mirror of
https://github.com/Sea-Haven-Industries/seahaven-org-baseline.git
synced 2026-09-30 08:03:19 +00:00
Adam Moussa
b264f74f01
Post-implementation verification of the INFRA-186 prod/dev scoping found two functional defects that would have denied permissions the migrating stacks actually need. Neither is live today (prod/dev boundary usage is 0), but both would have surfaced as AccessDenied at first migration. - KMS: the ViaService list omitted ssm., while SSMParameterRead in the same policy grants ssm:GetParameter*. A SecureString read decrypts via the SSM service principal, so the boundary denied reads it also granted. - S3: payments-dashboard was classified read-only from the template's own permission-source comment, but that enumeration is incomplete -- the real stack grants s3:PutObject on BoaRawBucket (template.yaml:272, 1098-1099). Write is now allowed on seahaven-payments-boa-raw-* only; payroll-emails and payments-csv stay read-only, preserving the evidence-deletion protection. The seahaven-payments-* wildcard is replaced by the three literal bucket names, verified against payments-dashboard/template.yaml. Not changed: SES configuration-set/*. Review claimed dropping it rested on a false premise; verified live -- prod and dev both have ZERO configuration sets and member-baseline-stack.ts:44 excludes SES monitoring. The drop is correct. README: the 'substrate changes must edit both files' rule is now false for the boundary specifically, and said so uniformly. Corrected to distinguish the deliberately divergent boundary from the still-at-parity substrate resources.
1393 lines
72 KiB
YAML
1393 lines
72 KiB
YAML
AWSTemplateFormatVersion: "2010-09-09"
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Description: >-
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Per-account GitHub Actions deploy substrate for Sea Haven Industries:
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the shared account-level resources every SAM deploy pipeline needs
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(GitHub OIDC provider, Lambda execution permissions boundary, and the
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shared CloudFormation execution role). Per-repo githubdeploy-* roles
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are NOT here — they are provisioned per repo at migration/onboarding
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time in the target account.
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# PROVENANCE / DRIFT WARNING
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# The Resources below are a VERBATIM extraction of the substrate section
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# (OIDC provider + LambdaExecutionBoundary + SamCfnExecutionRole) of
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# Sea-Haven-Industries/.github/oidc-deploy-roles.yaml at commit 786dcfe8,
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# which remains the deployed source of truth for the management account
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# (328440206208) until that account's stacks finish migrating out. If a
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# substrate resource must change while both copies are live, change BOTH
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# files in the same piece of work. Documented deltas from the source:
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# - unused GitHubOrg parameter dropped (only serves the per-repo roles
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# left behind),
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# - DependsOn: LambdaExecutionBoundary added to SamCfnExecutionRole (the
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# role only names the boundary ARN inside Condition strings, so CFN
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# infers no edge; first-create needs the boundary to exist first — moot
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# for mgmt where both resources already exist, so mgmt's copy is
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# deliberately unchanged),
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# - DeletionPolicy/UpdateReplacePolicy Retain on the OIDC provider,
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# - the boundary-gated IAM block moved from an INLINE role policy into an
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# attached managed policy (SamCfnIamManagementPolicy). Forced by IAM's
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# 10,240-byte per-role inline limit: mgmt's inline set is ~10.1 KB, i.e.
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# ~94 bytes from the cap, so the added Deny statements did not fit and the
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# first deploy failed with ServiceLimitExceeded (2026-07-27). Effective
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# permissions are unchanged — verified by comparing the full 27-statement
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# set before and after the move (identical), since identity policies are
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# unioned and an explicit Deny still wins. mgmt received this same
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# restructure in Phase B (.github PR #98), so this is no longer a
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# divergence,
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# - SECURITY FIX (now in BOTH copies): iam:DeleteRolePermissionsBoundary
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# removed from Sid IAMPutPermissionsBoundary and explicit Deny statements
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# (DenyBoundaryTampering / DenyBoundaryPolicyEdit / DenySelfMutation)
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# added. The mgmt copy was remediated 2026-07-27 (.github PRs #95 Phase A
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# + #98 Phase B); DenySelfMutation and the widened policy/seahaven-*
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# DenyBoundaryPolicyEdit scope were then ported back here, so the two
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# copies' GUARDRAIL statement sets were reconciled as of that date.
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# SamCfnIamManagementPolicy and SamCfnExecutionRole remain byte-identical
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# across the two files and MUST still be changed together; the only delta
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# between them is the DependsOn line above, which is ordering, not
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# permission. LambdaExecutionBoundary is NO LONGER byte-identical — see
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# DELIBERATE DIVERGENCE below.
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#
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# DELIBERATE DIVERGENCE — LambdaExecutionBoundary (INFRA-186, 2026-07-30)
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# The parity rule above is SCOPED, not global. LambdaExecutionBoundary in THIS
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# file is DELIBERATELY STRICTER than the mgmt copy in
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# Sea-Haven-Industries/.github/oidc-deploy-roles.yaml. Do not "reconcile" the two
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# by copying mgmt's statements back over these, or vice versa; the divergence is
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# load-bearing. A future mechanical drift check WILL read it as drift — it is not.
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#
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# 1. WHAT DIVERGED. Every scopable Resource pattern in LambdaExecutionBoundary
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# was re-scoped from account-wide wildcards (table/*, table/*/index/*,
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# secret:*, parameter/*, sqs :*, function:*, ses identity/* +
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# configuration-set/*, and an s3:::*-<accountid> pattern that was a bare
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# name-suffix filter rather than an ownership check) to per-workload
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# prefixes drawn from the permission-source block above. The three genuinely
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# unscopable statements (CloudWatchLogsDescribe, XRay, Ec2Eni) keep
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# Resource "*" with written justification on each. CloudWatch Logs was split
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# into a scoped write half and a wildcard describe half. KMS keeps key/* and
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# is scoped by a kms:ViaService condition instead, because key ARNs carry
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# UUID key ids that cannot be prefix-scoped.
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#
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# 2. WHY MGMT'S RATIONALE IS LEGITIMATE THERE. The superset framing this file
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# used to carry ("being slightly broad is the correct trade-off; a boundary
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# that is too tight will break Lambda functions at runtime AFTER deploy") is
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# a real constraint in the management account: 328440206208 has 26 LIVE
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# roles carrying seahaven-lambda-execution-boundary, across all five SAM
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# stacks. Tightening there is a production change to running workloads with
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# a silent, deploy-time-invisible failure mode.
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#
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# 3. WHY IT DOES NOT TRANSFER HERE. This file deploys ONLY to seahaven-prod
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# (011934824531) and seahaven-dev (710827005802), where
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# PermissionsBoundaryUsageCount is 0 and 0 respectively (aws iam get-policy,
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# verified 2026-07-30; corroborated by list-roles returning no role carrying
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# any permissions boundary in either account). No live Lambda can break, so
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# the risk that justifies mgmt's breadth is absent — while the exposure is
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# strictly WORSE here than in mgmt, because prod is multi-tenant: the old
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# wildcards reached proposal-system's, procurement-ingest's and
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# workorder-ingest's CDK-owned tables, buckets, secrets and queues, the org's
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# own Config and VPC-flow-log buckets, and — via function:* — CDK Lambdas
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# that carry no boundary at all.
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#
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# 4. RECONCILIATION OBLIGATION, RESTATED. For LambdaExecutionBoundary the two
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# copies are now INTENTIONALLY DIFFERENT and must NOT be synchronised:
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# - A change to the per-workload Resource patterns in THIS file does NOT
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# propagate to mgmt.
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# - A change to mgmt's boundary does NOT propagate here.
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# - Any change to the ACTION lists, or any new statement, is a substrate
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# semantic change and DOES still require the same review in both copies.
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# For SamCfnIamManagementPolicy and SamCfnExecutionRole the original rule is
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# unchanged: change BOTH files in the same piece of work.
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#
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# KNOWN OPEN ITEM (deferred, not closed by INFRA-186): mgmt 328440206208 still
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# carries the account-wide patterns. Tightening it needs its own validated
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# rollout — enumerate what the 26 live roles actually call, stage it, and be
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# ready to roll back — and is explicitly OUT OF SCOPE of INFRA-186. Until that
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# lands, the two copies stay divergent and that is the intended state.
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#
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# COUPLING: the boundary's ManagedPolicyName and ARN are UNCHANGED and must stay
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# unchanged. Four Conditions in SamCfnIamManagementPolicy below, and four more in
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# HcptfIamManagementPolicy in lib/terraform-substrate/terraform-substrate.template.yaml,
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# pin arn:aws:iam::<account>:policy/seahaven-lambda-execution-boundary by literal
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# string inside StringEquals iam:PermissionsBoundary. A rename fails SILENTLY — an
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# IAM condition naming a non-existent policy simply never matches, so the
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# escalation control would evaporate rather than error — and would additionally
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# force a CloudFormation REPLACEMENT that any role carrying the boundary would
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# block. INFRA-186 is a CONTENT-ONLY change for exactly this reason;
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# terraform-substrate.template.yaml already records that expectation and is
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# correctly left untouched.
