mirror of
https://github.com/Sea-Haven-Industries/seahaven-org-baseline.git
synced 2026-09-30 10:23:16 +00:00
New stack seahaven-terraform-substrate (instances terraform-substrate-prod + terraform-substrate-dev): app.terraform.io OIDC provider and the shared boundary-gated guardrail policy seahaven-hcptf-iam-management that per-workspace Terraform apply roles attach at migration time. No roles are pre-provisioned (accumulator pattern, parallel to githubdeploy-*). Guardrail statements mirror seahaven-cfn-exec-iam-management byte-identically except DenySelfMutation, whose scope extends to hcptf-* alongside the GitHub-substrate principals. Explicit stack dependency on the same-account deploy-substrate stack (boundary ARN appears only in Condition strings, so CFN infers no edge).
292 lines
15 KiB
JavaScript
292 lines
15 KiB
JavaScript
#!/usr/bin/env node
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import "source-map-support/register";
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import * as cdk from "aws-cdk-lib";
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import { AccountBaselineStack } from "../lib/account-baseline-stack";
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import { AlarmTopicStack } from "../lib/alarm-topic-stack";
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import { BackupOffsiteStack } from "../lib/backup-offsite-stack";
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import { BackupStack } from "../lib/backup-stack";
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import { RegionalBaselineStack } from "../lib/regional-baseline-stack";
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import { DeploySubstrateStack } from "../lib/deploy-substrate-stack";
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import { TerraformSubstrateStack } from "../lib/terraform-substrate-stack";
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import { DynamoDbCmkStack } from "../lib/dynamodb-cmk-stack";
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import { MemberBaselineStack } from "../lib/member-baseline-stack";
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import { OrgGovernanceStack } from "../lib/org-governance-stack";
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const ACCOUNT = "328440206208";
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const EXTERNAL_DEV_ACCOUNT = "396287094661";
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const SECURITY_ACCOUNT = "001520130573";
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const DEV_ACCOUNT = "710827005802";
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const PROD_ACCOUNT = "011934824531";
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// All 5 VPCs in 328440206208 / us-east-1 (4 custom + default), audit Agent 7.
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// Index-derived logical IDs — append only, never reorder.
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const PROD_VPC_IDS = [
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"vpc-061d66990b6a4d1fb",
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"vpc-0542a9e934b417d23",
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"vpc-062d200c68bd4ca0e",
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"vpc-0d3d4b67bd0cf8a68",
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"vpc-02c10a89d66f6f9b8",
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];
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const app = new cdk.App();
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new AccountBaselineStack(app, "account-baseline", {
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stackName: "seahaven-account-baseline",
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env: { account: ACCOUNT, region: "us-east-1" },
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monthlyBudgetUsd: 1200,
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// Dedicated AWS-notifications mailbox (Adam, 2026-07-14). Also feeds the CIS
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// alarm SNS subscription — a changed endpoint must CONFIRM via the email
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// link before alarm notifications flow again.
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budgetAlertEmail: "aws@seahaven.com",
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flowLogVpcIds: PROD_VPC_IDS,
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});
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// ── Member-account baseline: seahaven-external-dev ───────────────────────────
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// Absorbed from the retired seahaven-external-dev-baseline repo. Stack name and
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// every construct id preserved byte-identically (logical IDs are path-derived —
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// renaming anything here replaces live resources). Deploys to the isolated
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// external-dev member account via its own OIDC deploy role, NOT the mgmt role.
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//
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// Flow-log VPC ids are COMMITTED here, not passed via -c context. The old
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// repo's `-c flowLogVpcIds=...` pattern was a confirmed security-review trap
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// (SH-ORG-004): once flow logs were attached via context, any context-less
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// deploy (including CI) would silently REMOVE them all. Append ids via PR;
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// never reorder (index-derived logical IDs). Empty = hardened bucket only,
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// matching the currently deployed stack.
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const EXTDEV_FLOW_LOG_VPC_IDS: string[] = [];
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// ── Org structure: OUs + generalized SCPs (management account only) ─────────
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// Existing external-dev OU + its 3 SCPs are adopted into this stack via
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// `cdk import` post-deploy — see lib/org-governance-stack.ts header + README.
