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* feat: Python derived-field classifier with shadow telemetry for PO ingest Port the site_code/trade/fiscal_year rules from EXTRACTION_PROMPT into a pure, total derived_fields module applied in the shared enrich_parsed() post-stage. Python fills gaps on both parse paths (the template path has no LLM values, closing the derived-field gap opened by the PR #105 two-PR split) and never overwrites a non-null LLM value; on ai_fallback a DerivedFieldAgreement EMF record per field shadows Python against the LLM during the bake. Rules hardened against a full-corpus backtest (3,422 real emails vs the LLM-written baseline): site_code 99.4% with zero Python-wrong cases, fiscal_year 100%, trade 96.8% ex-deliberate. Also: quantity/price now declared numeric in the prompt, and derived_fields.py added to the po_stack bundling copy (deploy-time ImportError otherwise). * fix: security-review hardening — EMF value length clamp, aggregate trade CPU budget sh-security-review (4 detectors + proof-or-kill verifier): PASS, 0 confirmed critical/high. Fixes the one confirmed low (unbounded LLM-value str() into the DerivedFieldAgreement EMF log line, clamped to 64 chars) and adds the verifier-recommended defense-in-depth aggregate character budget across line items in derive_trade (per-item caps alone allowed ~10s full-core on a pathological direct-call input; unreachable through the deployed handler but cheap to bound). Bundling cp list now carries a warning comment (GPT-4.1 cross-review FIX).
701 lines
32 KiB
Python
701 lines
32 KiB
Python
"""CDK stack for the Coupa PO email ingestion pipeline."""
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import aws_cdk as cdk
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from aws_cdk import (
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Duration,
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RemovalPolicy,
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Stack,
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aws_cloudwatch as cloudwatch,
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aws_cloudwatch_actions as cw_actions,
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aws_dynamodb as dynamodb,
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aws_iam as iam,
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aws_kms as kms,
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aws_lambda as lambda_,
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aws_lambda_event_sources as lambda_event_sources,
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aws_logs as logs,
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aws_s3 as s3,
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aws_s3_notifications as s3n,
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aws_ses as ses,
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aws_ses_actions as ses_actions,
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aws_secretsmanager as secretsmanager,
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aws_sns as sns,
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aws_sqs as sqs,
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aws_ssm as ssm,
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)
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from constructs import Construct
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# Operations these tables actually issue (PutItem/UpdateItem/DeleteItem writes,
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# GetItem/Query/BatchGetItem reads). DynamoDB emits ThrottledRequests/SystemErrors
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# keyed by TableName + Operation only, so the CDK *_for_operations helpers (which
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# render a SUM MathExpression across these per-operation metrics) are the correct,
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# non-deprecated way to roll a table up to a single alarmable series.
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_DDB_ALARM_OPERATIONS = [
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dynamodb.Operation.GET_ITEM,
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dynamodb.Operation.BATCH_GET_ITEM,
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dynamodb.Operation.QUERY,
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dynamodb.Operation.SCAN,
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dynamodb.Operation.PUT_ITEM,
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dynamodb.Operation.UPDATE_ITEM,
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dynamodb.Operation.DELETE_ITEM,
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dynamodb.Operation.BATCH_WRITE_ITEM,
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]
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def _add_ddb_alarms(scope, id_prefix, table, alarm_name_prefix, alarm_topic):
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"""Add throttle + system-error alarms for a DynamoDB table.
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Both fire on any non-zero datapoint in a 5-min window. ALARM-only SnsAction
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to site-alerts (no OK action); TreatMissingData NOT_BREACHING.
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"""
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table.metric_throttled_requests_for_operations(
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operations=_DDB_ALARM_OPERATIONS,
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period=Duration.minutes(5),
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statistic="Sum",
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).create_alarm(
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scope,
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f"{id_prefix}ThrottlesAlarm",
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alarm_name=f"{alarm_name_prefix}-throttles",
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alarm_description=f"{alarm_name_prefix} DynamoDB throttled requests",
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threshold=0,
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evaluation_periods=1,
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comparison_operator=cloudwatch.ComparisonOperator.GREATER_THAN_THRESHOLD,
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treat_missing_data=cloudwatch.TreatMissingData.NOT_BREACHING,
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).add_alarm_action(cw_actions.SnsAction(alarm_topic))
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table.metric_system_errors_for_operations(
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operations=_DDB_ALARM_OPERATIONS,
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period=Duration.minutes(5),
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statistic="Sum",
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).create_alarm(
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scope,
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f"{id_prefix}SystemErrorsAlarm",
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alarm_name=f"{alarm_name_prefix}-system-errors",
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alarm_description=f"{alarm_name_prefix} DynamoDB server-side (5xx) errors",
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threshold=0,
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evaluation_periods=1,
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comparison_operator=cloudwatch.ComparisonOperator.GREATER_THAN_THRESHOLD,
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treat_missing_data=cloudwatch.TreatMissingData.NOT_BREACHING,
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).add_alarm_action(cw_actions.SnsAction(alarm_topic))
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# CloudWatch namespace for the log-derived sender-authentication metrics.
