*"
# Extended beyond the SAM copy's three patterns (2026-07-30 review
# findings C1/C3/C4). cdk-hnb659fds-* carries AdministratorAccess
# and deploys this very stack; OrganizationAccountAccessRole is the
# org break-glass path; seahaven-* covers detective-control roles
# (e.g. the Config recorder role) that the protect-security-baseline
# SCP does NOT shield from iam:DeleteRole. Defense in depth — the
# path scoping on the write statements is the primary control.
- !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/cdk-hnb659fds-*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/OrganizationAccountAccessRole"
- !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/seahaven-*"
# READ-ONLY on every role/policy in the account. Terraform data sources
# and refresh legitimately need to read arbitrary roles; none of these
# actions can modify anything, so Resource "*" is safe here.
- Sid: IAMReadOnly
Effect: Allow
Action:
- iam:GetRole
- iam:GetRolePolicy
- iam:ListAttachedRolePolicies
- iam:ListRolePolicies
- iam:ListRoles
- iam:GetPolicy
- iam:GetPolicyVersion
- iam:ListPolicies
- iam:ListPolicyVersions
Resource: "*"
# DESTRUCTIVE / MUTATING role actions — confined to the Terraform-owned
# path. The SAM copy grants these on Resource "*" unconditioned, which
# the 2026-07-30 review confirmed as a critical escalation primitive
# (finding C1): iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy on "*" lets the principal
# repoint the AdministratorAccess CDK bootstrap role's trust policy to
# an external account and assume it. Path scoping closes that at the
# root rather than enumerating protected names.
- Sid: IAMRoleWriteScoped
Effect: Allow
Action:
- iam:DeleteRole
- iam:DeleteRolePolicy
- iam:DetachRolePolicy
- iam:TagRole
- iam:UntagRole
- iam:UpdateRole
- iam:UpdateRoleDescription
- iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/tf-managed/*"
# PassRole — Terraform passes the execution roles it created (which are
# on the tf-managed path, boundary-gated above) to the Lambda service.
# Path-scoped, not role/*: unscoped, one workspace's apply role could
# attach ANOTHER workspace's or a SAM stack's execution role to a
# function it controls and run arbitrary code as that identity — a path
# that performs no IAM write and so evades every boundary gate and Deny
# in this document (2026-07-30 review finding C5). Other target services
# (scheduler, apigateway, ...) are NOT granted: a stack that needs one
# adds a scoped PassRole statement to its own apply role at migration.
- Sid: IAMPassRole
Effect: Allow
Action:
- iam:PassRole
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/tf-managed/*"
Condition:
StringEquals:
"iam:PassedToService": "lambda.amazonaws.com"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Per-workspace role pattern (required for every future hcptf-* append)
# and first workload: afi-backup-monitor-prod (PLAT-56).
#
# Copy this shape — do not invent enumerated Get* allow-lists.
#
# Plan role (every stack):
# - Managed: ViewOnlyAccess (never ReadOnlyAccess — it grants
# secretsmanager:GetSecretValue / s3:GetObject / kms:Decrypt to
# speculative PR plans).
# - PLUS a stack-scoped plan-refresh sidecar. ViewOnly alone omits
# iam:GetRole, events:DescribeRule, and provider Lambda/S3 reads
# needed after a partial first apply.
#
# Apply role (Lambda / EventBridge stacks):
# - Attach seahaven-hcptf-iam-management.
# - Service grants: prefix-scoped lambda:* on function:<prefix>-* and
# layer:<prefix>-*, events:* on rule/<prefix>-*, and bucket-scoped
# s3:* on the stack artifact bucket. Enumerating provider Get*
# (GetFunctionCodeSigningConfig, GetBucketAcl, …) lags and fails
# first apply (PLAT-56).
#
# Trust: exact StringEquals on organization/project/workspace/run_phase —
# never StringLike, never a wildcarded run_phase. Prod-only for this
# pair (IsProdAccount). See README "Migration checklist".
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
HcptfAfiBackupMonitorPlanRole:
Type: AWS::IAM::Role
Condition: IsProdAccount
DeletionPolicy: Retain
UpdateReplacePolicy: Retain
Properties:
RoleName: hcptf-afi-backup-monitor-plan
AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
Version: "2012-10-17"
Statement:
- Effect: Allow
Principal:
Federated: !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:oidc-provider/app.terraform.io"
Action: sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity
Condition:
StringEquals:
"app.terraform.io:aud": aws.workload.identity
"app.terraform.io:sub": organization:seahaven:project:seahaven-prod:workspace:afi-backup-monitor-prod:run_phase:plan
ManagedPolicyArns:
- arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/job-function/ViewOnlyAccess
Policies:
- PolicyName: afi-backup-monitor-plan-refresh
PolicyDocument:
Version: "2012-10-17"
Statement:
- Sid: RefreshIamRoles
Effect: Allow
Action:
- iam:GetRole
- iam:GetRolePolicy
- iam:ListRolePolicies
- iam:ListAttachedRolePolicies
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/tf-managed/afi-*"
- Sid: RefreshManagedPolicies
Effect: Allow
Action:
- iam:GetPolicy
- iam:GetPolicyVersion
Resource: "*"
- Sid: RefreshEventBridge
Effect: Allow
Action:
- events:DescribeRule
- events:ListTargetsByRule
- events:ListTagsForResource
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:events:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:rule/afi-*"
- Sid: RefreshLambda
Effect: Allow
Action:
- lambda:*
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:function:afi-*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:layer:afi-shared*"
- Sid: RefreshArtifactsBucket
Effect: Allow
Action:
- s3:Get*
- s3:ListBucket
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::afi-backup-monitor-artifacts-${AWS::AccountId}"
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::afi-backup-monitor-artifacts-${AWS::AccountId}/*"
- Sid: RefreshLogs
Effect: Allow
Action:
- logs:DescribeLogGroups
- logs:ListTagsForResource
Resource: "*"
HcptfAfiBackupMonitorApplyRole:
Type: AWS::IAM::Role
Condition: IsProdAccount
DeletionPolicy: Retain
UpdateReplacePolicy: Retain
Properties:
RoleName: hcptf-afi-backup-monitor
AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
Version: "2012-10-17"
Statement:
- Effect: Allow
Principal:
Federated: !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:oidc-provider/app.terraform.io"
Action: sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity
Condition:
StringEquals:
"app.terraform.io:aud": aws.workload.identity
"app.terraform.io:sub": organization:seahaven:project:seahaven-prod:workspace:afi-backup-monitor-prod:run_phase:apply
ManagedPolicyArns:
- !Ref HcptfIamManagementPolicy
Policies:
- PolicyName: afi-backup-monitor-services
PolicyDocument:
Version: "2012-10-17"
Statement:
# lambda:*/events:* on stack prefixes — AWS provider reads many
# Get* attributes (e.g. GetFunctionCodeSigningConfig) that lag any
# enumerated allow-list (PLAT-56 first-apply misses).
- Sid: LambdaAll
Effect: Allow
Action:
- lambda:*
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:function:afi-*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:layer:afi-shared*"
- Sid: LambdaList
Effect: Allow
Action:
- lambda:ListFunctions
- lambda:ListLayers
- lambda:GetAccountSettings
Resource: "*"
- Sid: EventBridgeRules
Effect: Allow
Action:
- events:*
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:events:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:rule/afi-*"
- Sid: CloudWatchLogs
Effect: Allow
Action:
- logs:CreateLogGroup
- logs:DeleteLogGroup
- logs:PutRetentionPolicy
- logs:DeleteRetentionPolicy
- logs:TagResource
- logs:UntagResource
- logs:ListTagsForResource
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:logs:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:log-group:/aws/lambda/afi-*"
# logs:DescribeLogGroups is a collection action — AWS authorises it
# against "*" only. Scoping it to a log-group ARN is a silent no-op
# grant (same pitfall documented on LambdaExecutionBoundary).
- Sid: CloudWatchLogsDescribe
Effect: Allow
Action:
- logs:DescribeLogGroups
Resource: "*"
# Artifact bucket for HCP plan/apply split: zip bytes travel in the
# plan via aws_s3_object content_base64 (local archive_file paths
# from the plan worker are not on the apply worker). Action set is
# s3:* on this bucket only — the AWS provider reads many GetBucket*
# attributes (e.g. GetBucketAcl) after CreateBucket; enumerating
# them lags provider upgrades (PLAT-56 first-apply miss).
- Sid: LambdaArtifactsBucket
Effect: Allow
Action:
- s3:*
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::afi-backup-monitor-artifacts-${AWS::AccountId}"
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::afi-backup-monitor-artifacts-${AWS::AccountId}/*"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# front-integrations (PLAT-72) — plan + apply roles for workspace
# front-integrations-prod. Copy shape from afi-backup-monitor above; extend
# for DynamoDB table front-sla-alerts, CloudWatch alarms, and site-alerts SNS.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
HcptfFrontIntegrationsPlanRole:
Type: AWS::IAM::Role
Condition: IsProdAccount
DeletionPolicy: Retain
UpdateReplacePolicy: Retain
Properties:
RoleName: hcptf-front-integrations-plan
AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
Version: "2012-10-17"
Statement:
- Effect: Allow
Principal:
Federated: !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:oidc-provider/app.terraform.io"
Action: sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity
Condition:
StringEquals:
"app.terraform.io:aud": aws.workload.identity
"app.terraform.io:sub": organization:seahaven:project:seahaven-prod:workspace:front-integrations-prod:run_phase:plan
ManagedPolicyArns:
- arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/job-function/ViewOnlyAccess
Policies:
- PolicyName: front-integrations-plan-refresh
PolicyDocument:
Version: "2012-10-17"
Statement:
- Sid: RefreshIamRoles
Effect: Allow
Action:
- iam:GetRole
- iam:GetRolePolicy
- iam:ListRolePolicies
- iam:ListAttachedRolePolicies
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/tf-managed/front-*"
- Sid: RefreshManagedPolicies
Effect: Allow
Action:
- iam:GetPolicy
- iam:GetPolicyVersion
Resource: "*"
- Sid: RefreshEventBridge
Effect: Allow
Action:
- events:DescribeRule
- events:ListTargetsByRule
- events:ListTagsForResource
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:events:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:rule/front-*"
- Sid: RefreshLambda
Effect: Allow
Action:
# Read-only refresh for plan; mutate APIs stay on the apply role.
- lambda:Get*
- lambda:List*
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:function:front-*"
- Sid: RefreshArtifactsBucket
Effect: Allow
Action:
- s3:Get*
- s3:ListBucket
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::front-integrations-artifacts-${AWS::AccountId}"
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::front-integrations-artifacts-${AWS::AccountId}/*"
- Sid: RefreshDynamoDB
Effect: Allow
Action:
- dynamodb:DescribeTable
- dynamodb:DescribeTimeToLive
- dynamodb:DescribeContinuousBackups
- dynamodb:ListTagsOfResource
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:table/front-sla-alerts"
- Sid: RefreshCloudWatchAlarms
Effect: Allow
Action:
- cloudwatch:DescribeAlarms
- cloudwatch:ListTagsForResource
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:cloudwatch:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:alarm:front-*"
- Sid: RefreshLogs
Effect: Allow
Action:
- logs:DescribeLogGroups
- logs:ListTagsForResource
Resource: "*"
HcptfFrontIntegrationsApplyRole:
Type: AWS::IAM::Role
Condition: IsProdAccount
DeletionPolicy: Retain
UpdateReplacePolicy: Retain
Properties:
RoleName: hcptf-front-integrations
AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
Version: "2012-10-17"
Statement:
- Effect: Allow
Principal:
Federated: !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:oidc-provider/app.terraform.io"
Action: sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity
Condition:
StringEquals:
"app.terraform.io:aud": aws.workload.identity
"app.terraform.io:sub": organization:seahaven:project:seahaven-prod:workspace:front-integrations-prod:run_phase:apply
ManagedPolicyArns:
- !Ref HcptfIamManagementPolicy
Policies:
- PolicyName: front-integrations-services
PolicyDocument:
Version: "2012-10-17"
Statement:
- Sid: LambdaAll
Effect: Allow
Action:
- lambda:*
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:function:front-*"
- Sid: LambdaList
Effect: Allow
Action:
- lambda:ListFunctions
- lambda:ListLayers
- lambda:GetAccountSettings
Resource: "*"
- Sid: EventBridgeRules
Effect: Allow
Action:
- events:*
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:events:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:rule/front-*"
- Sid: CloudWatchLogs
Effect: Allow
Action:
- logs:CreateLogGroup
- logs:DeleteLogGroup
- logs:PutRetentionPolicy
- logs:DeleteRetentionPolicy
- logs:TagResource
- logs:UntagResource
- logs:ListTagsForResource
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:logs:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:log-group:/aws/lambda/front-*"
- Sid: CloudWatchLogsDescribe
Effect: Allow
Action:
- logs:DescribeLogGroups
Resource: "*"
- Sid: LambdaArtifactsBucket
Effect: Allow
Action:
- s3:*
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::front-integrations-artifacts-${AWS::AccountId}"
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::front-integrations-artifacts-${AWS::AccountId}/*"
- Sid: DynamoDBTable
Effect: Allow
Action:
- dynamodb:*
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:table/front-sla-alerts"
- !Sub "arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:table/front-sla-alerts/index/*"
- Sid: DynamoDBList
Effect: Allow
Action:
- dynamodb:ListTables
Resource: "*"
- Sid: CloudWatchAlarms
Effect: Allow
Action:
- cloudwatch:*
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:cloudwatch:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:alarm:front-*"
- Sid: SiteAlertsSns
Effect: Allow
Action:
- sns:Publish
- sns:GetTopicAttributes
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:sns:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:site-alerts"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# paychex-integrations (PLAT-120/123) — plan + apply roles for workspace
# paychex-integrations-prod. Copy shape from front-integrations. Secret
# Get/Put value stays off the apply role. Lambda execution boundary pins
# minted secret ARNs and table paychex-worker-ledger.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
HcptfPaychexIntegrationsPlanRole:
Type: AWS::IAM::Role
Condition: IsProdAccount
DeletionPolicy: Retain
UpdateReplacePolicy: Retain
Properties:
RoleName: hcptf-paychex-integrations-plan
AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
Version: "2012-10-17"
Statement:
- Effect: Allow
Principal:
Federated: !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:oidc-provider/app.terraform.io"
Action: sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity
Condition:
StringEquals:
"app.terraform.io:aud": aws.workload.identity
"app.terraform.io:sub": organization:seahaven:project:seahaven-prod:workspace:paychex-integrations-prod:run_phase:plan
ManagedPolicyArns:
- arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/job-function/ViewOnlyAccess
Policies:
- PolicyName: paychex-integrations-plan-refresh
PolicyDocument:
Version: "2012-10-17"
Statement:
- Sid: RefreshIamRoles
Effect: Allow
Action:
- iam:GetRole
- iam:GetRolePolicy
- iam:ListRolePolicies
- iam:ListAttachedRolePolicies
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/tf-managed/paychex-*"
- Sid: RefreshManagedPolicies
Effect: Allow
Action:
- iam:GetPolicy
- iam:GetPolicyVersion
Resource: "*"
- Sid: RefreshLambda
Effect: Allow
Action:
- lambda:Get*
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:function:paychex-*"
# Collection/list APIs authorize only against Resource "*".
- Sid: RefreshLambdaList
Effect: Allow
Action:
- lambda:ListFunctions
- lambda:GetAccountSettings
Resource: "*"
- Sid: RefreshArtifactsBucket
Effect: Allow
Action:
- s3:Get*
- s3:ListBucket
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::paychex-integrations-artifacts-${AWS::AccountId}"
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::paychex-integrations-artifacts-${AWS::AccountId}/*"
- Sid: RefreshCloudWatchAlarms
Effect: Allow
Action:
- cloudwatch:DescribeAlarms
- cloudwatch:ListTagsForResource
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:cloudwatch:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:alarm:paychex-*"
- Sid: RefreshLogs
Effect: Allow
Action:
- logs:DescribeLogGroups
- logs:ListTagsForResource
Resource: "*"
- Sid: RefreshSecrets
Effect: Allow
Action:
- secretsmanager:DescribeSecret
- secretsmanager:GetResourcePolicy
- secretsmanager:ListSecretVersionIds
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:secret:paychex-integrations/*"
- Sid: RefreshDynamoDB
Effect: Allow
Action:
- dynamodb:DescribeTable
- dynamodb:DescribeTimeToLive
- dynamodb:DescribeContinuousBackups
- dynamodb:ListTagsOfResource
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:table/paychex-worker-ledger"
HcptfPaychexIntegrationsApplyRole:
Type: AWS::IAM::Role
Condition: IsProdAccount
DeletionPolicy: Retain
UpdateReplacePolicy: Retain
Properties:
RoleName: hcptf-paychex-integrations
AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
Version: "2012-10-17"
Statement:
- Effect: Allow
Principal:
Federated: !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:oidc-provider/app.terraform.io"
Action: sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity
Condition:
StringEquals:
"app.terraform.io:aud": aws.workload.identity
"app.terraform.io:sub": organization:seahaven:project:seahaven-prod:workspace:paychex-integrations-prod:run_phase:apply
ManagedPolicyArns:
- !Ref HcptfIamManagementPolicy
Policies:
- PolicyName: paychex-integrations-services
PolicyDocument:
Version: "2012-10-17"
Statement:
- Sid: LambdaAll
Effect: Allow
Action:
- lambda:*
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:function:paychex-*"
- Sid: LambdaList
Effect: Allow
Action:
- lambda:ListFunctions
- lambda:ListLayers
- lambda:GetAccountSettings
Resource: "*"
- Sid: CloudWatchLogs
Effect: Allow
Action:
- logs:CreateLogGroup
- logs:DeleteLogGroup
- logs:PutRetentionPolicy
- logs:DeleteRetentionPolicy
- logs:TagResource
- logs:UntagResource
- logs:ListTagsForResource
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:logs:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:log-group:/aws/lambda/paychex-*"
- Sid: CloudWatchLogsDescribe
Effect: Allow
Action:
- logs:DescribeLogGroups
Resource: "*"
- Sid: LambdaArtifactsBucket
Effect: Allow
Action:
- s3:*
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::paychex-integrations-artifacts-${AWS::AccountId}"
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::paychex-integrations-artifacts-${AWS::AccountId}/*"
- Sid: CloudWatchAlarms
Effect: Allow
Action:
- cloudwatch:*
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:cloudwatch:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:alarm:paychex-*"
- Sid: SiteAlertsSns
Effect: Allow
Action:
- sns:Publish
- sns:GetTopicAttributes
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:sns:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:site-alerts"
- Sid: PaychexSecretShell
Effect: Allow
Action:
- secretsmanager:DeleteSecret
- secretsmanager:DescribeSecret
- secretsmanager:GetResourcePolicy
- secretsmanager:PutResourcePolicy
- secretsmanager:DeleteResourcePolicy
- secretsmanager:TagResource
- secretsmanager:UntagResource
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:secret:paychex-integrations/*"
- Sid: PaychexSecretCreate
Effect: Allow
Action:
- secretsmanager:CreateSecret
Resource: "*"
Condition:
StringEquals:
"secretsmanager:Name":
- paychex-integrations/oauth-client
- paychex-integrations/webhook-api-key
- paychex-integrations/google-service-account
- paychex-integrations/slack-bot-token
- paychex-integrations/front-inboxes-write
- paychex-integrations/3cx-system-admin
- Sid: DynamoDBTable
Effect: Allow
Action:
- dynamodb:*
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:table/paychex-worker-ledger"
- !Sub "arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:table/paychex-worker-ledger/index/*"
- Sid: DynamoDBList
Effect: Allow
Action:
- dynamodb:ListTables
Resource: "*"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# procurement-ingest (PLAT-86) — plan + apply roles for workspace
# procurement-ingest-prod. Import-in-place of three former CDK stacks
# (po-ingest, WorkorderIngestStack, procurement-api). Copy shape from
# front-integrations; extend for S3 email buckets, SQS, SES receipt rules,
# API Gateway, KMS (SHOC + DynamoDB CMK manage), Secrets Manager shell/
# rotation, DynamoDB streams, and prefix-scoped Lambda/alarms/log groups.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
HcptfProcurementIngestPlanRole:
Type: AWS::IAM::Role
Condition: IsProdAccount
DeletionPolicy: Retain
UpdateReplacePolicy: Retain
Properties:
RoleName: hcptf-procurement-ingest-plan
AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
Version: "2012-10-17"
Statement:
- Effect: Allow
Principal:
Federated: !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:oidc-provider/app.terraform.io"
Action: sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity
Condition:
StringEquals:
"app.terraform.io:aud": aws.workload.identity
"app.terraform.io:sub": organization:seahaven:project:seahaven-prod:workspace:procurement-ingest-prod:run_phase:plan
ManagedPolicyArns:
- arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/job-function/ViewOnlyAccess
Policies:
- PolicyName: procurement-ingest-plan-refresh
PolicyDocument:
Version: "2012-10-17"
Statement:
- Sid: RefreshIamRoles
Effect: Allow
Action:
- iam:GetRole
- iam:GetRolePolicy
- iam:ListRolePolicies
- iam:ListAttachedRolePolicies
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/tf-managed/po-*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/tf-managed/workorder-*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/tf-managed/procurement-api"
- Sid: RefreshManagedPolicies
Effect: Allow
Action:
- iam:GetPolicy
- iam:GetPolicyVersion
Resource: "*"
- Sid: RefreshLambda
Effect: Allow
Action:
- lambda:Get*
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:function:po-*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:function:workorder-*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:function:procurement-api"
# Collection/list APIs authorize only against Resource "*".
# GetEventSourceMapping is authorized on the UUID mapping ARN
# (no FunctionArn in the request context), so it cannot share
# the apply-role FunctionArn condition.
- Sid: RefreshLambdaList
Effect: Allow
Action:
- lambda:ListFunctions
- lambda:ListEventSourceMappings
- lambda:GetEventSourceMapping
- lambda:GetAccountSettings
Resource: "*"
- Sid: RefreshArtifactsBucket
Effect: Allow
Action:
- s3:Get*
- s3:ListBucket
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::procurement-ingest-artifacts-${AWS::AccountId}"
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::procurement-ingest-artifacts-${AWS::AccountId}/*"
- Sid: RefreshEmailBuckets
Effect: Allow
Action:
- s3:Get*
- s3:ListBucket
- s3:GetBucketNotification
- s3:GetBucketPolicy
- s3:GetEncryptionConfiguration
- s3:GetBucketTagging
- s3:GetBucketVersioning
- s3:GetBucketPublicAccessBlock
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::po-ingest-emails-${AWS::AccountId}"
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::po-ingest-emails-${AWS::AccountId}/*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::workorder-ingest-emails-${AWS::AccountId}"
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::workorder-ingest-emails-${AWS::AccountId}/*"
- Sid: RefreshDynamoDB
Effect: Allow
Action:
- dynamodb:DescribeTable
- dynamodb:DescribeTimeToLive
- dynamodb:DescribeContinuousBackups
- dynamodb:DescribeStream
- dynamodb:ListTagsOfResource
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:table/purchase-orders"
- !Sub "arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:table/purchase-orders/*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:table/verified-sites"
- !Sub "arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:table/pending-site-review"
- !Sub "arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:table/work-orders"
- !Sub "arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:table/work-orders/*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:table/work-order-comments"
- !Sub "arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:table/work-order-comments/*"
- Sid: RefreshDynamoDBList
Effect: Allow
Action:
- dynamodb:ListStreams
- dynamodb:ListTables
Resource: "*"
- Sid: RefreshSqs
Effect: Allow
Action:
- sqs:GetQueueAttributes
- sqs:GetQueueUrl
- sqs:ListQueueTags
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:sqs:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:po-ingest-*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:sqs:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:WorkorderIngestStack-*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:sqs:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:workorder-shoc-emitter-*"
- Sid: RefreshCloudWatchAlarms
Effect: Allow
Action:
- cloudwatch:DescribeAlarms
- cloudwatch:ListTagsForResource
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:cloudwatch:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:alarm:po-*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:cloudwatch:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:alarm:workorder-*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:cloudwatch:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:alarm:procurement-api-*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:cloudwatch:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:alarm:purchase-orders-*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:cloudwatch:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:alarm:verified-sites-*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:cloudwatch:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:alarm:pending-site-review-*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:cloudwatch:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:alarm:work-orders-*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:cloudwatch:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:alarm:work-order-comments-*"
- Sid: RefreshApiGateway
Effect: Allow
Action:
- apigateway:GET
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:apigateway:us-east-1::/restapis/mvul1efda2"
- !Sub "arn:aws:apigateway:us-east-1::/restapis/mvul1efda2/*"
- arn:aws:apigateway:us-east-1::/domainnames/procurement-api.seahaven.com
- arn:aws:apigateway:us-east-1::/domainnames/procurement-api.seahaven.com/*
- Sid: RefreshKms
Effect: Allow
Action:
- kms:DescribeKey
- kms:GetKeyPolicy
- kms:GetKeyRotationStatus
- kms:ListResourceTags
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:key/*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:alias/workorder-ingest-shoc-webhook-kms"
