import * as cdk from "aws-cdk-lib";
import * as logs from "aws-cdk-lib/aws-logs";
import * as cloudwatch from "aws-cdk-lib/aws-cloudwatch";
import * as cwactions from "aws-cdk-lib/aws-cloudwatch-actions";
import * as sns from "aws-cdk-lib/aws-sns";
import * as subscriptions from "aws-cdk-lib/aws-sns-subscriptions";
import * as kms from "aws-cdk-lib/aws-kms";
import { Construct } from "constructs";

/**
 * CIS AWS Foundations Benchmark v3.0 Section 4 — Monitoring (audit H-1).
 *
 * 15 metric filters on the account CloudTrail log group, each backed by a
 * CloudWatch alarm that notifies a dedicated SNS topic. Closes CIS 4.1–4.15.
 * (4.16 "Security Hub enabled" is not a metric filter — done Day 1, H-4.)
 *
 * Alarms fire on ALARM only (no OK/recovery actions) per Sea Haven preference.
 *
 * The trail log group is injected via props (INFRA-19). The previous approach
 * imported the group by a hardcoded CDK-generated name constant — if the Trail
 * or log group was ever recreated the generated suffix would change and all 15
 * filters would silently detach. The caller now creates an explicit LogGroup with
 * a stable name and passes the CDK object here.
 */

interface CisControl {
  readonly id: string;
  readonly metricName: string;
  readonly pattern: string;
  readonly description: string;
  // Optional alarm-sensitivity override. Defaults to 1/1 (page on a single
  // breaching 5-min period) which suits low-frequency security signals. Raise
  // for noisy high-volume metrics where one-off breaches are expected.
  readonly evaluationPeriods?: number;
  readonly datapointsToAlarm?: number;
}