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_SENDER_AUTH_METRIC_NAMESPACE = "Seahaven/ProcurementIngest"
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def _add_sender_auth_rejected_alarm(scope, id_prefix, function_name, alarm_topic):
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"""Metric-filter + alarm on ``sender_auth_rejected`` warnings (INFRA-107).
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A rejected inbound email is skipped without erroring the invocation, so it
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is invisible to the Errors/Throttles/DLQ alarms. This turns the structured
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warning log into a CloudWatch metric and pages when rejections spike --
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catching a silent false-reject storm (allowlist wrong, signing-domain
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drift, SES header-format change) that would otherwise discard legitimate
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mail while the pipeline reports healthy.
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ALARM-only SnsAction to site-alerts; no OK action. The metric filter reads
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the function's own log group (imported by the deterministic
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``/aws/lambda/<fn>`` name, created by the function's log_retention). A plain
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substring pattern is used because Lambda prefixes each line with its own
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level/timestamp/request-id, so the JSON payload is not a standalone JSON
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log event a `{$.event=...}` pattern could match.
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"""
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metric_name = f"{function_name}-sender-auth-rejected"
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logs.MetricFilter(
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scope,
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f"{id_prefix}SenderAuthRejectedFilter",
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log_group=logs.LogGroup.from_log_group_name(
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scope,
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f"{id_prefix}LogGroup",
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f"/aws/lambda/{function_name}",
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),
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filter_pattern=logs.FilterPattern.literal('"sender_auth_rejected"'),
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metric_namespace=_SENDER_AUTH_METRIC_NAMESPACE,
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metric_name=metric_name,
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metric_value="1",
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default_value=0,
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)
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# Fire on a *sustained* reject condition rather than a volume spike. The
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# earlier Sum>=3-over-15-min threshold had a blind spot that is exactly the
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# failure this alarm exists to catch: a low-traffic pipeline in total
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# drift outage (allowlist wrong / signing-domain changed) may only produce
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# a trickle of rejects -- one every few minutes -- that never sums to 3 in
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# any window, so the outage never pages. Instead: >=1 reject per 5-min
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# period, alarming when 2 of the last 6 periods breach (evaluation_periods=6
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# / datapoints_to_alarm=2). Six periods (30 min) with only 2 required
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# datapoints closes the sparse-outage residual: even rejections >10-15 min
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# apart can still place two breaching datapoints in a single 30-min
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# evaluation window. A single stray spoof probe (one lone period) is
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# tolerated and self-clears, but a sustained reject condition trips even
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# at very low arrival rates. default_value=0 on the metric filter keeps the
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# series continuous so NOT_BREACHING only applies before the first datapoint
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# ever arrives.
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cloudwatch.Metric(
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namespace=_SENDER_AUTH_METRIC_NAMESPACE,
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metric_name=metric_name,
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period=Duration.minutes(5),
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statistic="Sum",
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).create_alarm(
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scope,
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f"{id_prefix}SenderAuthRejectedAlarm",
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alarm_name=f"{function_name}-sender-auth-rejected",
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alarm_description=(
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f"{function_name} rejected inbound mail on sender authentication "
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"(possible allowlist/DKIM-domain drift silently dropping real mail)"
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),
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threshold=1,
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evaluation_periods=6,
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datapoints_to_alarm=2,
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comparison_operator=cloudwatch.ComparisonOperator.GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL_TO_THRESHOLD,
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treat_missing_data=cloudwatch.TreatMissingData.NOT_BREACHING,
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).add_alarm_action(cw_actions.SnsAction(alarm_topic))
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class PoIngestStack(Stack):
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def __init__(self, scope: Construct, construct_id: str, **kwargs):
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super().__init__(scope, construct_id, **kwargs)
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# --- Shared alarm SNS topic (site-alerts) ---
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# Imported once near the top so every alarm in this stack reuses the same
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# Topic construct instance (avoids duplicate logical IDs). ALARM-only
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# SnsAction; no OK action, per the CloudWatch-alarm preference. The
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# topic's CMK (alias/seahaven-alarm-topics) lives on the topic itself.
