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Implements docs/shoc-webhook-plan.md Phases 1-5 (PR-2 of the SHOC call-and-be-called effort). Everything ships DARK: both DynamoDB event source mappings deploy enabled=False; activation is a deliberate one-line follow-up PR gated on the SHOC receiver passing the shared HMAC test vectors. - Streams: NEW_AND_OLD_IMAGES on WorkOrders + WorkOrderComments (in-place update, RETAIN + logical IDs untouched; no existing consumers — verified live, neither table had a stream). - workorder-shoc-emitter (Py3.12/ARM64): stream -> envelope -> HMAC-signed POST per docs/shoc-webhook-contract.md; strict per-shard ordering (parallelization 1, bisect off, retry until 24h age, ReportBatchItemFailures); 429/5xx/timeout block the shard in order, other 4xx park to workorder-shoc-emitter-rejected; ESM failures -> workorder-shoc-emitter-failures (metadata; replay rebuilds from DynamoDB). Echo guard skips write_origin=shoc-write-api. - Secret workorder-ingest/shoc-webhook-hmac on a dedicated CMK (alias workorder-ingest-shoc-webhook-kms); cross-account GetSecretValue/DescribeSecret + kms:Decrypt granted to exactly arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev. RemovalPolicy DESTROY deliberately (machine-generated material; avoids the fixed-name RETAIN-orphan deadlock). - workorder-shoc-hmac-rotator: 30-day rotation, dual-key overlap, 64-hex keys, kid = UTC %Y-%m-%dT%H. - Alarms (ALARM-only -> site-alerts): emitter errors/throttles/ duration + iterator-age (>=10 min) + failures/rejected queue depth; rotator standard trio. - scripts/replay_shoc_webhooks.py: dry-run-default operator replay (rebuilds from tables, replay:true envelopes). - Tests: 742 passing, 85.56% aggregate; golden HMAC vectors shared with SHOC in docs/shoc-webhook-test-vectors.json (emitter + replay signing pinned to identical vectors); bundle-consistency AST pins for both new bundles. - README: WO stack + webhook feed section, alarm table, runbooks; removed stale seahaven-slack-bot consumer references.
226 lines
7.9 KiB
Python
226 lines
7.9 KiB
Python
"""Rotation Lambda for the SHOC webhook HMAC secret.
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Secrets Manager invokes this on the 30-day rotation schedule for
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``workorder-ingest/shoc-webhook-hmac`` (docs/shoc-webhook-contract.md section
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6.1). Secret value shape::
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{"keys": [{"kid": "<YYYY-MM-DDTHH>", "secret": "<64 hex chars>"}, ...]}
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newest first, truncated to 2 entries (one overlap cycle). The emitter always
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signs with ``keys[0]``; the SHOC receiver accepts any listed ``kid``.
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This is *single-user* rotation: no external system holds the value -- both
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sides re-fetch from Secrets Manager on their own <=5-minute cache TTLs -- so
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the standard 4-step protocol collapses to createSecret/finishSecret, with
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setSecret a logged no-op and testSecret validating the pending value's shape.
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The secret material is machine-generated HMAC key bytes and is NEVER logged;
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structured logs carry only step names, version ids, and ``kid`` values.
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"""
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import json
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import logging
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import re
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import secrets
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from datetime import datetime, timezone
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import boto3
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logger = logging.getLogger()
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logger.setLevel(logging.INFO)
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# One overlap cycle: the new key plus the previous key (contract section 6.1).
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MAX_KEYS = 2
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# 32 random bytes -> secrets.token_hex emits 64 lowercase hex chars.
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SECRET_NUM_BYTES = 32
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SECRET_HEX_PATTERN = re.compile(r"[0-9a-f]{64}")
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KID_FORMAT = "%Y-%m-%dT%H"
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# Forced re-rotation within the same hour needs a distinct kid.
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KID_FORMAT_INTRA_HOUR = "%Y-%m-%dT%H%M"
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# Lazy cached Secrets Manager client. Keeps the public attribute name
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# ``secretsmanager_client`` so the test monkeypatch target is stable.
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secretsmanager_client = None
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def _get_client():
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global secretsmanager_client
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if secretsmanager_client is None:
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secretsmanager_client = boto3.client("secretsmanager")
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return secretsmanager_client
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def _current_keys(client, secret_id: str) -> list:
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"""Read the AWSCURRENT ``keys`` list, tolerating malformed prior values.
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The CDK-seeded bootstrap value is ``{"keys": [], "bootstrap_entropy": ...}``;
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any unparseable or wrong-shape prior value likewise falls back to ``[]``
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(rotation then simply starts a fresh key list -- the material is fully
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regenerable, receivers refresh within their TTL).
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"""
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try:
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raw = client.get_secret_value(SecretId=secret_id, VersionStage="AWSCURRENT")
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parsed = json.loads(raw["SecretString"])
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except Exception:
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logger.warning(
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json.dumps(
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{"event": "hmac_rotation_current_unreadable", "fallback": "empty"}
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)
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)
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return []
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keys = parsed.get("keys") if isinstance(parsed, dict) else None
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if not isinstance(keys, list) or not all(
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isinstance(key, dict)
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and isinstance(key.get("kid"), str)
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and isinstance(key.get("secret"), str)
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for key in keys
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):
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logger.warning(
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json.dumps(
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{"event": "hmac_rotation_current_malformed", "fallback": "empty"}
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)
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)
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return []
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return keys
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def _create_secret(client, secret_id: str, token: str) -> None:
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"""Stage a new AWSPENDING value: fresh key prepended, list truncated to 2."""