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#
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# SIZE BUDGET: an attached managed policy document is capped at 6,144 characters
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# (whitespace excluded). LambdaExecutionBoundary measures 4,060 characters across
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# 13 statements as of 2026-07-30 (was 2,507 across 11 — TIGHTENING COSTS
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# CHARACTERS). Measure before widening —
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# len(json.dumps(doc,separators=(',',':'))) on the synthesized PolicyDocument with
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# ${AWS::AccountId} resolved. A typical new workload costs ~450 characters, so
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# roughly five more fit. CRITICAL: unlike the 2026-07-27 inline-limit incident,
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# there is NO restructure available when this cap is reached — a role has exactly
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# ONE permissions boundary, so statements cannot be spilled into a second attached
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# managed policy. At the cap the only levers are prefix consolidation and dropping
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# unused actions.
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#
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# This template is deployed via lib/deploy-substrate-stack.ts
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# (cloudformation-include) as stack seahaven-deploy-substrate, once per member
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# account that hosts SAM workloads (currently seahaven-prod 011934824531 and
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# seahaven-dev 710827005802 via bin/app.ts instances deploy-substrate-prod /
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# deploy-substrate-dev; NEVER mgmt — 328440206208 is served by the .github copy
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# named above until its stacks migrate out).
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Parameters:
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CreateOIDCProvider:
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Type: String
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Default: "false"
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AllowedValues: ["true", "false"]
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Description: Set to true only if the GitHub OIDC provider does not already exist in this account
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Conditions:
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ShouldCreateOIDCProvider: !Equals [!Ref CreateOIDCProvider, "true"]
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Resources:
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# OIDC Provider (conditional — most accounts already have it; seahaven-prod
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# and seahaven-dev both do, from their githubdeploy-* role provisioning)
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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GitHubOIDCProvider:
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Type: AWS::IAM::OIDCProvider
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Condition: ShouldCreateOIDCProvider
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Properties:
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Url: https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
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ClientIdList:
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- sts.amazonaws.com
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ThumbprintList:
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- 6938fd4d98bab03faadb97b34396831e3780aea1
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# An account has exactly ONE provider per URL and every githubdeploy-* role
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# trusts it. Retain so that flipping createOidcProvider back to false (or
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# deleting this stack) can never delete the account's federation anchor and
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# break every deploy into it.
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DeletionPolicy: Retain
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UpdateReplacePolicy: Retain
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Lambda execution permissions boundary (INFRA-103, re-scoped by INFRA-186)
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#
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# This managed policy is the CEILING for every Lambda execution role that the
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# five SAM stacks auto-generate via AWS::Serverless::Function. Applying it as
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# PermissionsBoundary on those roles means the effective permissions are the
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# intersection of the role's own policies and this boundary, so a misconfigured
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# SAM role can never exceed what is listed here.
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#
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# SCOPING RULE (INFRA-186, 2026-07-30). This boundary is a CLOSED ENUMERATION
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# of per-workload resource prefixes. It was previously a deliberate SUPERSET
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# with account-wide wildcards (table/*, secret:*, sqs :*, function:*,
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# parameter/*, and an s3:::*-<accountid> pattern that was a name-suffix filter,
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# not an ownership check). That trade-off was made when the only account
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# carrying this policy hosted nothing but the five SAM stacks. It does not
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# survive multi-tenancy: seahaven-prod now hosts CDK-owned tenants
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# (proposal-system, procurement-ingest, workorder-ingest) whose tables, buckets,
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# secrets and queues those wildcards reached, and whose Lambdas carry NO
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# permissions boundary at all — making function:* a boundary-escape primitive.
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#
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# Tightening here carries ZERO runtime risk and was sequenced deliberately:
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# PermissionsBoundaryUsageCount is 0 in BOTH accounts this template deploys to
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# (seahaven-prod 011934824531 and seahaven-dev 710827005802, verified
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# 2026-07-30), so no live Lambda can break. A boundary that is slightly TOO
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# TIGHT is recoverable here — the migrating stack widens it in its own PR before
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# its first deploy — whereas leaving it loose perpetuates the exposure. Prefer
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# tighter; the widening path is below.
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#
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# A resource pattern that genuinely CANNOT be scoped keeps its wildcard WITH a
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# written justification on the statement: CloudWatchLogsDescribe, XRay and
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# Ec2Eni name runtime-created resources or use actions AWS authorises against
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# "*" regardless of the ARN supplied. Do not "tighten" those.
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#
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# WIDENING PATH — read this before migrating a stack into prod or dev.
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# The boundary is never widened by the person who hits the AccessDenied. It is
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# widened by the migrating stack's owner, in THIS repo, BEFORE the workload's
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# first deploy into the target account:
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# 1. Add the workload's prefixes to the relevant per-service Resource lists
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# above — never add a new per-workload statement (a duplicated action list
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# costs ~250 characters for zero new actions; an extra ARN costs ~60).
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# Add its entry to the permission-source block below in the same edit: that
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# block is the sanctioned scope source, and a prefix added without one will
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# be "reconciled" away later.
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# 2. Measure. See SIZE BUDGET in the header. There is NO escape hatch.
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# 3. Both review gates run and neither discharges the other: the GPT-4.1
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# cross-family review against the real diff, and /sh-security-review
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# (IaC/IAM is on the mandatory surface). CLI down = review outstanding.
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# 4. Merge and let CI deploy deploy-substrate-prod / deploy-substrate-dev to
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# UPDATE_COMPLETE, THEN deploy the workload stack.
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# 5. Check the managed-policy VERSION budget first: max 5 versions, both
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# accounts are on v1 today. Every widening — and every Description-only
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# edit — burns one. Delete the oldest non-default version if at 5.
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# ORDERING IS NOT ENFORCED BY CLOUDFORMATION AND THIS IS THE MOST IMPORTANT
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# SENTENCE HERE: the workload's deploy SUCCEEDS even against a stale boundary,
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# because seahaven-cfn-exec-iam-management's gate checks that the boundary ARN
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# is attached, never its contents. The failure surfaces later, at first invoke,
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# as AccessDenied. A stale boundary is a silent deploy-time pass and a loud
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# production failure.
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#
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# CONSIDERED AND REJECTED: a Deny statement reserving the seahaven-* namespace.
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# With the Allow set now enumerated per workload it is fully redundant (verified
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# 2026-07-30: seahaven-prod-config-* and seahaven-prod-vpc-flow-logs-* are
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# already denied by the Allow set alone), and a Deny inside a BOUNDARY is the
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# hardest failure mode in the estate to debug — it beats every Allow in every
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# policy with no synth-time signal. Revisit only if a widening ever has to
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# re-broaden a per-service Resource list back toward a wildcard.
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#
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# NOTE ON WHAT THESE PREFIXES ARE. All five stacks below currently live in the
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# MANAGEMENT account and none of their resources exists in seahaven-prod or
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# seahaven-dev yet. These are MIGRATION-CANDIDATE prefixes for the accounts this
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# template deploys to, not an inventory of what is deployed there. They are the
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# sanctioned scope source because they are the enumerated permission sources of
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# the stacks this boundary exists to cap.
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#
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# Permission sources per stack (verified live 2026-07-30; this block is the
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# sanctioned source for every Resource pattern above — keep it accurate):
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#
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# afterhours-shift-manager (functions: afterhours-*, 6 live)
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# - DynamoDB CRUD (afterhours-shifts table)
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# - secretsmanager:GetSecretValue (afterhours-shift-manager/*)
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# - ssm:GetParameter (/afterhours-shift-manager/*: channel-id,
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# slack-bot-token, slack-signing-secret)
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# - ses:SendEmail (SES identity)
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# - lambda:InvokeFunction (ReleaseNotifyInvokeRole,
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# HolidaySchedulerExecutionRole — these two carry the boundary and need
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# ONLY this action)
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# - CloudWatch Logs (all functions)
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# - UNRESOLVED: /3cx-scheduler/* ownership (this stack vs. the retired
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# standalone 3CX scheduler). Deliberately NOT granted. Resolve at migration.
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#
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# payments-dashboard (functions: payments-*)
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# - DynamoDB CRUD / Read (PaymentsDashboard table — legacy PascalCase)
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# - S3 GetObject ONLY (seahaven-payments-csv-*, seahaven-payments-boa-raw-*,
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# seahaven-payroll-emails-*) — no write intent enumerated
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# - secretsmanager:GetSecretValue (payments-dashboard/*)
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# - sqs Send/Receive/Delete etc. (payments-payroll-batch + DLQs)
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# - lambda:InvokeFunction (ExpenseReceiver -> ExpenseProcessor)
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# - ec2 ENI lifecycle (VPC-attached functions)
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# - KMS via dynamodb (table CMK) — no SSM, no SES
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# - CloudWatch Logs
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#
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# meal-order-manager (functions: meal-order-manager-*, 7 live)
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# - DynamoDB CRUD / Read (meal-order-manager-orders table)
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# - S3 CRUD (meal-order-manager-reports-*, meal-order-manager-form-*)
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# - secretsmanager:GetSecretValue (meal-order-manager/*)
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# - ssm:GetParameter (/meal-order-manager/*)
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# - lambda:InvokeFunction (submit-order -> slack-notifier,
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# close-form -> aggregate-orders, plus AdminAuthorizerInvokeRole)
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# - ses:SendRawEmail
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# - CloudWatch Logs
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#
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# front-integrations (functions: front-*)
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# - DynamoDB CRUD (front-sla-alerts table)
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# - secretsmanager:GetSecretValue (front-integrations/*)
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# - CloudWatch Logs
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# - no S3 / SQS / SSM / SES / KMS / VPC
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#
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# afi-backup-monitor (functions: afi-*)
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# - secretsmanager:GetSecretValue (afi-backup-monitor/slack-webhook-url AND
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# the bare, unprefixed afi-api-key — see the SecretsManager statement)
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# - CloudWatch Logs
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# - nothing else
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#
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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LambdaExecutionBoundary:
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Type: AWS::IAM::ManagedPolicy
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Properties:
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ManagedPolicyName: seahaven-lambda-execution-boundary
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Description: >-
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Permissions boundary ceiling for all SAM-managed Lambda execution roles.
