seahaven-account-baseline/lib/account-baseline-stack.ts

import * as cdk from "aws-cdk-lib";
import * as s3 from "aws-cdk-lib/aws-s3";
import * as kms from "aws-cdk-lib/aws-kms";
import * as iam from "aws-cdk-lib/aws-iam";
import * as logs from "aws-cdk-lib/aws-logs";
import * as cloudtrail from "aws-cdk-lib/aws-cloudtrail";
import { Construct } from "constructs";
import { LogsKey } from "./logs-key";
import { DetectiveControls } from "./detective-controls";
import { GovernanceToggles } from "./governance-toggles";
import { BedrockLogging } from "./bedrock-logging";
import { CisMonitoring } from "./cis-monitoring";
import { FlowLogs } from "./flow-logs";
import { SesMonitoring } from "./ses-monitoring";
import { AppWebAcl } from "./web-acl";

/**
 * Account-level security baseline for Sea Haven (account 328440206208).
 *
 * First resident: a multi-region CloudTrail with log-file validation, KMS
 * encryption, an Object-Lock'd S3 log bucket, and CloudWatch Logs delivery.
 * Closes audit finding C-1 and CIS 3.1/3.2/3.4/3.6/3.7 (+3.8 via key rotation),
 * and provides the CloudWatch Logs group that the CIS Section 4 metric filters
 * (H-1) attach to.
 *
 * Future residents (same stack): AWS Config (H-2), GuardDuty (H-3),
 * Security Hub (H-4), IAM Access Analyzer (M-5), Inspector2 (M-6).
 */
export interface AccountBaselineStackProps extends cdk.StackProps {
  /** Monthly cost budget ceiling in USD (M-10). */
  readonly monthlyBudgetUsd: number;
  /** Email for budget threshold alerts (M-10). */
  readonly budgetAlertEmail: string;
  /**
   * VPC ids to attach ALL-traffic flow logs to (H-14). Logical IDs are
   * index-derived — only append, never reorder (see lib/flow-logs.ts).
   */
  readonly flowLogVpcIds: string[];
}

export class AccountBaselineStack extends cdk.Stack {
  constructor(scope: Construct, id: string, props: AccountBaselineStackProps) {
    super(scope, id, props);

    const trailName = "seahaven-org-trail";
    // AWS Organizations org id (o-9kufuzz6b4). CloudTrail org trusted-access is
    // already enabled on the management account; promoting this trail to an org
    // trail (INFRA-73) makes it collect member-account events into this bucket.
    const orgId = "o-9kufuzz6b4";
    // Static trail ARN (built from name, not trail.trailArn) so the key policy
    // does not create a circular dependency with the Trail resource.
    const trailArn = cdk.Arn.format(
      { service: "cloudtrail", resource: "trail", resourceName: trailName },
      this
    );

    // ── KMS CMK ── encrypts CloudTrail log files (CIS 3.7); rotation = CIS 3.8.
    const trailKey = new kms.Key(this, "TrailKey", {
      alias: "cloudtrail-logs",
      description: "Encrypts CloudTrail log files for the account-wide trail",
      enableKeyRotation: true,
      removalPolicy: cdk.RemovalPolicy.RETAIN,
    });

