# seahaven-account-baseline

Account-level security and governance baseline for Sea Haven Industries
(AWS account **328440206208**), managed as a single CDK TypeScript app. Most
resources are in **us-east-1**; the offsite backup vault is in **us-west-2**.
This is where account-wide detective and recovery controls live, so they are
versioned, reviewed, and drift-checked like any other stack.

Stacks (all deployed by `cdk deploy --all` / the CD workflow):

| Stack | Region | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| `seahaven-account-baseline` | us-east-1 | CloudTrail + future detective controls (C-1) |
| `seahaven-backup` | us-east-1 | Primary AWS Backup vault + plan + role (C-7) |
| `seahaven-backup-offsite` | us-west-2 | Governance-locked offsite copy vault (C-7) |

## What it deploys

### CloudTrail (audit finding C-1)

| Resource | Logical ID | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Multi-region trail | `Trail` (`seahaven-org-trail`) | Management events read+write, global service events, **log-file validation on** |
| Log bucket | `TrailLogBucket` (`seahaven-cloudtrail-logs-328440206208`) | Private (Block Public Access all), SSE-KMS, versioned, **TLS-only**, **Object Lock GOVERNANCE 365d**, lifecycle (Glacier @90d, expire @365d), server access logging → `seahaven-s3-access-logs` |
| KMS CMK | `TrailKey` (`alias/cloudtrail-logs`) | Encrypts log files; **automatic rotation enabled** |
| CloudWatch Logs group | created by the L2 `Trail` | 365-day retention; this is the group the CIS Section 4 metric filters (H-1) attach to |

**Data flow:** API activity across all regions → CloudTrail → (a) KMS-encrypted,
Object-Locked S3 bucket for durable/tamper-resistant storage and (b) CloudWatch
Logs for real-time querying and metric-filter alarms.

**Compliance impact:** closes CIS 3.1 (multi-region trail), 3.2 (log-file
validation), 3.4 (CloudWatch Logs integration), 3.6 (bucket access logging),
3.7 (KMS CMK encryption), and 3.8 (CMK rotation). Unblocks CIS Section 4 /
finding H-1 (metric filters + alarms now have a log group to target).

### Design decisions

- **Management events only.** Object-level S3/Lambda data events (CIS 3.10/3.11)
  are deferred to control cost; revisit with targeted S3 *write* data events on
  sensitive buckets (payments / accounting / kb) if needed.
- **Object Lock GOVERNANCE, not COMPLIANCE.** Tamper-resistant but still
  deletable by a principal holding `s3:BypassGovernanceRetention` — avoids the
  irreversibility of COMPLIANCE mode. Revisit if a stricter posture is required.
- **RETAIN** on the bucket and KMS key so a stack teardown never destroys the
  audit trail.

### AWS Backup (audit finding C-7)

Phase 1 ("critical data first") of fixing the account's complete lack of AWS
Backup. Protects the data stores with no offsite leg today and copies each
recovery point cross-region into a governance-locked vault.

| Resource | Logical ID | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Primary vault | `seahaven-primary` (us-east-1) | KMS-CMK encrypted, unlocked (working copy), RETAIN |
| Offsite vault | `seahaven-offsite` (us-west-2) | KMS-CMK encrypted, **Vault Lock GOVERNANCE** (min-retention 30d, no cooling-off window), RETAIN |
| Backup plan | `seahaven-critical-daily` | Daily 06:00 UTC, delete-after 35d, **cross-region CopyAction → offsite** (retain 90d) |
| Service role | `seahaven-backup-service-role` | **Backup-only** (Backup + S3-Backup managed policies); restore perms intentionally deferred |

**Phase-1 scope** (selected by explicit ARN, not tags, to avoid drifting other
stacks): RDS `database-1`, RDS `proposal-system-db`, DynamoDB `PaymentsDashboard`,
DynamoDB `purchase-orders`, S3 `accounting.seahaven.com`,
`seahaven-payments-csv-328440206208`, `google-workspace-seahavenind.com`.

**Coexists with** existing EBS DLM snapshots and DynamoDB PITR — it supplements
them with the missing offsite + immutable leg; it does not replace them.

**Design decisions:**

- **Governance lock first, not compliance.** Recovery points can't be silently
  deleted, but a principal with explicit permission can still intervene while
  we validate. Graduate to COMPLIANCE (irreversible) later by adding
  `changeableFor` to the offsite vault lock + redeploy.
- **Backup-only role.** Restore policies and `allowRestores` are not granted;
  restores get a separate audited path once a restore-test process exists.

**Pre-deploy gates** (must clear before the first scheduled run):

1. Enable S3 versioning on `seahaven-payments-csv-328440206208` and
   `google-workspace-seahavenind.com` (`accounting.seahaven.com` already has it,
   audit C-9), or their jobs fail silently (folds in H-21).
2. `database-1` is unencrypted (H-19): smoke-test an on-demand backup + copy of
   it to us-west-2 first; if the copy fails, encrypt it or drop it from the copy.
3. Enable DynamoDB PITR (H-7) on the two tables for between-window recovery.

## Roadmap (same stack)

Account-level detective controls with no current home, to be added to the
`account-baseline` stack: AWS Config (H-2), GuardDuty (H-3), Security Hub (H-4),
IAM Access Analyzer (M-5), Inspector2 (M-6). Backup phase 2: expand past the
phase-1 set via tag-based selection and graduate the offsite vault to compliance
mode.

## Deploy

CI/CD via the org reusable workflows (`ci-typescript-cdk.yaml`,
`cd-cdk.yaml`); pushes to `main` deploy through the OIDC role in
`secrets.AWS_DEPLOY_ROLE_ARN`. Local: `npm ci && npm run build && npx cdk diff`.

```
npx cdk deploy seahaven-account-baseline
```

## Verify

```
aws cloudtrail get-trail-status --name seahaven-org-trail        # IsLogging: true
aws cloudtrail describe-trails --trail-name-list seahaven-org-trail
aws cloudtrail validate-logs --trail-arn <arn> --start-time <t>  # digest integrity
```

AWS Backup (C-7):

```
aws backup list-backup-vaults                                    # seahaven-primary
aws backup list-backup-vaults --region us-west-2                 # seahaven-offsite
aws backup describe-backup-vault --backup-vault-name seahaven-offsite --region us-west-2  # Locked, MinRetentionDays
aws backup get-backup-plan --backup-plan-id <id>                 # daily rule + CopyAction
# Smoke test: on-demand backup of one resource, then confirm the cross-region copy lands
aws backup start-backup-job --backup-vault-name seahaven-primary \
  --resource-arn arn:aws:rds:us-east-1:328440206208:db:database-1 \
  --iam-role-arn arn:aws:iam::328440206208:role/seahaven-backup-service-role
aws backup list-copy-jobs --region us-west-2                     # copy to offsite present + COMPLETED
```