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Applied via PermissionsBoundary on every Globals.Function in the five
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SAM stacks (INFRA-103). Effective permissions are the intersection of
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this policy and the role's own inline policies.
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PolicyDocument:
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Version: "2012-10-17"
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Statement:
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# ── CloudWatch Logs — write (every Lambda) ──────────────────────────
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# Scoped to the Lambda log-group namespace. Every SAM function's group
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# is /aws/lambda/<function>, and the trailing * also covers the
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# :log-stream:<name> suffix PutLogEvents authorises against, so one ARN
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# serves CreateLogGroup, CreateLogStream, PutLogEvents and
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# DescribeLogStreams. The * is deliberately NOT after a trailing slash:
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# /aws/lambda* also matches the /aws/lambda-insights groups the Lambda
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# Insights extension writes to, which /aws/lambda/* would have denied.
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# VERIFICATION PROVENANCE, stated precisely (2026-07-30). What
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# iam simulate-custom-policy DOES confirm: this pattern allows
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# logs:CreateLogGroup / logs:PutLogEvents on the bare group ARN
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# log-group:/aws/lambda/<fn> (and /aws/lambda/<a>/<b>), and DENIES
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# log-group:seahaven-prod-vpc-flow-logs — the latter re-checked against
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# an Allow */* positive control, which allows it, so the deny is real
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# policy behaviour and not a simulator artifact.
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# What the simulator CANNOT evaluate, so do NOT claim it was verified:
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# log-stream-qualified ARNs (log-group:<g>:log-stream:<s>) and the bare
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# /aws/lambda-insights group both return implicitDeny EVEN UNDER an
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# Allow */* policy. That is a simulator resource-parsing limitation, not
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# a denial. Coverage of those two rests on documented IAM wildcard
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# semantics — "*" matches any sequence of characters including ":" and
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# "/" — which is why the * is deliberately NOT placed after a trailing
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# slash. If this ever needs true end-to-end proof, it must come from a
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# real invoke in dev, not from the simulator.
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#
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# NOT scoped per workload, deliberately. A per-stack prefix
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# (/aws/lambda/payments-* etc.) was considered and rejected: a Lambda
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# denied PutLogEvents does not fail — it keeps running and silently
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# produces no logs. Log denial is the one failure class in this policy
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# that is NOT loud, so it must not depend on function-name discipline.
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# ACCEPTED RESIDUAL RISK: a SAM Lambda can write into another tenant's
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# /aws/lambda/* group (log poisoning). No read action is granted here, so
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# this is not an exfiltration path. Tighten only once every
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# boundary-carrying function is confirmed to set an explicit FunctionName.
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- Sid: CloudWatchLogsWrite
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Effect: Allow
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Action:
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- logs:CreateLogGroup
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- logs:CreateLogStream
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- logs:PutLogEvents
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- logs:DescribeLogStreams
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Resource:
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- !Sub "arn:aws:logs:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:log-group:/aws/lambda*"
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|
# ── CloudWatch Logs — describe (UNSCOPABLE, kept "*" deliberately) ──
|
|
# logs:DescribeLogGroups is a COLLECTION action: AWS authorises it
|
|
# against "*" regardless of any resource ARN supplied. Scoping it would
|
|
# produce a policy that reads tighter and denies at runtime, so it is
|
|
# split into its own statement and keeps the wildcard. Read-only
|
|
# metadata; it cannot mutate anything or return log content.
|
|
- Sid: CloudWatchLogsDescribe
|
|
Effect: Allow
|
|
Action:
|
|
- logs:DescribeLogGroups
|
|
Resource: "*"
|
|
|
|
# ── X-Ray tracing (UNSCOPABLE, kept "*" deliberately) ───────────────
|
|
# xray:PutTraceSegments / PutTelemetryRecords support no resource-level
|
|
# permissions — X-Ray exposes no ARN for them, which is why the AWS
|
|
# managed AWSXRayDaemonWriteAccess also uses "*". Any ARN written here
|
|
# would be inert and would falsely imply a control exists. Write-only
|
|
# into this account's own trace store; no cross-tenant read is
|
|
# expressible with this action set.
|
|
- Sid: XRay
|
|
Effect: Allow
|
|
Action:
|
|
- xray:PutTraceSegments
|
|
- xray:PutTelemetryRecords
|
|
Resource: "*"
|
|
|
|
# ── VPC / ENI management (UNSCOPABLE, kept "*" deliberately) ────────
|
|
# Matches AWSLambdaVPCAccessExecutionRole exactly, and for the same
|
|
# reasons. The three ec2:Describe* actions do not support resource-level
|
|
# permissions AT ALL — an ARN in Resource is ignored and the call is
|
|
# authorised against "*" — so narrowing them is cosmetic. The ENI in
|
|
# CreateNetworkInterface / DeleteNetworkInterface is created by the
|
|
# Lambda service at attach time with an id that cannot exist when this
|
|
# policy is written. Nothing here is scopable by resource name.
|
|
# AssignPrivateIpAddresses / UnassignPrivateIpAddresses are for EFA and
|
|
# secondary IPs — not part of the Lambda ENI lifecycle — omitted.
|
|
#
|
|
# KNOWN OPEN ITEM (pre-existing, NOT introduced by INFRA-186):
|
|
# ec2:DeleteNetworkInterface on "*" lets a bounded Lambda delete any ENI
|
|
# in the account, including NAT / VPC-endpoint / RDS ENIs — a
|
|
# denial-of-service primitive inherited from the AWS managed policy. The
|
|
# durable fix is a Condition on ec2:Subnet / ec2:Vpc naming the VPC the
|
|
# Lambda fleet attaches to. That VPC does not exist in seahaven-prod or
|
|
# seahaven-dev today (payments-dashboard's 10.20.0.0/16 VPC is in mgmt),
|
|
# so writing the condition now would encode an mgmt resource into a
|
|
# prod/dev template. Whoever brings the VPC across in payments-dashboard's
|
|
# migration PR adds the condition in the same PR.
|
|
- Sid: Ec2Eni
|
|
Effect: Allow
|
|
Action:
|
|
- ec2:CreateNetworkInterface
|
|
- ec2:DescribeNetworkInterfaces
|
|
- ec2:DeleteNetworkInterface
|
|
- ec2:DescribeSubnets
|
|
- ec2:DescribeSecurityGroups
|
|
- ec2:DescribeVpcs
|
|
Resource: "*"
|
|
|
|
# ── DynamoDB — one prefix per enumerated workload ───────────────────
|
|
# Replaces table/* + table/*/index/*, which reached every table in the
|
|
# account. A trailing * on each workload prefix covers the base table
|
|
# AND its /index/* GSI ARNs in a single entry (IAM wildcards match "/"),
|
|
# verified 2026-07-30 with iam simulate-custom-policy against
|
|
# table/afterhours-shifts/index/gsi1 — so the separate table/*/index/*
|
|
# line is deleted, not replaced. Prod's CDK-owned tables (WorkOrders,
|
|
# WorkOrderComments, purchase-orders, verified-sites, pending-site-review)
|
|
# match none of these prefixes, which is the point.
|
|
# PaymentsDashboard is a legacy PascalCase table exempt from renaming
|
|
# under handbook naming-conventions.md; the kebab-case prefix is listed
|
|
# alongside it so a future rename cannot silently lock the stack out.
|
|
# Table names are NOT stack names (afterhours-shifts, front-sla-alerts) —
|
|
# scoping naively off stack name would deny at runtime.
|
|
- Sid: DynamoDB
|
|
Effect: Allow
|
|
Action:
|
|
- dynamodb:GetItem
|
|
- dynamodb:PutItem
|
|
- dynamodb:UpdateItem
|
|
- dynamodb:DeleteItem
|
|
- dynamodb:Query
|
|
- dynamodb:Scan
|
|
- dynamodb:BatchGetItem
|
|
- dynamodb:BatchWriteItem
|
|
- dynamodb:DescribeTable
|
|
- dynamodb:ConditionCheckItem
|
|
Resource:
|
|
- !Sub "arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:table/afterhours-*"
|
|
- !Sub "arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:table/front-*"
|
|
- !Sub "arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:table/meal-order-manager-*"
|
|
- !Sub "arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:table/PaymentsDashboard*"
|
|
- !Sub "arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:table/payments-dashboard-*"