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new OrgGovernanceStack(app, "org-governance", {
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stackName: "seahaven-org-governance",
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env: { account: ACCOUNT, region: "us-east-1" },
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});
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new MemberBaselineStack(app, "external-dev-baseline", {
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stackName: "seahaven-external-dev-baseline",
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env: { account: EXTERNAL_DEV_ACCOUNT, region: "us-east-1" },
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namePrefix: "seahaven-extdev",
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monthlyBudgetUsd: 200,
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// Account-dedicated AWS-notifications mailbox (Adam, 2026-07-14 — resolves
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// security-review flag SH-ORG-007).
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budgetAlertEmail: "aws-external-dev@seahaven.com",
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ownerEmail: "adam@seahaven.com",
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flowLogVpcIds: EXTDEV_FLOW_LOG_VPC_IDS,
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// Keeps the tag value the stack was deployed with (zero-diff merge). Update
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// to the current repo name in a deliberate follow-up change if desired.
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managedByTag: "seahaven-external-dev-baseline",
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});
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// ── Member-account baseline: seahaven-security (Phase 3) ────────────────────
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// The org's delegated security administrator-to-be (GuardDuty / Security Hub /
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// IAM Access Analyzer / Config aggregator / Inspector2 — delegation is CLI +
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// README runbook with HARD preconditions, no CFN types). Created 2026-07-14 at
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// org ROOT; moves into the security OU only after manual root hardening
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// (deny-root-user invariant, see lib/org-governance-stack.ts). Delegation runs
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// ONLY after the OU move (SEC-BASE-B).
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// LIFECYCLE (SEC-BASE-E): once delegation is live, this stack's GuardDuty
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// detector + Security Hub hub are co-managed by the org admin config — never
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// rename/remove those constructs via CFN while the account is delegated admin.
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new MemberBaselineStack(app, "security-baseline", {
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stackName: "seahaven-security-baseline",
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env: { account: SECURITY_ACCOUNT, region: "us-east-1" },
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namePrefix: "seahaven-security",
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monthlyBudgetUsd: 50,
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// aws@ (not a per-account mailbox) is deliberate: Adam's 2026-07-14
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// direction routes all AWS notifications to aws@seahaven.com; extdev's
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// dedicated mailbox predates that direction.
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budgetAlertEmail: "aws@seahaven.com",
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ownerEmail: "adam@seahaven.com",
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// Empty is deliberate: the account's default VPC is DELETED (a delegated
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// security-admin account runs no workloads — SEC-BASE-F; also clears the
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// default-VPC CIS/FSBP controls). Any future VPC id gets appended via PR.
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flowLogVpcIds: [],
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managedByTag: "seahaven-org-baseline",
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});
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// ── Member-account baseline: seahaven-dev (Phase 4) ─────────────────────────
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// Internal dev/staging workloads (NOT the external-dev engagement account).
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// Created 2026-07-14 AFTER org delegation went live: GuardDuty detector +
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// Security Hub hub are org-managed — enrolled via delegated-admin
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// create-members and verified Enabled (the AUTOMATIC sweep was later proven
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// on seahaven-prod, ~2min; still verify enrollment before any org-managed
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// stack's first deploy). Standards and
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// the account analyzer stay CFN-owned (SH-DEV-001/SH-DEVBASE-002). Same
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// lifecycle rule as the other new accounts: root-harden at org ROOT, then
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// move-account into the nonprod OU (ou-nbuj-zpt5ka98) — NO WORKLOADS until
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// the account is inside the OU (SH-DEV-002: until then no region lock, no
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// baseline-tamper SCP, usable root).
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new MemberBaselineStack(app, "dev-baseline", {
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stackName: "seahaven-dev-baseline",
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env: { account: DEV_ACCOUNT, region: "us-east-1" },
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namePrefix: "seahaven-dev",
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monthlyBudgetUsd: 150,
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budgetAlertEmail: "aws@seahaven.com",
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ownerEmail: "adam@seahaven.com",
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// Default VPC kept (dev runs real workloads); flow-logged from this stack's
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// first deploy. Index-derived logical IDs — append only, never reorder
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// (replacing the default VPC later = append the new id, keep this entry
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// until its flow log is deliberately retired).