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alarm_topic = sns.Topic.from_topic_arn(
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self,
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"SiteAlertsTopic",
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f"arn:aws:sns:{self.region}:{self.account}:site-alerts",
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)
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# --- S3 bucket for raw emails ---
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email_bucket = s3.Bucket(
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self,
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"EmailBucket",
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bucket_name=f"po-ingest-emails-{self.account}",
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block_public_access=s3.BlockPublicAccess.BLOCK_ALL,
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removal_policy=RemovalPolicy.RETAIN,
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lifecycle_rules=[
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s3.LifecycleRule(expiration=Duration.days(90)),
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],
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)
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# --- Shared customer-managed CMK for sensitive DynamoDB tables ---
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# Owned by the account-baseline app (alias/seahaven-dynamodb, INFRA-95 /
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# M-3); ARN published to SSM. The purchase-orders table was migrated to
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# SSE-KMS out-of-band, so declaring encryption_key here reconciles the
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# drift and — via grant_read_write_data below — propagates the required
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# kms:Decrypt/GenerateDataKey/DescribeKey to the consumer roles.
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dynamodb_cmk = kms.Key.from_key_arn(
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self,
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"DynamoDbCmk",
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ssm.StringParameter.value_for_string_parameter(
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self, "/seahaven/dynamodb/cmk-arn"
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),
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)
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# --- Purchase-orders DynamoDB table ---
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# Owned by this stack. Streams enabled for the site-extractor pipeline.
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# Other stacks (seahaven-slack-bot) reference this table via fromTableName().
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po_table = dynamodb.Table(
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self,
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"PurchaseOrdersTable",
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table_name="purchase-orders",
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partition_key=dynamodb.Attribute(
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name="po_number",
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type=dynamodb.AttributeType.STRING,
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),
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billing_mode=dynamodb.BillingMode.PAY_PER_REQUEST,
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removal_policy=RemovalPolicy.RETAIN,
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stream=dynamodb.StreamViewType.NEW_IMAGE,
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encryption=dynamodb.TableEncryption.CUSTOMER_MANAGED,
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encryption_key=dynamodb_cmk,
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)
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# --- Anthropic API key secret removed (Bedrock migration) ---
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# PO parsing stays fully AI but moved from the Anthropic API to the
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# Bedrock inference profile us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0,
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# so no provider API key is needed. The old secret
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# "po-ingest/anthropic-api-key" had RemovalPolicy.RETAIN, so it is
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# ORPHANED (not deleted) by this change: delete it manually post-deploy
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# and revoke the stored key at Anthropic.
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# --- DLQ for failed async invocations (INFRA-41 / audit H-8) ---
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# SES → S3 → Lambda is async; without an OnFailure destination a failed
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# parse (bad email, transient error) is silently dropped after Lambda's
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# retries. CDK generates the queue name to avoid colliding with the
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# interim CLI-created po-email-processor-dlq (removed post-deploy).
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email_processor_dlq = sqs.Queue(
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self,
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"EmailProcessorDlq",
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retention_period=Duration.days(14),
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enforce_ssl=True,
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)
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# --- Lambda function ---
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email_processor = lambda_.Function(
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self,
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"EmailProcessor",
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function_name="po-email-processor",
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runtime=lambda_.Runtime.PYTHON_3_12,
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architecture=lambda_.Architecture.ARM_64,
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handler="handler.handler",
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code=lambda_.Code.from_asset(
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"../lambdas/po/email_processor",
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bundling=cdk.BundlingOptions(
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image=lambda_.Runtime.PYTHON_3_12.bundling_image,
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command=[
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"bash",
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"-c",
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"pip install --platform manylinux2014_aarch64 --only-binary=:all: "
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"-r requirements.txt -t /asset-output && "
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# NOTE: every module handler.py imports as a sibling
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# MUST be listed here or the deploy ships a Lambda that
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# ImportErrors at runtime (bit us for template_parser
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# in PR #105 and nearly for derived_fields in PR #2).