# ListAliases/ListKeys are collection APIs (Resource "*").
- Sid: RefreshKmsList
Effect: Allow
Action:
- kms:ListAliases
- kms:ListKeys
Resource: "*"
- Sid: RefreshSecrets
Effect: Allow
Action:
- secretsmanager:DescribeSecret
- secretsmanager:GetResourcePolicy
- secretsmanager:ListSecretVersionIds
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:secret:workorder-ingest/shoc-webhook-hmac-*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:secret:procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token-*"
# OOB SSM pins used by data.aws_ssm_parameter (not in ViewOnlyAccess).
- Sid: RefreshSsm
Effect: Allow
Action:
- ssm:GetParameter
- ssm:GetParameters
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:ssm:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:parameter/seahaven/dynamodb/cmk-arn"
- !Sub "arn:aws:ssm:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:parameter/procurement-api/custom-domain/certificate-arn"
- Sid: RefreshSes
Effect: Allow
Action:
- ses:DescribeReceiptRule
- ses:DescribeReceiptRuleSet
Resource: "*"
- Sid: RefreshLogs
Effect: Allow
Action:
- logs:DescribeLogGroups
- logs:DescribeMetricFilters
- logs:ListTagsForResource
Resource: "*"
HcptfProcurementIngestApplyRole:
Type: AWS::IAM::Role
Condition: IsProdAccount
DeletionPolicy: Retain
UpdateReplacePolicy: Retain
Properties:
RoleName: hcptf-procurement-ingest
AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
Version: "2012-10-17"
Statement:
- Effect: Allow
Principal:
Federated: !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:oidc-provider/app.terraform.io"
Action: sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity
Condition:
StringEquals:
"app.terraform.io:aud": aws.workload.identity
"app.terraform.io:sub": organization:seahaven:project:seahaven-prod:workspace:procurement-ingest-prod:run_phase:apply
ManagedPolicyArns:
- !Ref HcptfIamManagementPolicy
Policies:
- PolicyName: procurement-ingest-services
PolicyDocument:
Version: "2012-10-17"
Statement:
- Sid: LambdaAll
Effect: Allow
Action:
- lambda:*
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:function:po-*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:function:workorder-*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:function:procurement-api"
# Event source mapping ARNs are UUID-keyed; AWS authorises Create against
# FunctionArn. Mutating Get/Update/Delete also take the mapping ARN.
# GetEventSourceMapping by UUID does not carry FunctionArn in the
# request context, so read is unconditioned on "*"; mutate stays
# FunctionArn-constrained.
- Sid: LambdaEventSourceMappingRead
Effect: Allow
Action:
- lambda:GetEventSourceMapping
- lambda:ListTags
# Tag/Untag on ESM UUID ARNs do not carry FunctionArn in the
# request context (provider default_tags on import).
- lambda:TagResource
- lambda:UntagResource
Resource: "*"
- Sid: LambdaEventSourceMappings
Effect: Allow
Action:
- lambda:CreateEventSourceMapping
- lambda:DeleteEventSourceMapping
- lambda:UpdateEventSourceMapping
Resource: "*"
Condition:
"ForAnyValue:StringLike":
"lambda:FunctionArn":
- !Sub "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:function:po-*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:function:workorder-*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:function:procurement-api"
- Sid: LambdaList
Effect: Allow
Action:
- lambda:ListFunctions
- lambda:ListEventSourceMappings
- lambda:GetAccountSettings
Resource: "*"
- Sid: SsmRead
Effect: Allow
Action:
- ssm:GetParameter
- ssm:GetParameters
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:ssm:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:parameter/seahaven/dynamodb/cmk-arn"
- !Sub "arn:aws:ssm:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:parameter/procurement-api/custom-domain/certificate-arn"
- Sid: CloudWatchLogs
Effect: Allow
Action:
- logs:CreateLogGroup
- logs:DeleteLogGroup
- logs:PutRetentionPolicy
- logs:DeleteRetentionPolicy
- logs:TagResource
- logs:UntagResource
- logs:ListTagsForResource
- logs:PutMetricFilter
- logs:DeleteMetricFilter
- logs:DescribeMetricFilters
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:logs:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:log-group:/aws/lambda/po-*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:logs:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:log-group:/aws/lambda/workorder-*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:logs:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:log-group:/aws/lambda/procurement-api*"
- Sid: CloudWatchLogsDescribe
Effect: Allow
Action:
- logs:DescribeLogGroups
Resource: "*"
- Sid: ArtifactsBucket
Effect: Allow
Action:
- s3:*
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::procurement-ingest-artifacts-${AWS::AccountId}"
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::procurement-ingest-artifacts-${AWS::AccountId}/*"
- Sid: EmailBuckets
Effect: Allow
Action:
- s3:*
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::po-ingest-emails-${AWS::AccountId}"
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::po-ingest-emails-${AWS::AccountId}/*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::workorder-ingest-emails-${AWS::AccountId}"
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::workorder-ingest-emails-${AWS::AccountId}/*"
- Sid: DynamoDBTables
Effect: Allow
Action:
- dynamodb:*
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:table/purchase-orders"
- !Sub "arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:table/purchase-orders/*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:table/verified-sites"
- !Sub "arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:table/verified-sites/*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:table/pending-site-review"
- !Sub "arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:table/pending-site-review/*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:table/work-orders"
- !Sub "arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:table/work-orders/*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:table/work-order-comments"
- !Sub "arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:table/work-order-comments/*"
- Sid: DynamoDBList
Effect: Allow
Action:
- dynamodb:ListTables
- dynamodb:ListStreams
Resource: "*"
- Sid: SqsQueues
Effect: Allow
Action:
- sqs:*
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:sqs:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:po-ingest-*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:sqs:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:WorkorderIngestStack-*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:sqs:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:workorder-shoc-emitter-*"
- Sid: CloudWatchAlarms
Effect: Allow
Action:
- cloudwatch:*
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:cloudwatch:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:alarm:po-*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:cloudwatch:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:alarm:workorder-*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:cloudwatch:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:alarm:procurement-api-*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:cloudwatch:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:alarm:purchase-orders-*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:cloudwatch:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:alarm:verified-sites-*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:cloudwatch:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:alarm:pending-site-review-*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:cloudwatch:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:alarm:work-orders-*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:cloudwatch:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:alarm:work-order-comments-*"
- Sid: SiteAlertsSns
Effect: Allow
Action:
- sns:Publish
- sns:GetTopicAttributes
- sns:ListTagsForResource
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:sns:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:site-alerts"
- Sid: ApiGateway
Effect: Allow
Action:
- apigateway:*
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:apigateway:us-east-1::/restapis/mvul1efda2"
- !Sub "arn:aws:apigateway:us-east-1::/restapis/mvul1efda2/*"
- arn:aws:apigateway:us-east-1::/domainnames/procurement-api.seahaven.com
- arn:aws:apigateway:us-east-1::/domainnames/procurement-api.seahaven.com/*
# TagResource/UntagResource authorize against /tags/<arn>.
- arn:aws:apigateway:us-east-1::/tags/*
- Sid: SesReceiptRules
Effect: Allow
Action:
- ses:CreateReceiptRule
- ses:UpdateReceiptRule
- ses:DeleteReceiptRule
- ses:DescribeReceiptRule
- ses:SetReceiptRulePosition
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:ses:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:receipt-rule-set/INBOUND_MAIL:receipt-rule/ExistingRuleSetPoEmailRuleAC8E9C87-qwGDj9lBoL1G"
- !Sub "arn:aws:ses:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:receipt-rule-set/INBOUND_MAIL:receipt-rule/ExistingRuleSetWorkorderEmailRuleEA29F845-PKtaDBvIg61a"
- Sid: SesDescribeRuleSet
Effect: Allow
Action:
- ses:DescribeReceiptRuleSet
Resource: "*"
# Key management only on the live SHOC CMK — no kms:* (excludes
# unconstrained key-policy/destructive ops on other keys and
# avoids data-plane Encrypt/Decrypt on the apply role).
- Sid: ShocKms
Effect: Allow
Action:
- kms:DescribeKey
- kms:GetKeyPolicy
- kms:GetKeyRotationStatus
- kms:ListResourceTags
- kms:PutKeyPolicy
- kms:EnableKeyRotation
- kms:DisableKeyRotation
- kms:ScheduleKeyDeletion
- kms:CancelKeyDeletion
- kms:TagResource
- kms:UntagResource
- kms:EnableKey
- kms:DisableKey
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:key/d10fd1f0-a61a-4405-8568-85e9fd11ba18"
- Sid: KmsList
Effect: Allow
Action:
- kms:ListAliases
- kms:ListKeys
Resource: "*"
- Sid: ShocKmsAlias
Effect: Allow
Action:
- kms:CreateAlias
- kms:DeleteAlias
- kms:UpdateAlias
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:alias/workorder-ingest-shoc-webhook-kms"
- !Sub "arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:key/d10fd1f0-a61a-4405-8568-85e9fd11ba18"
# Shell lifecycle only — no CreateSecret / UpdateSecret so apply
# never writes SecretString into HCP state or run logs. Create is
# isolated in ShocSecretCreate with an exact Name pin.
- Sid: ShocSecretShell
Effect: Allow
Action:
- secretsmanager:DeleteSecret
- secretsmanager:DescribeSecret
- secretsmanager:GetResourcePolicy
- secretsmanager:PutResourcePolicy
- secretsmanager:DeleteResourcePolicy
- secretsmanager:TagResource
- secretsmanager:UntagResource
- secretsmanager:RotateSecret
- secretsmanager:CancelRotateSecret
- secretsmanager:UpdateSecretVersionStage
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:secret:workorder-ingest/shoc-webhook-hmac-*"
- Sid: ShocSecretCreate
Effect: Allow
Action:
- secretsmanager:CreateSecret
Resource: "*"
Condition:
StringEquals:
"secretsmanager:Name": workorder-ingest/shoc-webhook-hmac
- Sid: WebUiSecretDescribe
Effect: Allow
Action:
- secretsmanager:DescribeSecret
- secretsmanager:GetResourcePolicy
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:secret:procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token-*"
# seahaven-site-prod exec roles moved to stack seahaven-site-hcptf (PLAT-225).
# DeletionPolicy on the removed resources was Retain, so dropping them here
# keeps the live roles for that stack to import.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# meal-order-manager-prod (PLAT-70, imported to the app workspace in PLAT-146).
# Live plan/apply IAM is terraform/hcp_iam.tf in meal-order-manager (ECS/ALB
# as of PLAT-215). Do not mutate these CFN role policies; they are Retain
# leftovers. githubdeploy-meal-order-manager OIDC lives in that app module.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Original shape: HttpApi + Lambdas + DynamoDB + S3 + CloudFront.
# Plan role: ViewOnly + plan-refresh sidecar. Apply role: HcptfIamManagement
# + prefix-scoped service wildcards (no enumerated Get* lists).
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
HcptfMealOrderManagerPlanRole:
Type: AWS::IAM::Role
Condition: IsProdAccount
DeletionPolicy: Retain
UpdateReplacePolicy: Retain
Properties:
RoleName: hcptf-meal-order-manager-plan
AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
Version: "2012-10-17"
Statement:
- Effect: Allow
Principal:
Federated: !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:oidc-provider/app.terraform.io"
Action: sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity
Condition:
StringEquals:
"app.terraform.io:aud": aws.workload.identity
"app.terraform.io:sub": organization:seahaven:project:seahaven-prod:workspace:meal-order-manager-prod:run_phase:plan
ManagedPolicyArns:
- arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/job-function/ViewOnlyAccess
Policies:
- PolicyName: meal-order-manager-plan-refresh
PolicyDocument:
Version: "2012-10-17"
Statement:
- Sid: RefreshIamRoles
Effect: Allow
Action:
- iam:GetRole
- iam:GetRolePolicy
- iam:ListRolePolicies
- iam:ListAttachedRolePolicies
- iam:ListRoleTags
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/tf-managed/meal-order-manager-*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/tf-managed/githubdeploy-meal-order-manager*"
- Sid: RefreshManagedPolicies
Effect: Allow
Action:
- iam:GetPolicy
- iam:GetPolicyVersion
Resource: "*"
- Sid: RefreshEventBridge
Effect: Allow
Action:
- events:DescribeRule
- events:ListTargetsByRule
- events:ListTagsForResource
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:events:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:rule/meal-order-manager-*"
- Sid: RefreshLambda
Effect: Allow
Action:
# Read-only refresh for plan; mutate APIs stay on the apply role.
- lambda:Get*
- lambda:List*
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:function:meal-order-manager-*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:layer:meal-order-manager-*"
- Sid: RefreshBuckets
Effect: Allow
Action:
- s3:Get*
- s3:ListBucket
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::meal-order-manager-artifacts-${AWS::AccountId}"
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::meal-order-manager-artifacts-${AWS::AccountId}/*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::meal-order-manager-form-${AWS::AccountId}"
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::meal-order-manager-form-${AWS::AccountId}/*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::meal-order-manager-reports-${AWS::AccountId}"
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::meal-order-manager-reports-${AWS::AccountId}/*"
- Sid: RefreshDynamoDB
Effect: Allow
Action:
- dynamodb:DescribeTable
- dynamodb:DescribeTimeToLive
- dynamodb:DescribeContinuousBackups
- dynamodb:ListTagsOfResource
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:table/meal-order-manager-orders"
- Sid: RefreshLogs
Effect: Allow
Action:
- logs:DescribeLogGroups
- logs:ListTagsForResource
Resource: "*"
- Sid: RefreshCloudFront
Effect: Allow
Action:
- cloudfront:Get*
- cloudfront:List*
Resource: "*"
- Sid: RefreshAcm
Effect: Allow
Action:
- acm:DescribeCertificate
- acm:ListCertificates
- acm:ListTagsForCertificate
- acm:GetCertificate
Resource: "*"
- Sid: RefreshAppWebAclSsm
Effect: Allow
Action:
- ssm:GetParameter
- ssm:GetParameters
# aws_ssm_parameter refresh lists tags on managed parameters.
- ssm:ListTagsForResource
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:ssm:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:parameter/seahaven/waf/app-web-acl-arn"
- !Sub "arn:aws:ssm:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:parameter/meal-order-manager/*"
# aws_ssm_parameter refresh uses DescribeParameters (collection API;
# resource-level parameter ARNs are a silent no-op for this action).
- Sid: RefreshSsmDescribeParameters
Effect: Allow
Action:
- ssm:DescribeParameters
Resource: "*"
- Sid: RefreshWafWebAcl
Effect: Allow
Action:
- wafv2:GetWebACL
- wafv2:ListWebACLs
Resource: "*"
- Sid: RefreshHttpApi
Effect: Allow
Action:
- apigateway:GET
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:apigateway:us-east-1::/apis/*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:apigateway:us-east-1::/tags/*"
- Sid: RefreshAlarms
Effect: Allow
Action:
- cloudwatch:DescribeAlarms
- cloudwatch:ListTagsForResource
Resource: "*"
HcptfMealOrderManagerApplyRole:
Type: AWS::IAM::Role
Condition: IsProdAccount
DeletionPolicy: Retain
UpdateReplacePolicy: Retain
Properties:
RoleName: hcptf-meal-order-manager
AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
Version: "2012-10-17"
Statement:
- Effect: Allow
Principal:
Federated: !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:oidc-provider/app.terraform.io"
Action: sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity
Condition:
StringEquals:
"app.terraform.io:aud": aws.workload.identity
"app.terraform.io:sub": organization:seahaven:project:seahaven-prod:workspace:meal-order-manager-prod:run_phase:apply
ManagedPolicyArns:
- !Ref HcptfIamManagementPolicy
Policies:
- PolicyName: meal-order-manager-services
PolicyDocument:
Version: "2012-10-17"
Statement:
- Sid: LambdaAll
Effect: Allow
Action:
- lambda:*
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:function:meal-order-manager-*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:layer:meal-order-manager-*"
- Sid: LambdaList
Effect: Allow
Action:
- lambda:ListFunctions
- lambda:ListLayers
- lambda:GetAccountSettings
Resource: "*"
- Sid: EventBridgeRules
Effect: Allow
Action:
- events:*
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:events:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:rule/meal-order-manager-*"
- Sid: CloudWatchLogs
Effect: Allow
Action:
- logs:CreateLogGroup
- logs:DeleteLogGroup
- logs:PutRetentionPolicy
- logs:DeleteRetentionPolicy
- logs:TagResource
- logs:UntagResource
- logs:ListTagsForResource
- logs:PutMetricFilter
- logs:DeleteMetricFilter
- logs:DescribeMetricFilters
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:logs:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:log-group:/aws/lambda/meal-order-manager-*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:logs:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:log-group:/aws/apigateway/meal-order-manager*"
- Sid: CloudWatchLogsDescribe
Effect: Allow
Action:
- logs:DescribeLogGroups
Resource: "*"
# HTTP API stage access_log_settings uses Log Delivery APIs
# (account-level Resource "*"). PutResourcePolicy is intentionally
# omitted: MealOrderApiAccessLogResourcePolicy below pre-grants
# delivery.logs.amazonaws.com on the meal-order API log group so
# the apply role cannot mutate account-wide log resource policies.
- Sid: MealOrderApiGwAccessLogDelivery
Effect: Allow
Action:
- logs:CreateLogDelivery
- logs:GetLogDelivery
- logs:UpdateLogDelivery
- logs:DeleteLogDelivery
- logs:ListLogDeliveries
- logs:DescribeResourcePolicies
Resource: "*"
- Sid: StackBuckets
Effect: Allow
Action:
- s3:*
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::meal-order-manager-artifacts-${AWS::AccountId}"
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::meal-order-manager-artifacts-${AWS::AccountId}/*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::meal-order-manager-form-${AWS::AccountId}"
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::meal-order-manager-form-${AWS::AccountId}/*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::meal-order-manager-reports-${AWS::AccountId}"
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::meal-order-manager-reports-${AWS::AccountId}/*"
- Sid: DynamoDBTable
Effect: Allow
Action:
- dynamodb:*
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:table/meal-order-manager-orders"
- !Sub "arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:table/meal-order-manager-orders/*"
- Sid: DynamoDBList
Effect: Allow
Action:
- dynamodb:ListTables
Resource: "*"
- Sid: HttpApiManage
Effect: Allow
Action:
- apigateway:*
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:apigateway:us-east-1::/apis"
- !Sub "arn:aws:apigateway:us-east-1::/apis/*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:apigateway:us-east-1::/tags/*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:apigateway:us-east-1::/vpclinks"
- !Sub "arn:aws:apigateway:us-east-1::/vpclinks/*"
- Sid: CloudFrontManage
Effect: Allow
Action:
- cloudfront:*
Resource: "*"
- Sid: AcmCreate
Effect: Allow
Action:
- acm:RequestCertificate
Resource: "*"
Condition:
StringEquals:
"aws:RequestTag/Project": meal-order-manager
- Sid: AcmList
Effect: Allow
Action:
- acm:ListCertificates
- acm:ListTagsForCertificate
Resource: "*"
- Sid: AcmManageTagged
Effect: Allow
Action:
- acm:DescribeCertificate
- acm:GetCertificate
- acm:DeleteCertificate
- acm:AddTagsToCertificate
- acm:RemoveTagsFromCertificate
- acm:RenewCertificate
Resource: "*"
Condition:
StringEquals:
"aws:ResourceTag/Project": meal-order-manager
- Sid: ReadAppWebAclSsm
Effect: Allow
Action:
- ssm:GetParameter
- ssm:GetParameters
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:ssm:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:parameter/seahaven/waf/app-web-acl-arn"
- Sid: MealOrderSsm
Effect: Allow
Action:
- ssm:GetParameter
- ssm:GetParameters
- ssm:PutParameter
- ssm:DeleteParameter
- ssm:AddTagsToResource
- ssm:RemoveTagsFromResource
- ssm:ListTagsForResource
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:ssm:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:parameter/meal-order-manager/*"
# Collection API required for aws_ssm_parameter refresh/import.
- Sid: MealOrderSsmDescribeParameters
Effect: Allow
Action:
- ssm:DescribeParameters
Resource: "*"
# API Gateway Lambda authorizer requires PassRole to
# apigateway.amazonaws.com. Shared HcptfIamManagementPolicy only
# grants PassRole to lambda.amazonaws.com (see IAMPassRole comment).
- Sid: MealOrderPassRoleApiGateway
Effect: Allow
Action:
- iam:PassRole
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/tf-managed/meal-order-manager-*"
Condition:
StringEquals:
"iam:PassedToService": "apigateway.amazonaws.com"
- Sid: ReadWafWebAcl
Effect: Allow
Action:
- wafv2:GetWebACL
- wafv2:GetWebACLForResource
- wafv2:ListWebACLs
- wafv2:ListResourcesForWebACL
Resource: "*"
- Sid: CloudWatchAlarms
Effect: Allow
Action:
- cloudwatch:PutMetricAlarm
- cloudwatch:DeleteAlarms
- cloudwatch:DescribeAlarms
- cloudwatch:TagResource
- cloudwatch:UntagResource
- cloudwatch:ListTagsForResource
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:cloudwatch:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:alarm:meal-order-manager-*"
- Sid: SnsPublishSiteAlerts
Effect: Allow
Action:
- sns:Publish
- sns:GetTopicAttributes
- sns:ListTagsForResource
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:sns:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:site-alerts"
- Sid: SesIdentityRead
Effect: Allow
Action:
- ses:GetIdentityVerificationAttributes
- ses:GetSendQuota
Resource: "*"
# Pre-grant delivery.logs write to the meal-order API access log group so
# hcptf-meal-order-manager does not need logs:PutResourcePolicy (account-wide).
# Deployed by CDK CFN exec on substrate update (PLAT-99).
MealOrderApiAccessLogResourcePolicy:
Type: AWS::Logs::ResourcePolicy
Condition: IsProdAccount
DeletionPolicy: Retain
UpdateReplacePolicy: Retain
Properties:
PolicyName: MealOrderManagerApiAccessLogDelivery
PolicyDocument: !Sub |
{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Sid": "AWSLogDeliveryWrite",
"Effect": "Allow",
"Principal": { "Service": "delivery.logs.amazonaws.com" },
"Action": [
"logs:CreateLogStream",
"logs:PutLogEvents"
],
"Resource": [
"arn:aws:logs:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:log-group:/aws/apigateway/meal-order-manager",
"arn:aws:logs:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:log-group:/aws/apigateway/meal-order-manager:*"
],
"Condition": {
"StringEquals": {
"aws:SourceAccount": "${AWS::AccountId}"
}
}
}
]
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# seahaven-door-unlock-api-prod (PLAT-76) — HttpApi + 5 Lambdas + EventBridge
# + ACM custom domain + alarms. Plan role: ViewOnly + plan-refresh sidecar.
# Apply role: HcptfIamManagement + prefix-scoped service wildcards.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
HcptfDoorUnlockApiPlanRole:
Type: AWS::IAM::Role
Condition: IsProdAccount
DeletionPolicy: Retain
UpdateReplacePolicy: Retain
Properties:
RoleName: hcptf-seahaven-door-unlock-api-plan
AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
Version: "2012-10-17"
Statement:
- Effect: Allow
Principal:
Federated: !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:oidc-provider/app.terraform.io"
Action: sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity
Condition:
StringEquals:
"app.terraform.io:aud": aws.workload.identity
"app.terraform.io:sub": organization:seahaven:project:seahaven-prod:workspace:seahaven-door-unlock-api-prod:run_phase:plan
ManagedPolicyArns:
- arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/job-function/ViewOnlyAccess
Policies:
- PolicyName: seahaven-door-unlock-api-plan-refresh
PolicyDocument:
Version: "2012-10-17"
Statement:
- Sid: RefreshIamRoles
Effect: Allow
Action:
- iam:GetRole
- iam:GetRolePolicy
- iam:ListRolePolicies
- iam:ListAttachedRolePolicies
- iam:ListRoleTags
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/tf-managed/door-unlock-api-*"
- Sid: RefreshManagedPolicies
Effect: Allow
Action:
- iam:GetPolicy
- iam:GetPolicyVersion
Resource: "*"
- Sid: RefreshEventBridge
Effect: Allow
Action:
- events:DescribeRule
- events:ListTargetsByRule
- events:ListTagsForResource
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:events:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:rule/door-unlock-api-*"
- Sid: RefreshLambda
Effect: Allow
Action:
- lambda:Get*
- lambda:List*
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:function:door-unlock-api-*"
- Sid: RefreshBuckets
Effect: Allow
Action:
- s3:Get*
- s3:ListBucket
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::door-unlock-api-artifacts-${AWS::AccountId}"
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::door-unlock-api-artifacts-${AWS::AccountId}/*"
- Sid: RefreshLogs
Effect: Allow
Action:
- logs:DescribeLogGroups
- logs:ListTagsForResource
Resource: "*"
- Sid: RefreshAcm
Effect: Allow
Action:
- acm:DescribeCertificate
- acm:ListCertificates
- acm:ListTagsForCertificate
- acm:GetCertificate
Resource: "*"