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flowLogVpcIds: ["vpc-08f07dc5edeea621f"],
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managedByTag: "seahaven-org-baseline",
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orgManagedDetection: true,
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});
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// ── Member-account baseline: seahaven-prod (Phase 5) ────────────────────────
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// Target for ALL new production stacks (mgmt 328440206208 is frozen for new
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// workloads). First tenant: proposal-system redeploy. Detection is org-managed
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// (AUTO-enrolled by the sweep in 124s — first proven exercise, 2026-07-14 —
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// and verified Enabled before this stack's first deploy); standards + account
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// analyzer are CFN-owned per the Phase-4 review. Default VPC DELETED (prod
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// workloads use purpose-built VPCs). Same lifecycle rule: root-harden at org
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// ROOT, then move-account into the prod OU (ou-nbuj-5lc2wp6h) — NO WORKLOADS
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// until the account is inside the OU. Budget starts at $100 and is resized as
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// tenants land; AWS Backup vaults are added with the first stateful tenant
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// (cross-account restore test = definition of done for that change).
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new MemberBaselineStack(app, "prod-baseline", {
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stackName: "seahaven-prod-baseline",
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env: { account: PROD_ACCOUNT, region: "us-east-1" },
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namePrefix: "seahaven-prod",
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monthlyBudgetUsd: 100,
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budgetAlertEmail: "aws@seahaven.com",
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ownerEmail: "adam@seahaven.com",
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// Append-only, never reorder (index-derived logical IDs). Empty: no VPCs
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// exist yet; append ids via PR as purpose-built VPCs land.
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flowLogVpcIds: [],
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managedByTag: "seahaven-org-baseline",
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orgManagedDetection: true,
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});
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// ── Per-account GitHub Actions deploy substrate ──────────────────────────────
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// The shared account-level deploy plumbing for SAM pipelines: permissions
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// boundary + github-cfn-execution-role (+ optional OIDC provider). mgmt's
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// copy lives in Sea-Haven-Industries/.github/oidc-deploy-roles.yaml and stays
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// there until its stacks finish migrating out; these stacks are what let SAM
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// repos (payments-dashboard, front-integrations, sh-openswe-traces, ...)
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// target prod/dev at all. Per-repo githubdeploy-* roles are provisioned at
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// each repo's migration time, never here. createOidcProvider stays false for
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// both accounts (provider verified present in each, 2026-07-27); a FUTURE
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// member account without one sets it true on its own instance. First-create
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// precondition verified 2026-07-27: github-cfn-execution-role and the
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// seahaven-lambda-execution-boundary policy both returned NoSuchEntity in
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// 011934824531 AND 710827005802, so the named creates cannot collide with
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// out-of-band copies.
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const deploySubstrateProd = new DeploySubstrateStack(app, "deploy-substrate-prod", {
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stackName: "seahaven-deploy-substrate",
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env: { account: PROD_ACCOUNT, region: "us-east-1" },
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createOidcProvider: false,
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});
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const deploySubstrateDev = new DeploySubstrateStack(app, "deploy-substrate-dev", {
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stackName: "seahaven-deploy-substrate",
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env: { account: DEV_ACCOUNT, region: "us-east-1" },
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createOidcProvider: false,
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});
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// ── Per-account HCP Terraform deploy substrate ───────────────────────────────
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// The Terraform analog of the GitHub Actions substrate above: app.terraform.io
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// OIDC provider + the shared boundary-gated guardrail policy
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// (seahaven-hcptf-iam-management) that per-workspace apply roles attach.
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// Per-workspace hcptf-* roles are appended to the template at each stack's
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// migration time, never here. prod/dev ONLY — mgmt stays SAM (Terraform POC
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// decision 2026-07-30; the mgmt POC substrate was rolled back the same day).
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// The guardrail policy names the seahaven-lambda-execution-boundary ARN only
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// inside Condition strings, so CFN infers no creation edge — the explicit
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// dependency below guarantees the deploy-substrate stack (which owns the
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// boundary) lands first in any future account onboarding. First-create
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// precondition verified 2026-07-30: no app.terraform.io provider and no
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// hcptf-* roles in either account.
