seahaven-org-baseline/bin/app.ts

#!/usr/bin/env node
import "source-map-support/register";
import * as cdk from "aws-cdk-lib";
import { AccountBaselineStack } from "../lib/account-baseline-stack";
import { AlarmTopicStack } from "../lib/alarm-topic-stack";
import { BackupOffsiteStack } from "../lib/backup-offsite-stack";
import { BackupStack } from "../lib/backup-stack";
import { RegionalBaselineStack } from "../lib/regional-baseline-stack";
import { DeploySubstrateStack } from "../lib/deploy-substrate-stack";
import { TerraformSubstrateStack } from "../lib/terraform-substrate-stack";
import { DynamoDbCmkStack } from "../lib/dynamodb-cmk-stack";
import { AppWebAclStack } from "../lib/app-web-acl-stack";
import { SeahavenSiteHcptfStack } from "../lib/seahaven-site-hcptf-stack";
import { MemberBaselineStack } from "../lib/member-baseline-stack";
import { OrgGovernanceStack } from "../lib/org-governance-stack";
import { PlatformAccessStack } from "../lib/platform-access-stack";

const ACCOUNT = "328440206208";
const EXTERNAL_DEV_ACCOUNT = "396287094661";
const SECURITY_ACCOUNT = "001520130573";
const DEV_ACCOUNT = "710827005802";
const PROD_ACCOUNT = "011934824531";

// All 5 VPCs in 328440206208 / us-east-1 (4 custom + default), audit Agent 7.
// Index-derived logical IDs — append only, never reorder.
const PROD_VPC_IDS = [
  "vpc-061d66990b6a4d1fb",
  "vpc-0542a9e934b417d23",
  "vpc-062d200c68bd4ca0e",
  "vpc-0d3d4b67bd0cf8a68",
  "vpc-02c10a89d66f6f9b8",
];

const app = new cdk.App();

const contextBoolean = (key: string): boolean => {
  const value = app.node.tryGetContext(key);
  if (value === true || value === "true") return true;
  if (value === false || value === "false" || value === undefined) return false;
  throw new Error(`${key} must be true or false`);
};

const contextString = (key: string): string => {
  const value = app.node.tryGetContext(key);
  if (value === undefined) return "";
  if (typeof value === "string") return value;
  throw new Error(`${key} must be a string`);
};

new AccountBaselineStack(app, "account-baseline", {
  stackName: "seahaven-account-baseline",
  env: { account: ACCOUNT, region: "us-east-1" },
  monthlyBudgetUsd: 1200,
  // Dedicated AWS-notifications mailbox (Adam, 2026-07-14). Also feeds the CIS
  // alarm SNS subscription — a changed endpoint must CONFIRM via the email
  // link before alarm notifications flow again.
  budgetAlertEmail: "aws@seahaven.com",
  flowLogVpcIds: PROD_VPC_IDS,
});

// ── Member-account baseline: seahaven-external-dev ───────────────────────────
// Absorbed from the retired seahaven-external-dev-baseline repo. Stack name and
// every construct id preserved byte-identically (logical IDs are path-derived —
// renaming anything here replaces live resources). Deploys to the isolated
// external-dev member account via its own OIDC deploy role, NOT the mgmt role.
//
// Flow-log VPC ids are COMMITTED here, not passed via -c context. The old
// repo's `-c flowLogVpcIds=...` pattern was a confirmed security-review trap
// (SH-ORG-004): once flow logs were attached via context, any context-less
// deploy (including CI) would silently REMOVE them all. Append ids via PR;
// never reorder (index-derived logical IDs). Empty = hardened bucket only,
// matching the currently deployed stack.
const EXTDEV_FLOW_LOG_VPC_IDS: string[] = [];

// ── Org structure: OUs + generalized SCPs (management account only) ─────────
// Existing external-dev OU + its 3 imported SCPs are adopted into this stack via
// `cdk import` post-deploy — see lib/org-governance-stack.ts header + README.
new OrgGovernanceStack(app, "org-governance", {
  stackName: "seahaven-org-governance",
  env: { account: ACCOUNT, region: "us-east-1" },
});

new PlatformAccessStack(app, "platform-access", {
  stackName: "seahaven-platform-access",
  // Same management-account region as org-governance above.
  env: { account: ACCOUNT, region: "us-east-1" }, // pragma: allowlist secret
});