const CIS_CONTROLS: CisControl[] = [
  {
    id: "UnauthorizedApiCalls",
    metricName: "UnauthorizedAPICalls",
    // The previous pattern relied on `&&` binding tighter than `||`, so the
    // sourceIPAddress/HeadBucket exclusions applied ONLY to the AccessDenied
    // branch, and the sole IP exclusion was delivery.logs.amazonaws.com. That
    // left the filter counting the dominant source of benign noise: AccessDenied
    // /*UnauthorizedOperation records generated by AWS services acting on our
    // behalf — CloudFormation deploy/drift describe-scans (cloudformation. and
    // hooks.cloudformation.amazonaws.com), the AWS Config recorder, etc. On
    // 2026-07-07 a single CFN run emitted 100+ such denials in 15 minutes and
    // flapped this alarm; it transitioned OK<->ALARM 15 times in 30 days, all
    // benign, drowning the CIS 4.1 signal in email noise (alert fatigue).
    //
    // Fix: (1) group both error codes so the exclusions apply to the whole
    // filter (not just the AccessDenied branch), and (2) drop only the SPECIFIC
    // benign service sources that actually flap this account — CloudFormation
    // (deploy/drift describe-scans, `cloudformation.` and `hooks.cloudformation.`)
    // and the Config recorder (`config.`) — plus the pre-existing delivery.logs
    // exclusion.
    //
    // SECURITY NOTE (sh-security-review 2026-07-07): an earlier revision excluded
    // ALL `*.amazonaws.com` source hosts. That was rejected — a confirmed MEDIUM
    // blind spot: denials driven through OTHER services (SSM Automation, Step
    // Functions, Lambda, etc.) are recorded with that service's host as the
    // sourceIPAddress, so a blanket exclusion would hide service-proxied
    // privesc/recon attempts. Scoping to the named benign hosts keeps every other
    // service-proxied denial in scope. Residual (accepted): denials proxied
    // specifically through CloudFormation/Config are still excluded — that path
    // requires near-admin privilege (cloudformation:CreateStack + iam:PassRole),
    // any *successful* change still trips the other CIS 4.x alarms, and GuardDuty
    // provides defence-in-depth. Direct console/CLI/credential denials always
    // present a routable IP and are always counted.
    pattern:
      '{ (($.errorCode = "*UnauthorizedOperation") || ($.errorCode = "AccessDenied*")) && ($.sourceIPAddress != "*cloudformation.amazonaws.com") && ($.sourceIPAddress != "config.amazonaws.com") && ($.sourceIPAddress != "delivery.logs.amazonaws.com") && ($.eventName != "HeadBucket") }',
    description: "CIS 4.1 — unauthorized API calls",
    // M-of-N with N > M so a single quiet 5-min window cannot reset detection.
    // Before #36, false positives from CFN/Config-proxied denials forced a
    // conservative 3/3 consecutive; now that #36 scoped the metric-filter
    // exclusion to those benign sources, we can widen the evaluation window
    // while keeping the same alarm threshold. An attacker pacing denied calls to
    // leave every third window empty would evade a 3/3 alarm but still trips a
    // 3/6 — three breaching windows in any rolling 30-min span fire the alarm.
    evaluationPeriods: 6,
    datapointsToAlarm: 3,
  },
  {
    id: "ConsoleSigninNoMfa",
    metricName: "ConsoleSigninWithoutMFA",
    pattern:
      '{ ($.eventName = "ConsoleLogin") && ($.additionalEventData.MFAUsed != "Yes") && ($.userIdentity.type = "IAMUser") && ($.responseElements.ConsoleLogin = "Success") }',
    description: "CIS 4.2 — console sign-in without MFA",
  },
  {
    id: "RootAccountUsage",
    metricName: "RootAccountUsage",
    pattern:
      '{ $.userIdentity.type = "Root" && $.userIdentity.invokedBy NOT EXISTS && $.eventType != "AwsServiceEvent" }',
    description: "CIS 4.3 — root account usage",
  },
  {
    id: "IamPolicyChanges",
    metricName: "IAMPolicyChanges",
    pattern:
      "{($.eventName=DeleteGroupPolicy)||($.eventName=DeleteRolePolicy)||($.eventName=DeleteUserPolicy)||($.eventName=PutGroupPolicy)||($.eventName=PutRolePolicy)||($.eventName=PutUserPolicy)||($.eventName=CreatePolicy)||($.eventName=DeletePolicy)||($.eventName=CreatePolicyVersion)||($.eventName=DeletePolicyVersion)||($.eventName=AttachRolePolicy)||($.eventName=DetachRolePolicy)||($.eventName=AttachUserPolicy)||($.eventName=DetachUserPolicy)||($.eventName=AttachGroupPolicy)||($.eventName=DetachGroupPolicy)}",
    description: "CIS 4.4 — IAM policy changes",
  },
  {
    id: "CloudTrailConfigChanges",
    metricName: "CloudTrailConfigChanges",
    pattern:
      "{ ($.eventName = CreateTrail) || ($.eventName = UpdateTrail) || ($.eventName = DeleteTrail) || ($.eventName = StartLogging) || ($.eventName = StopLogging) }",
