procurement-ingest/lambdas/shared/web_ui_auth.py
Adam Moussa f67d8b9907
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feat(api): procurement-api read stack + OpenAPI docs (SHOC reconciliation path) (#127)
* feat(api): add procurement-api stack - read API + OpenAPI docs page

Third CDK stack: API Gateway REST API (IAM SigV4) over both pipelines'
tables, replacing SHOC's retired SyncController cross-account DynamoDB
scan as the reconciliation/backfill path.

- lambdas/api/: handler (healthcheck + docs-token gate + router dispatch),
  router (single route table), pagination (opaque cursor, hostile -> 400),
  Decimal-safe serialization, wo_repo/po_repo reads. No VendorReplies.
- OpenAPI 3.1 spec as source of truth incl. top-level webhooks section
  documenting the outbound SHOC feed; phase-2 write endpoints x-planned
  (router answers 501). Self-contained /docs page, no CDN.
- Auth: AWS_IAM on data routes + resource policy scoped to exactly
  arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev on GET/*; /docs and
  /openapi.json carve-out is token-gated in the Lambda via shared
  web_ui_auth (fail-closed, INFRA-74 posture).
- KMS: explicit Decrypt/DescribeKey on the DynamoDB CMK from SSM
  (name-imported table drops the key association - INFRA-104 class).
- Alarms: errors/throttles/duration(p99>=22.5s) + gateway 5xx, ALARM-only
  to site-alerts. No access logging in v1 (docs ?token= shim stays out of
  logs); cloud_watch_role=False.
- Tests: handler auth-seam + routing + Decimal round-trip; moto cursor
  pagination incl. hostile cursors; spec<->router drift gate; bundle
  AST pins for the api command; pytest.ini --cov + loader siblings.
- Deploy role: third stack DescribeStacks ARN + procurement-api smoke
  invoke ARN (re-run create-deploy-role.sh before merge).

* harden(api): apply sh-security-review findings to procurement-api

Fan-out (6 detectors) + review findings resolved:

Correctness / DoS:
- pagination: require EXACT key-set match (was subset) so a partial/foreign
  composite cursor can't reach DynamoDB as an inconsistent ExclusiveStartKey
  -> ValidationException -> 500; comments Query now pins the cursor's
  work_order_id to the path entity.
- handler: map botocore ValidationException to 400 (defense in depth) so a
  crafted cursor can't drive the zero-threshold 5xx alarm.
- web_ui_auth: compare tokens as bytes; a non-ASCII presented token now fails
  closed (401) instead of crashing hmac.compare_digest into a 500. Resolves the
  pre-existing xfail(strict) follow-up test; hardens the web UIs too.

Docs page:
- typeStr() now escapes the one spec-derived string that reached innerHTML.
- spec inlined into the docs <script> block escapes "<" -> < (</script>
  breakout guard); /openapi.json still served byte-faithful.
- Cache-Control: no-store + Referrer-Policy: no-referrer on docs responses so
  the ?token= URL stays out of caches/Referer.
- spec-drift test asserts the committed spec carries no "</" / "<!--".

IAM / IaC:
- resource policy enumerates the 7 data GET resources instead of GET/* so a
  future GET route can't silently inherit SHOC cross-account reach.
- kms:Decrypt grant gains a kms:ViaService=dynamodb condition.
- stage throttling (50 rps / 100 burst) bounds the unauthenticated /docs blast
  radius below the 10k account default.
- corrected the PATCH/POST comment (same-account callers aren't blocked by the
  resource policy; 501 handler + absent write grant are the gate).
- documented the RETAIN log-group first-deploy rollback trap and the
  resource-policy-needs-redeploy gotcha in-stack.

Mandatory GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the full policy surface: no BLOCK/FIX.
675 tests pass, ruff clean, cdk synth green.
2026-07-23 19:32:20 -04:00

81 lines
3 KiB
Python

import hmac
import logging
import os
import time
import boto3
logger = logging.getLogger()
_WEB_UI_AUTH_TOKEN_SECRET_ARN = os.environ.get("WEB_UI_AUTH_TOKEN_SECRET_ARN")
# Refresh the cached token this often so a rotated secret propagates without
# waiting for the execution environment to recycle (emergency-rotation path).
_AUTH_TOKEN_CACHE_TTL_SECONDS = 300
_auth_token_cache = None
_auth_token_cached_at = 0.0
def _get_auth_token() -> str | None:
"""Fetch the shared web UI auth token from Secrets Manager.
Cached in the warm container for a short TTL so we don't hit Secrets Manager
on every request, while still picking up a rotated secret within the TTL
rather than only when the execution environment recycles. Returns None when
not configured or unreadable (the caller then fails closed).
"""
global _auth_token_cache, _auth_token_cached_at
now = time.monotonic()
if (
_auth_token_cache is not None
and now - _auth_token_cached_at < _AUTH_TOKEN_CACHE_TTL_SECONDS
):
return _auth_token_cache
if not _WEB_UI_AUTH_TOKEN_SECRET_ARN:
return None
secrets = boto3.client("secretsmanager")
try:
secret = secrets.get_secret_value(SecretId=_WEB_UI_AUTH_TOKEN_SECRET_ARN)
_auth_token_cache = secret["SecretString"]
_auth_token_cached_at = now
return _auth_token_cache
except Exception:
# Fail closed (return None -> caller 401s) but surface the failure: a
# Secrets Manager permission/config error would otherwise make every
# request 401 with no operational signal. The secret value is never
# logged.
logger.exception(
"Failed to fetch web UI auth token from Secrets Manager; "
"denying request (failing closed)"
)
return None
def _header(event: dict, name: str) -> str:
"""Case-insensitive header lookup from a Lambda Function URL / APIGW event."""
headers = event.get("headers") or {}
name_lower = name.lower()
for key, value in headers.items():
if key.lower() == name_lower:
return value or ""
return ""
def is_authenticated(event: dict) -> bool:
"""Constant-time check of the request's shared secret against the configured
token. Fails closed when no token is configured."""
token = _get_auth_token()
if not token:
return False
presented = _header(event, "x-auth-token")
if not presented:
auth = _header(event, "authorization")
if auth.lower().startswith("bearer "):
presented = auth[7:].strip()
if not presented:
return False
# Compare as bytes: hmac.compare_digest raises TypeError on non-ASCII str
# operands, which a crafted token (?token=%C3%A9 or a non-ASCII header)
# would otherwise turn into an uncaught 500. Bytes always compare in
# constant time, so a non-matching token fails closed (401) instead.
return hmac.compare_digest(presented.encode("utf-8"), token.encode("utf-8"))