fix(web): harden auth session teardown per /sh-security-review findings

- AUTH-L1 (confirmed medium): logout() now clears the react-query cache —
  the singleton cache survived SPA logout, serving the previous
  principal's cached GETs to the next login in the same tab for up to
  staleTime with no server round-trip.
- AUTH-L3 (confirmed low): isTokenValid decodes base64url before atob —
  valid Cognito JWTs containing '-'/'_' in the payload segment were
  misclassified as expired (login lockout/loop; inherited from the old
  authSlice).
- AUTH-L2 (unverified, hardened anyway): 401 interceptor broadcasts
  AUTH_SESSION_CLEARED_EVENT so AuthProvider drops in-memory state
  synchronously, restoring the old Redux atomic-clear semantics.
- INJ-1 (unverified, hardened anyway): Authorization header only set
  when the stored token is a string.

Each fix pinned by a test; 63 vitest green, tsc clean.
This commit is contained in:
Adam Moussa 2026-07-13 19:43:48 -04:00
parent 8fbca7f780
commit 5441836274
No known key found for this signature in database
6 changed files with 79 additions and 8 deletions

View file

@ -120,6 +120,18 @@ describe('API client interceptors', () => {
expect(result.headers.Authorization).toBeUndefined();
});
it('does not attach header when the token field is not a string', () => {
sessionStorageData['proposal_system_token'] = JSON.stringify({ token: { a: 1 } });
const config = {
headers: {} as Record<string, string>,
} as unknown as InternalAxiosRequestConfig;
const result = interceptors.requestFulfilled(config);
expect(result.headers.Authorization).toBeUndefined();
});
it('WEB-C1: does not attach header when token field is missing in parsed data', () => {
sessionStorageData['proposal_system_token'] = JSON.stringify({ email: 'user@test.com' });

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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
import axios from 'axios';
import { API_URL, STORAGE_KEY_TOKEN } from '../../constants';
import { clearAuth } from '../auth/authStorage';
import { AUTH_SESSION_CLEARED_EVENT, clearAuth } from '../auth/authStorage';
const apiClient = axios.create({
baseURL: API_URL,
@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ apiClient.interceptors.request.use(
if (tokenData) {
try {
const parsed = JSON.parse(tokenData);
if (parsed?.token) {
if (typeof parsed?.token === 'string') {
config.headers.Authorization = `Bearer ${parsed.token}`;
}
} catch {
@ -35,9 +35,10 @@ apiClient.interceptors.response.use(
const { status, data } = error.response;
if (status === 401) {
// Fix: WEB-M2 — clear the stored session before redirecting; the full-page
// navigation resets the AuthProvider, so context state re-derives as logged out.
// Fix: WEB-M2 — terminate the session atomically: clear storage, tell the
// AuthProvider to drop in-memory state, then hard-redirect as belt-and-braces.
clearAuth();
window.dispatchEvent(new Event(AUTH_SESSION_CLEARED_EVENT));
window.location.href = '/login';
return Promise.reject(new Error('Session expired. Please log in again.'));
}

View file

@ -67,6 +67,17 @@ describe('authStorage', () => {
expect(isTokenValid(createToken(-3600))).toBe(false);
});
it('isTokenValid accepts a base64url payload (JWT segments are base64url, not base64)', () => {
// '>>>' encodes to 'Pj4-' in base64url — the '-' made the old atob() call throw.
const payload = btoa(JSON.stringify({ sub: '>>>>>>', exp: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + 3600 }))
.replace(/\+/g, '-')
.replace(/\//g, '_')
.replace(/=+$/, '');
expect(payload).toMatch(/[-_]/);
expect(isTokenValid(`${btoa(JSON.stringify({ alg: 'HS256' }))}.${payload}.sig`)).toBe(true);
});
it('QA-C5: isTokenValid rejects missing or malformed tokens', () => {
expect(isTokenValid(null)).toBe(false);
expect(isTokenValid(undefined)).toBe(false);

