fix: Fix noisy CIS 4.1 unauthorized-API alarm; drop redundant billing alarm (#36)

* Fix noisy CIS 4.1 unauthorized-API alarm; drop redundant billing alarm

CIS 4.1 (cis-UnauthorizedAPICalls) flapped OK<->ALARM 15 times in 30 days,
all from benign AWS-service AccessDenied noise (CloudFormation deploy/drift
describe-scans, AWS Config recorder). A single CFN run on 2026-07-07 emitted
100+ such denials in 15 min, tripping the alarm and burying the real CIS 4.1
security signal in email noise (alert fatigue).

- Group both error codes so the exclusions apply to the whole filter (the old
  pattern leaked the UnauthorizedOperation branch past the exclusions due to
  && binding tighter than ||).
- Exclude denials whose sourceIPAddress is an AWS service host (*.amazonaws.com)
  — AWS acting on our behalf, not a principal of concern. Real unauthorized
  calls from a console/CLI/attacker present a routable IP and are still counted.
  Validated against the trail log group: spike window 107 -> 4 matches, the 4
  remaining all from a routable admin IP (genuine activity CIS should retain).
- Keep the 3/3 evaluation as a backstop against one-off human fat-fingers.

Billing: deleted the manually-created AWS-MonthlyBilling CloudWatch alarm
($50 threshold on EstimatedCharges, routed to site-alerts). It was unmanaged
drift, permanently in ALARM, and fully redundant with the managed M-10 budget
(seahaven-monthly-cost). README updated with rationale + restore command.

* Address sh-security-review: scope CIS 4.1 exclusion to named benign sources

The high-recall security review (detector fan-out + proof-or-kill verifier)
confirmed a MEDIUM detection blind spot in the first revision: excluding all
`*.amazonaws.com` source hosts would hide denials driven through ANY AWS
service (SSM Automation, Step Functions, Lambda, etc.), which CloudTrail
records with that service's host as sourceIPAddress — i.e. service-proxied
privesc/recon attempts would evade CIS 4.1.

Remediation: scope the exclusion to the specific benign sources that actually
flap this account — `*cloudformation.amazonaws.com` (covers both
cloudformation. and hooks.cloudformation.) and `config.amazonaws.com` — plus
the pre-existing delivery.logs exclusion. Every other service-proxied denial
is now retained. Residual (accepted, documented inline): CloudFormation/Config-
proxied denials are still excluded — that path needs near-admin privilege
(CreateStack + PassRole), successful changes still trip the other CIS 4.x
alarms, and GuardDuty backstops.

Validated on the live trail log group: spike window still 107 -> 4 matches
(identical noise suppression), the 4 from a routable admin IP. tsc + synth clean.

README.md

@@ -177,8 +177,19 @@ aws ce update-cost-allocation-tags-status --cost-allocation-tags-status \
 **L-8 (billing-metrics preference) is OUTSTANDING — console only.** Enabling the
 CloudWatch `EstimatedCharges` metric in us-east-1 requires turning on *Receive
 Billing Alerts* under Billing → Billing preferences; there is no public API/CLI.
-The M-10 budget already provides cost alerting independent of that metric, so
+The M-10 budget (`seahaven-monthly-cost`, 80%/100% actual + 100% forecast)
-this only affects the legacy `AWS-MonthlyBilling` CloudWatch alarm (L-8).
+provides cost alerting independent of that metric.
+
+> The legacy, manually-created `AWS-MonthlyBilling` CloudWatch alarm ($50
+> threshold on `EstimatedCharges`, routed to `site-alerts`) was **deleted
+> 2026-07-07** as unmanaged drift: it was fully redundant with the M-10 budget,
+> sat permanently in ALARM (spend has far exceeded $50/mo), and was never in
+> IaC. Billing alerting is now solely the managed M-10 budget. To restore the
+> old alarm if ever needed: `aws cloudwatch put-metric-alarm --alarm-name
+> AWS-MonthlyBilling --namespace AWS/Billing --metric-name EstimatedCharges
+> --dimensions Name=Currency,Value=USD --statistic Maximum --period 86400
+> --evaluation-periods 1 --threshold 50 --comparison-operator GreaterThanThreshold
+> --alarm-actions arn:aws:sns:us-east-1:328440206208:site-alerts`.
 
