diff --git a/lib/backup-stack.ts b/lib/backup-stack.ts
index b8b0d53..f53d089 100644
--- a/lib/backup-stack.ts
+++ b/lib/backup-stack.ts
@@ -87,10 +87,13 @@ export class BackupStack extends cdk.Stack {
     // is written to MATCH the live lock exactly, so the deploy diff is a no-op
     // adoption — it does not change the live vault.
     //
-    // The vault carries a scoped access policy (below) denying manual recovery-
-    // point deletion to everyone except a break-glass principal and the Backup
-    // service role, so lifecycle expiry still works but humans cannot prune
-    // recovery points by hand.
+    // NOTE: the scoped vault access policy that previously lived here was DROPPED
+    // from this deploy (INFRA-94). Attaching a BackupVaultAccessPolicy that
+    // denies DeleteBackupVault / PutBackupVaultLockConfiguration to all but a
+    // break-glass principal made the vault unmanageable by CloudFormation/CDK.
+    // The deny-manual-deletion control is tracked separately in INFRA-94 and
+    // will be reintroduced via a safe mechanism. Governance lock codify +
+    // backup selections land here.
     const primaryVault = new backup.BackupVault(this, "PrimaryVault", {
       backupVaultName: "seahaven-primary",
       encryptionKey: vaultKey,
@@ -102,49 +105,6 @@ export class BackupStack extends cdk.Stack {
       },
     });
 
-    // Break-glass principal exempt from the deny below. The SSO
-    // AdministratorAccess permission-set role is the only path to assume an
-    // admin identity in this account; deletions still require its explicit use
-    // (and are CloudTrail-audited). The SSO role name carries a hash suffix, so
-    // a wildcard is required to match it.
-    const breakGlassRoleArnPattern = `arn:${this.partition}:iam::${this.account}:role/aws-reserved/sso.amazonaws.com/AWSReservedSSO_AdministratorAccess_*`;
-    const backupServiceRoleArn = `arn:${this.partition}:iam::${this.account}:role/seahaven-backup-service-role`;
-
-    // Scoped vault access policy (INFRA-89): deny MANUAL deletion of recovery
-    // points / lifecycle tampering to all principals EXCEPT the break-glass SSO
-    // admin and the AWS Backup service role.
-    //
-    // IMPORTANT (cross-review BLOCK, GPT-4.1): `NotPrincipal` does NOT support
-    // wildcard matching — a wildcarded ARN there is treated literally and would
-    // silently FAIL to exempt the hash-suffixed SSO role, trapping the vault.
-    // So we use the robust pattern instead: Effect DENY with Principal `*` and a
-    // `StringNotLike` condition on `aws:PrincipalArn` (which DOES support
-    // wildcards). Lifecycle expiry is performed by the AWS Backup service itself
-    // (not a caller subject to this policy), so automatic expiry is unaffected;
-    // `UpdateRecoveryPointLifecycle` is denied to humans to prevent retention
-    // tampering, while the two exempted principals retain full control.
-    primaryVault.addToAccessPolicy(
-      new iam.PolicyStatement({
-        sid: "DenyManualRecoveryPointDeletion",
-        effect: iam.Effect.DENY,
-        principals: [new iam.AnyPrincipal()],
-        actions: [
-          "backup:DeleteRecoveryPoint",
-          "backup:UpdateRecoveryPointLifecycle",
-          "backup:DeleteBackupVault",
-          "backup:DeleteBackupVaultAccessPolicy",
-          "backup:DeleteBackupVaultLockConfiguration",
-          "backup:PutBackupVaultLockConfiguration",
-        ],
-        resources: ["*"],
-        conditions: {
-          StringNotLike: {
-            "aws:PrincipalArn": [breakGlassRoleArnPattern, backupServiceRoleArn],
-          },
-        },
-      })
-    );
-
     // Cross-region copy destination, referenced by literal ARN (the offsite
     // stack is in another region; a literal ARN avoids crossRegionReferences /
     // SSM exports). Stack ordering is enforced via addDependency in bin/app.ts.