View file

@ -22,12 +22,17 @@ export function clearAuth(): void {
window.sessionStorage.removeItem(STORAGE_KEY_TOKEN); // WEB-C1
}
// Dispatched by non-React code (the 401 interceptor) so AuthProvider can drop
// in-memory session state synchronously, keeping storage and context atomic.
export const AUTH_SESSION_CLEARED_EVENT = 'auth:session-cleared';
export function isTokenValid(token: string | null | undefined): boolean {
if (!token) return false;
try {
const part = token.split('.')[1];
if (!part) return false;
const payload = JSON.parse(atob(part));
// JWT segments are base64url; atob only accepts standard base64.
const payload = JSON.parse(atob(part.replace(/-/g, '+').replace(/_/g, '/')));
return new Date(payload.exp * 1000) > new Date();
} catch {
return false;

View file

@ -3,9 +3,16 @@
// this provider only owns the in-memory state. Token acquisition (Cognito code
// exchange, dev-login) stays in the auth pages — they hand the resolved AuthUser
// to login().
import { useCallback, useMemo, useState, type ReactNode } from 'react';
import { useCallback, useEffect, useMemo, useState, type ReactNode } from 'react';
import type { AuthUser } from '@proposal-system/api-contracts';
import { clearAuth, getAuthUser, isTokenValid, setAuthUser } from '../lib/auth/authStorage';
import {
AUTH_SESSION_CLEARED_EVENT,
clearAuth,
getAuthUser,
isTokenValid,
setAuthUser,
} from '../lib/auth/authStorage';
import { queryClient } from '../lib/queryClient';
import { AuthContext, type AuthContextValue } from './authContext';
export default function AuthProvider({ children }: { children: ReactNode }) {
@ -22,10 +29,22 @@ export default function AuthProvider({ children }: { children: ReactNode }) {
const logout = useCallback(() => {
clearAuth();
// Drop all principal-scoped state: cached queries must not survive into the
// next login in the same tab, or query keys shared across users would serve
// the previous principal's data without hitting the server.
queryClient.clear();
setUser(null);
setErrorState(null);
}, []);
// The 401 interceptor clears storage outside React; mirror it here so context
// state never outlives the stored session while the redirect commits.
useEffect(() => {
const onSessionCleared = () => setUser(null);
window.addEventListener(AUTH_SESSION_CLEARED_EVENT, onSessionCleared);
return () => window.removeEventListener(AUTH_SESSION_CLEARED_EVENT, onSessionCleared);
}, []);
const setError = useCallback((message: string | null) => {
setErrorState(message);
setIsLoading(false);

View file

@ -13,7 +13,8 @@ import { describe, it, expect, beforeEach } from 'vitest';
import type { AuthUser } from '@proposal-system/api-contracts';
import AuthProvider from '../AuthProvider';
import { useAuthContext } from '../authContext';
import { setAuthUser } from '../../lib/auth/authStorage';
import { AUTH_SESSION_CLEARED_EVENT, setAuthUser } from '../../lib/auth/authStorage';
import { queryClient } from '../../lib/queryClient';
import { STORAGE_KEY_TOKEN } from '../../constants';
function createToken(expOffsetSeconds: number): string {
@ -78,6 +79,28 @@ describe('AuthProvider', () => {
expect(window.sessionStorage.getItem(STORAGE_KEY_TOKEN)).toBeNull();
});
it('logout clears the react-query cache so the next principal cannot read cached data', () => {
queryClient.setQueryData(['proposals', 'list'], [{ id: 'p1' }]);
const { result } = renderAuth();
act(() => result.current.login(createUser()));
act(() => result.current.logout());
expect(queryClient.getQueryData(['proposals', 'list'])).toBeUndefined();
});
it('drops in-memory session state when the 401 interceptor broadcasts session-cleared', () => {
const { result } = renderAuth();
act(() => result.current.login(createUser()));
act(() => {
window.dispatchEvent(new Event(AUTH_SESSION_CLEARED_EVENT));
});
expect(result.current.user).toBeNull();
expect(result.current.isAuthenticated).toBe(false);
});
it('QA-C5: initializes from an existing stored session', () => {
const user = createUser();
setAuthUser(user);