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https://github.com/Sea-Haven-Industries/procurement-ingest.git
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Adam Moussa
447b0619ad
The From header and any raw-MIME Authentication-Results copies are attacker-forgeable, so a forged email to apm@int.seahaven.com or amazon_po@int.seahaven.com could create or mutate a WO/PO (INFRA-107, CRITICAL). Both S3-triggered email processors now authenticate the sender against the Authentication-Results header SES itself prepends at delivery: only the topmost header is consulted, its authserv-id must be amazonses.com, and it must carry dkim=pass for a domain in the per-pipeline ALLOWED_DKIM_DOMAINS env var (comma-separated, set in CDK so ops can adjust without code changes). Allowlists come from live traffic observed 2026-07-15 on both ingest buckets: WO mail arrives via the apm@ Google Groups forward, which re-signs as seahaven.com (the hxgnsmartcloud.com signature does not survive the forward); PO mail passes for amazon.coupahost.com. amazonses.com also passes on PO mail but is deliberately excluded -- every SES customer's outbound mail passes for it. Every failure path (env var unset, header missing or unparseable, verdict fail, unaligned domain) rejects the email: a structured warning with the reason and S3 key is logged and the record skipped without erroring the invocation, so rejected mail causes no Lambda retries or DLQ messages. Handler signatures and event sources are unchanged. Refs: INFRA-107 |
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| .. | ||
| app.py | ||
| cdk.json | ||
| po_stack.py | ||
| requirements.txt | ||
| wo_stack.py | ||