# String door-id only. SecureString auth-token / elements-api-key
# stay off the plan role so speculative runs cannot render them.
- Sid: RefreshDoorUnlockSsm
Effect: Allow
Action:
- ssm:GetParameter
- ssm:GetParameters
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:ssm:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:parameter/seahaven/door-unlock/door-id"
- Sid: RefreshDoorUnlockSsmTags
Effect: Allow
Action:
- ssm:ListTagsForResource
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:ssm:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:parameter/seahaven/door-unlock/*"
- Sid: RefreshSsmDescribeParameters
Effect: Allow
Action:
- ssm:DescribeParameters
Resource: "*"
- Sid: RefreshHttpApi
Effect: Allow
Action:
- apigateway:GET
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:apigateway:us-east-1::/apis/*"
- arn:aws:apigateway:us-east-1::/domainnames/doorunlock.seahaven.com
- arn:aws:apigateway:us-east-1::/domainnames/doorunlock.seahaven.com/*
- !Sub "arn:aws:apigateway:us-east-1::/tags/*"
- Sid: RefreshAlarms
Effect: Allow
Action:
- cloudwatch:DescribeAlarms
- cloudwatch:ListTagsForResource
Resource: "*"
- Sid: RefreshThreeCxSecrets
Effect: Allow
Action:
- secretsmanager:DescribeSecret
- secretsmanager:GetResourcePolicy
- secretsmanager:ListSecretVersionIds
Resource:
- arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:011934824531:secret:afterhours-shift-manager/3cx-domain-TPwqWP
- arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:011934824531:secret:afterhours-shift-manager/3cx-client-id-jzyQXb
- arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:011934824531:secret:afterhours-shift-manager/3cx-client-secret-jpO476
HcptfDoorUnlockApiApplyRole:
Type: AWS::IAM::Role
Condition: IsProdAccount
DeletionPolicy: Retain
UpdateReplacePolicy: Retain
Properties:
RoleName: hcptf-seahaven-door-unlock-api
AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
Version: "2012-10-17"
Statement:
- Effect: Allow
Principal:
Federated: !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:oidc-provider/app.terraform.io"
Action: sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity
Condition:
StringEquals:
"app.terraform.io:aud": aws.workload.identity
"app.terraform.io:sub": organization:seahaven:project:seahaven-prod:workspace:seahaven-door-unlock-api-prod:run_phase:apply
ManagedPolicyArns:
- !Ref HcptfIamManagementPolicy
Policies:
- PolicyName: seahaven-door-unlock-api-services
PolicyDocument:
Version: "2012-10-17"
Statement:
- Sid: LambdaAll
Effect: Allow
Action:
- lambda:*
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:function:door-unlock-api-*"
- Sid: LambdaList
Effect: Allow
Action:
- lambda:ListFunctions
- lambda:GetAccountSettings
Resource: "*"
- Sid: EventBridgeRules
Effect: Allow
Action:
- events:*
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:events:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:rule/door-unlock-api-*"
- Sid: CloudWatchLogs
Effect: Allow
Action:
- logs:CreateLogGroup
- logs:DeleteLogGroup
- logs:PutRetentionPolicy
- logs:DeleteRetentionPolicy
- logs:TagResource
- logs:UntagResource
- logs:ListTagsForResource
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:logs:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:log-group:/aws/lambda/door-unlock-api-*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:logs:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:log-group:/aws/apigateway/door-unlock-api*"
- Sid: CloudWatchLogsDescribe
Effect: Allow
Action:
- logs:DescribeLogGroups
Resource: "*"
- Sid: DoorUnlockApiGwAccessLogDelivery
Effect: Allow
Action:
- logs:CreateLogDelivery
- logs:GetLogDelivery
- logs:UpdateLogDelivery
- logs:DeleteLogDelivery
- logs:ListLogDeliveries
- logs:DescribeResourcePolicies
Resource: "*"
- Sid: StackBuckets
Effect: Allow
Action:
- s3:*
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::door-unlock-api-artifacts-${AWS::AccountId}"
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::door-unlock-api-artifacts-${AWS::AccountId}/*"
# HTTP API ids are allocated at create (same as meal-order).
# Custom domain is hostname-pinned like procurement-api.
# CreateDomainName POSTs to /domainnames and cannot be hostname-pinned;
# mgmt still holds doorunlock.seahaven.com, so the domain is attached
# at DNS cutover rather than granted as an unscoped collection POST.
- Sid: HttpApiManage
Effect: Allow
Action:
- apigateway:*
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:apigateway:us-east-1::/apis"
- !Sub "arn:aws:apigateway:us-east-1::/apis/*"
- !Sub "arn:aws:apigateway:us-east-1::/tags/*"
- Sid: HttpApiDomain
Effect: Allow
Action:
- apigateway:*
Resource:
- arn:aws:apigateway:us-east-1::/domainnames/doorunlock.seahaven.com
- arn:aws:apigateway:us-east-1::/domainnames/doorunlock.seahaven.com/*
- Sid: AcmCreate
Effect: Allow
Action:
- acm:RequestCertificate
Resource: "*"
Condition:
StringEquals:
"aws:RequestTag/Project": seahaven-door-unlock-api
- Sid: AcmList
Effect: Allow
Action:
- acm:ListCertificates
- acm:ListTagsForCertificate
Resource: "*"
- Sid: AcmManageTagged
Effect: Allow
Action:
- acm:DescribeCertificate
- acm:GetCertificate
- acm:DeleteCertificate
- acm:AddTagsToCertificate
- acm:RemoveTagsFromCertificate
- acm:RenewCertificate
Resource: "*"
Condition:
StringEquals:
"aws:ResourceTag/Project": seahaven-door-unlock-api
# HCP reads the String door-id data source only. Lambda execution
# roles (not this apply role) GetParameter the SecureStrings.
- Sid: DoorUnlockSsm
Effect: Allow
Action:
- ssm:GetParameter
- ssm:GetParameters
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:ssm:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:parameter/seahaven/door-unlock/door-id"
- Sid: DoorUnlockSsmTags
Effect: Allow
Action:
- ssm:ListTagsForResource
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:ssm:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:parameter/seahaven/door-unlock/*"
- Sid: DoorUnlockSsmDescribeParameters
Effect: Allow
Action:
- ssm:DescribeParameters
Resource: "*"
- Sid: DescribeThreeCxSecrets
Effect: Allow
Action:
- secretsmanager:DescribeSecret
- secretsmanager:GetResourcePolicy
- secretsmanager:ListSecretVersionIds
Resource:
- arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:011934824531:secret:afterhours-shift-manager/3cx-domain-TPwqWP
- arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:011934824531:secret:afterhours-shift-manager/3cx-client-id-jzyQXb
- arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:011934824531:secret:afterhours-shift-manager/3cx-client-secret-jpO476
- Sid: DoorUnlockPassRoleApiGateway
Effect: Allow
Action:
- iam:PassRole
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/tf-managed/door-unlock-api-*"
Condition:
StringEquals:
"iam:PassedToService": "apigateway.amazonaws.com"
- Sid: CloudWatchAlarms
Effect: Allow
Action:
- cloudwatch:PutMetricAlarm
- cloudwatch:DeleteAlarms
- cloudwatch:DescribeAlarms
- cloudwatch:TagResource
- cloudwatch:UntagResource
- cloudwatch:ListTagsForResource
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:cloudwatch:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:alarm:door-unlock-api-*"
- Sid: SnsPublishSiteAlerts
Effect: Allow
Action:
- sns:Publish
- sns:GetTopicAttributes
- sns:ListTagsForResource
Resource:
- !Sub "arn:aws:sns:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:site-alerts"
DoorUnlockApiAccessLogResourcePolicy:
Type: AWS::Logs::ResourcePolicy
Condition: IsProdAccount
DeletionPolicy: Retain
UpdateReplacePolicy: Retain
Properties:
PolicyName: DoorUnlockApiAccessLogDelivery
PolicyDocument: !Sub |
{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Sid": "AWSLogDeliveryWrite",
"Effect": "Allow",
"Principal": { "Service": "delivery.logs.amazonaws.com" },
"Action": [
"logs:CreateLogStream",
"logs:PutLogEvents"
],
"Resource": [
"arn:aws:logs:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:log-group:/aws/apigateway/door-unlock-api",
"arn:aws:logs:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:log-group:/aws/apigateway/door-unlock-api:*"
],
"Condition": {
"StringEquals": {
"aws:SourceAccount": "${AWS::AccountId}"
}
}
}
]
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# SHOC backend GitHub deployment permissions boundaries (external-dev only)
#
# These are ceilings for the dev and staging githubdeploy roles, not grants.
# Existing dev/staging roles receive them through a separately approved
# administrator/CDK action before HCP import.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ShocBackendDevDeployBoundary:
Type: AWS::IAM::ManagedPolicy
Condition: IsExternalDevAccount
DeletionPolicy: Retain
UpdateReplacePolicy: Retain
Properties:
ManagedPolicyName: shoc-backend-dev-deploy-boundary
Description: Maximum deployment permissions for githubdeploy-shoc-backend-dev.
PolicyDocument:
Version: "2012-10-17"
Statement:
- Sid: DescribeDeploymentResources
Effect: Allow
Action:
- autoscaling:Describe*
- ec2:Describe*
- elasticbeanstalk:DescribeApplicationVersions
- elasticbeanstalk:DescribeEnvironments
- elasticbeanstalk:DescribeEvents
- elasticloadbalancing:Describe*
Resource: "*"
- Sid: CreateApplicationVersion
Effect: Allow
Action: elasticbeanstalk:CreateApplicationVersion
Resource:
- arn:aws:elasticbeanstalk:us-east-1:396287094661:application/shoc-backend
- arn:aws:elasticbeanstalk:us-east-1:396287094661:applicationversion/shoc-backend/*
- Sid: UpdateDevEnvironment
Effect: Allow
Action: elasticbeanstalk:UpdateEnvironment
Resource: arn:aws:elasticbeanstalk:us-east-1:396287094661:environment/shoc-backend/shoc-backend-dev
- Sid: ManageDevEnvironmentStack
Effect: Allow
Action:
- cloudformation:CancelUpdateStack
- cloudformation:DescribeStackEvents
- cloudformation:DescribeStackResource
- cloudformation:DescribeStackResources
- cloudformation:DescribeStacks
- cloudformation:GetTemplate
- cloudformation:ListStackResources
- cloudformation:UpdateStack
Resource: arn:aws:cloudformation:us-east-1:396287094661:stack/awseb-e-hehnrqjjrt-stack/*
- Sid: ManageDevEnvironmentAsg
Effect: Allow
Action:
- autoscaling:PutNotificationConfiguration
- autoscaling:ResumeProcesses
- autoscaling:SuspendProcesses
Resource: arn:aws:autoscaling:us-east-1:396287094661:autoScalingGroup:*:autoScalingGroupName/awseb-e-hehnrqjjrt-stack-*
- Sid: LegacyBeanstalkObjects
Effect: Allow
Action:
- s3:Delete*
- s3:Get*
- s3:Put*
Resource: arn:aws:s3:::elasticbeanstalk-*/*
- Sid: LegacyBeanstalkBuckets
Effect: Allow
Action:
- s3:GetBucket*
- s3:ListBucket
- s3:PutBucketOwnershipControls
- s3:PutBucketPolicy
- s3:PutBucketPublicAccessBlock
Resource: arn:aws:s3:::elasticbeanstalk-*
- Sid: ReadDeployParameters
Effect: Allow
Action:
- ssm:GetParameter
- ssm:GetParameters
Resource: arn:aws:ssm:us-east-1:396287094661:parameter/shoc-backend/dev/deploy/*
ShocBackendStagingDeployBoundary:
Type: AWS::IAM::ManagedPolicy
Condition: IsExternalDevAccount
DeletionPolicy: Retain
UpdateReplacePolicy: Retain
Properties:
ManagedPolicyName: shoc-backend-staging-deploy-boundary
Description: Maximum deployment permissions for githubdeploy-shoc-backend-staging.