|
|
|
|
# ── S3 — write access (meal-order-manager only) ─────────────────────
|
|
# THE LARGEST SECURITY WIN IN INFRA-186. The removed
|
|
# arn:aws:s3:::*-${AWS::AccountId} was not a per-workload scope at all:
|
|
# S3 ARNs carry no account field, so it was a bare NAME-SUFFIX FILTER
|
|
# matching every bucket in the account whose name ends in the account id.
|
|
# In seahaven-prod today that was 8 of 9 buckets — all four
|
|
# proposal-system-*, both ingest-email buckets, AND the org's own
|
|
# seahaven-prod-config-* and seahaven-prod-vpc-flow-logs-* — with
|
|
# PutObject and DeleteObject. That is anti-forensics capability over the
|
|
# org's own security telemetry, handed to the SAM fleet's ceiling.
|
|
# Verified 2026-07-30 with iam simulate-custom-policy: the patterns below
|
|
# deny seahaven-prod-config-*, seahaven-prod-vpc-flow-logs-* and
|
|
# proposal-system-uploads-*, and allow meal-order-manager-reports-*.
|
|
# The four meal-order-manager-*-${AWS::AccountId} entries previously
|
|
# listed here were strictly redundant — every one ends in -<accountid> and
|
|
# was already matched by the wildcard above them; their comment claiming a
|
|
# "non-AccountId suffix pattern" was contradicted by the ARNs beneath it.
|
|
# Split by DIRECTION of access: meal-order-manager is the only stack the
|
|
# permission-source block gives write intent to (ReportsBucket /
|
|
# FormBucket CRUD). Both the bucket and object ARN forms are listed in
|
|
# each statement because s3:ListBucket authorises against the bucket ARN
|
|
# and s3:GetObject against the object ARN.
|
|
- Sid: S3WorkloadReadWrite
|
|
Effect: Allow
|
|
Action:
|
|
- s3:GetObject
|
|
- s3:PutObject
|
|
- s3:DeleteObject
|
|
- s3:ListBucket
|
|
- s3:GetBucketLocation
|
|
- s3:GetObjectVersion
|
|
- s3:GetObjectTagging
|
|
- s3:PutObjectTagging
|
|
Resource:
|
|
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::meal-order-manager-*-${AWS::AccountId}"
|
|
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::meal-order-manager-*-${AWS::AccountId}/*"
|
|
|
|
# ── S3 — payments-dashboard ─────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
# Split by direction, but note the source of truth: the template
|
|
# comment above enumerates "S3 GetObject" for payments-dashboard, and
|
|
# that enumeration is INCOMPLETE. Verified against the real stack
|
|
# 2026-07-30 — payments-dashboard/template.yaml grants s3:PutObject on
|
|
# BoaRawBucket (lines 272 and 1098-1099), so the fetchBoaTransactions
|
|
# path writes raw BoA payloads. A read-only grant here would deny that
|
|
# write at migration time. Write is therefore allowed on the boa-raw
|
|
# bucket ONLY; payroll-emails and payments-csv stay read-only, so a
|
|
# compromised payments function still cannot delete payroll evidence.
|
|
# Buckets carry the org-wide seahaven- prefix rather than a payments-
|
|
# one, which is why bucket names cannot be derived from stack names.
|
|
- Sid: S3PaymentsBoaRawWrite
|
|
Effect: Allow
|
|
Action:
|
|
- s3:GetObject
|
|
- s3:PutObject
|
|
- s3:GetObjectVersion
|
|
- s3:ListBucket
|
|
- s3:GetBucketLocation
|
|
Resource:
|
|
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::seahaven-payments-boa-raw-${AWS::AccountId}"
|
|
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::seahaven-payments-boa-raw-${AWS::AccountId}/*"
|
|
|
|
- Sid: S3WorkloadReadOnly
|
|
Effect: Allow
|
|
Action:
|
|
- s3:GetObject
|
|
- s3:GetObjectVersion
|
|
- s3:ListBucket
|
|
- s3:GetBucketLocation
|
|
Resource:
|
|
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::seahaven-payments-csv-${AWS::AccountId}"
|
|
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::seahaven-payments-csv-${AWS::AccountId}/*"
|
|
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::seahaven-payroll-emails-${AWS::AccountId}"
|
|
- !Sub "arn:aws:s3:::seahaven-payroll-emails-${AWS::AccountId}/*"
|
|
|
|
# ── Secrets Manager — one <stack>/ prefix per workload ──────────────
|
|
# Replaces secret:*, which in seahaven-prod today reads
|
|
# proposal-system/db-credentials, proposal-system/bedrock-user,
|
|
# procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token and workorder-ingest/shoc-webhook-hmac
|
|
# — the last of which is an HMAC SIGNING key, so the wildcard was a
|
|
# webhook-forgery primitive against the SHOC integration.
|
|
# The trailing * after each / is MANDATORY, not decorative: Secrets
|
|
# Manager appends a random 6-character suffix to every ARN, so an
|
|
# exact-name ARN never matches. Verified 2026-07-30 with
|
|
# iam simulate-custom-policy against a suffixed ARN.
|
|
# afi-api-key is a bare, unprefixed, account-root secret that predates the
|
|
# <stack>/<name> convention (afi-backup-monitor's OTHER secret,
|
|
# afi-backup-monitor/slack-webhook-url, is correctly prefixed). It is
|
|
# listed explicitly because omitting it would encode a KNOWN-WRONG scope
|
|
# that fails silently months from now at migration. MIGRATION OBLIGATION:
|
|
# afi-backup-monitor's migration PR renames it to
|
|
# afi-backup-monitor/api-key and deletes this line.
|
|
# secretsmanager:ListSecrets and BatchGetSecretValue are deliberately
|
|
# ABSENT and must stay absent — AWS authorises both against "*" regardless
|
|
# of any resource list, so adding either would silently reinstate
|
|
# account-wide read. (Precedent: BatchGetSecretValue synthed clean, passed
|
|
# review, then AccessDenied in production and crash-looped open-swe.)
|
|
- Sid: SecretsManager
|
|
Effect: Allow
|
|
Action:
|
|
- secretsmanager:GetSecretValue
|
|
- secretsmanager:DescribeSecret
|
|
Resource:
|
|
- !Sub "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:secret:afterhours-shift-manager/*"
|
|
- !Sub "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:secret:afi-backup-monitor/*"
|
|
- !Sub "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:secret:afi-api-key-*"
|
|
- !Sub "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:secret:front-integrations/*"
|
|
- !Sub "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:secret:meal-order-manager/*"
|
|
- !Sub "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:secret:payments-dashboard/*"
|
|
|
|
# ── SSM Parameter Store (meal-order-manager, afterhours) ────────────
|
|
# Replaces parameter/*, which in seahaven-prod reads
|
|
# /procurement-api/custom-domain/certificate-arn and
|
|
# /seahaven/dynamodb/cmk-arn. These are exactly the two hierarchies the
|
|
# statement's own heading already claimed to serve.
|
|
# The bare-path entries alongside the /* entries are REQUIRED, not
|
|
# duplicates: ssm:GetParametersByPath authorises against the PATH ARN,
|
|
# not the leaf, so a /*-only grant can deny the recursive read.
|
|
# Note the ARN form drops the parameter's leading slash.
|
|
# /3cx-scheduler/* is deliberately EXCLUDED: ownership between
|
|
# afterhours-shift-manager and the retired standalone 3CX ring-group
|
|
# scheduler is unresolved, and inventing a scope is not permitted.
|
|
# Resolve at afterhours' migration and widen then if it is genuinely ours.
|
|
- Sid: SSMParameterRead
|
|
Effect: Allow
|
|
Action:
|
|
- ssm:GetParameter
|
|
- ssm:GetParameters
|
|
- ssm:GetParametersByPath
|
|
Resource:
|
|
- !Sub "arn:aws:ssm:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:parameter/afterhours-shift-manager"
|
|
- !Sub "arn:aws:ssm:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:parameter/afterhours-shift-manager/*"
|
|
- !Sub "arn:aws:ssm:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:parameter/meal-order-manager"
|
|
- !Sub "arn:aws:ssm:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:parameter/meal-order-manager/*"