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versions = client.describe_secret(SecretId=secret_id).get("VersionIdsToStages", {})
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if "AWSCURRENT" in versions.get(token, []):
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logger.info(
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json.dumps(
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{"event": "hmac_rotation_create_already_current", "version_id": token}
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)
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)
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return
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try:
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client.get_secret_value(
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SecretId=secret_id, VersionId=token, VersionStage="AWSPENDING"
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)
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# This token's version already holds a value: retried createSecret
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# invocation, nothing to do.
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logger.info(
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json.dumps(
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{"event": "hmac_rotation_create_idempotent", "version_id": token}
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)
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)
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return
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except client.exceptions.ResourceNotFoundException:
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pass
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current_keys = _current_keys(client, secret_id)
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now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
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new_kid = now.strftime(KID_FORMAT)
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if current_keys and current_keys[0]["kid"] == new_kid:
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new_kid = now.strftime(KID_FORMAT_INTRA_HOUR)
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new_key = {"kid": new_kid, "secret": secrets.token_hex(SECRET_NUM_BYTES)}
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client.put_secret_value(
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SecretId=secret_id,
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ClientRequestToken=token,
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SecretString=json.dumps({"keys": [new_key] + current_keys[: MAX_KEYS - 1]}),
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VersionStages=["AWSPENDING"],
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)
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logger.info(
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json.dumps(
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{
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"event": "hmac_rotation_pending_staged",
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"version_id": token,
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"kid": new_kid,
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"key_count": 1 + len(current_keys[: MAX_KEYS - 1]),
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}
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)
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)
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def _set_secret(client, secret_id: str, token: str) -> None:
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"""No-op: no external system holds the value (single-user rotation)."""
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logger.info(
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json.dumps({"event": "hmac_rotation_set_secret_noop", "version_id": token})
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)
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def _test_secret(client, secret_id: str, token: str) -> None:
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"""Validate the AWSPENDING value's shape; raise ValueError to fail rotation."""
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pending = client.get_secret_value(
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SecretId=secret_id, VersionId=token, VersionStage="AWSPENDING"
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)
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# json.JSONDecodeError is a ValueError subclass: bad JSON fails the rotation.
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parsed = json.loads(pending["SecretString"])
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keys = parsed.get("keys") if isinstance(parsed, dict) else None
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if not isinstance(keys, list) or not keys:
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raise ValueError("AWSPENDING value has no keys list")
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head = keys[0]
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if not isinstance(head, dict) or not isinstance(head.get("kid"), str):
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raise ValueError("AWSPENDING keys[0] has no string kid")
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secret_value = head.get("secret")
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if not isinstance(secret_value, str) or not SECRET_HEX_PATTERN.fullmatch(
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secret_value
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):
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raise ValueError("AWSPENDING keys[0].secret is not 64 lowercase hex chars")
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logger.info(
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json.dumps(
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{
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"event": "hmac_rotation_test_ok",
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"version_id": token,
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"kid": head["kid"],
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}
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)
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)
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def _finish_secret(client, secret_id: str, token: str) -> None:
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"""Move AWSCURRENT to the pending version (idempotent on retry)."""
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versions = client.describe_secret(SecretId=secret_id).get("VersionIdsToStages", {})
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current_version_id = None
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for version_id, stages in versions.items():
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if "AWSCURRENT" in stages:
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current_version_id = version_id
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break
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if current_version_id == token:
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logger.info(
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json.dumps(
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{"event": "hmac_rotation_finish_idempotent", "version_id": token}
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)
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)
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return
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stage_move = {
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"SecretId": secret_id,
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"VersionStage": "AWSCURRENT",
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"MoveToVersionId": token,
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}
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if current_version_id is not None:
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stage_move["RemoveFromVersionId"] = current_version_id
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client.update_secret_version_stage(**stage_move)
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logger.info(
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json.dumps(
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{
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"event": "hmac_rotation_finished",
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"moved_to": token,
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"removed_from": current_version_id,
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}
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)
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)
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def handler(event, context):
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"""Secrets Manager rotation entry point.
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``event`` = ``{"SecretId", "ClientRequestToken", "Step"}``; dispatches the
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standard rotation steps. Unknown steps raise (rotation marked failed).
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"""
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secret_id = event["SecretId"]
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token = event["ClientRequestToken"]
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step = event["Step"]
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logger.info(
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json.dumps({"event": "hmac_rotation_step", "step": step, "version_id": token})
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)
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client = _get_client()
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steps = {
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"createSecret": _create_secret,
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"setSecret": _set_secret,
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"testSecret": _test_secret,
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"finishSecret": _finish_secret,
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}
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if step not in steps:
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raise ValueError(f"Unknown rotation step: {step}")
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steps[step](client, secret_id, token)
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