new MemberBaselineStack(app, "external-dev-baseline", {
  stackName: "seahaven-external-dev-baseline",
  env: { account: EXTERNAL_DEV_ACCOUNT, region: "us-east-1" },
  namePrefix: "seahaven-extdev",
  monthlyBudgetUsd: 200,
  // Account-dedicated AWS-notifications mailbox (Adam, 2026-07-14 — resolves
  // security-review flag SH-ORG-007).
  budgetAlertEmail: "aws-external-dev@seahaven.com",
  ownerEmail: "adam@seahaven.com",
  flowLogVpcIds: EXTDEV_FLOW_LOG_VPC_IDS,
  // Keeps the tag value the stack was deployed with (zero-diff merge). Update
  // to the current repo name in a deliberate follow-up change if desired.
  managedByTag: "seahaven-external-dev-baseline",
});

// ── Member-account baseline: seahaven-security (Phase 3) ────────────────────
// The org's delegated security administrator-to-be (GuardDuty / Security Hub /
// IAM Access Analyzer / Config aggregator / Inspector2 — delegation is CLI +
// README runbook with HARD preconditions, no CFN types). Created 2026-07-14 at
// org ROOT; moves into the security OU only after manual root hardening
// (deny-root-user invariant, see lib/org-governance-stack.ts). Delegation runs
// ONLY after the OU move (SEC-BASE-B).
// LIFECYCLE (SEC-BASE-E): once delegation is live, this stack's GuardDuty
// detector + Security Hub hub are co-managed by the org admin config — never
// rename/remove those constructs via CFN while the account is delegated admin.
new MemberBaselineStack(app, "security-baseline", {
  stackName: "seahaven-security-baseline",
  env: { account: SECURITY_ACCOUNT, region: "us-east-1" },
  namePrefix: "seahaven-security",
  monthlyBudgetUsd: 50,
  // aws@ (not a per-account mailbox) is deliberate: Adam's 2026-07-14
  // direction routes all AWS notifications to aws@seahaven.com; extdev's
  // dedicated mailbox predates that direction.
  budgetAlertEmail: "aws@seahaven.com",
  ownerEmail: "adam@seahaven.com",
  // Empty is deliberate: the account's default VPC is DELETED (a delegated
  // security-admin account runs no workloads — SEC-BASE-F; also clears the
  // default-VPC CIS/FSBP controls). Any future VPC id gets appended via PR.
  flowLogVpcIds: [],
  managedByTag: "seahaven-org-baseline",
});

// ── Member-account baseline: seahaven-dev (Phase 4) ─────────────────────────
// Internal dev/staging workloads (NOT the external-dev engagement account).
// Created 2026-07-14 AFTER org delegation went live: GuardDuty detector +
// Security Hub hub are org-managed — enrolled via delegated-admin
// create-members and verified Enabled (the AUTOMATIC sweep was later proven
// on seahaven-prod, ~2min; still verify enrollment before any org-managed
// stack's first deploy). Standards and
// the account analyzer stay CFN-owned (SH-DEV-001/SH-DEVBASE-002). Same
// lifecycle rule as the other new accounts: root-harden at org ROOT, then
// move-account into the nonprod OU (ou-nbuj-zpt5ka98) — NO WORKLOADS until
// the account is inside the OU (SH-DEV-002: until then no region lock, no
// baseline-tamper SCP, usable root).
new MemberBaselineStack(app, "dev-baseline", {
  stackName: "seahaven-dev-baseline",
  env: { account: DEV_ACCOUNT, region: "us-east-1" },
  namePrefix: "seahaven-dev",
  monthlyBudgetUsd: 150,
  budgetAlertEmail: "aws@seahaven.com",
  ownerEmail: "adam@seahaven.com",
  // Default VPC kept (dev runs real workloads); flow-logged from this stack's
  // first deploy. Index-derived logical IDs — append only, never reorder
  // (replacing the default VPC later = append the new id, keep this entry
  // until its flow log is deliberately retired).
  flowLogVpcIds: ["vpc-08f07dc5edeea621f"],
  managedByTag: "seahaven-org-baseline",
  orgManagedDetection: true,
});