PolicyDocument:
Version: "2012-10-17"
Statement:
- Sid: DescribeDeploymentResources
Effect: Allow
Action:
- autoscaling:Describe*
- ec2:Describe*
- elasticbeanstalk:DescribeApplicationVersions
- elasticbeanstalk:DescribeEnvironments
- elasticbeanstalk:DescribeEvents
- elasticloadbalancing:Describe*
Resource: "*"
- Sid: CreateApplicationVersion
Effect: Allow
Action: elasticbeanstalk:CreateApplicationVersion
Resource:
- arn:aws:elasticbeanstalk:us-east-1:396287094661:application/shoc-backend
- arn:aws:elasticbeanstalk:us-east-1:396287094661:applicationversion/shoc-backend/*
- Sid: UpdateStagingEnvironment
Effect: Allow
Action: elasticbeanstalk:UpdateEnvironment
Resource: arn:aws:elasticbeanstalk:us-east-1:396287094661:environment/shoc-backend/shoc-backend-staging
- Sid: ManageStagingEnvironmentStack
Effect: Allow
Action:
- cloudformation:CancelUpdateStack
- cloudformation:DescribeStackEvents
- cloudformation:DescribeStackResource
- cloudformation:DescribeStackResources
- cloudformation:DescribeStacks
- cloudformation:GetTemplate
- cloudformation:ListStackResources
- cloudformation:UpdateStack
Resource: arn:aws:cloudformation:us-east-1:396287094661:stack/awseb-e-6c9m4vb62z-stack/*
- Sid: ManageStagingEnvironmentAsg
Effect: Allow
Action:
- autoscaling:PutNotificationConfiguration
- autoscaling:ResumeProcesses
- autoscaling:SuspendProcesses
Resource: arn:aws:autoscaling:us-east-1:396287094661:autoScalingGroup:*:autoScalingGroupName/awseb-e-6c9m4vb62z-stack-*
- Sid: UploadApplicationVersion
Effect: Allow
Action:
- s3:PutObject
- s3:PutObjectAcl
- s3:PutObjectVersionAcl
- s3:GetObject
- s3:GetObjectAcl
- s3:GetObjectVersion
- s3:GetObjectVersionAcl
- s3:DeleteObject
Resource:
- arn:aws:s3:::elasticbeanstalk-us-east-1-396287094661/shoc-backend/*
- arn:aws:s3:::elasticbeanstalk-us-east-1-396287094661/resources/_runtime/_embedded_extensions/shoc-backend/*
- arn:aws:s3:::elasticbeanstalk-us-east-1-396287094661/resources/environments/e-6c9m4vb62z/*
- Sid: UseBeanstalkBucket
Effect: Allow
Action:
- s3:GetBucketLocation
- s3:ListBucket
- s3:GetBucketPolicy
- s3:GetBucketAcl
- s3:GetBucketVersioning
- s3:GetBucketOwnershipControls
Resource: arn:aws:s3:::elasticbeanstalk-us-east-1-396287094661
- Sid: ReadDeployParameters
Effect: Allow
Action:
- ssm:GetParameter
- ssm:GetParameters
Resource: arn:aws:ssm:us-east-1:396287094661:parameter/shoc-backend/staging/deploy/*
# Dedicated runtime ceilings preserve the non-AI portions of
# AWSElasticBeanstalkWebTier while removing its 2026 Bedrock/Marketplace
# additions. All S3/log/health resources are pinned to this account and the
# exact SHOC environment; X-Ray APIs do not support resource scoping.
ShocBackendDevRuntimeBoundary:
Type: AWS::IAM::ManagedPolicy
Condition: IsExternalDevAccount
DeletionPolicy: Retain
UpdateReplacePolicy: Retain
Properties:
ManagedPolicyName: shoc-backend-dev-runtime-boundary
Description: Maximum runtime permissions for the SHOC backend dev instance role.
PolicyDocument:
Version: "2012-10-17"
Statement:
- Sid: ReadAppConfig
Effect: Allow
Action: secretsmanager:GetSecretValue
Resource: arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:396287094661:secret:shoc/dev/app-config-*
- Sid: ReadWebhookSecret
Effect: Allow
Action:
- secretsmanager:DescribeSecret
- secretsmanager:GetSecretValue
Resource: arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:011934824531:secret:workorder-ingest/shoc-webhook-hmac-puYTcB
- Sid: DecryptWebhookSecret
Effect: Allow
Action: kms:Decrypt
Resource: arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:011934824531:key/d10fd1f0-a61a-4405-8568-85e9fd11ba18
Condition:
StringEquals:
"kms:ViaService": secretsmanager.us-east-1.amazonaws.com
- Sid: AssumeDynamoReader
Effect: Allow
Action: sts:AssumeRole
Resource: arn:aws:iam::328440206208:role/shoc-dynamo-reader
- Sid: ElasticBeanstalkBucket
Effect: Allow
Action:
- s3:Get*
- s3:List*
- s3:PutObject
Resource:
- arn:aws:s3:::elasticbeanstalk-us-east-1-396287094661
- arn:aws:s3:::elasticbeanstalk-us-east-1-396287094661/*
- Sid: ElasticBeanstalkHealth
Effect: Allow
Action: elasticbeanstalk:PutInstanceStatistics
Resource:
- arn:aws:elasticbeanstalk:us-east-1:396287094661:application/shoc-backend
- arn:aws:elasticbeanstalk:us-east-1:396287094661:environment/shoc-backend/shoc-backend-dev
- Sid: ElasticBeanstalkLogs
Effect: Allow
Action:
- logs:PutLogEvents
- logs:CreateLogStream
- logs:DescribeLogStreams
- logs:DescribeLogGroups
Resource: arn:aws:logs:us-east-1:396287094661:log-group:/aws/elasticbeanstalk/shoc-backend-dev*
- Sid: XRayTelemetry
Effect: Allow
Action:
- xray:PutTraceSegments
- xray:PutTelemetryRecords
- xray:GetSamplingRules
- xray:GetSamplingTargets
- xray:GetSamplingStatisticSummaries
Resource: "*"
ShocBackendStagingRuntimeBoundary:
Type: AWS::IAM::ManagedPolicy
Condition: IsExternalDevAccount
DeletionPolicy: Retain
UpdateReplacePolicy: Retain
Properties:
ManagedPolicyName: shoc-backend-staging-runtime-boundary
Description: Maximum runtime permissions for the SHOC backend staging instance role.
PolicyDocument:
Version: "2012-10-17"
Statement:
- Sid: ReadAppConfig
Effect: Allow
Action: secretsmanager:GetSecretValue
Resource: arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:396287094661:secret:shoc/staging/app-config-*
- Sid: ReadWebhookSecret
Effect: Allow
Action:
- secretsmanager:DescribeSecret
- secretsmanager:GetSecretValue
Resource: arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:011934824531:secret:workorder-ingest/shoc-webhook-hmac-puYTcB
- Sid: DecryptWebhookSecret
Effect: Allow
Action: kms:Decrypt
Resource: arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:011934824531:key/d10fd1f0-a61a-4405-8568-85e9fd11ba18
Condition:
StringEquals:
"kms:ViaService": secretsmanager.us-east-1.amazonaws.com
- Sid: ElasticBeanstalkBucket
Effect: Allow
Action:
- s3:Get*
- s3:List*
- s3:PutObject
Resource:
- arn:aws:s3:::elasticbeanstalk-us-east-1-396287094661
- arn:aws:s3:::elasticbeanstalk-us-east-1-396287094661/*
- Sid: ElasticBeanstalkHealth
Effect: Allow
Action: elasticbeanstalk:PutInstanceStatistics
Resource:
- arn:aws:elasticbeanstalk:us-east-1:396287094661:application/shoc-backend
- arn:aws:elasticbeanstalk:us-east-1:396287094661:environment/shoc-backend/shoc-backend-staging
- Sid: ElasticBeanstalkLogs
Effect: Allow
Action:
- logs:PutLogEvents
- logs:CreateLogStream
- logs:DescribeLogStreams
- logs:DescribeLogGroups
Resource: arn:aws:logs:us-east-1:396287094661:log-group:/aws/elasticbeanstalk/shoc-backend-staging*
- Sid: XRayTelemetry
Effect: Allow
Action:
- xray:PutTraceSegments
- xray:PutTelemetryRecords
- xray:GetSamplingRules
- xray:GetSamplingTargets
- xray:GetSamplingStatisticSummaries
Resource: "*"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# shoc-backend import/adoption rehearsal (external-dev only)
#
# These roles intentionally do not attach HcptfIamManagementPolicy. Its
# DenySelfMutation protects every githubdeploy-* role, while this rehearsal
# must adopt three exact githubdeploy roles. Each apply role instead carries
# an environment-scoped inline policy. No apply role can create/delete roles,
# change managed-policy attachments or boundaries, read/write secret
# values, or pass a role. Live apply roles may UpdateAssumeRolePolicy only
# on the matching githubdeploy-shoc-backend-{dev,staging} role so the
# GitHub OIDC job_workflow_ref seam can land. The POC gate controls its new
# pair independently; the live gate stays false until the four existing
# dev/staging roles enter through a CloudFormation IMPORT change set.
#
# The existing app.terraform.io provider is referenced by literal ARN. The
# stack instance sets CreateOIDCProvider=false, so external-dev never attempts
# to create the account-global provider.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
HcptfShocBackendPocPlanRole:
Type: AWS::IAM::Role
Condition: ShouldManageShocBackendPocRoles
DeletionPolicy: Retain
UpdateReplacePolicy: Retain
Properties:
RoleName: hcptf-shoc-backend-tf-poc-plan
Description: Read-only HCP Terraform plan role for the SHOC backend import rehearsal.
PermissionsBoundary: arn:aws:iam::396287094661:policy/external-dev-execution-boundary
MaxSessionDuration: 3600
AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
Version: "2012-10-17"
Statement:
- Effect: Allow
Principal:
Federated: arn:aws:iam::396287094661:oidc-provider/app.terraform.io
Action: sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity
Condition:
StringEquals:
"app.terraform.io:aud": aws.workload.identity
"app.terraform.io:sub": organization:seahaven:project:seahaven-external-dev:workspace:shoc-backend-tf-poc:run_phase:plan
Policies:
- &shocPocReadPolicy
PolicyName: shoc-backend-tf-poc-import-read
PolicyDocument:
Version: "2012-10-17"
Statement:
- Sid: CallerIdentity
Effect: Allow
Action: sts:GetCallerIdentity
Resource: "*"
- Sid: ReadExactIam
Effect: Allow
Action:
- iam:GetInstanceProfile
- iam:GetRole
- iam:GetRolePolicy
- iam:ListAttachedRolePolicies
- iam:ListInstanceProfileTags
- iam:ListInstanceProfilesForRole
- iam:ListRolePolicies
- iam:ListRoleTags
Resource:
- arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/githubdeploy-shoc-backend-tf-poc
- arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-tf-poc
- arn:aws:iam::396287094661:instance-profile/shoc-backend-tf-poc
- arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-eb-service-role
- Sid: ReadOidcProviders
Effect: Allow
Action: iam:GetOpenIDConnectProvider
Resource:
- arn:aws:iam::396287094661:oidc-provider/app.terraform.io
- arn:aws:iam::396287094661:oidc-provider/token.actions.githubusercontent.com
- Sid: ListOidcProviders
Effect: Allow
Action: iam:ListOpenIDConnectProviders
Resource: "*"
- Sid: ReadSharedInventory
Effect: Allow
Action:
- acm:ListCertificates
- autoscaling:DescribeAutoScalingGroups
- ec2:DescribeSecurityGroups
- ec2:DescribeSubnets
- ec2:DescribeVpcAttribute
- ec2:DescribeVpcs
- elasticbeanstalk:DescribeApplications
- elasticbeanstalk:DescribeConfigurationOptions
- elasticbeanstalk:DescribeConfigurationSettings
- elasticbeanstalk:DescribeEnvironmentResources
- elasticbeanstalk:DescribeEnvironments
- elasticbeanstalk:ListTagsForResource
- rds:DescribeDBInstances
- route53:ListHostedZonesByName
Resource: "*"
- Sid: ReadSharedCertificate
Effect: Allow
Action:
- acm:DescribeCertificate
- acm:ListTagsForCertificate
Resource: arn:aws:acm:us-east-1:396287094661:certificate/2b78e74f-7b65-4b82-a413-7a498b102f00
- Sid: ReadPocCertificate
Effect: Allow
Action:
- acm:DescribeCertificate
- acm:GetCertificate
- acm:ListTagsForCertificate
Resource: arn:aws:acm:us-east-1:396287094661:certificate/*
Condition:
StringEquals:
"aws:ResourceTag/project": shoc
"aws:ResourceTag/env": tf-poc
- Sid: ReadSharedRdsTags
Effect: Allow
Action: rds:ListTagsForResource
Resource: arn:aws:rds:us-east-1:396287094661:db:shoc-sqlserver-shared
- Sid: AccessExistingElasticBeanstalkStorage
Effect: Allow
Action:
- s3:CreateBucket
- s3:PutBucketOwnershipControls
Resource: arn:aws:s3:::elasticbeanstalk-us-east-1-396287094661
- Sid: ReadPocDns
Effect: Allow
Action:
- route53:GetHostedZone
- route53:ListResourceRecordSets
- route53:ListTagsForResource
Resource: arn:aws:route53:::hostedzone/Z02451891BSZD93CMMGDU
- Sid: ReadRoute53Changes
Effect: Allow
Action: route53:GetChange
Resource: arn:aws:route53:::change/*
- Sid: ReadPocAppConfigMetadata
Effect: Allow
Action:
- secretsmanager:DescribeSecret
- secretsmanager:GetResourcePolicy
- secretsmanager:ListSecretVersionIds
Resource: arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:396287094661:secret:shoc/tf-poc/app-config-*
HcptfShocBackendPocApplyRole:
Type: AWS::IAM::Role
Condition: ShouldManageShocBackendPocRoles
DeletionPolicy: Retain
UpdateReplacePolicy: Retain
Properties:
RoleName: hcptf-shoc-backend-tf-poc
Description: Import/adoption HCP Terraform apply role for SHOC backend tf-poc.