    // The L2 Trail construct does NOT grant the CloudTrail service principal use
    // of a customer-provided key, so delivery of encrypted logs would fail.
    // Grant it explicitly, scoped to this account's trail via SourceArn and the
    // CloudTrail encryption context. (Caught by cross-review 2026-05-29.)
    trailKey.addToResourcePolicy(
      new iam.PolicyStatement({
        sid: "AllowCloudTrailEncrypt",
        effect: iam.Effect.ALLOW,
        principals: [new iam.ServicePrincipal("cloudtrail.amazonaws.com")],
        actions: ["kms:GenerateDataKey*"],
        resources: ["*"],
        conditions: {
          StringEquals: { "aws:SourceArn": trailArn },
          StringLike: {
            "kms:EncryptionContext:aws:cloudtrail:arn": `arn:${this.partition}:cloudtrail:*:${this.account}:trail/*`,
          },
        },
      })
    );
    // INFRA-73 (org trail): member accounts deliver their CloudTrail events to
    // this CMK-encrypted bucket, so the CloudTrail service principal must be able
    // to GenerateDataKey using each member trail's own encryption context.
    //
    // Cross-review BLOCK (GPT-4.1): the SourceArn must NOT be pinned to the
    // management account 328440206208 — org-trail shadow trails in member
    // accounts present their OWN account id in both the SourceArn and the
    // encryption-context arn, so pinning to the management account would silently
    // block all member-account delivery. Both are wildcarded across accounts and
    // the statement is org-scoped by aws:PrincipalOrgID so only accounts in
    // o-9kufuzz6b4 — not arbitrary CloudTrail principals — can use the key.
    trailKey.addToResourcePolicy(
      new iam.PolicyStatement({
        sid: "AllowOrgMemberCloudTrailEncrypt",
        effect: iam.Effect.ALLOW,
        principals: [new iam.ServicePrincipal("cloudtrail.amazonaws.com")],
        actions: ["kms:GenerateDataKey*", "kms:DescribeKey"],
        resources: ["*"],
        conditions: {
          StringEquals: { "aws:PrincipalOrgID": orgId },
          StringLike: {
            "kms:EncryptionContext:aws:cloudtrail:arn": `arn:${this.partition}:cloudtrail:*:*:trail/*`,
            "aws:SourceArn": `arn:${this.partition}:cloudtrail:*:*:trail/*`,
          },
        },
      })
    );
    trailKey.addToResourcePolicy(
      new iam.PolicyStatement({
        sid: "AllowCloudTrailDescribeKey",
        effect: iam.Effect.ALLOW,
        principals: [new iam.ServicePrincipal("cloudtrail.amazonaws.com")],
        actions: ["kms:DescribeKey"],
        resources: ["*"],
      })
    );

    // Central, pre-existing access-logs bucket (manually created, imported
    // read-only) — receives S3 server access logs for the trail bucket (CIS 3.6).
    const accessLogsBucket = s3.Bucket.fromBucketName(
      this,
      "AccessLogsBucket",
      "seahaven-s3-access-logs"
    );

    // ── Hardened, tamper-resistant log bucket ──
    // Private (BPA all on), KMS-encrypted, versioned, TLS-only, Object-Lock
    // GOVERNANCE 365d so logs cannot be silently deleted/overwritten.
    const logBucket = new s3.Bucket(this, "TrailLogBucket", {
      bucketName: `seahaven-cloudtrail-logs-${this.account}`,
      encryption: s3.BucketEncryption.KMS,
      encryptionKey: trailKey,
      bucketKeyEnabled: true,
      blockPublicAccess: s3.BlockPublicAccess.BLOCK_ALL,
      enforceSSL: true,
      versioned: true,
      objectLockEnabled: true,
      objectLockDefaultRetention: s3.ObjectLockRetention.governance(
        cdk.Duration.days(365)
      ),
      serverAccessLogsBucket: accessLogsBucket,
      serverAccessLogsPrefix: "cloudtrail-bucket-access/",
      lifecycleRules: [
        {
          id: "transition-and-expire",
          transitions: [
            {
              storageClass: s3.StorageClass.GLACIER,
              transitionAfter: cdk.Duration.days(90),
            },
          ],
          expiration: cdk.Duration.days(365),
          abortIncompleteMultipartUploadAfter: cdk.Duration.days(7),
        },
      ],
      removalPolicy: cdk.RemovalPolicy.RETAIN,
    });

    // ── Sensitive CloudWatch Logs CMK (M-24 / INFRA-96) ──
    // Dedicated key for encrypting the CloudTrail CW log group and the
    // finance/PII Lambda log groups (those live in other stacks and are
    // associated via CLI until codified in their owning repos — see README).
    const logsKey = new LogsKey(this, "LogsKey");

    // ── Stable-named CloudTrail log group (INFRA-19) ──
    // Previously the L2 Trail construct auto-created an anonymous log group
    // (CDK-generated name with a hash suffix). The 15 CIS Section 4 metric
    // filters in CisMonitoring imported it by that hardcoded generated name,
    // which changes if the Trail/log group is ever recreated — causing all 15
    // filters to silently detach with no error.
    //
    // This explicit LogGroup uses a stable, human-readable name so the filters
    // can reference the CDK object (not a string constant). The group is passed
    // to the Trail via cloudWatchLogGroup, and the same object is forwarded to
    // CisMonitoring. RETAIN ensures historical audit logs are never destroyed
    // when the stack is updated or deleted.
    //
    // DEPLOY NOTE: This is a one-time replacement of the auto-created log group
    // with an explicit named one. CloudFormation will DELETE the old auto-named
    // group and CREATE this new stable-named group. The old group (with its
    // historical audit logs) is ORPHANED in AWS — it will NOT be deleted because
    // CloudFormation loses track of it; the logs remain accessible in the
    // CloudWatch console under the old name. No audit history is destroyed.
    const trailLogGroup = new logs.LogGroup(this, "TrailLogGroup", {
      logGroupName: "seahaven-account-baseline-trail-logs",
      retention: logs.RetentionDays.ONE_YEAR,
      encryptionKey: logsKey.key,
      removalPolicy: cdk.RemovalPolicy.RETAIN,
    });