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"cp handler.py ses_auth.py template_parser.py "
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"derived_fields.py /asset-output/",
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],
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),
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),
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timeout=Duration.seconds(60),
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memory_size=256,
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log_retention=logs.RetentionDays.TWO_MONTHS,
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dead_letter_queue=email_processor_dlq,
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environment={
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"PO_TABLE": "purchase-orders",
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"BEDROCK_MODEL_ID": "us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0",
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# Fail-closed sender auth (INFRA-107): the handler only
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# accepts mail whose SES-stamped Authentication-Results
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# header carries dkim=pass for one of these domains.
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# Observed on live traffic 2026-07-15: Coupa PO mail passes
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# DKIM for amazon.coupahost.com (and amazonses.com, which is
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# deliberately NOT allowlisted — every SES customer's mail
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# passes that). Unset/empty ⇒ the handler rejects all mail.
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"ALLOWED_DKIM_DOMAINS": "amazon.coupahost.com",
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},
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)
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# Grant permissions
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email_bucket.grant_read(email_processor)
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po_table.grant_read_write_data(email_processor)
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# --- Bedrock InvokeModel grant ---
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# The us.* inference profile can route cross-region, so the grant MUST
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# cover both the inference-profile ARN AND the per-region foundation-model
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# ARNs (empty account field) for every region the profile can reach
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# (us-east-1/us-east-2/us-west-2). A profile-only grant AccessDenies at
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# runtime whenever the profile routes to a region whose foundation-model
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# ARN is not allowed.
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email_processor.add_to_role_policy(
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iam.PolicyStatement(
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actions=[
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"bedrock:InvokeModel",
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"bedrock:InvokeModelWithResponseStream",
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],
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resources=[
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"arn:aws:bedrock:us-east-1:328440206208:inference-profile/us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0",
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"arn:aws:bedrock:us-east-1::foundation-model/anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0",
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"arn:aws:bedrock:us-east-2::foundation-model/anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0",
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"arn:aws:bedrock:us-west-2::foundation-model/anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0",
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],
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)
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)
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# --- Errors alarm (INFRA-41 / audit H-8) ---
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# ALARM-only (no OK action, per the CloudWatch-alarm preference) to the
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# shared site-alerts topic. Any errored invocation in a 5-min window pages.
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email_processor.metric_errors(
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period=Duration.minutes(5),
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statistic="Sum",
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).create_alarm(
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self,
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"EmailProcessorErrorsAlarm",
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alarm_name="po-email-processor-errors",
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alarm_description="po-email-processor async invocation errors",
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threshold=0,
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evaluation_periods=1,
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comparison_operator=cloudwatch.ComparisonOperator.GREATER_THAN_THRESHOLD,
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treat_missing_data=cloudwatch.TreatMissingData.NOT_BREACHING,
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).add_alarm_action(cw_actions.SnsAction(alarm_topic))
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# --- Sender-auth rejection alarm (INFRA-107) ---
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# A rejected email (bad/unaligned DKIM verdict) returns normally, so it
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# produces NO Lambda error, NO DLQ message and NO retry -- only a
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# `sender_auth_rejected` warning log. Without this metric filter + alarm a
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# domain drift (Coupa rotates its signing subdomain, SES changes its
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# Authentication-Results format, the allowlist is wrong) would silently
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# discard 100% of legitimate PO mail while every other alarm stays green.
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# A CloudWatch Logs metric filter turns those warnings into a metric so a
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# false-reject storm pages instead of vanishing. default_value=0 keeps the
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# series populated (alarm stays OK, never INSUFFICIENT_DATA) between events.
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_add_sender_auth_rejected_alarm(
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self, "EmailProcessor", "po-email-processor", alarm_topic
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)
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# --- Throttles alarm: po-email-processor ---
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# Any throttled invocation (concurrency cap hit) in a 5-min window pages.
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# ALARM-only to site-alerts; no OK action; NOT_BREACHING when no data.
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email_processor.metric_throttles(
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period=Duration.minutes(5),
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statistic="Sum",
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).create_alarm(
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self,
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"EmailProcessorThrottlesAlarm",
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alarm_name="po-email-processor-throttles",
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alarm_description="po-email-processor invocation throttles",
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threshold=0,
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evaluation_periods=1,
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comparison_operator=cloudwatch.ComparisonOperator.GREATER_THAN_THRESHOLD,
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treat_missing_data=cloudwatch.TreatMissingData.NOT_BREACHING,
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).add_alarm_action(cw_actions.SnsAction(alarm_topic))
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# --- DLQ messages-present alarm ---
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# Pages when any message lands in the EmailProcessorDlq: a message here
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# means a PO email was permanently dropped after Lambda exhausted its
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# async retries. Maximum over a single 5-min window > 0 fires; missing
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# data (no messages metric emitted) is not breaching. Reuses the shared
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# site-alerts topic, ALARM-only, like the errors alarm above. The metric
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# helper derives the QueueName dimension from the queue construct, so the
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# alarm tracks the CDK-generated queue name without hardcoding it.