// ── Member-account baseline: seahaven-prod (Phase 5) ────────────────────────
// Target for ALL new production stacks (mgmt 328440206208 is frozen for new
// workloads). First tenant: proposal-system redeploy. Detection is org-managed
// (AUTO-enrolled by the sweep in 124s — first proven exercise, 2026-07-14 —
// and verified Enabled before this stack's first deploy); standards + account
// analyzer are CFN-owned per the Phase-4 review. Default VPC DELETED (prod
// workloads use purpose-built VPCs). Same lifecycle rule: root-harden at org
// ROOT, then move-account into the prod OU (ou-nbuj-5lc2wp6h) — NO WORKLOADS
// until the account is inside the OU. Budget starts at $100 and is resized as
// tenants land; AWS Backup vaults are added with the first stateful tenant
// (cross-account restore test = definition of done for that change).
new MemberBaselineStack(app, "prod-baseline", {
  stackName: "seahaven-prod-baseline",
  env: { account: PROD_ACCOUNT, region: "us-east-1" },
  namePrefix: "seahaven-prod",
  monthlyBudgetUsd: 100,
  budgetAlertEmail: "aws@seahaven.com",
  ownerEmail: "adam@seahaven.com",
  // Append-only, never reorder (index-derived logical IDs). Empty: no VPCs
  // exist yet; append ids via PR as purpose-built VPCs land.
  flowLogVpcIds: [],
  managedByTag: "seahaven-org-baseline",
  orgManagedDetection: true,
});

// ── Per-account GitHub Actions deploy substrate ──────────────────────────────
// The shared account-level deploy plumbing for SAM pipelines: permissions
// boundary + github-cfn-execution-role (+ optional OIDC provider). mgmt's
// copy lives in Sea-Haven-Industries/.github/oidc-deploy-roles.yaml and stays
// there until its stacks finish migrating out; these stacks are what let SAM
// repos (payments-dashboard, front-integrations, sh-openswe-traces, ...)
// target prod/dev at all. Per-repo githubdeploy-* roles are provisioned at
// each repo's migration time, never here. createOidcProvider stays false for
// both accounts (provider verified present in each, 2026-07-27); a FUTURE
// member account without one sets it true on its own instance. First-create
// precondition verified 2026-07-27: github-cfn-execution-role and the
// seahaven-lambda-execution-boundary policy both returned NoSuchEntity in
// 011934824531 AND 710827005802, so the named creates cannot collide with
// out-of-band copies.
new DeploySubstrateStack(app, "deploy-substrate-prod", {
  stackName: "seahaven-deploy-substrate",
  env: { account: PROD_ACCOUNT, region: "us-east-1" },
  createOidcProvider: false,
});

new DeploySubstrateStack(app, "deploy-substrate-dev", {
  stackName: "seahaven-deploy-substrate",
  env: { account: DEV_ACCOUNT, region: "us-east-1" },
  createOidcProvider: false,
});

// Prod/dev seahaven-terraform-substrate is out of this app and out of CD
// (PLAT-147). The live stacks stay until scripts/delete-terraform-substrate-prod-dev.sh.
// Do not add them back. Do not add a CDK stack for hcptf-bootstrap (CLI-owned,
// PLAT-145). External-dev stays: SHOC IAM is not moving (PLAT-148).
// deploy-substrate stays for remaining SAM (PLAT-150).

// Shared CloudFront WAF for seahaven-prod (PLAT-92). Same AppWebAcl construct
// as mgmt account-baseline; thin stack so prod does not inherit the full
// mgmt baseline. Publishes /seahaven/waf/app-web-acl-arn for in-account
// CloudFront associations (same-account only).
new AppWebAclStack(app, "app-web-acl-prod", {
  stackName: "seahaven-app-web-acl",
  env: { account: PROD_ACCOUNT, region: "us-east-1" },
});

// seahaven-site exec roles (PLAT-225). Not part of terraform-substrate.
// Imported. On the prod deploy job. A create fails because the roles already exist.
new SeahavenSiteHcptfStack(app, "seahaven-site-hcptf", {
  stackName: "seahaven-site-hcptf",
  env: { account: PROD_ACCOUNT, region: "us-east-1" },
});

// External-dev already has app.terraform.io federation. Both role gates start
// false in cdk.json: POC is enabled by a normal update; dev/staging only by
// CloudFormation import after Terraform relinquishes those four live roles.
const terraformSubstrateExternalDev = new TerraformSubstrateStack(
  app,
  "terraform-substrate-external-dev",
  {
    stackName: "seahaven-terraform-substrate",
    env: { account: EXTERNAL_DEV_ACCOUNT, region: "us-east-1" },
    createOidcProvider: false,
    enableShocBackendPocRoles: contextBoolean("enableShocBackendPocRoles"),
    enableShocBackendLiveRoles: contextBoolean("enableShocBackendLiveRoles"),
    enableShocFrontendPocRoles: contextBoolean("enableShocFrontendPocRoles"),
    enableShocFrontendLiveRoles: contextBoolean("enableShocFrontendLiveRoles"),
    shocFrontendPocDistributionId: contextString(
      "shocFrontendPocDistributionId",
    ),
    shocFrontendPocOriginAccessControlId: contextString(
      "shocFrontendPocOriginAccessControlId",
    ),
    shocFrontendPocFunctionName: contextString(
      "shocFrontendPocFunctionName",
    ),
    shocFrontendPocHostedZoneId: contextString(
      "shocFrontendPocHostedZoneId",
    ),
    shocFrontendPocCertificateArn: contextString(
      "shocFrontendPocCertificateArn",
    ),
  },
);