Tags:
- Key: HcpTerraformWorkspace
Value: shoc-backend-tf-poc
PermissionsBoundary: arn:aws:iam::396287094661:policy/external-dev-execution-boundary
MaxSessionDuration: 3600
AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
Version: "2012-10-17"
Statement:
- Effect: Allow
Principal:
Federated: arn:aws:iam::396287094661:oidc-provider/app.terraform.io
Action: sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity
Condition:
StringEquals:
"app.terraform.io:aud": aws.workload.identity
"app.terraform.io:sub": organization:seahaven:project:seahaven-external-dev:workspace:shoc-backend-tf-poc:run_phase:apply
Policies:
- *shocPocReadPolicy
- PolicyName: shoc-backend-tf-poc-import-apply
PolicyDocument:
Version: "2012-10-17"
Statement:
- Sid: UpdatePocEnvironment
Effect: Allow
Action: elasticbeanstalk:UpdateEnvironment
Resource: arn:aws:elasticbeanstalk:us-east-1:396287094661:environment/shoc-backend/shoc-backend-tf-poc
- Sid: PutPocRuntimePolicy
Effect: Allow
Action: iam:PutRolePolicy
Resource: arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-tf-poc
Condition:
StringEquals:
"iam:PermissionsBoundary": arn:aws:iam::396287094661:policy/shoc-backend-tf-poc-runtime-boundary
- Sid: TagPocRuntimeRole
Effect: Allow
Action:
- iam:TagRole
- iam:UntagRole
Resource: arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-tf-poc
- Sid: ManagePocInstanceProfile
Effect: Allow
Action:
- iam:TagInstanceProfile
- iam:UntagInstanceProfile
Resource: arn:aws:iam::396287094661:instance-profile/shoc-backend-tf-poc
- Sid: PutPocGithubDeployPolicy
Effect: Allow
Action: iam:PutRolePolicy
Resource: arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/githubdeploy-shoc-backend-tf-poc
Condition:
StringEquals:
"iam:PermissionsBoundary": arn:aws:iam::396287094661:policy/shoc-backend-tf-poc-deploy-boundary
- Sid: TagPocGithubDeployRole
Effect: Allow
Action:
- iam:TagRole
- iam:UntagRole
Resource: arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/githubdeploy-shoc-backend-tf-poc
- Sid: TagPocAppConfig
Effect: Allow
Action:
- secretsmanager:TagResource
- secretsmanager:UntagResource
Resource: arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:396287094661:secret:shoc/tf-poc/app-config-*
- Sid: ChangePocApiAndValidationRecords
Effect: Allow
Action: route53:ChangeResourceRecordSets
Resource: arn:aws:route53:::hostedzone/Z02451891BSZD93CMMGDU
Condition:
ForAllValues:StringLike:
"route53:ChangeResourceRecordSetsNormalizedRecordNames":
- api.tf-poc.seahaven.com
- "*.tf-poc.seahaven.com"
ForAllValues:StringEquals:
"route53:ChangeResourceRecordSetsRecordTypes":
- CNAME
- Sid: TagPocHostedZone
Effect: Allow
Action: route53:ChangeTagsForResource
Resource: arn:aws:route53:::hostedzone/Z02451891BSZD93CMMGDU
- Sid: TagPocCertificate
Effect: Allow
Action:
- acm:AddTagsToCertificate
- acm:RemoveTagsFromCertificate
Resource: arn:aws:acm:us-east-1:396287094661:certificate/*
Condition:
StringEquals:
"aws:ResourceTag/project": shoc
"aws:ResourceTag/env": tf-poc
- Sid: TerminatePocEnvironment
Effect: Allow
Action: elasticbeanstalk:TerminateEnvironment
Resource: arn:aws:elasticbeanstalk:us-east-1:396287094661:environment/shoc-backend/shoc-backend-tf-poc
- Sid: DeletePocRuntimeIam
Effect: Allow
Action:
- iam:DeleteRole
- iam:DeleteRolePolicy
- iam:DetachRolePolicy
Resource: arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-tf-poc
- Sid: DeletePocInstanceProfile
Effect: Allow
Action:
- iam:DeleteInstanceProfile
- iam:RemoveRoleFromInstanceProfile
Resource: arn:aws:iam::396287094661:instance-profile/shoc-backend-tf-poc
- Sid: DeletePocAppConfig
Effect: Allow
Action: secretsmanager:DeleteSecret
Resource: arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:396287094661:secret:shoc/tf-poc/app-config-*
- Sid: DeletePocHostedZone
Effect: Allow
Action: route53:DeleteHostedZone
Resource: arn:aws:route53:::hostedzone/Z02451891BSZD93CMMGDU
- Sid: DeletePocCertificate
Effect: Allow
Action: acm:DeleteCertificate
Resource: arn:aws:acm:us-east-1:396287094661:certificate/*
Condition:
StringEquals:
"aws:ResourceTag/project": shoc
"aws:ResourceTag/env": tf-poc
HcptfShocBackendDevPlanRole:
Type: AWS::IAM::Role
Condition: ShouldManageShocBackendLiveRoles
DeletionPolicy: Retain
UpdateReplacePolicy: Retain
Properties:
RoleName: hcptf-shoc-backend-dev-plan
Description: Read-only HCP Terraform plan role for SHOC backend dev import.
PermissionsBoundary: arn:aws:iam::396287094661:policy/external-dev-execution-boundary
MaxSessionDuration: 3600
AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
Version: "2012-10-17"
Statement:
- Effect: Allow
Principal:
Federated: arn:aws:iam::396287094661:oidc-provider/app.terraform.io
Action: sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity
Condition:
StringEquals:
"app.terraform.io:aud": aws.workload.identity
"app.terraform.io:sub": organization:seahaven:project:seahaven-external-dev:workspace:shoc-backend-dev:run_phase:plan
Policies:
- &shocDevReadPolicy
PolicyName: shoc-backend-dev-import-read
PolicyDocument:
Version: "2012-10-17"
Statement:
- Sid: CallerIdentity
Effect: Allow
Action: sts:GetCallerIdentity
Resource: "*"
- Sid: ReadExactIam
Effect: Allow
Action:
- iam:GetInstanceProfile
- iam:GetRole
- iam:GetRolePolicy
- iam:ListAttachedRolePolicies
- iam:ListInstanceProfileTags
- iam:ListInstanceProfilesForRole
- iam:ListRolePolicies
- iam:ListRoleTags
Resource:
- arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/githubdeploy-shoc-backend-dev
- arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev
- arn:aws:iam::396287094661:instance-profile/shoc-backend-dev
- arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-eb-service-role
- Sid: ReadGithubOidc
Effect: Allow
Action: iam:GetOpenIDConnectProvider
Resource: arn:aws:iam::396287094661:oidc-provider/token.actions.githubusercontent.com
- Sid: ListOidcProviders
Effect: Allow
Action: iam:ListOpenIDConnectProviders
Resource: "*"
- Sid: ReadSharedInventory
Effect: Allow
Action:
- acm:ListCertificates
- autoscaling:DescribeAutoScalingGroups
- ec2:DescribeSecurityGroups
- ec2:DescribeSubnets
- ec2:DescribeVpcs
- elasticbeanstalk:DescribeApplications
- elasticbeanstalk:DescribeConfigurationOptions
- elasticbeanstalk:DescribeConfigurationSettings
- elasticbeanstalk:DescribeEnvironmentResources
- elasticbeanstalk:DescribeEnvironments
- elasticbeanstalk:ListTagsForResource
- rds:DescribeDBInstances
- route53:ListHostedZones
- route53:ListHostedZonesByName
Resource: "*"
# Elastic Beanstalk DescribeConfigurationSettings calls
# CreateBucket against its existing regional service bucket
# during both plan and apply refresh.
- Sid: AuthorizeExistingEbBucketDiscovery
Effect: Allow
Action:
- s3:CreateBucket
- s3:PutBucketOwnershipControls
Resource: arn:aws:s3:::elasticbeanstalk-us-east-1-396287094661
Condition:
StringEquals:
s3:x-amz-object-ownership: ObjectWriter
- Sid: ReadSharedCertificate
Effect: Allow
Action:
- acm:DescribeCertificate
- acm:GetCertificate
- acm:ListTagsForCertificate
Resource: arn:aws:acm:us-east-1:396287094661:certificate/2b78e74f-7b65-4b82-a413-7a498b102f00
- Sid: ReadSharedRdsTags
Effect: Allow
Action: rds:ListTagsForResource
Resource: arn:aws:rds:us-east-1:396287094661:db:shoc-sqlserver-shared
- Sid: ReadDevDns
Effect: Allow
Action:
- route53:GetHostedZone
- route53:GetChange
- route53:ListResourceRecordSets
- route53:ListTagsForResource
Resource:
- arn:aws:route53:::hostedzone/Z07671212N75U4YLPWZR8
- arn:aws:route53:::change/*
- Sid: ReadDevAppConfigMetadata
Effect: Allow
Action:
- secretsmanager:DescribeSecret
- secretsmanager:GetResourcePolicy
- secretsmanager:ListSecretVersionIds
Resource: arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:396287094661:secret:shoc/dev/app-config-*
- Sid: ReadDevDeploySsm
Effect: Allow
Action:
- ssm:GetParameter
- ssm:GetParameters
- ssm:ListTagsForResource
Resource: arn:aws:ssm:us-east-1:396287094661:parameter/shoc-backend/dev/deploy/*
- Sid: DescribeDevDeploySsm
Effect: Allow
Action: ssm:DescribeParameters
Resource: "*"
HcptfShocBackendDevApplyRole:
Type: AWS::IAM::Role
Condition: ShouldManageShocBackendLiveRoles
DeletionPolicy: Retain
UpdateReplacePolicy: Retain
Properties:
RoleName: hcptf-shoc-backend-dev
Description: Import/adoption HCP Terraform apply role for SHOC backend dev.
Tags:
- Key: HcpTerraformWorkspace
Value: shoc-backend-dev
PermissionsBoundary: arn:aws:iam::396287094661:policy/external-dev-execution-boundary
MaxSessionDuration: 3600
AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
Version: "2012-10-17"
Statement:
- Effect: Allow
Principal:
Federated: arn:aws:iam::396287094661:oidc-provider/app.terraform.io
Action: sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity
Condition:
StringEquals:
"app.terraform.io:aud": aws.workload.identity
"app.terraform.io:sub": organization:seahaven:project:seahaven-external-dev:workspace:shoc-backend-dev:run_phase:apply
Policies:
- *shocDevReadPolicy
- PolicyName: shoc-backend-dev-import-apply
PolicyDocument:
Version: "2012-10-17"
Statement:
- Sid: UpdateDevEnvironment
Effect: Allow
Action:
- elasticbeanstalk:UpdateEnvironment
- elasticbeanstalk:UpdateTagsForResource
Resource: arn:aws:elasticbeanstalk:us-east-1:396287094661:environment/shoc-backend/shoc-backend-dev
- Sid: ManageDevEnvironmentStack
Effect: Allow
Action:
- cloudformation:CancelUpdateStack
- cloudformation:DescribeStackEvents
- cloudformation:DescribeStackResource
- cloudformation:DescribeStackResources
- cloudformation:DescribeStacks
- cloudformation:GetTemplate
- cloudformation:ListStackResources
- cloudformation:UpdateStack
Resource: arn:aws:cloudformation:us-east-1:396287094661:stack/awseb-e-hehnrqjjrt-stack/*
- Sid: DescribeDeploymentResources
Effect: Allow
Action:
- autoscaling:Describe*
- ec2:Describe*
- elasticloadbalancing:Describe*
Resource: "*"
- Sid: ManageDevEnvironmentAsg
Effect: Allow
Action:
- autoscaling:PutNotificationConfiguration
- autoscaling:ResumeProcesses
- autoscaling:SuspendProcesses
Resource: arn:aws:autoscaling:us-east-1:396287094661:autoScalingGroup:*:autoScalingGroupName/awseb-e-hehnrqjjrt-stack-*
- Sid: LegacyBeanstalkObjects
Effect: Allow
Action:
- s3:Delete*
- s3:Get*
- s3:Put*
Resource: arn:aws:s3:::elasticbeanstalk-*/*
- Sid: LegacyBeanstalkBuckets
Effect: Allow
Action:
- s3:GetBucket*
- s3:ListBucket
- s3:PutBucketOwnershipControls
- s3:PutBucketPolicy
- s3:PutBucketPublicAccessBlock
Resource: arn:aws:s3:::elasticbeanstalk-*
- Sid: PutDevRuntimePolicy
Effect: Allow
Action: iam:PutRolePolicy
Resource: arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev
Condition:
StringEquals:
"iam:PermissionsBoundary": arn:aws:iam::396287094661:policy/shoc-backend-dev-runtime-boundary
- Sid: TagDevRuntimeRole
Effect: Allow
Action:
- iam:TagRole
- iam:UntagRole
Resource: arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev
- Sid: ManageDevInstanceProfile
Effect: Allow
Action:
- iam:TagInstanceProfile
- iam:UntagInstanceProfile
Resource: arn:aws:iam::396287094661:instance-profile/shoc-backend-dev
- Sid: PutDevGithubDeployPolicy
Effect: Allow
Action: iam:PutRolePolicy
Resource: arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/githubdeploy-shoc-backend-dev
Condition:
StringEquals:
"iam:PermissionsBoundary": arn:aws:iam::396287094661:policy/shoc-backend-dev-deploy-boundary
- Sid: TagDevGithubDeployRole
Effect: Allow
Action:
- iam:TagRole
- iam:UntagRole
Resource: arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/githubdeploy-shoc-backend-dev
- Sid: UpdateDevGithubDeployTrust
Effect: Allow
Action: iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy
Resource: arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/githubdeploy-shoc-backend-dev
- Sid: ManageDevDeploySsm
Effect: Allow
Action:
- ssm:PutParameter
- ssm:AddTagsToResource
- ssm:RemoveTagsFromResource
Resource: arn:aws:ssm:us-east-1:396287094661:parameter/shoc-backend/dev/deploy/*
- Sid: TagDevAppConfig
Effect: Allow
Action:
- secretsmanager:TagResource
- secretsmanager:UntagResource
Resource: arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:396287094661:secret:shoc/dev/app-config-*
- Sid: ChangeDevApiRecord
Effect: Allow
Action: route53:ChangeResourceRecordSets
Resource: arn:aws:route53:::hostedzone/Z07671212N75U4YLPWZR8
Condition:
ForAllValues:StringEquals:
"route53:ChangeResourceRecordSetsNormalizedRecordNames":
- api.dev.seahaven.com
"route53:ChangeResourceRecordSetsRecordTypes":
- A
HcptfShocBackendStagingPlanRole:
Type: AWS::IAM::Role
Condition: ShouldManageShocBackendLiveRoles
DeletionPolicy: Retain
UpdateReplacePolicy: Retain
Properties:
RoleName: hcptf-shoc-backend-staging-plan
Description: Read-only HCP Terraform plan role for SHOC backend staging import.