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email_processor_dlq.metric_approximate_number_of_messages_visible(
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period=Duration.minutes(5),
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statistic="Maximum",
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).create_alarm(
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self,
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"EmailProcessorDlqMessagesAlarm",
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alarm_name="po-email-processor-dlq-messages",
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alarm_description="po-email-processor DLQ has messages (dropped PO emails)",
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threshold=0,
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evaluation_periods=1,
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comparison_operator=cloudwatch.ComparisonOperator.GREATER_THAN_THRESHOLD,
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treat_missing_data=cloudwatch.TreatMissingData.NOT_BREACHING,
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).add_alarm_action(cw_actions.SnsAction(alarm_topic))
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# --- Duration alarm: po-email-processor (orphan adoption) ---
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# Adopts the orphaned CLI alarm Lambda-Duration-po-email-processor under
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# the repo's <fn>-duration naming (NEW logical name → no deploy collision;
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# delete the orphan post-deploy). p99 / 45000 ms
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# (75% of the 60s timeout) / eval 3 of 3 — tighter than the orphan's
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# Maximum>=48000 / 1-of-1.
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email_processor.metric_duration(
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period=Duration.minutes(5),
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statistic="p99",
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).create_alarm(
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self,
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"EmailProcessorDurationAlarm",
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alarm_name="po-email-processor-duration",
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alarm_description="po-email-processor p99 duration approaching the 60s timeout",
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threshold=45000,
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evaluation_periods=3,
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datapoints_to_alarm=2,
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comparison_operator=cloudwatch.ComparisonOperator.GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL_TO_THRESHOLD,
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treat_missing_data=cloudwatch.TreatMissingData.NOT_BREACHING,
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).add_alarm_action(cw_actions.SnsAction(alarm_topic))
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# --- Template fallback-rate alarm: po-email-processor ---
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# The processor tries a deterministic template parse first and only calls