// ── Shared DynamoDB CMK (INFRA-95 / M-3) ─────────────────────────────────────
// Dedicated, standalone stack so the customer-managed key for sensitive
// finance/PII DynamoDB tables is an independent shared dependency for the owning
// app repos (payments-dashboard, procurement-ingest, exec-aide). Its ARN is
// published to SSM (/seahaven/dynamodb/cmk-arn) for those stacks to consume.
new DynamoDbCmkStack(app, "dynamodb-cmk", {
  stackName: "seahaven-dynamodb-cmk",
  env: { account: ACCOUNT, region: "us-east-1" },
});

// ── seahaven-prod copies for the procurement-ingest migration ────────────────
// procurement-ingest is moving from mgmt to seahaven-prod; its stacks resolve
// the DynamoDB CMK via SSM /seahaven/dynamodb/cmk-arn and import the SNS topic
// `site-alerts` by constructed in-account ARN, so both must exist in prod
// BEFORE that app's first prod deploy. Same stack names as mgmt (unique
// per-account); distinct CDK ids.
// No cross-account key-policy statement: the only cross-account reader of the
// CMK-encrypted purchase-orders table (seahaven-slack-bot) was decommissioned
// 2026-07-23, and its successor sh-mcp is undeployed and uses same-account
// DynamoDB access. When/if a cross-account consumer materializes, add a
// correctly-scoped grant then (target its real roles + account).
//
// Recovery note (failed FIRST create): the key is RETAIN, its alias/SSM param
// are not — a CREATE_FAILED rollback orphans an unaliased rotation-enabled
// key. Before re-running the deploy, list unaliased CMKs in prod and schedule
// deletion of the orphan.
new DynamoDbCmkStack(app, "dynamodb-cmk-prod", {
  stackName: "seahaven-dynamodb-cmk",
  env: { account: PROD_ACCOUNT, region: "us-east-1" },
});

new AlarmTopicStack(app, "alarm-topic-prod", {
  stackName: "seahaven-alarm-topic",
  env: { account: PROD_ACCOUNT, region: "us-east-1" },
});

// ── Secondary-region baselines (INFRA-16, INFRA-91) ──────────────────────────
// The us-east-1 baseline above is region-pinned by design. These stacks extend
// a minimal detective/logging footprint into the secondary regions, codifying
// state applied out-of-band this week so it lives in IaC.

// us-west-2: Bedrock invocation logging only (INFRA-91). Shares the region with
// the offsite backup vault but is an independent concern (separate stack).
new RegionalBaselineStack(app, "regional-baseline-us-west-2", {
  stackName: "seahaven-regional-baseline-us-west-2",
  env: { account: ACCOUNT, region: "us-west-2" },
  bedrockLogging: true,
});

// us-east-2: Bedrock invocation logging (INFRA-91) + the still-missing AWS
// Config recorder and Security Hub (INFRA-16). GuardDuty + flow logs already
// live here (adopted as a follow-up, see lib/regional-baseline-stack.ts).
new RegionalBaselineStack(app, "regional-baseline-us-east-2", {
  stackName: "seahaven-regional-baseline-us-east-2",
  env: { account: ACCOUNT, region: "us-east-2" },
  bedrockLogging: true,
  configRecorder: true,
  securityHub: true,
});

// AWS Backup (audit C-7). Offsite vault (us-west-2) must exist before the
// primary plan that copies to it, hence the explicit dependency.
const backupOffsite = new BackupOffsiteStack(app, "backup-offsite", {
  stackName: "seahaven-backup-offsite",
  env: { account: "328440206208", region: "us-west-2" },
});

const backupPrimary = new BackupStack(app, "backup", {
  stackName: "seahaven-backup",
  env: { account: "328440206208", region: "us-east-1" },
});

backupPrimary.addStackDependency(backupOffsite);