The L1 AWS::Config::ConfigurationRecorder deadlocks the CDK stack
(recorder can't complete without a delivery channel; channel can't be
created without a recorder — observed 2026-06-01).
Fix: three AwsCustomResource nodes call PutConfigurationRecorder →
PutDeliveryChannel → StartConfigurationRecorder in sequence. Put* is
an idempotent upsert, so the deploy adopts the existing CLI-created
recorder and channel without destroying or interrupting them. onDelete
stops recording rather than deleting the per-account singleton.
New IAM permissions on the custom-resource role (cross-reviewed,
GPT-4.1 APPROVE — no BLOCK):
config:PutConfigurationRecorder
config:PutDeliveryChannel
config:StartConfigurationRecorder
config:StopConfigurationRecorder
iam:PassRole → seahaven-config-recorder-role (service=config)
cdk diff shows [+] adds only — no existing resources destroyed or
replaced. Removes README note that recorder/channel are CLI-only.
Refs: INFRA-17
* [INFRA-96] CMK-encrypt sensitive CloudWatch log groups (M-24)
Add a dedicated customer-managed CMK (alias/seahaven-logs) for encrypting
the sensitive CloudWatch Logs groups (CloudTrail + finance/PII Lambdas).
- lib/logs-key.ts: LogsKey construct. Key policy grants the CloudWatch Logs
service principal (logs.us-east-1.amazonaws.com) Encrypt*/Decrypt*/
ReEncrypt*/GenerateDataKey*/DescribeKey, scoped by the
kms:EncryptionContext:aws:logs:arn condition (REQUIRED per AWS docs or log
delivery breaks). Cross-reviewed (GPT-4.1): tightened Describe* -> DescribeKey;
CreateGrant omitted (not needed for plain log-group encryption).
- account-baseline-stack.ts: instantiate LogsKey and set KmsKeyId on the L2
Trail's CloudWatch log group in place (escape hatch on the existing
AWS::Logs::LogGroup) so it keeps the same logical id + physical name -
additive, no replacement, CIS Section-4 metric filters (which import the
group by name) keep working, live audit trail not disrupted. Gated by
context `encryptTrailLogGroup` so the CMK can be smoke-tested on a low-risk
Lambda group before the most-sensitive CloudTrail group.
Finance/PII Lambda log groups (exec-aide-*, payments-*, po-email-processor,
vendor-reply-processor) are owned by other stacks and associated to this CMK
via the CLI for now; codifying KmsKeyId in those repos is tracked as drift.
* [INFRA-96] Document sensitive-logs CMK (M-24) in README
README: document AWS Backup phase-2 (phase2-offsite-everything selection),
remove retired database-1 from phase-1 scope (audit H-19), update roadmap +
verify smoke-test to a live resource.
scripts/iam-user-delete.sh: reusable full IAM user teardown (keys, policies,
groups, MFA, login profile, certs, SSH keys, service creds, then user) with
--profile/--yes and a guard against deleting the caller's own identity. Built
from the Day 4 audit IAM cleanup.
* Add account detective layer + budget (audit Day 1: H-2/H-3/H-4/M-5/M-10)
Adds to the seahaven-account-baseline stack:
- AWS Config recorder (all + global resources) + delivery channel + role +
hardened delivery bucket (H-2, CIS 3.3/3.5). Recorder role IAM cross-reviewed.
- GuardDuty detector, us-east-1 (H-3)
- Security Hub with AWS FSBP v1.0.0 + CIS v3.0.0 standards, depends on Config (H-4)
- IAM Access Analyzer, account scope (M-5)
- Monthly cost budget $1,200 with 80/100% actual + 100% forecast alerts to
adam@seahavenind.com (M-10)
Scope us-east-1 only (all workloads here); multi-region is a follow-up.
The CLI-applied governance toggles (M-6/M-3/M-7/L-8/M-11) are documented
separately in the README runbook.
* Document Day 1 detective layer + CLI governance toggles in README
* Move Config recorder+channel to CLI (L1 stabilization deadlock)
The L1 AWS::Config::ConfigurationRecorder hangs the stack: it never reaches
CREATE_COMPLETE until recording is active (needs a delivery channel), and the
delivery channel cannot be created until the recorder completes — a deadlock
that hung the deploy ~27 min before manual cancel (2026-06-01).
Keep the cross-reviewed recorder role + delivery bucket in IaC; create the
recorder, delivery channel, and start recording via CLI (documented in README).
Security Hub no longer takes a CFN dependency on the recorder; CIS/FSBP controls
evaluate once Config is recording. Verified live: recording=true, SUCCESS.
* Add AWS Backup with offsite vault (audit C-7)
The account had zero AWS Backup vaults/plans, so 22 of 23 data stores
had no immutable, cross-region recovery path (audit finding C-7). One
ransomware event or rogue delete would erase primary plus same-region
snapshots/PITR.
Phase 1 ("critical data first") protects the seven highest-risk stores
with no offsite leg today (2 RDS, 2 DynamoDB, 3 S3) via a daily plan in
a new us-east-1 vault, copied cross-region into a governance-locked
us-west-2 vault. Governance (not compliance) mode first so the plan can
be validated before committing to irreversible immutability.
The backup service role is backup-only (no restore policies) to stay
least-privilege; restores get a separate audited path later. Resources
are selected by explicit ARN to avoid drifting the stacks that own them.
Deploys via the shared cdk deploy --all alongside the C-1 CloudTrail
stack. See the README pre-deploy gates (S3 versioning, database-1
unencrypted copy smoke-test, DynamoDB PITR) before the first run.
* Grant AWS Backup service use of vault CMKs
The L2 BackupVault does not grant the backup service principal use of a
customer-managed key; the synthesized key policy only delegated to
account IAM. Cross-region copy of encrypted RDS/EBS recovery points uses
KMS grants on the destination key, so without an explicit grant those
copy jobs fail — and silently, since the account has no CloudTrail yet.
Add backup.amazonaws.com crypto + CreateGrant statements to both vault
keys, scoped by aws:SourceAccount (cross-review BLOCK 2; mirrors the
discipline used on the C-1 CloudTrail key). Same class of bug the C-1
cross-review caught on the CloudTrail CMK.