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const terraformSubstrateProd = new TerraformSubstrateStack(
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app,
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"terraform-substrate-prod",
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{
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stackName: "seahaven-terraform-substrate",
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env: { account: PROD_ACCOUNT, region: "us-east-1" },
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},
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);
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terraformSubstrateProd.addStackDependency(deploySubstrateProd);
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const terraformSubstrateDev = new TerraformSubstrateStack(
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app,
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"terraform-substrate-dev",
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{
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stackName: "seahaven-terraform-substrate",
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env: { account: DEV_ACCOUNT, region: "us-east-1" },
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},
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);
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terraformSubstrateDev.addStackDependency(deploySubstrateDev);
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// ── Shared DynamoDB CMK (INFRA-95 / M-3) ─────────────────────────────────────
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// Dedicated, standalone stack so the customer-managed key for sensitive
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// finance/PII DynamoDB tables is an independent shared dependency for the owning
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// app repos (payments-dashboard, procurement-ingest, exec-aide). Its ARN is
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// published to SSM (/seahaven/dynamodb/cmk-arn) for those stacks to consume.
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new DynamoDbCmkStack(app, "dynamodb-cmk", {
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stackName: "seahaven-dynamodb-cmk",
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env: { account: ACCOUNT, region: "us-east-1" },
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});
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// ── seahaven-prod copies for the procurement-ingest migration ────────────────
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// procurement-ingest is moving from mgmt to seahaven-prod; its stacks resolve
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// the DynamoDB CMK via SSM /seahaven/dynamodb/cmk-arn and import the SNS topic
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// `site-alerts` by constructed in-account ARN, so both must exist in prod
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// BEFORE that app's first prod deploy. Same stack names as mgmt (unique
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// per-account); distinct CDK ids.
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// No cross-account key-policy statement: the only cross-account reader of the
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// CMK-encrypted purchase-orders table (seahaven-slack-bot) was decommissioned
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// 2026-07-23, and its successor sh-mcp is undeployed and uses same-account
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// DynamoDB access. When/if a cross-account consumer materializes, add a
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// correctly-scoped grant then (target its real roles + account).
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//
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// Recovery note (failed FIRST create): the key is RETAIN, its alias/SSM param
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// are not — a CREATE_FAILED rollback orphans an unaliased rotation-enabled
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// key. Before re-running the deploy, list unaliased CMKs in prod and schedule
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// deletion of the orphan.
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new DynamoDbCmkStack(app, "dynamodb-cmk-prod", {
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stackName: "seahaven-dynamodb-cmk",
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env: { account: PROD_ACCOUNT, region: "us-east-1" },
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});
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new AlarmTopicStack(app, "alarm-topic-prod", {
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stackName: "seahaven-alarm-topic",
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env: { account: PROD_ACCOUNT, region: "us-east-1" },
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});
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// ── Secondary-region baselines (INFRA-16, INFRA-91) ──────────────────────────
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// The us-east-1 baseline above is region-pinned by design. These stacks extend
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// a minimal detective/logging footprint into the secondary regions, codifying
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// state applied out-of-band this week so it lives in IaC.
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// us-west-2: Bedrock invocation logging only (INFRA-91). Shares the region with
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// the offsite backup vault but is an independent concern (separate stack).
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new RegionalBaselineStack(app, "regional-baseline-us-west-2", {
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stackName: "seahaven-regional-baseline-us-west-2",
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env: { account: ACCOUNT, region: "us-west-2" },
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bedrockLogging: true,
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});
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// us-east-2: Bedrock invocation logging (INFRA-91) + the still-missing AWS
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// Config recorder and Security Hub (INFRA-16). GuardDuty + flow logs already
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// live here (adopted as a follow-up, see lib/regional-baseline-stack.ts).
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new RegionalBaselineStack(app, "regional-baseline-us-east-2", {
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stackName: "seahaven-regional-baseline-us-east-2",
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env: { account: ACCOUNT, region: "us-east-2" },
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bedrockLogging: true,
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configRecorder: true,
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securityHub: true,
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});
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// AWS Backup (audit C-7). Offsite vault (us-west-2) must exist before the
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// primary plan that copies to it, hence the explicit dependency.
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const backupOffsite = new BackupOffsiteStack(app, "backup-offsite", {
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stackName: "seahaven-backup-offsite",
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env: { account: "328440206208", region: "us-west-2" },
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});
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const backupPrimary = new BackupStack(app, "backup", {
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stackName: "seahaven-backup",
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env: { account: "328440206208", region: "us-east-1" },
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});
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backupPrimary.addStackDependency(backupOffsite);
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