    // ── Multi-region trail ──
    // Management events (read + write), log-file validation, global service
    // events, delivered to the KMS-encrypted bucket and to CloudWatch Logs.
    // Data events (CIS 3.10/3.11) intentionally deferred — management events
    // only for now to control cost (see README).
    const trail = new cloudtrail.Trail(this, "Trail", {
      trailName,
      bucket: logBucket,
      encryptionKey: trailKey,
      isMultiRegionTrail: true,
      // INFRA-73: promote to an organization trail. CloudTrail org
      // trusted-access is already enabled on the management account; this makes
      // the trail collect every member account's events into this bucket.
      // Passing orgId lets the L2 construct auto-attach the AWSLogs/<orgId>/*
      // bucket-policy PutObject statement (scoped to this trail's SourceArn).
      isOrganizationTrail: true,
      orgId,
      includeGlobalServiceEvents: true,
      enableFileValidation: true,
      sendToCloudWatchLogs: true,
      cloudWatchLogGroup: trailLogGroup,
      managementEvents: cloudtrail.ReadWriteType.ALL,
      // CloudTrail Insights (§37): compensating control for the residual risk
      // accepted in #36 (CFN/Config-proxied denials excluded from CIS 4.1) and
      // the low-and-slow evasion surface in the UnauthorizedApiCalls alarm.
      // ApiCallRateInsight flags anomalous write-API spikes; ApiErrorRateInsight
      // flags anomalous errored/denied call rates — including the denials CIS
      // 4.1 intentionally filters out. Per-event cost (≈$0.35/100k management
      // events); an org trail with 10–15M management events/month adds roughly
      // $35–$53/month. CIS 4.1 alarm + GuardDuty + Security Hub (CIS v3.0) are
      // already live, so this is defence-in-depth, not an urgent gap-fill.
      insightTypes: [
        cloudtrail.InsightType.API_CALL_RATE,
        cloudtrail.InsightType.API_ERROR_RATE,
      ],
    });

    // ── Day 1 detective layer + governance toggles ──
    // Config (H-2), GuardDuty (H-3), Security Hub (H-4), Access Analyzer (M-5).
    new DetectiveControls(this, "DetectiveControls", {
      namePrefix: "seahaven",
    });
    // Monthly cost budget (M-10). Other governance toggles are CLI + documented.
    new GovernanceToggles(this, "GovernanceToggles", {
      budgetName: "seahaven-monthly-cost",
      monthlyLimitUsd: props.monthlyBudgetUsd,
      alertEmail: props.budgetAlertEmail,
    });

    // ── Day 2 monitoring + logging ──
    // CIS Section 4 metric filters/alarms (H-1), VPC flow logs (H-14),
    // SES bounce/complaint config set (M-13).
    new CisMonitoring(this, "CisMonitoring", {
      alarmEmail: props.budgetAlertEmail,
      trailLogGroup,
    });
    new FlowLogs(this, "FlowLogs", {
      namePrefix: "seahaven",
      vpcIds: props.flowLogVpcIds,
    });
    new SesMonitoring(this, "SesMonitoring");
    // Shared CloudFront WAF WebACL (M-17); ARN published to SSM for app stacks.
    new AppWebAcl(this, "AppWebAcl");

    // ── Day 5 AI governance ──
    // Bedrock model invocation logging destinations + delivery role (H-20).
    // The account-level logging configuration itself has no CFN resource type;
    // applied via CLI post-deploy (see lib/bedrock-logging.ts header).
    new BedrockLogging(this, "BedrockLogging");

    cdk.Tags.of(this).add("Project", "account-baseline");
    cdk.Tags.of(this).add("Owner", "adam@seahavenind.com");
    cdk.Tags.of(this).add("Environment", "prod");
    cdk.Tags.of(this).add("ManagedBy", "cdk");

    new cdk.CfnOutput(this, "TrailArn", { value: trail.trailArn });
    new cdk.CfnOutput(this, "LogBucketName", { value: logBucket.bucketName });
    new cdk.CfnOutput(this, "TrailKmsKeyArn", { value: trailKey.keyArn });
  }
}