    description: "CIS 4.5 — CloudTrail configuration changes",
  },
  {
    id: "ConsoleAuthFailures",
    metricName: "ConsoleAuthenticationFailures",
    pattern:
      '{ ($.eventName = ConsoleLogin) && ($.errorMessage = "Failed authentication") }',
    description: "CIS 4.6 — console authentication failures",
  },
  {
    id: "CmkDisableOrDelete",
    metricName: "CMKDisableOrScheduledDelete",
    pattern:
      "{ ($.eventSource = kms.amazonaws.com) && (($.eventName = DisableKey) || ($.eventName = ScheduleKeyDeletion)) }",
    description: "CIS 4.7 — disabling or scheduled deletion of CMKs",
  },
  {
    id: "S3BucketPolicyChanges",
    metricName: "S3BucketPolicyChanges",
    pattern:
      "{ ($.eventSource = s3.amazonaws.com) && (($.eventName = PutBucketAcl) || ($.eventName = PutBucketPolicy) || ($.eventName = PutBucketCors) || ($.eventName = PutBucketLifecycle) || ($.eventName = PutBucketReplication) || ($.eventName = DeleteBucketPolicy) || ($.eventName = DeleteBucketCors) || ($.eventName = DeleteBucketLifecycle) || ($.eventName = DeleteBucketReplication)) }",
    description: "CIS 4.8 — S3 bucket policy changes",
  },
  {
    id: "ConfigChanges",
    metricName: "AWSConfigChanges",
    pattern:
      "{ ($.eventSource = config.amazonaws.com) && (($.eventName=StopConfigurationRecorder)||($.eventName=DeleteDeliveryChannel)||($.eventName=PutDeliveryChannel)||($.eventName=PutConfigurationRecorder)) }",
    description: "CIS 4.9 — AWS Config configuration changes",
  },
  {
    id: "SecurityGroupChanges",
    metricName: "SecurityGroupChanges",
    pattern:
      "{ ($.eventName = AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress) || ($.eventName = AuthorizeSecurityGroupEgress) || ($.eventName = RevokeSecurityGroupIngress) || ($.eventName = RevokeSecurityGroupEgress) || ($.eventName = CreateSecurityGroup) || ($.eventName = DeleteSecurityGroup) }",
    description: "CIS 4.10 — security group changes",
  },
  {
    id: "NaclChanges",
    metricName: "NetworkACLChanges",
    pattern:
      "{ ($.eventName = CreateNetworkAcl) || ($.eventName = CreateNetworkAclEntry) || ($.eventName = DeleteNetworkAcl) || ($.eventName = DeleteNetworkAclEntry) || ($.eventName = ReplaceNetworkAclEntry) || ($.eventName = ReplaceNetworkAclAssociation) }",
    description: "CIS 4.11 — network ACL changes",
  },
  {
    id: "NetworkGatewayChanges",
    metricName: "NetworkGatewayChanges",
    pattern:
      "{ ($.eventName = CreateCustomerGateway) || ($.eventName = DeleteCustomerGateway) || ($.eventName = AttachInternetGateway) || ($.eventName = CreateInternetGateway) || ($.eventName = DeleteInternetGateway) || ($.eventName = DetachInternetGateway) }",
    description: "CIS 4.12 — network gateway changes",
  },
  {
    id: "RouteTableChanges",
    metricName: "RouteTableChanges",
    pattern:
      "{ ($.eventName = CreateRoute) || ($.eventName = CreateRouteTable) || ($.eventName = ReplaceRoute) || ($.eventName = ReplaceRouteTableAssociation) || ($.eventName = DeleteRouteTable) || ($.eventName = DeleteRoute) || ($.eventName = DisassociateRouteTable) }",
    description: "CIS 4.13 — route table changes",
  },
  {
    id: "VpcChanges",
    metricName: "VPCChanges",
    pattern:
      "{ ($.eventName = CreateVpc) || ($.eventName = DeleteVpc) || ($.eventName = ModifyVpcAttribute) || ($.eventName = AcceptVpcPeeringConnection) || ($.eventName = CreateVpcPeeringConnection) || ($.eventName = DeleteVpcPeeringConnection) || ($.eventName = RejectVpcPeeringConnection) || ($.eventName = AttachClassicLinkVpc) || ($.eventName = DetachClassicLinkVpc) || ($.eventName = DisableVpcClassicLink) || ($.eventName = EnableVpcClassicLink) }",
    description: "CIS 4.14 — VPC changes",
  },
  {
    id: "OrganizationsChanges",
    metricName: "OrganizationsChanges",
    pattern:
      '{ ($.eventSource = organizations.amazonaws.com) && (($.eventName = "AcceptHandshake") || ($.eventName = "AttachPolicy") || ($.eventName = "CreateAccount") || ($.eventName = "CreateOrganizationalUnit") || ($.eventName = "CreatePolicy") || ($.eventName = "DeclineHandshake") || ($.eventName = "DeleteOrganization") || ($.eventName = "DeleteOrganizationalUnit") || ($.eventName = "DeletePolicy") || ($.eventName = "DetachPolicy") || ($.eventName = "DisablePolicyType") || ($.eventName = "EnablePolicyType") || ($.eventName = "InviteAccountToOrganization") || ($.eventName = "LeaveOrganization") || ($.eventName = "MoveAccount") || ($.eventName = "RemoveAccountFromOrganization") || ($.eventName = "UpdatePolicy") || ($.eventName = "UpdateOrganizationalUnit")) }',
    description: "CIS 4.15 — AWS Organizations changes",
  },
];