 ### Monitoring + logging (audit Day 2)
 

lib/cis-monitoring.ts

@@ -39,15 +39,43 @@ const CIS_CONTROLS: CisControl[] = [
   {
     id: "UnauthorizedApiCalls",
     metricName: "UnauthorizedAPICalls",
+    // The previous pattern relied on `&&` binding tighter than `||`, so the
+    // sourceIPAddress/HeadBucket exclusions applied ONLY to the AccessDenied
+    // branch, and the sole IP exclusion was delivery.logs.amazonaws.com. That
+    // left the filter counting the dominant source of benign noise: AccessDenied
+    // /*UnauthorizedOperation records generated by AWS services acting on our
+    // behalf — CloudFormation deploy/drift describe-scans (cloudformation. and
+    // hooks.cloudformation.amazonaws.com), the AWS Config recorder, etc. On
+    // 2026-07-07 a single CFN run emitted 100+ such denials in 15 minutes and
+    // flapped this alarm; it transitioned OK<->ALARM 15 times in 30 days, all
+    // benign, drowning the CIS 4.1 signal in email noise (alert fatigue).
+    //
+    // Fix: (1) group both error codes so the exclusions apply to the whole
+    // filter (not just the AccessDenied branch), and (2) drop only the SPECIFIC
+    // benign service sources that actually flap this account — CloudFormation
+    // (deploy/drift describe-scans, `cloudformation.` and `hooks.cloudformation.`)
+    // and the Config recorder (`config.`) — plus the pre-existing delivery.logs
+    // exclusion.
+    //
+    // SECURITY NOTE (sh-security-review 2026-07-07): an earlier revision excluded
+    // ALL `*.amazonaws.com` source hosts. That was rejected — a confirmed MEDIUM
+    // blind spot: denials driven through OTHER services (SSM Automation, Step
+    // Functions, Lambda, etc.) are recorded with that service's host as the
+    // sourceIPAddress, so a blanket exclusion would hide service-proxied
+    // privesc/recon attempts. Scoping to the named benign hosts keeps every other
+    // service-proxied denial in scope. Residual (accepted): denials proxied
+    // specifically through CloudFormation/Config are still excluded — that path
+    // requires near-admin privilege (cloudformation:CreateStack + iam:PassRole),
+    // any *successful* change still trips the other CIS 4.x alarms, and GuardDuty
+    // provides defence-in-depth. Direct console/CLI/credential denials always
+    // present a routable IP and are always counted.
     pattern:
-      '{ ($.errorCode = "*UnauthorizedOperation") || ($.errorCode = "AccessDenied*") && ($.sourceIPAddress != "delivery.logs.amazonaws.com") && ($.eventName != "HeadBucket") }',
+      '{ (($.errorCode = "*UnauthorizedOperation") || ($.errorCode = "AccessDenied*")) && ($.sourceIPAddress != "*cloudformation.amazonaws.com") && ($.sourceIPAddress != "config.amazonaws.com") && ($.sourceIPAddress != "delivery.logs.amazonaws.com") && ($.eventName != "HeadBucket") }',
     description: "CIS 4.1 — unauthorized API calls",
-    // This metric is high-volume: a single CloudFormation/CDK deploy can emit a
+    // Belt-and-suspenders after the service-noise exclusion above: still require
-    // burst of benign describe-API denials, and any one-off console fat-finger
+    // 3 consecutive breaching 5-min periods so a one-off human fat-finger that
-    // trips a 1/1 alarm and self-recovers, producing notification storms. Require
+    // self-recovers doesn't page, while sustained unauthorized activity (e.g. a
-    // 3 consecutive breaching 5-min periods so only *sustained* unauthorized
+    // misconfigured role failing every call) still trips within ~15 minutes.
-    // activity (e.g. a misconfigured role failing every call) pages. Detection of
-    // a real persistent problem is preserved; transient bursts are filtered.
     evaluationPeriods: 3,
     datapointsToAlarm: 3,
   },