PermissionsBoundary: arn:aws:iam::396287094661:policy/external-dev-execution-boundary
MaxSessionDuration: 3600
AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
Version: "2012-10-17"
Statement:
- Effect: Allow
Principal:
Federated: arn:aws:iam::396287094661:oidc-provider/app.terraform.io
Action: sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity
Condition:
StringEquals:
"app.terraform.io:aud": aws.workload.identity
"app.terraform.io:sub": organization:seahaven:project:seahaven-external-dev:workspace:shoc-backend-staging:run_phase:plan
Policies:
- &shocStagingReadPolicy
PolicyName: shoc-backend-staging-import-read
PolicyDocument:
Version: "2012-10-17"
Statement:
- Sid: CallerIdentity
Effect: Allow
Action: sts:GetCallerIdentity
Resource: "*"
- Sid: ReadExactIam
Effect: Allow
Action:
- iam:GetInstanceProfile
- iam:GetRole
- iam:GetRolePolicy
- iam:ListAttachedRolePolicies
- iam:ListInstanceProfileTags
- iam:ListInstanceProfilesForRole
- iam:ListRolePolicies
- iam:ListRoleTags
Resource:
- arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/githubdeploy-shoc-backend-staging
- arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-staging
- arn:aws:iam::396287094661:instance-profile/shoc-backend-staging
- arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-eb-service-role
- Sid: ReadGithubOidc
Effect: Allow
Action: iam:GetOpenIDConnectProvider
Resource: arn:aws:iam::396287094661:oidc-provider/token.actions.githubusercontent.com
- Sid: ListOidcProviders
Effect: Allow
Action: iam:ListOpenIDConnectProviders
Resource: "*"
- Sid: ReadSharedInventory
Effect: Allow
Action:
- acm:ListCertificates
- autoscaling:DescribeAutoScalingGroups
- ec2:DescribeSecurityGroups
- ec2:DescribeSubnets
- ec2:DescribeVpcs
- elasticbeanstalk:DescribeApplications
- elasticbeanstalk:DescribeConfigurationOptions
- elasticbeanstalk:DescribeConfigurationSettings
- elasticbeanstalk:DescribeEnvironmentResources
- elasticbeanstalk:DescribeEnvironments
- elasticbeanstalk:ListTagsForResource
- rds:DescribeDBInstances
- route53:ListHostedZones
- route53:ListHostedZonesByName
Resource: "*"
# Elastic Beanstalk DescribeConfigurationSettings calls
# CreateBucket against its existing regional service bucket
# during both plan and apply refresh.
- Sid: AuthorizeExistingEbBucketDiscovery
Effect: Allow
Action:
- s3:CreateBucket
- s3:PutBucketOwnershipControls
Resource: arn:aws:s3:::elasticbeanstalk-us-east-1-396287094661
Condition:
StringEquals:
s3:x-amz-object-ownership: ObjectWriter
- Sid: ReadSharedCertificate
Effect: Allow
Action:
- acm:DescribeCertificate
- acm:GetCertificate
- acm:ListTagsForCertificate
Resource: arn:aws:acm:us-east-1:396287094661:certificate/2b78e74f-7b65-4b82-a413-7a498b102f00
- Sid: ReadSharedRdsTags
Effect: Allow
Action: rds:ListTagsForResource
Resource: arn:aws:rds:us-east-1:396287094661:db:shoc-sqlserver-shared
- Sid: ReadStagingDns
Effect: Allow
Action:
- route53:GetHostedZone
- route53:GetChange
- route53:ListResourceRecordSets
- route53:ListTagsForResource
Resource:
- arn:aws:route53:::hostedzone/Z02602739VQWBWCAGXP4
- arn:aws:route53:::change/*
- Sid: ReadStagingAppConfigMetadata
Effect: Allow
Action:
- secretsmanager:DescribeSecret
- secretsmanager:GetResourcePolicy
- secretsmanager:ListSecretVersionIds
Resource: arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:396287094661:secret:shoc/staging/app-config-*
- Sid: ReadStagingDeploySsm
Effect: Allow
Action:
- ssm:GetParameter
- ssm:GetParameters
- ssm:ListTagsForResource
Resource: arn:aws:ssm:us-east-1:396287094661:parameter/shoc-backend/staging/deploy/*
- Sid: DescribeStagingDeploySsm
Effect: Allow
Action: ssm:DescribeParameters
Resource: "*"
HcptfShocBackendStagingApplyRole:
Type: AWS::IAM::Role
Condition: ShouldManageShocBackendLiveRoles
DeletionPolicy: Retain
UpdateReplacePolicy: Retain
Properties:
RoleName: hcptf-shoc-backend-staging
Description: Import/adoption HCP Terraform apply role for SHOC backend staging.
Tags:
- Key: HcpTerraformWorkspace
Value: shoc-backend-staging
PermissionsBoundary: arn:aws:iam::396287094661:policy/external-dev-execution-boundary
MaxSessionDuration: 3600
AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
Version: "2012-10-17"
Statement:
- Effect: Allow
Principal:
Federated: arn:aws:iam::396287094661:oidc-provider/app.terraform.io
Action: sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity
Condition:
StringEquals:
"app.terraform.io:aud": aws.workload.identity
"app.terraform.io:sub": organization:seahaven:project:seahaven-external-dev:workspace:shoc-backend-staging:run_phase:apply
Policies:
- *shocStagingReadPolicy
- PolicyName: shoc-backend-staging-import-apply
PolicyDocument:
Version: "2012-10-17"
Statement:
- Sid: UpdateStagingEnvironment
Effect: Allow
Action:
- elasticbeanstalk:UpdateEnvironment
- elasticbeanstalk:UpdateTagsForResource
Resource: arn:aws:elasticbeanstalk:us-east-1:396287094661:environment/shoc-backend/shoc-backend-staging
- Sid: ManageStagingEnvironmentStack
Effect: Allow
Action:
- cloudformation:CancelUpdateStack
- cloudformation:DescribeStackEvents
- cloudformation:DescribeStackResource
- cloudformation:DescribeStackResources
- cloudformation:DescribeStacks
- cloudformation:GetTemplate
- cloudformation:ListStackResources
- cloudformation:UpdateStack
Resource: arn:aws:cloudformation:us-east-1:396287094661:stack/awseb-e-6c9m4vb62z-stack/*
- Sid: DescribeDeploymentResources
Effect: Allow
Action:
- autoscaling:Describe*
- ec2:Describe*
- elasticloadbalancing:Describe*
Resource: "*"
- Sid: ManageStagingEnvironmentAsg
Effect: Allow
Action:
- autoscaling:PutNotificationConfiguration
- autoscaling:ResumeProcesses
- autoscaling:SuspendProcesses
Resource: arn:aws:autoscaling:us-east-1:396287094661:autoScalingGroup:*:autoScalingGroupName/awseb-e-6c9m4vb62z-stack-*
- Sid: StagingBeanstalkObjects
Effect: Allow
Action:
- s3:Delete*
- s3:Get*
- s3:Put*
Resource: arn:aws:s3:::elasticbeanstalk-us-east-1-396287094661/*
- Sid: StagingBeanstalkBuckets
Effect: Allow
Action:
- s3:GetBucket*
- s3:ListBucket
- s3:PutBucketOwnershipControls
- s3:PutBucketPolicy
- s3:PutBucketPublicAccessBlock
Resource: arn:aws:s3:::elasticbeanstalk-us-east-1-396287094661
# Elastic Beanstalk stages the CloudFormation template for
# configuration UpdateStack calls in its AWS-owned regional
# bucket and CloudFormation fetches it with the caller's
# credentials. Zip deploys never touch this path.
- Sid: ReadBeanstalkServiceTemplates
Effect: Allow
Action:
- s3:GetObject
- s3:GetObjectVersion
Resource: arn:aws:s3:::elasticbeanstalk-us-east-1/*
- Sid: ManageCloudFormationTemplates
Effect: Allow
Action:
- s3:CreateBucket
- s3:GetBucket*
- s3:ListBucket
- s3:PutBucketPolicy
- s3:PutBucketOwnershipControls
- s3:PutBucketPublicAccessBlock
- s3:PutEncryptionConfiguration
Resource: arn:aws:s3:::cf-templates-*
- Sid: ManageCloudFormationTemplateObjects
Effect: Allow
Action:
- s3:Get*
- s3:Put*
- s3:Delete*
Resource: arn:aws:s3:::cf-templates-*/*
- Sid: PutStagingRuntimePolicy
Effect: Allow
Action: iam:PutRolePolicy
Resource: arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-staging
Condition:
StringEquals:
"iam:PermissionsBoundary": arn:aws:iam::396287094661:policy/shoc-backend-staging-runtime-boundary
- Sid: UpdateStagingRuntimeTrust
Effect: Allow
Action:
- iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy
- iam:UpdateRole
- iam:UpdateRoleDescription
Resource: arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-staging
- Sid: TagStagingRuntimeRole
Effect: Allow
Action:
- iam:TagRole
- iam:UntagRole
Resource: arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-staging
- Sid: ManageStagingInstanceProfile
Effect: Allow
Action:
- iam:TagInstanceProfile
- iam:UntagInstanceProfile
Resource: arn:aws:iam::396287094661:instance-profile/shoc-backend-staging
- Sid: PutStagingGithubDeployPolicy
Effect: Allow
Action: iam:PutRolePolicy
Resource: arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/githubdeploy-shoc-backend-staging
Condition:
StringEquals:
"iam:PermissionsBoundary": arn:aws:iam::396287094661:policy/shoc-backend-staging-deploy-boundary
- Sid: TagStagingGithubDeployRole
Effect: Allow
Action:
- iam:TagRole
- iam:UntagRole
Resource: arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/githubdeploy-shoc-backend-staging
- Sid: UpdateStagingGithubDeployTrust
Effect: Allow
Action: iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy
Resource: arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/githubdeploy-shoc-backend-staging
- Sid: ManageStagingDeploySsm
Effect: Allow
Action:
- ssm:PutParameter
- ssm:AddTagsToResource
- ssm:RemoveTagsFromResource
Resource: arn:aws:ssm:us-east-1:396287094661:parameter/shoc-backend/staging/deploy/*
- Sid: TagStagingAppConfig
Effect: Allow
Action:
- secretsmanager:TagResource
- secretsmanager:UntagResource
Resource: arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:396287094661:secret:shoc/staging/app-config-*
- Sid: ChangeStagingApiRecord
Effect: Allow
Action: route53:ChangeResourceRecordSets
Resource: arn:aws:route53:::hostedzone/Z02602739VQWBWCAGXP4
Condition:
ForAllValues:StringEquals:
"route53:ChangeResourceRecordSetsNormalizedRecordNames":
- api.staging.seahaven.com
"route53:ChangeResourceRecordSetsRecordTypes":
- CNAME
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