export interface CisMonitoringProps {
  /** Email subscribed to the CIS alarm topic. */
  readonly alarmEmail: string;
  /**
   * The CloudTrail CloudWatch Logs group. Must be the explicit stable-named
   * LogGroup created in account-baseline-stack.ts (INFRA-19) — not an imported
   * reference, so the metric filters are bound to the CDK object rather than a
   * hardcoded generated name.
   */
  readonly trailLogGroup: logs.ILogGroup;
}

export class CisMonitoring extends Construct {
  constructor(scope: Construct, id: string, props: CisMonitoringProps) {
    super(scope, id);

    // Customer-managed key for alarm topics (audit L-14). The AWS-managed
    // alias/aws/sns key CANNOT be used here: its key policy can't grant
    // cloudwatch.amazonaws.com, so CloudWatch alarms silently fail to publish
    // to topics it encrypts — which is exactly what these topics receive.
    // Also used by the unmanaged site-alerts topic (set via CLI; ARN output below).
    const alarmTopicKey = new kms.Key(this, "AlarmTopicKey", {
      alias: "seahaven-alarm-topics",
      description:
        "SSE for SNS alarm topics; grants CloudWatch alarms publish-side usage",
      enableKeyRotation: true,
    });
    alarmTopicKey.addToResourcePolicy(
      new cdk.aws_iam.PolicyStatement({
        sid: "AllowCloudWatchAlarmsUse",
        principals: [new cdk.aws_iam.ServicePrincipal("cloudwatch.amazonaws.com")],
        actions: ["kms:GenerateDataKey*", "kms:Decrypt", "kms:DescribeKey"],
        resources: ["*"],
        conditions: {
          StringEquals: { "aws:SourceAccount": cdk.Stack.of(this).account },
        },
      })
    );
    new cdk.CfnOutput(this, "AlarmTopicKeyArn", { value: alarmTopicKey.keyArn });

    // Dedicated topic for security/CIS alarms (audit H-1, L-14).
    const topic = new sns.Topic(this, "CisAlarmTopic", {
      topicName: "seahaven-cis-alarms",
      displayName: "Sea Haven CIS / security alarms",
      masterKey: alarmTopicKey,
    });
    topic.addSubscription(new subscriptions.EmailSubscription(props.alarmEmail));

    const logGroup = props.trailLogGroup;

    for (const c of CIS_CONTROLS) {
      const mf = new logs.MetricFilter(this, `${c.id}Filter`, {
        logGroup,
        filterPattern: logs.FilterPattern.literal(c.pattern),
        metricNamespace: "CISBenchmark",
        metricName: c.metricName,
        metricValue: "1",
        defaultValue: 0,
      });

      const alarm = mf
        .metric({
          statistic: "Sum",
          period: cdk.Duration.minutes(5),
        })
        .createAlarm(this, `${c.id}Alarm`, {
          alarmName: `cis-${c.metricName}`,
          alarmDescription: c.description,
          threshold: 1,
          comparisonOperator:
            cloudwatch.ComparisonOperator.GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL_TO_THRESHOLD,
          evaluationPeriods: c.evaluationPeriods ?? 1,
          // Omitted (undefined) for default 1/1 controls so their templates are
          // untouched; CloudWatch defaults datapointsToAlarm to evaluationPeriods.
          datapointsToAlarm: c.datapointsToAlarm ?? c.evaluationPeriods,
          treatMissingData: cloudwatch.TreatMissingData.NOT_BREACHING,
        });

      // ALARM-only notification (no OK/recovery action) per Sea Haven preference.
      alarm.addAlarmAction(new cwactions.SnsAction(topic));
    }

    new cdk.CfnOutput(this, "CisAlarmTopicArn", { value: topic.topicArn });
  }
}