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* fix: add fail-closed validation gate and XML-delimited prompt on ai_fallback path The ai_fallback parse path applied no validation gate to raw Bedrock/LLM output before DynamoDB writes, and the extraction prompt concatenated the untrusted email body directly with no instructions-vs-data delimiter. A DKIM-passing attacker could prompt-inject arbitrary field values into the work-order store. Changes: - wrap untrusted email in \<email\> XML block with prompt instructing the model to treat its contents as data only - add validate_ai_fallback() in template_parser that enforces the same contract keys, enums, and patterns as the template path before any write - call validate_ai_fallback() in handler() dispatch; emit an ai_fallback_rejected EMF metric on failure and skip the record - add 17 unit tests covering every gate rule and two end-to-end dispatch tests (injected email_type, injected status) Refs #101 * style: apply ruff formatting to fix CI check * harden ai_fallback gate: review fixes + security-review findings Review follow-up on the ai_fallback validation gate (PR #104), plus findings from a fan-out /sh-security-review of the change surface. Reviewer FIX items: - Neutralize forged <email> delimiters in the untrusted body before wrapping, so an in-body </email> cannot escape the data block. - Fail closed on non-dict model output instead of crashing the handler into async retries; count ai_fallback_rejected parses in the fallback-rate alarm and add a dedicated rejected-parse alarm so a gate-rejection drift outage is not silent. - Return a distinct invalid_status reason (was malformed_site_code); validate ISO-8601 dates; README + docstring updates. Security-review findings (detector fan-out + proof-or-kill verifier): - ReDoS (confirmed, medium): the tag neutralizer used two \s* around an optional /, backtracking quadratically on "<" + a long whitespace run (~32s at 100k chars -- one email could time out the Lambda). Collapse to a single [\s/]* class: linear, same defanging. - Unhashable-type crash (confirmed): a JSON list/dict for email_type or status made `x in <set>` raise TypeError, escaping the gate into retries. Guard with isinstance(str) before membership. - Unicode/newline regex (confirmed): _WO_ID_RE/_SITE_CODE_RE used ^..$ with \d, admitting fullwidth digits ("１２３４５" as a lookalike partition key) and trailing newlines. Switch to \A[0-9]+\Z (and the handler's inline recheck to [0-9]) so neither passes. - Alarm comment (confirmed, low): corrected the "slow trickle still pages" wording -- rejections >~25-30 min apart page on neither alarm, the same knowingly-accepted residual as sender-auth-rejected. Refuted: residual free-text prompt injection is inherent to trusting allowlisted senders, not a new primitive; no DynamoDB key-poisoning bypass survives both gates ('#' can never enter work_order_id). 7 new regression tests. All 260 tests pass; ruff clean; cdk synth OK. --------- Co-authored-by: amoussa1229 <166072409+amoussa1229@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Adam Moussa <adam@seahavenind.com> |
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