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|
# the Bedrock AI extractor on a miss/invalid. A sustained rise in the
|
|
# ai_fallback share signals Coupa template drift (coverage collapse).
|
|
# EMF metric Seahaven/PoIngest/ParseOutcome, dimensioned by ParseMethod
|
|
# (template|ai_fallback).
|
|
#
|
|
# RETUNED for PO volume (~57 emails/day ≈ 14.25 per 6h period) -- the WO
|
|
# alarm's 15-min period / >=10-sample floor assume ~760/day and would be
|
|
# structurally DEAD here (a 15-min period holds ~0.6 PO emails, so the
|
|
# floor is never met and the IF always takes the 0 branch):
|
|
# * period 6h: a stable ~14-email denominator per datapoint.
|
|
# * volume floor >=8: at the floor, one fallback email = 12.5% < 20%,
|
|
# so a single email can NEVER breach a datapoint; a breach needs >=2
|
|
# fallbacks in one 6h window (2/8 = 25%) or >=3 at typical volume
|
|
# (3/14 ≈ 21%). Sparse overnight/weekend windows (<8 emails) take
|
|
# the 0 branch -- non-breaching by design (accepted trade: a Friday-
|
|
# evening drift may not page until weekend volume accrues).
|
|
# * threshold >20%: expected baseline fallback ≈1% (comments 0.55% +
|
|
# multi-line 0.18% + non-USD 0) -- far below the threshold.
|
|
# * 2 of 4 datapoints (24h span): isolated noise self-clears, while
|
|
# total template drift (100% fallback) pages within ~12h.
|
|
# Post-#102 rule: NO element-wise MAX(timeseries, scalar) in alarm math;
|
|
# the IF volume floor guarantees the non-zero denominator. Any change to
|
|
# this expression must be gated by `npx cdk synth po-ingest`.
|
|
fb_metric = cloudwatch.Metric(
|
|
namespace="Seahaven/PoIngest",
|
|
metric_name="ParseOutcome",
|
|
dimensions_map={"ParseMethod": "ai_fallback"},
|
|
statistic="Sum",
|
|
period=Duration.hours(6),
|
|
)
|
|
tmpl_metric = cloudwatch.Metric(
|
|
namespace="Seahaven/PoIngest",
|
|
metric_name="ParseOutcome",
|
|
dimensions_map={"ParseMethod": "template"},
|
|
statistic="Sum",
|
|
period=Duration.hours(6),
|
|
)
|
|
fallback_rate = cloudwatch.MathExpression(
|
|
expression=(
|
|
"IF((FILL(fb,0)+FILL(tmpl,0))>=8, "
|
|
"100*FILL(fb,0)/(FILL(fb,0)+FILL(tmpl,0)), 0)"
|
|
),
|
|
using_metrics={"fb": fb_metric, "tmpl": tmpl_metric},
|
|
period=Duration.hours(6),
|
|
label="TemplateFallbackRatePct",
|
|
)
|
|
fallback_rate.create_alarm(
|
|
self,
|
|
"EmailProcessorTemplateFallbackRateAlarm",
|
|
alarm_name="po-email-processor-template-fallback-rate",
|
|
alarm_description=(
|
|
"po-email-processor deterministic-template coverage collapse: "
|
|
">20% of parses fell back to the Bedrock AI extractor"
|
|
),
|
|
threshold=20,
|
|
evaluation_periods=4,
|
|
datapoints_to_alarm=2,
|
|
comparison_operator=cloudwatch.ComparisonOperator.GREATER_THAN_THRESHOLD,
|
|
treat_missing_data=cloudwatch.TreatMissingData.NOT_BREACHING,
|
|
).add_alarm_action(cw_actions.SnsAction(alarm_topic))
|
|
|
|
# S3 event notification → Lambda
|
|
email_bucket.add_event_notification(
|
|
s3.EventType.OBJECT_CREATED,
|
|
s3n.LambdaDestination(email_processor),
|
|
s3.NotificationKeyFilter(prefix="inbound/"),
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# --- SES Receipt Rule ---
|
|
# Reuse the existing INBOUND_MAIL rule set (shared with workorder-ingest)
|
|
rule_set = ses.ReceiptRuleSet.from_receipt_rule_set_name(
|
|
self,
|
|
"ExistingRuleSet",
|
|
"INBOUND_MAIL",
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
rule_set.add_rule(
|
|
"PoEmailRule",
|
|
recipients=["amazon_po@int.seahaven.com"],
|
|
actions=[
|
|
ses_actions.S3(
|
|
bucket=email_bucket,
|
|
object_key_prefix="inbound/",
|
|
),
|
|
],
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# --- Web UI auth token secret ---