|
|
|
|
# ── SQS (payments-dashboard batch queues + async DLQs) ──────────────
|
|
# payments-dashboard is the only enumerated stack with a queue
|
|
# dependency, and all of its live queues are payments-prefixed. Replacing
|
|
# :* costs four characters and removes sqs:ReceiveMessage /
|
|
# sqs:DeleteMessage on proposal-system-jobs, workorder-shoc-emitter-failures
|
|
# and workorder-shoc-emitter-rejected, where the wildcard was a silent
|
|
# message-drain (data-loss) primitive against another tenant's pipeline.
|
|
# Verified denied 2026-07-30 with iam simulate-custom-policy.
|
|
# A prefix rather than four literals is deliberate: SAM auto-names async
|
|
# DLQs from the function name, so a new payments-* function's DLQ is
|
|
# covered without a boundary edit.
|
|
# sqs:ListQueues is absent and must stay absent (authorised against "*").
|
|
- Sid: SQS
|
|
Effect: Allow
|
|
Action:
|
|
- sqs:SendMessage
|
|
- sqs:ReceiveMessage
|
|
- sqs:DeleteMessage
|
|
- sqs:GetQueueAttributes
|
|
- sqs:GetQueueUrl
|
|
- sqs:ChangeMessageVisibility
|
|
Resource:
|
|
- !Sub "arn:aws:sqs:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:payments-*"
|
|
|
|
# ── Lambda invocation — HIGHEST-LEVERAGE FIX IN THIS CHANGE ─────────
|
|
# function:* was a BOUNDARY-ESCAPE primitive, not merely lateral
|
|
# movement: an invoked function executes under ITS OWN execution role,
|
|
# and every non-SAM function in seahaven-prod (proposal-system-*,
|
|
# procurement-api, workorder-*, po-*) is CDK-deployed and carries NO
|
|
# permissions boundary at all. A bounded SAM Lambda could therefore reach,
|
|
# by proxy, capability this ceiling exists to deny. Verified 2026-07-30
|
|
# with iam simulate-custom-policy: proposal-system-api is now denied,
|
|
# payments-expenseProcessor still allowed.
|
|
# Scoped to the three workloads with enumerated inter-function calls:
|
|
# payments-dashboard (ExpenseReceiver -> ExpenseProcessor),
|
|
# meal-order-manager (submit-order -> slack-notifier, close-form ->
|
|
# aggregate-orders, plus AdminAuthorizerInvokeRole), and
|
|
# afterhours-shift-manager, whose boundary-carrying ReleaseNotifyInvokeRole
|
|
# and HolidaySchedulerExecutionRole exist solely to invoke.
|
|
# front-integrations and afi-backup-monitor have no enumerated invoke need
|
|
# and are deliberately absent. Prefixes (not literal function ARNs) are
|
|
# used because they also match the :<alias> / :<version> qualified form.
|
|
- Sid: LambdaInvoke
|
|
Effect: Allow
|
|
Action:
|
|
- lambda:InvokeFunction
|
|
Resource:
|
|
- !Sub "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:function:afterhours-*"
|
|
- !Sub "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:function:meal-order-manager-*"
|
|
- !Sub "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:function:payments-*"
|
|
|
|
# ── SES — pinned to account inventory, NOT per-workload scoping ─────
|
|
# Labelled honestly: an SES identity is a shared DOMAIN, so no
|
|
# per-workload prefix exists to scope to. These are seahaven-prod's two
|
|
# verified identities (re-verified live 2026-07-30); seahaven-dev has
|
|
# none, so both entries are simply inert there. The win is bounded but
|
|
# real: identity/* would let the SAM fleet send as ANY identity ever added
|
|
# to the account, including a customer or partner domain, from a
|
|
# legitimately-authenticated sender. This cannot break anything that would
|
|
# otherwise work — sending from an unverified identity fails with
|
|
# MessageRejected regardless of IAM — so the failure mode is LOUD.
|
|
# configuration-set/* is DROPPED: zero configuration sets exist in prod or
|
|
# dev and no enumerated stack uses one.
|
|
# MIGRATION-BLOCKING QUESTION: mgmt additionally has seahavenind.com,
|
|
# apfacilities.org, adam@seahaven.com and payroll@seahaven.com verified;
|
|
# prod does NOT. Each migrating stack must confirm its actual Source
|
|
# address, verify that domain in the target account, and add the identity
|
|
# ARN here in the same PR.
|
|
# A ses:FromAddress condition would be stronger but is not available: the
|
|
# permission-source block names payroll@seahavenind.com, which is not a
|
|
# verified identity in prod — writing that condition would invent a scope.
|
|
- Sid: SES
|
|
Effect: Allow
|
|
Action:
|
|
- ses:SendEmail
|
|
- ses:SendRawEmail
|
|
Resource:
|
|
- !Sub "arn:aws:ses:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:identity/int.seahaven.com"
|
|
- !Sub "arn:aws:ses:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:identity/seahaven.com"
|
|
|
|
# ── KMS — key/* RETAINED, scoped by condition instead ───────────────
|
|
# KMS is the one high-value data plane that CANNOT be scoped by resource
|
|
# name: key ARNs carry UUID key ids, not workload names, and alias ARNs
|
|
# are not valid in a Resource for these actions (alias scoping needs a
|
|
# kms:RequestAlias condition). The two key ids named in this statement's
|
|
# previous comment (key/0b660af3, key/b748750c) are MGMT keys that do not
|
|
# exist in seahaven-prod or seahaven-dev; hardcoding them — or prod's
|
|
# three live CMKs — would encode one account's inventory into a template
|
|
# shared by two, and would break on any key replacement.
|
|
# So Resource stays key/* and the scope is derived from kms:ViaService:
|
|
# the fleet may use a CMK ONLY as part of a request one of these services
|
|
# makes on its behalf. Decrypting a DynamoDB item or an S3 object still
|
|
# works; a direct kms:Decrypt on arbitrary ciphertext lifted from anywhere
|
|
# in the account is denied — the actual escalation path key/* opened.
|
|
# Because those services are themselves prefix-scoped above, the effective
|
|
# KMS scope INHERITS the per-workload scoping for free, with no key ids
|
|
# and no per-account parameterisation.
|
|
# logs.us-east-1.amazonaws.com is included as belt-and-braces: CloudWatch
|
|
# Logs is believed to decrypt log-group CMKs under its own service grant
|
|
# rather than the execution role's credentials, which would make this entry
|
|
# a no-op — but a KMS denial on the logging path would be SILENT, and the
|
|
# entry cannot grant anything meaningful on its own, so the insurance is
|
|
# bought deliberately.
|
|
# If a specific key must ever be named, use a kms:RequestAlias condition —
|
|
# never a literal key id.
|
|
- Sid: KMS
|
|
Effect: Allow
|
|
Action:
|
|
- kms:Decrypt
|
|
- kms:GenerateDataKey
|
|
- kms:DescribeKey
|
|
Resource:
|
|
- !Sub "arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:key/*"
|
|
Condition:
|
|
StringEquals:
|
|
kms:ViaService:
|
|
- dynamodb.us-east-1.amazonaws.com
|
|
- logs.us-east-1.amazonaws.com
|
|
- s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com
|
|
- secretsmanager.us-east-1.amazonaws.com
|
|
# REQUIRED for parity with SSMParameterRead above: a
|
|
# SecureString parameter decrypts via the SSM service
|
|
# principal, so omitting this denies reads that this same
|
|
# policy grants — a self-inconsistency caught by the
|
|
# 2026-07-30 review. Any ssm:GetParameter* grant in this
|
|
# boundary must keep this entry.
|
|
- ssm.us-east-1.amazonaws.com
|
|
- sqs.us-east-1.amazonaws.com
|
|
|
|
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
# Shared CloudFormation execution role (SAM stacks) — INFRA-97 scoped
|
|
#
|
|
# Replaces the previous blanket managed-policy set (IAMFullAccess +
|
|
# *FullAccess) with per-service inline statements that cover exactly
|
|
# what the five SAM stacks need during a CloudFormation deploy/update.
|
|
#
|
|
# PRIMARY ESCALATION CONTROL
|
|
# iam:CreateRole and iam:AttachRolePolicy / iam:PutRolePolicy are
|
|
# conditioned on iam:PermissionsBoundary StringEquals the boundary ARN
|
|
# (seahaven-lambda-execution-boundary, created in INFRA-103). That
|
|
# condition is what prevents the CFN execution role from minting an
|
|
# unconstrained admin role.
|
|
#
|
|
# SAM RolePath deviation note
|
|
# The original cross-review suggestion mentioned scoping IAM role
|
|
# creation to a specific path (/cfn-managed/). AWS::Serverless::Function
|
|
# does NOT support a custom RolePath on auto-generated execution roles —
|
|
# the PermissionsBoundary property is supported, but the role always lands
|
|
# at path /. Relying on a path condition (iam:ResourceTag or path-prefix)
|
|
# would therefore exclude the SAM auto-roles and break every deploy.
|
|
# The iam:PermissionsBoundary condition achieves the same security goal
|
|
# without requiring a path. For any explicit AWS::IAM::Role resources
|
|
# in SAM templates (e.g. AdminAuthorizerInvokeRole in meal-order-manager)
|
|
# where we can control the path, path scoping can be added in a follow-up.
|
|
#
|
|
# DEPLOY ORDER DEPENDENCY
|
|
# This role references the boundary ARN only as literal !Sub strings inside
|
|
# Condition values, so CloudFormation infers NO creation edge from the
|
|
# references alone. The explicit DependsOn below is what guarantees the
|
|
# boundary exists before the role on first create (IAM would otherwise
|
|
# accept the role, leaving a window where the role exists unbounded-gated
|
|
# against a not-yet-existing boundary policy).
|
|
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
SamCfnExecutionRole:
|
|
Type: AWS::IAM::Role
|
|
DependsOn: LambdaExecutionBoundary
|
|
Properties:
|
|
RoleName: github-cfn-execution-role
|
|
ManagedPolicyArns:
|
|
- !Ref SamCfnIamManagementPolicy
|
|
AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
|
|
Version: "2012-10-17"
|
|
Statement:
|
|
- Effect: Allow
|
|
Principal:
|
|
Service: cloudformation.amazonaws.com
|
|
Action: sts:AssumeRole
|
|
Policies:
|
|
|
|
# ── CloudFormation transforms (SAM macro) ─────────────────────────
|
|
- PolicyName: cloudformation-transforms
|
|
PolicyDocument:
|
|
Version: "2012-10-17"
|
|
Statement:
|
|
- Sid: AllowSAMTransform
|
|
Effect: Allow
|
|
Action:
|
|
- cloudformation:CreateChangeSet
|
|
Resource:
|
|
- arn:aws:cloudformation:us-east-1:aws:transform/*
|
|
|
|
# ── Lambda management ─────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
# Covers function create/update/delete, aliases, event source
|
|
# mappings, and Lambda layers — all needed for SAM deploys.
|
|
- PolicyName: lambda-management
|
|
PolicyDocument:
|
|
Version: "2012-10-17"
|
|
Statement:
|
|
- Sid: LambdaFunctions
|
|
Effect: Allow
|
|
Action:
|
|
- lambda:AddPermission
|
|
- lambda:CreateFunction
|
|
- lambda:DeleteFunction
|
|
- lambda:GetFunction
|
|
- lambda:GetFunctionConfiguration
|
|
- lambda:ListFunctions
|
|
- lambda:RemovePermission
|
|
- lambda:UpdateFunctionCode
|
|
- lambda:UpdateFunctionConfiguration
|
|
- lambda:UpdateFunctionEventInvokeConfig
|
|
- lambda:PutFunctionEventInvokeConfig
|
|
- lambda:DeleteFunctionEventInvokeConfig
|
|
- lambda:GetFunctionEventInvokeConfig
|
|
- lambda:ListTags
|
|
- lambda:TagResource
|
|
- lambda:UntagResource
|
|
- lambda:GetPolicy
|
|
- lambda:ListVersionsByFunction
|
|
- lambda:PublishVersion
|
|
- lambda:CreateAlias
|
|
- lambda:DeleteAlias
|
|
- lambda:UpdateAlias
|
|
- lambda:GetAlias
|
|
Resource:
|
|
- !Sub "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:function:*"
|
|
- Sid: LambdaLayers
|
|
Effect: Allow
|
|
Action:
|
|
- lambda:PublishLayerVersion
|
|
- lambda:DeleteLayerVersion
|
|
- lambda:GetLayerVersion
|
|
- lambda:ListLayerVersions
|
|
- lambda:ListLayers
|
|
- lambda:AddLayerVersionPermission
|
|
- lambda:RemoveLayerVersionPermission
|
|
Resource:
|
|
- !Sub "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:layer:*"
|
|
- Sid: LambdaEventSourceMappings
|
|
Effect: Allow
|
|
Action:
|
|
- lambda:CreateEventSourceMapping
|
|
- lambda:DeleteEventSourceMapping
|
|
- lambda:GetEventSourceMapping
|
|
- lambda:ListEventSourceMappings
|
|
- lambda:UpdateEventSourceMapping
|
|
Resource: "*"
|
|
|
|
# ── API Gateway (HTTP APIs + REST APIs) ───────────────────────────
|
|
- PolicyName: apigateway-management
|
|
PolicyDocument:
|
|
Version: "2012-10-17"
|
|
Statement:
|
|
- Sid: ApiGateway
|
|
Effect: Allow
|
|
Action:
|
|
- apigateway:GET
|
|
- apigateway:POST
|
|
- apigateway:PUT
|
|
- apigateway:PATCH
|
|
- apigateway:DELETE
|
|
Resource:
|
|
- "arn:aws:apigateway:us-east-1::*"
|
|
|
|
# ── DynamoDB ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
- PolicyName: dynamodb-management
|
|
PolicyDocument:
|
|
Version: "2012-10-17"
|
|
Statement:
|
|
- Sid: DynamoDBTables
|
|
Effect: Allow
|
|
Action:
|
|
- dynamodb:CreateTable
|
|
- dynamodb:DeleteTable
|
|
- dynamodb:DescribeTable
|
|
- dynamodb:UpdateTable
|
|
- dynamodb:ListTables
|
|
- dynamodb:TagResource
|
|
- dynamodb:UntagResource
|
|
- dynamodb:DescribeTimeToLive
|
|
- dynamodb:UpdateTimeToLive
|
|
- dynamodb:DescribeContinuousBackups
|
|
- dynamodb:UpdateContinuousBackups
|
|
Resource:
|
|
- !Sub "arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:table/*"
|
|
|
|
# ── S3 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
# Covers bucket create/configure + object operations for SAM
|
|
# artifact buckets and application buckets.
|
|
- PolicyName: s3-management
|
|
PolicyDocument:
|
|
Version: "2012-10-17"
|
|
Statement:
|
|
- Sid: S3BucketOps
|
|
Effect: Allow
|
|
Action:
|
|
- s3:CreateBucket
|
|
- s3:DeleteBucket
|
|
- s3:GetBucketLocation
|
|
- s3:GetBucketPolicy
|
|
- s3:PutBucketPolicy
|
|
- s3:DeleteBucketPolicy
|
|
- s3:GetBucketTagging
|
|
- s3:PutBucketTagging
|
|
- s3:GetBucketVersioning
|
|
- s3:PutBucketVersioning
|
|
- s3:GetLifecycleConfiguration
|
|
- s3:PutLifecycleConfiguration
|
|
- s3:GetBucketPublicAccessBlock
|
|
- s3:PutBucketPublicAccessBlock
|
|
# Explicit BucketEncryption blocks (first: payments-dashboard
|
|
# BoaRawBucket, 2026-07-22) need the encryption config pair.
|
|
- s3:GetEncryptionConfiguration
|
|
- s3:PutEncryptionConfiguration
|
|
- s3:GetBucketNotification
|
|
- s3:PutBucketNotification
|
|
- s3:GetBucketWebsite
|
|
- s3:PutBucketWebsite
|
|
- s3:DeleteBucketWebsite
|
|
- s3:GetBucketAcl
|
|
- s3:PutBucketAcl
|
|
Resource:
|
|
- "arn:aws:s3:::*"
|
|
- Sid: S3ObjectOps
|
|
Effect: Allow
|
|
Action:
|
|
- s3:GetObject
|
|
- s3:PutObject
|
|
- s3:DeleteObject
|
|
- s3:ListBucket
|
|
- s3:ListBucketVersions
|
|
- s3:GetObjectVersion
|
|
Resource:
|
|
- "arn:aws:s3:::*"
|
|
- "arn:aws:s3:::*/*"
|
|
|
|
# ── CloudWatch Logs ───────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
- PolicyName: cloudwatch-logs-management
|
|
PolicyDocument:
|
|
Version: "2012-10-17"
|
|
Statement:
|
|
- Sid: CWLogs
|
|
Effect: Allow
|
|
Action:
|
|
- logs:CreateLogGroup
|
|
- logs:DeleteLogGroup
|
|
- logs:DescribeLogGroups
|
|
- logs:PutRetentionPolicy
|
|
- logs:DeleteRetentionPolicy
|
|
- logs:ListTagsLogGroup
|
|
- logs:TagLogGroup
|
|
- logs:UntagLogGroup
|
|
- logs:ListTagsForResource
|
|
- logs:TagResource
|
|
- logs:UntagResource
|
|
- logs:CreateLogDelivery
|
|
- logs:GetLogDelivery
|
|
- logs:UpdateLogDelivery
|
|
- logs:DeleteLogDelivery
|
|
- logs:ListLogDeliveries
|
|
- logs:PutResourcePolicy
|
|
- logs:DescribeResourcePolicies
|
|
- logs:PutDestination
|
|
- logs:DeleteDestination
|
|
- logs:DescribeDestinations
|
|
- logs:AssociateKmsKey
|
|
- logs:DisassociateKmsKey
|
|
# Ported from the mgmt copy (Phase A): afterhours-shift-manager
|
|
# creates an AWS::Logs::MetricFilter through this role, so a
|
|
# SAM stack migrating here fails mid-deploy without these.
|
|
- logs:PutMetricFilter
|
|
- logs:DeleteMetricFilter
|
|
- logs:DescribeMetricFilters
|
|
Resource: "*"
|
|
|
|
# ── EventBridge / CloudWatch Events (scheduled Lambdas) ───────────
|
|
- PolicyName: eventbridge-management
|
|
PolicyDocument:
|
|
Version: "2012-10-17"
|
|
Statement:
|
|
- Sid: EventBridge
|
|
Effect: Allow
|
|
Action:
|
|
- events:DeleteRule
|
|
- events:DescribeRule
|
|
- events:EnableRule
|
|
- events:DisableRule
|
|
- events:ListRules
|
|
- events:ListTargetsByRule
|
|
- events:PutRule
|
|
- events:PutTargets
|
|
- events:RemoveTargets
|
|
- events:TagResource
|
|
- events:UntagResource
|
|
- events:ListTagsForResource
|
|
- events:PutPermission
|
|
- events:RemovePermission
|
|
Resource: "*"
|
|
|
|
# ── SES (afterhours weekly-post, meal-order email-report) ─────────
|
|
- PolicyName: ses-management
|
|
PolicyDocument:
|
|
Version: "2012-10-17"
|
|
Statement:
|
|
- Sid: SESRules
|
|
Effect: Allow
|
|
Action:
|
|
- ses:CreateReceiptRule
|
|
- ses:DeleteReceiptRule
|
|
- ses:DescribeReceiptRule
|
|
- ses:UpdateReceiptRule
|
|
- ses:CreateReceiptRuleSet
|
|
- ses:DescribeActiveReceiptRuleSet
|
|
- ses:DescribeReceiptRuleSet
|
|
- ses:SetActiveReceiptRuleSet
|
|
- ses:ReorderReceiptRuleSet
|
|
- ses:GetIdentityVerificationAttributes
|
|
- ses:ListIdentities
|
|
Resource: "*"
|
|
|
|
# ── SQS (payments-dashboard queues + DLQs) ────────────────────────
|
|
- PolicyName: sqs-management
|
|
PolicyDocument:
|
|
Version: "2012-10-17"
|
|
Statement:
|
|
- Sid: SQSQueues
|
|
Effect: Allow
|
|
Action:
|
|
- sqs:CreateQueue
|
|
- sqs:DeleteQueue
|
|
- sqs:GetQueueAttributes
|
|
- sqs:SetQueueAttributes
|
|
- sqs:GetQueueUrl
|
|
- sqs:ListQueues
|
|
- sqs:TagQueue
|
|
- sqs:UntagQueue
|
|
- sqs:ListQueueTags
|
|
- sqs:AddPermission
|
|
- sqs:RemovePermission
|
|
Resource:
|
|
- !Sub "arn:aws:sqs:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:*"
|
|
|
|
# ── SNS (validation / alarm notifications) ────────────────────────
|
|
- PolicyName: sns-management
|
|
PolicyDocument:
|
|
Version: "2012-10-17"
|
|
Statement:
|
|
- Sid: SNS
|
|
Effect: Allow
|
|
Action:
|
|
- sns:CreateTopic
|
|
- sns:DeleteTopic
|
|
- sns:GetTopicAttributes
|
|
- sns:SetTopicAttributes
|
|
- sns:Subscribe
|
|
- sns:Unsubscribe
|
|
- sns:ListSubscriptionsByTopic
|
|
- sns:ListTopics
|
|
- sns:TagResource
|
|
- sns:UntagResource
|
|
Resource:
|
|
- !Sub "arn:aws:sns:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:*"
|
|
|
|
# ── CloudWatch Alarms ─────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
- PolicyName: cloudwatch-alarms-management
|
|
PolicyDocument:
|
|
Version: "2012-10-17"
|
|
Statement:
|
|
- Sid: CWAlarms
|
|
Effect: Allow
|
|
Action:
|
|
- cloudwatch:PutMetricAlarm
|
|
- cloudwatch:DeleteAlarms
|
|
- cloudwatch:DescribeAlarms
|
|
- cloudwatch:EnableAlarmActions
|
|
- cloudwatch:DisableAlarmActions
|
|
- cloudwatch:ListTagsForResource
|
|
- cloudwatch:TagResource
|
|
- cloudwatch:UntagResource
|
|
Resource: "*"
|
|
|
|
# ── EC2 / VPC / NAT / EIP / Security Groups ───────────────────────
|
|
# payments-dashboard deploys a VPC, NAT gateway, EIP, route tables,
|
|
# subnets, security groups, and gateway VPC endpoints.
|
|
- PolicyName: ec2-vpc-management
|
|
PolicyDocument:
|
|
Version: "2012-10-17"
|
|
Statement:
|
|
- Sid: EC2VPC
|
|
Effect: Allow
|
|
Action:
|
|
- ec2:AllocateAddress
|
|
- ec2:AssociateRouteTable
|
|
- ec2:AttachInternetGateway
|
|
- ec2:AuthorizeSecurityGroupEgress
|
|
- ec2:AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress
|
|
- ec2:CreateInternetGateway
|
|
- ec2:CreateNatGateway
|
|
- ec2:CreateRoute
|
|
- ec2:CreateRouteTable
|
|
- ec2:CreateSecurityGroup
|
|
- ec2:CreateSubnet
|
|
- ec2:CreateVpc
|
|
- ec2:CreateVpcEndpoint
|
|
- ec2:CreateTags
|
|
- ec2:DeleteInternetGateway
|
|
- ec2:DeleteNatGateway
|
|
- ec2:DeleteRoute
|
|
- ec2:DeleteRouteTable
|
|
- ec2:DeleteSecurityGroup
|
|
- ec2:DeleteSubnet
|
|
- ec2:DeleteVpc
|
|
- ec2:DeleteVpcEndpoints
|
|
- ec2:DescribeAddresses
|
|
- ec2:DescribeAvailabilityZones
|
|
- ec2:DescribeInternetGateways
|
|
- ec2:DescribeNatGateways
|
|
- ec2:DescribeRouteTables
|
|
- ec2:DescribeSecurityGroups
|
|
- ec2:DescribeSubnets
|
|
- ec2:DescribeVpcEndpoints
|
|
- ec2:DescribeVpcs
|
|
- ec2:DescribePrefixLists
|
|
- ec2:DetachInternetGateway
|
|
- ec2:DisassociateAddress
|
|
- ec2:DisassociateRouteTable
|
|
- ec2:ModifySubnetAttribute
|
|
- ec2:ModifyVpcAttribute
|
|
- ec2:ModifyVpcEndpoint
|
|
- ec2:ReleaseAddress
|
|
- ec2:RevokeSecurityGroupEgress
|
|
- ec2:RevokeSecurityGroupIngress
|
|
- ec2:UpdateSecurityGroupRuleDescriptionsEgress
|
|
- ec2:UpdateSecurityGroupRuleDescriptionsIngress
|
|
Resource: "*"
|
|
|
|
# ── CloudFront + OAC (meal-order-manager form distribution) ───────
|
|
- PolicyName: cloudfront-management
|
|
PolicyDocument:
|
|
Version: "2012-10-17"
|
|
Statement:
|
|
- Sid: CloudFront
|
|
Effect: Allow
|
|
Action:
|
|
- cloudfront:CreateDistribution
|
|
- cloudfront:DeleteDistribution
|
|
- cloudfront:GetDistribution
|
|
- cloudfront:GetDistributionConfig
|
|
- cloudfront:UpdateDistribution
|
|
- cloudfront:TagResource
|
|
- cloudfront:UntagResource
|
|
- cloudfront:ListTagsForResource
|
|
- cloudfront:CreateOriginAccessControl
|
|
- cloudfront:DeleteOriginAccessControl
|
|
- cloudfront:GetOriginAccessControl
|
|
- cloudfront:GetOriginAccessControlConfig
|
|
- cloudfront:UpdateOriginAccessControl
|
|
- cloudfront:ListOriginAccessControls
|
|
- cloudfront:CreateInvalidation
|
|
- cloudfront:GetInvalidation
|
|
Resource: "*"
|
|
|
|
# ── SSM Parameter Store (meal-order-manager, afterhours) ──────────
|
|
# Write is needed because meal-order-manager creates
|
|
# /meal-order-manager/slack-channel-id via AWS::SSM::Parameter.
|
|
- PolicyName: ssm-management
|
|
PolicyDocument:
|
|
Version: "2012-10-17"
|
|
Statement:
|
|
- Sid: SSMParameters
|
|
Effect: Allow
|
|
Action:
|
|
- ssm:GetParameter
|
|
- ssm:GetParameters
|
|
- ssm:GetParametersByPath
|
|
- ssm:PutParameter
|
|
- ssm:DeleteParameter
|
|
- ssm:DeleteParameters
|
|
- ssm:DescribeParameters
|
|
- ssm:AddTagsToResource
|
|
- ssm:RemoveTagsFromResource
|
|
- ssm:ListTagsForResource
|
|
Resource:
|
|
- !Sub "arn:aws:ssm:us-east-1:${AWS::AccountId}:parameter/*"
|
|
# WAF association needs SSM parameter read at deploy time
|
|
# (/seahaven/waf/app-web-acl-arn value lookup)
|
|
- Sid: SSMParameterDescribe
|
|
Effect: Allow
|
|
Action:
|
|
- ssm:DescribeParameters
|
|
Resource: "*"
|
|
|
|
# ── WAF (meal-order-manager CloudFront WebACL association) ────────
|
|
- PolicyName: waf-management
|
|
PolicyDocument:
|
|
Version: "2012-10-17"
|
|
Statement:
|
|
- Sid: WAF
|
|
Effect: Allow
|
|
Action:
|
|
- wafv2:GetWebACL
|
|
- wafv2:GetWebACLForResource
|
|
- wafv2:ListWebACLs
|
|
- wafv2:AssociateWebACL
|
|
- wafv2:DisassociateWebACL
|
|
- wafv2:ListResourcesForWebACL
|
|
Resource: "*"
