mirror of
https://github.com/Sea-Haven-Industries/procurement-ingest.git
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Adam Moussa
7569bd8250
High-recall detector fan-out (injection/authz/secrets-crypto/iac-iam/logic) + proof-or-kill verifier. Gate PASSES: 1 confirmed medium, 0 confirmed critical/high. Confirmed finding fixed; several unverified-but-cheap hardenings applied since the emitter ships dark and activation is weeks out. - CONFIRMED medium (confused deputy): the rotation Lambda's generated invoke permission for secretsmanager.amazonaws.com carried no SourceAccount/SourceArn, so any account's Secrets Manager could invoke the rotator. Patched the generated CfnPermission in place (a second permission would be additive, not restrictive) to pin account + this secret ARN. - delivery + replay: refuse to follow receiver 3xx redirects (no-redirect opener) so live X-SH-* auth headers can't be forwarded to a receiver-chosen Location and an http:// Location can't slip past the https guard. Fixed the "unfollowed 3xx" comment that was factually wrong. - delivery: classify 401/403 as retryable (invalidate key cache + retry in order) instead of parking -- transient auth failures (rotation outran the TTL cache, clock skew) are availability events, not contract bugs. - envelope: build_event now genuinely total (guarded eventID / ApproximateCreationDateTime subscripts) per its own never-raise contract. - handler: catch-all so an unexpected per-record error (e.g. SQS park failure) reports only that record instead of failing the whole batch (which would re-deliver every earlier success for 24h); per-invocation emit/skip batch summary so a systemic silent drop is queryable/alarmable. - rotator: narrow the AWSCURRENT-read except to ResourceNotFound/JSONDecode (transient SM/KMS errors re-raise so the overlap key isn't silently dropped); kid uniqueness checked against ALL retained kids with a random suffix on collision (never reissue a kid for a different secret). - contract: skeleton-upsert required on ANY unknown work_order_id (not just comment-before-create) + monotonicity guard (ignore older updated_at), so a parked created or an out-of-order replay can't corrupt receiver state. Unverified/refuted findings left as-is with rationale: the two "high" logic claims (whole-batch crash triggers, ordering violation) were refuted on reachability (real stream records carry required fields; persistence writes strings only; full-state idempotent upsert absorbs the ordering gap). Signed kid/version binding (AUTHZ-002) declined: coordinated contract change, not cheap, no exploit with one algorithm/key. |
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| .. | ||
| support | ||
| requirements.txt | ||
| test_api_handlers.py | ||
| test_api_pagination_moto.py | ||
| test_api_spec_drift.py | ||
| test_bundle_consistency.py | ||
| test_cross_account_principal_pin.py | ||
| test_handler_auth_seam.py | ||
| test_parse_raw_email.py | ||
| test_replay_shoc_webhooks_contract.py | ||
| test_reprocess_contract.py | ||
| test_ses_auth.py | ||
| test_shoc_emitter_delivery.py | ||
| test_shoc_emitter_envelope.py | ||
| test_shoc_emitter_handler.py | ||
| test_shoc_hmac_rotator.py | ||
| test_web_ui_auth.py | ||
| test_web_ui_handlers.py | ||