|
|
# Shared secret for the web UI auth gate, stored in Secrets Manager and
|
|
# resolved at runtime so the token never appears in CloudFormation templates
|
|
# or Lambda environment variables. Create this secret before deploying
|
|
# either stack; both PO and WO stacks reference it by name.
|
|
web_ui_auth_secret = secretsmanager.Secret.from_secret_name_v2(
|
|
self,
|
|
"WebUiAuthToken",
|
|
"procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token",
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# --- Web UI Lambda ---
|
|
web_ui = lambda_.Function(
|
|
self,
|
|
"WebUI",
|
|
function_name="po-web-ui",
|
|
runtime=lambda_.Runtime.PYTHON_3_12,
|
|
architecture=lambda_.Architecture.ARM_64,
|
|
handler="handler.handler",
|
|
code=lambda_.Code.from_asset("../lambdas/po/web_ui"),
|
|
timeout=Duration.seconds(60),
|
|
memory_size=256,
|
|
log_retention=logs.RetentionDays.TWO_MONTHS,
|
|
environment={
|
|
"PO_TABLE": "purchase-orders",
|
|
# Defense-in-depth shared secret for the web UI handler. The
|
|
# handler fails closed if this ARN is unset or the secret is
|
|
# missing, so any future invocation path cannot re-expose the
|
|
# PO DB unauthenticated. The secret value is fetched at runtime
|
|
# from Secrets Manager (not embedded in env vars or template).
|
|
"WEB_UI_AUTH_TOKEN_SECRET_ARN": web_ui_auth_secret.secret_arn,
|
|
},
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
po_table.grant_read_data(web_ui)
|
|
web_ui_auth_secret.grant_read(web_ui)
|
|
|
|
# --- Throttles alarm: po-web-ui ---
|
|
web_ui.metric_throttles(
|
|
period=Duration.minutes(5),
|
|
statistic="Sum",
|
|
).create_alarm(
|
|
self,
|
|
"WebUiThrottlesAlarm",
|
|
alarm_name="po-web-ui-throttles",
|
|
alarm_description="po-web-ui invocation throttles",
|
|
threshold=0,
|
|
evaluation_periods=1,
|
|
comparison_operator=cloudwatch.ComparisonOperator.GREATER_THAN_THRESHOLD,
|
|
treat_missing_data=cloudwatch.TreatMissingData.NOT_BREACHING,
|
|
).add_alarm_action(cw_actions.SnsAction(alarm_topic))
|
|
|
|
# --- Duration alarm: po-web-ui ---
|
|
# Net-new (no orphan exists for this function).
|
|
# p99 / 45000 ms (75% of the 60s timeout) / eval 3, datapoints 2.
|
|
web_ui.metric_duration(
|
|
period=Duration.minutes(5),
|
|
statistic="p99",
|
|
).create_alarm(
|
|
self,
|
|
"WebUiDurationAlarm",
|
|
alarm_name="po-web-ui-duration",
|
|
alarm_description="po-web-ui p99 duration approaching the 60s timeout",
|
|
threshold=45000,
|
|
evaluation_periods=3,
|
|
datapoints_to_alarm=2,
|
|
comparison_operator=cloudwatch.ComparisonOperator.GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL_TO_THRESHOLD,
|
|
treat_missing_data=cloudwatch.TreatMissingData.NOT_BREACHING,
|
|
).add_alarm_action(cw_actions.SnsAction(alarm_topic))
|
|
|
|
# Public Function URL removed 2026-06-08 (INFRA-74 / audit C-5): the
|
|
# unauthenticated FunctionUrlAuthType.NONE URL was deleted out-of-band
|
|
# via CLI. Removing the construct (and its auto-generated Principal:*
|
|
# invoke permission) reconciles IaC with the live state.
|
|
|
|
# --- Verified sites table (extracted from PO ship-to addresses) ---
|
|
verified_sites_table = dynamodb.Table(
|
|
self,
|
|
"VerifiedSitesTable",
|
|
table_name="verified-sites",
|
|
partition_key=dynamodb.Attribute(
|
|
name="siteCode",
|
|
type=dynamodb.AttributeType.STRING,
|
|
),
|
|
billing_mode=dynamodb.BillingMode.PAY_PER_REQUEST,
|
|
removal_policy=RemovalPolicy.RETAIN,
|
|
)
|
|
# by-state GSI removed 2026-06-03 (audit M-20): 0 reads in 30d against
|
|
# 518 WCU of write amplification. Re-add if a state-level query path ships.
|
|
|
|
# --- Site extractor Lambda (DynamoDB Streams → verified-sites) ---
|
|
site_extractor = lambda_.Function(
|
|
self,
|
|
"SiteExtractor",
|
|
function_name="po-ingest-site-extractor",
|
|
runtime=lambda_.Runtime.PYTHON_3_12,
|
|
architecture=lambda_.Architecture.ARM_64,
|
|
handler="handler.handler",
|
|
code=lambda_.Code.from_asset("../lambdas/po/site_extractor"),
|
|
timeout=Duration.seconds(60),
|
|
memory_size=256,
|
|
log_retention=logs.RetentionDays.TWO_MONTHS,
|
|
environment={
|
|
"VERIFIED_SITES_TABLE": verified_sites_table.table_name,
|
|
"PENDING_REVIEW_TABLE": "pending-site-review",
|
|
},
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
verified_sites_table.grant_read_write_data(site_extractor)
|
|
|
|
site_extractor.add_event_source(
|
|
lambda_event_sources.DynamoEventSource(
|
|
po_table,
|
|
starting_position=lambda_.StartingPosition.TRIM_HORIZON,
|
|
batch_size=10,
|
|
max_batching_window=Duration.seconds(30),
|
|
bisect_batch_on_error=True,
|
|
retry_attempts=3,
|
|
)
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# --- Errors alarm: po-ingest-site-extractor ---