|
|
|
|
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
# IAM role lifecycle - BOUNDARY-GATED (attached managed policy)
|
|
#
|
|
# Lives in a MANAGED policy, not inline on the role, because the role's
|
|
# inline policies total ~10.1 KB against IAM's hard 10,240-byte per-role
|
|
# inline limit - adding the Deny statements below inline exceeds it and
|
|
# fails the deploy (ServiceLimitExceeded, hit live 2026-07-27). Attached
|
|
# managed policies have their own separate 6,144-byte budget, so moving this
|
|
# block out both fits the Denies and leaves ~1.9 KB of inline headroom for
|
|
# future statements. Identity policies are unioned and an explicit Deny still
|
|
# wins, so effective permissions are unchanged by the relocation.
|
|
#
|
|
# This is the PRIMARY escalation control for INFRA-97.
|
|
#
|
|
# iam:CreateRole / iam:AttachRolePolicy / iam:PutRolePolicy are
|
|
# conditioned on iam:PermissionsBoundary StringEquals the
|
|
# seahaven-lambda-execution-boundary ARN. That condition means
|
|
# any role this execution role creates must have the boundary
|
|
# applied, so it can never exceed what the boundary allows
|
|
# (which is scoped to the services the five stacks actually use).
|
|
#
|
|
# iam:PassRole is also included here so CloudFormation can pass
|
|
# the auto-generated Lambda execution role to the Lambda service.
|
|
#
|
|
# Why not path-scoped (e.g. iam:ResourceTag / path /cfn-managed/)?
|
|
# SAM's AWS::Serverless::Function auto-generates execution roles at
|
|
# path / — there is no supported way to set a custom RolePath on
|
|
# SAM auto-roles. A path condition would therefore exclude the
|
|
# SAM auto-roles and break every deploy. The PermissionsBoundary
|
|
# condition achieves the same security goal without a path requirement.
|
|
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
SamCfnIamManagementPolicy:
|
|
Type: AWS::IAM::ManagedPolicy
|
|
Properties:
|
|
# Fixed name: changing it makes CloudFormation create a replacement policy
|
|
# and detach this one, which briefly drops the role's IAM permissions
|
|
# mid-update. Treat a rename as a coordinated migration, not an edit. This
|
|
# is the role's FIRST attached managed policy (per-role quota is 10).
|
|
ManagedPolicyName: seahaven-cfn-exec-iam-management
|
|
Description: >-
|
|
Boundary-gated IAM role lifecycle for github-cfn-execution-role, plus the
|
|
explicit Deny backstops that keep the permissions boundary from being
|
|
detached or rewritten. Separated from the role's inline policies to stay
|
|
under IAM's 10,240-byte inline limit.
|
|
PolicyDocument:
|
|
Version: "2012-10-17"
|
|
Statement:
|
|
# Create role — MUST attach boundary
|
|
- Sid: IAMCreateRoleWithBoundary
|
|
Effect: Allow
|
|
Action:
|
|
- iam:CreateRole
|
|
Resource:
|
|
- !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/*"
|
|
Condition:
|
|
StringEquals:
|
|
"iam:PermissionsBoundary": !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:policy/seahaven-lambda-execution-boundary"
|
|
|
|
# Attach managed policies — MUST have boundary already on role
|
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- Sid: IAMAttachPolicyWithBoundary
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Effect: Allow
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Action:
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- iam:AttachRolePolicy
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Resource:
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- !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/*"
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Condition:
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StringEquals:
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"iam:PermissionsBoundary": !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:policy/seahaven-lambda-execution-boundary"
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# Put inline policy — MUST have boundary already on role
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- Sid: IAMPutRolePolicyWithBoundary
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Effect: Allow
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Action:
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- iam:PutRolePolicy
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Resource:
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- !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/*"
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Condition:
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StringEquals:
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"iam:PermissionsBoundary": !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:policy/seahaven-lambda-execution-boundary"
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# Boundary management — SET the boundary only. DELETE is NOT
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# granted: for a delete, the iam:PermissionsBoundary condition key
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# reflects the boundary CURRENTLY attached to the target role, so
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# a StringEquals condition on the boundary ARN MATCHES exactly the
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# roles the gate protects. Granting delete under that condition
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# lets this role create a boundary-gated role with an inline *:*
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# policy, strip the boundary, and pass the now-unbounded role to
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# Lambda — defeating the primary escalation control. Verified live
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# against the mgmt copy 2026-07-27 (simulate-principal-policy:
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# iam:DeleteRolePermissionsBoundary = allowed). SAM never needs
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# the delete: it only SETS the boundary on roles it creates, and
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# stack teardown calls DeleteRole, not DeleteRolePermissionsBoundary.
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- Sid: IAMPutPermissionsBoundary
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Effect: Allow
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Action:
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- iam:PutRolePermissionsBoundary
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Resource:
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- !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/*"
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Condition:
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StringEquals:
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"iam:PermissionsBoundary": !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:policy/seahaven-lambda-execution-boundary"
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# Explicit Deny backstop (AWS's documented NoBoundaryPolicyEdit /
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# NoBoundaryDelete delegation pattern). A Deny is required, not
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# merely omitting the Allow: without it, any future Allow added to
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# this role — or a broader managed policy attached to it — silently
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# reopens the escalation. Covers both removing a boundary from a
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# role and rewriting the boundary POLICY DOCUMENT itself (the
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# latter is only implicitly denied today).
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- Sid: DenyBoundaryTampering
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Effect: Deny
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Action:
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- iam:DeleteRolePermissionsBoundary
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- iam:DeleteUserPermissionsBoundary
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Resource:
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- !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/*"
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- !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:user/*"
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# Scoped to the whole seahaven-* policy family, not just the boundary:
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# this policy carries the Deny statements, so it is now a
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# higher-value target than the boundary it protects. Safe to scope
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# broadly — the role holds no iam:CreatePolicy anywhere and no SAM
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# stack manages a managed policy through it (both verified
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# 2026-07-27), so nothing legitimate writes policy versions here.
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- Sid: DenyBoundaryPolicyEdit
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Effect: Deny
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Action:
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- iam:CreatePolicyVersion
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- iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion
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- iam:DeletePolicyVersion
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- iam:DeletePolicy
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Resource:
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- !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:policy/seahaven-*"
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# Self-protection. Without this the whole control is one API call
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# from being undone: IAMRoleReadAndDelete below grants
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# iam:DetachRolePolicy on Resource "*" with no condition, so this
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# role could detach the very policy carrying these Denies from
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# itself and reinstate the escalation. Verified live 2026-07-27:
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# simulate-principal-policy returned "allowed" for DetachRolePolicy,
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# DeleteRolePolicy and DeleteRole against this role's own ARN and
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# against githubdeploy-* roles.
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#
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# Also closes a denial-of-service and a self-elevation precondition:
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# iam:PutRolePermissionsBoundary is condition-pinned to the Lambda
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# boundary ARN but NOT scoped by target, so this role could apply
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# that runtime boundary to itself or to a githubdeploy-* role —
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# bricking the pipelines, unrecoverable without an admin because
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# removing a boundary is denied above, and making the otherwise-inert
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# AttachRolePolicy/PutRolePolicy self-elevation conditions start
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# matching.
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#
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# Costs nothing operationally: this role is only ever passed to
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# CloudFormation for SAM application stacks. The substrate's own
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|
# roles are managed by THIS stack (deployed through the CDK
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|
# bootstrap execution role), and per-repo githubdeploy-* roles are
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# provisioned at onboarding time outside any stack this role
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|
# executes — so CloudFormation never exercises these actions
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# against them as this role. SAM-generated roles are named
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|
# <stack>-<Function>Role-<hash> and are unaffected.
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- Sid: DenySelfMutation
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Effect: Deny
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Action:
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- iam:AttachRolePolicy
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- iam:DeleteRole
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- iam:DeleteRolePolicy
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- iam:DeleteRolePermissionsBoundary
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- iam:DetachRolePolicy
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- iam:PutRolePolicy
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- iam:PutRolePermissionsBoundary
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- iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy
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- iam:UpdateRole
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- iam:UpdateRoleDescription
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|
Resource:
|
|
- !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/github-cfn-execution-role"
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|
- !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/githubdeploy-*"
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|
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# Read / tag / delete role and policy — no boundary condition needed
|
|
- Sid: IAMRoleReadAndDelete
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Effect: Allow
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|
Action:
|
|
- iam:DeleteRole
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- iam:DeleteRolePolicy
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|
- iam:DetachRolePolicy
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- iam:GetRole
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- iam:GetRolePolicy
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- iam:ListAttachedRolePolicies
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- iam:ListRolePolicies
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|
- iam:ListRoles
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|
- iam:TagRole
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|
- iam:UntagRole
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|
- iam:UpdateRole
|
|
- iam:UpdateRoleDescription
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|
- iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy
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|
- iam:GetPolicy
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|
- iam:GetPolicyVersion
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|
- iam:ListPolicies
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|
- iam:ListPolicyVersions
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|
Resource: "*"
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|
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|
# PassRole — CloudFormation passes the Lambda execution role
|
|
# to the Lambda service. Scoped to SAM-generated role pattern.
|
|
- Sid: IAMPassRole
|
|
Effect: Allow
|
|
Action:
|
|
- iam:PassRole
|
|
Resource:
|
|
- !Sub "arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/*"
|
|
Condition:
|
|
StringEquals:
|
|
"iam:PassedToService": "lambda.amazonaws.com"
|
|
|