mirror of
https://github.com/Sea-Haven-Industries/procurement-ingest.git
synced 2026-10-07 16:08:54 +00:00
Adam Moussa
c8450458e3
seahaven-slack-bot was decommissioned 2026-07-23 (stack DELETE_IN_PROGRESS,
consumer Lambdas gone); its successor sh-mcp is undeployed and uses
same-account DynamoDB access. So no live consumer reads these tables
cross-account. Per Adam's call, drop the cross-account grants entirely and
re-add correctly-scoped ones if/when sh-mcp deploys to a different account.
- Remove the four table resource policies + make_slack_bot_read_policy helper
+ its constants (cdk/common.py, po_stack.py, wo_stack.py) and the helper's
unit test. Both stacks synth with zero table ResourcePolicy.
- scripts/migrate_tables.py hardening (fixes from the sh-security-review
fan-out on the destructive backfill tool):
* validate --cutoff strictly (parse ISO-8601, require aware UTC, re-emit
canonical second-precision form) so a malformed cutoff can't silently
copy dual-window rows or drop history;
* reject `copy --all` up front (must run tables individually, in order,
with the stream-drain wait) instead of writing three tables then erroring;
* truncate backup gate now also checks recency (<1h) and TableId, not just
status+name;
* verify requires --cutoff whenever a cutoff table is in scope (else it
false-flags dual-window rows as MISSING);
* sticky-cancel is now PREVENTED copy-side (a non-Cancelled source item
never overwrites a dest-Cancelled PO), and the verify comment no longer
overstates what its source-side scan covers;
* spot-check all modes (truncate_load keys are verbatim, so key-existence
is sound there too).
- Deploy role: scope cloudformation:DescribeStacks to this repo's stacks +
CDKToolkit (was Resource:*, disclosed all tenant stacks in the shared prod
account); add a drift check warning on unexpected role policies and drop the
dead SMOKE_POLICY_NAME var; document the shared-account bootstrap-role
accepted risk in the deploy-role README.
|
||
|---|---|---|
| .. | ||
| create-deploy-role.sh | ||
| permissions-policy.json | ||
| README.md | ||
| trust-policy.json | ||
Deploy role: githubdeploy-procurement-ingest (seahaven-prod)
OIDC deploy role for this repo's GitHub Actions pipeline in AWS account
011934824531 (seahaven-prod), us-east-1. Created as part of the migration
from the management account (328440206208); the mgmt role of the same name
stays untouched until decommission as the emergency mgmt deploy path.
Files
| File | Purpose |
|---|---|
trust-policy.json |
OIDC trust: repo:Sea-Haven-Industries/procurement-ingest:ref:refs/heads/main only |
permissions-policy.json |
sts:AssumeRole on the four cdk-hnb659fds-* bootstrap roles, cloudformation:DescribeStacks (cd-cdk health check), and lambda:InvokeFunction on exactly the two email-processor function ARNs (post-deploy smoke gate) |
create-deploy-role.sh |
Idempotent create-or-update from the two JSON files, profile seahaven-prod |
Why the SmokeInvokeLambda statement exists
deploy.yaml runs scripts/post-deploy-smoke.sh under the deploy role's own
session, not the assumed cdk-* roles. Without lambda:InvokeFunction on the
two function ARNs the smoke gate hits AccessDenied and every deploy fails
closed. The mgmt-era grant was applied out-of-band and undocumented; keeping
it in these reviewed artifacts closes that gap. Scope it to exactly the two
ARNs, never Resource: "*".
Change process
- Edit the JSON artifacts on a branch; both gates must pass on the exact files before anything is applied: GPT-4.1 cross-family review (cross_review.py) and /sh-security-review.
- Run
./create-deploy-role.sh(idempotent) with the seahaven-prod profile. - Verify:
aws iam simulate-principal-policyfor the bootstrap-role AssumeRole and both InvokeFunction ARNs, then a real pipeline run.