|
|
# Stream-consumer errors retry per the event-source config, but a
|
|
# persistent failure stalls the verified-sites pipeline. ALARM-only to
|
|
# site-alerts; no OK action; NOT_BREACHING when no data.
|
|
site_extractor.metric_errors(
|
|
period=Duration.minutes(5),
|
|
statistic="Sum",
|
|
).create_alarm(
|
|
self,
|
|
"SiteExtractorErrorsAlarm",
|
|
alarm_name="po-ingest-site-extractor-errors",
|
|
alarm_description="po-ingest-site-extractor invocation errors",
|
|
threshold=0,
|
|
evaluation_periods=1,
|
|
comparison_operator=cloudwatch.ComparisonOperator.GREATER_THAN_THRESHOLD,
|
|
treat_missing_data=cloudwatch.TreatMissingData.NOT_BREACHING,
|
|
).add_alarm_action(cw_actions.SnsAction(alarm_topic))
|
|
|
|
# --- Throttles alarm: po-ingest-site-extractor ---
|
|
site_extractor.metric_throttles(
|
|
period=Duration.minutes(5),
|
|
statistic="Sum",
|
|
).create_alarm(
|
|
self,
|
|
"SiteExtractorThrottlesAlarm",
|
|
alarm_name="po-ingest-site-extractor-throttles",
|
|
alarm_description="po-ingest-site-extractor invocation throttles",
|
|
threshold=0,
|
|
evaluation_periods=1,
|
|
comparison_operator=cloudwatch.ComparisonOperator.GREATER_THAN_THRESHOLD,
|
|
treat_missing_data=cloudwatch.TreatMissingData.NOT_BREACHING,
|
|
).add_alarm_action(cw_actions.SnsAction(alarm_topic))
|
|
|
|
# --- Duration alarm: po-ingest-site-extractor ---
|
|
# Net-new (no orphan exists for this function).
|
|
# p99 / 45000 ms (75% of the 60s timeout) / eval 3, datapoints 2.
|
|
site_extractor.metric_duration(
|
|
period=Duration.minutes(5),
|
|
statistic="p99",
|
|
).create_alarm(
|
|
self,
|
|
"SiteExtractorDurationAlarm",
|
|
alarm_name="po-ingest-site-extractor-duration",
|
|
alarm_description="po-ingest-site-extractor p99 duration approaching the 60s timeout",
|
|
threshold=45000,
|
|
evaluation_periods=3,
|
|
datapoints_to_alarm=2,
|
|
comparison_operator=cloudwatch.ComparisonOperator.GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL_TO_THRESHOLD,
|
|
treat_missing_data=cloudwatch.TreatMissingData.NOT_BREACHING,
|
|
).add_alarm_action(cw_actions.SnsAction(alarm_topic))
|
|
|
|
cdk.CfnOutput(
|
|
self,
|
|
"VerifiedSitesTableName",
|
|
value=verified_sites_table.table_name,
|
|
description="Verified site addresses extracted from POs",
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# --- Pending site review table (POs with no extractable site code) ---
|
|
pending_review_table = dynamodb.Table(
|
|
self,
|
|
"PendingSiteReviewTable",
|
|
table_name="pending-site-review",
|
|
partition_key=dynamodb.Attribute(
|
|
name="po_number",
|
|
type=dynamodb.AttributeType.STRING,
|
|
),
|
|
billing_mode=dynamodb.BillingMode.PAY_PER_REQUEST,
|
|
removal_policy=RemovalPolicy.RETAIN,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
pending_review_table.grant_read_write_data(site_extractor)
|
|
verified_sites_table.grant_read_data(site_extractor)
|
|
|
|
# --- DynamoDB throttle + system-error alarms ---
|
|
# ThrottledRequests / SystemErrors emit at TableName + Operation only
|
|
# (verified against live CloudWatch: no TableName-only rollup exists, and
|
|
# metric_throttled_requests is deprecated/invalid in aws-cdk-lib 2.259.0).
|
|
# Each table currently has zero throttle/error datapoints, so the series
|
|
# only materialise on first occurrence — NOT_BREACHING keeps them OK until
|
|
# then.
|
|
_add_ddb_alarms(
|
|
self, "PurchaseOrdersTable", po_table, "purchase-orders", alarm_topic
|
|
)
|
|
_add_ddb_alarms(
|
|
self,
|
|
"VerifiedSitesTable",
|
|
verified_sites_table,
|
|
"verified-sites",
|
|
alarm_topic,
|
|
)
|
|
_add_ddb_alarms(
|
|
self,
|
|
"PendingSiteReviewTable",
|
|
pending_review_table,
|
|
"pending-site-review",
|
|
alarm_topic,
|
|
)
|