The processor role already allows these ARNs. The live boundary denied
them, so GetSecretValue and period PutItem returned HTTP 400. Sync the
template to the live ceiling and add the missing period table plus
slack-admin and afterhours secret suffixes.
* feat(iam): allow frontend HCP apply to own release pointer and invalidation (PLAT-188)
Plan and apply roles can read .release/current; apply can PutObject that key and CreateInvalidation on the exact distribution.
* fix(iam): allow frontend HCP roles to tag the release pointer (PLAT-188)
Terraform aws_s3_object lists object tags on every refresh, so plan and apply need GetObjectTagging and apply needs PutObjectTagging on the exact .release/current key.
* feat(iam): allow frontend HCP apply to update exact CloudFront resources (PLAT-187)
Phase 2 ownership tags cannot apply while UpdateDistribution and UpdateFunction are denied on *. Allow those two actions only on the pinned distribution and function ARNs.
* fix(iam): allow PublishFunction on exact frontend CloudFront functions (PLAT-187)
The AWS provider publishes after UpdateFunction, including tag-only applies, so denying PublishFunction on * still blocked Phase 2 function updates.
* feat(iam): lock app-owned HCP IAM and add bootstrap SCP (PLAT-143)
* fix(iam): pin HCP boundary ARNs and bootstrap trust window (PLAT-143)
Null on iam:PermissionsBoundary accepted any ceiling, including AdministratorAccess. Import apply cannot self-mutate hcptf-* while bootstrap trust is iam-bootstrap only; add a time-boxed exact StringEquals workspace grant instead of StringLike.
* fix(iam): update paychex boundary in place without fn if
CloudFormation replaced the named managed policy when the secrets statement was wrapped in Fn::If (409 duplicate name). Keep the six minted ARNs as a static statement so the document updates in place.
* fix(iam): leave paychex boundary description unchanged
Keep the live ManagedPolicy Description so CloudFormation only updates PolicyDocument.
CreateDomainName cannot be hostname-pinned, and mgmt still holds doorunlock.seahaven.com. Attach the domain at cutover instead of granting collection POST.
* feat(iam): add door-unlock-api hcptf roles and boundary
Give HCP Terraform a prod plan/apply pair, a per-workload Lambda boundary with exact SSM and 3CX ARNs, and API access-log delivery so PLAT-76 can leave the mgmt CDK stack.
* fix(iam): pin door-unlock apigw domain and ssm reads
Stop the apply role from managing every HTTP API custom domain, and keep SecureString door-unlock parameters off HCP plan and apply GetParameter.
Shared seahaven-lambda-execution-boundary stays unchanged for live roles.
New named policies plus an enumerated StringEquals allow-list unblock the
next PLAT-71 widen without growing the 6144-character shared document.
Pre-grant delivery.logs write via MealOrderApiAccessLogResourcePolicy on
substrate so the HCP apply role cannot mutate account-wide log resource
policies.
* feat(iam): add hcptf roles and boundary widen for meal-order-manager
Append plan/apply OIDC roles for meal-order-manager-prod and widen the lambda execution boundary with exact prod secret ARN and data-plane statements.
* fix(iam): make meal-order plan role Lambda refresh read-only
Replace plan-role lambda:* with Get*/List* so plan-phase credentials cannot mutate functions or layers.
* feat(waf): add seahaven-prod shared CloudFront WebACL stack
Stand up AppWebAcl in a thin prod stack and widen seahaven-site HCP
roles to read the SSM ARN so CloudFront can associate the ACL in-account.
* fix(deploy): add app-web-acl-prod to deploy.yaml
* feat(iam): add hcptf-seahaven-site plan/apply roles
Static-site HCP substrate for seahaven-site-prod plus boundary widen for
the TF-managed content-deploy role (S3 origin + CloudFront invalidate).
* fix(iam): allow seahaven-site HCP roles to read GitHub OIDC provider
Plan refresh needs iam:GetOpenIDConnectProvider for the content-deploy
role trust data source (PLAT-91 first-plan AccessDenied).
* feat(iam): add hcptf roles and boundary for procurement-ingest
* fix(iam): tighten procurement-ingest apply and plan scopes
Replace kms:* and secret-value writes on shell statements; split IAM
collection APIs onto Resource "*".
* feat(iam): add hcptf roles for sh-openswe-traces-prod
Storage/IAM-user apply and plan roles for the HCP workspace. No Lambda
boundary widen; explicit IAM user CRUD because hcptf-iam-management is
role-path-only.
* fix(iam): pin CreateSecret to exact export secret name
Remove CreateSecret and UpdateSecret from the ARN-prefix shell grant so
apply cannot create longer-named secrets or overwrite SecretString.
* feat(iam): add hcptf front-integrations roles and boundary widen
Add plan/apply OIDC roles for front-integrations-prod and widen the
Lambda execution boundary with exact prod secret ARNs plus DynamoDB
CRUD on front-sla-alerts.
* fix(iam): restrict front-integrations plan role to lambda Get/List
Keep mutate APIs on the apply role so a compromised plan-phase
OIDC session cannot update or delete front-* functions.
Expand the README playbook to steps 0–10 and document the required
plan-refresh sidecar plus prefix-scoped apply-role wildcards so the
next workload copies afi patterns instead of relearning first-apply misses.
* feat(iam): add hcptf roles and boundary widen for afi-backup-monitor
Provision plan/apply OIDC roles for workspace afi-backup-monitor-prod
and widen the prod Lambda boundary with the two exact secret ARNs.
* fix(iam): split DescribeLogGroups and allow afi artifact bucket
logs:DescribeLogGroups cannot be resource-scoped; grant it on *. Add
S3 permissions for the HCP Lambda artifact bucket used by PLAT-56.
