procurement-ingest/cdk/wo_stack.py
Adam Moussa 7c74ac1761
Harden AR parsing and alarm on sender-auth rejects
The SES-stamped Authentication-Results value echoes attacker-controlled
SMTP-session tokens (envelope-from, helo, header.from) as their own
semicolon-delimited property clauses. A naive split(";") tore an RFC 5321
quoted-local-part MAIL FROM apart and manufactured a forged dkim=pass
clause, so a fully spoofed email was accepted on the genuinely
SES-stamped topmost header. Tokenise comment- and quoted-string-aware
(RFC 8601 / RFC 5322): strip CFWS comments, split clauses only on
semicolons outside a quoted-string, and fail closed on unbalanced
quotes/comments so a ';' inside a quoted pvalue can never start a clause.

Rejected mail returns normally (no error, no retry, no DLQ message), so a
signing-domain drift or a wrong allowlist would silently discard 100% of
legitimate mail while every alarm stayed green. Add a CloudWatch Logs
metric filter + alarm on the sender_auth_rejected warning to both stacks
so a false-reject storm pages instead of vanishing. This is also the
safety net for the WO seahaven.com allowlist assumption, which must be
validated against a live SES-stamped header (a plain Gmail auto-forward
re-signs under the sending Workspace domain, not seahaven.com).

Refs: INFRA-107
2026-07-15 19:13:55 -04:00

437 lines
19 KiB
Python

"""CDK stack for the work order email ingestion pipeline."""
import aws_cdk as cdk
from aws_cdk import (
Duration,
RemovalPolicy,
Stack,
aws_cloudwatch as cloudwatch,
aws_cloudwatch_actions as cw_actions,
aws_dynamodb as dynamodb,
aws_kms as kms,
aws_lambda as lambda_,
aws_logs as logs,
aws_s3 as s3,
aws_s3_notifications as s3n,
aws_ses as ses,
aws_ses_actions as ses_actions,
aws_secretsmanager as secretsmanager,
aws_sns as sns,
aws_sqs as sqs,
aws_ssm as ssm,
)
from constructs import Construct
# Operations these tables actually issue (PutItem/UpdateItem/DeleteItem writes,
# GetItem/Query/BatchGetItem reads). DynamoDB emits ThrottledRequests/SystemErrors
# keyed by TableName + Operation only, so the CDK *_for_operations helpers (which
# render a SUM MathExpression across these per-operation metrics) are the correct,
# non-deprecated way to roll a table up to a single alarmable series.
_DDB_ALARM_OPERATIONS = [
dynamodb.Operation.GET_ITEM,
dynamodb.Operation.BATCH_GET_ITEM,
dynamodb.Operation.QUERY,
dynamodb.Operation.SCAN,
dynamodb.Operation.PUT_ITEM,
dynamodb.Operation.UPDATE_ITEM,
dynamodb.Operation.DELETE_ITEM,
dynamodb.Operation.BATCH_WRITE_ITEM,
]
def _add_ddb_alarms(scope, id_prefix, table, alarm_name_prefix, alarm_topic):
"""Add throttle + system-error alarms for a DynamoDB table.
Both fire on any non-zero datapoint in a 5-min window. ALARM-only SnsAction
to site-alerts (no OK action); TreatMissingData NOT_BREACHING.
"""
table.metric_throttled_requests_for_operations(
operations=_DDB_ALARM_OPERATIONS,
period=Duration.minutes(5),
statistic="Sum",
).create_alarm(
scope,
f"{id_prefix}ThrottlesAlarm",
alarm_name=f"{alarm_name_prefix}-throttles",
alarm_description=f"{alarm_name_prefix} DynamoDB throttled requests",
threshold=0,
evaluation_periods=1,
comparison_operator=cloudwatch.ComparisonOperator.GREATER_THAN_THRESHOLD,
treat_missing_data=cloudwatch.TreatMissingData.NOT_BREACHING,
).add_alarm_action(cw_actions.SnsAction(alarm_topic))
table.metric_system_errors_for_operations(
operations=_DDB_ALARM_OPERATIONS,
period=Duration.minutes(5),
statistic="Sum",
).create_alarm(
scope,
f"{id_prefix}SystemErrorsAlarm",
alarm_name=f"{alarm_name_prefix}-system-errors",
alarm_description=f"{alarm_name_prefix} DynamoDB server-side (5xx) errors",
threshold=0,
evaluation_periods=1,
comparison_operator=cloudwatch.ComparisonOperator.GREATER_THAN_THRESHOLD,
treat_missing_data=cloudwatch.TreatMissingData.NOT_BREACHING,
).add_alarm_action(cw_actions.SnsAction(alarm_topic))
# CloudWatch namespace for the log-derived sender-authentication metrics.
_SENDER_AUTH_METRIC_NAMESPACE = "Seahaven/ProcurementIngest"
def _add_sender_auth_rejected_alarm(scope, id_prefix, function_name, alarm_topic):
"""Metric-filter + alarm on ``sender_auth_rejected`` warnings (INFRA-107).
A rejected inbound email is skipped without erroring the invocation, so it
is invisible to the Errors/Throttles/DLQ alarms. This turns the structured
warning log into a CloudWatch metric and pages when rejections spike --
catching a silent false-reject storm (allowlist wrong, signing-domain
drift, SES header-format change) that would otherwise discard legitimate
mail while the pipeline reports healthy. This is the safety net for the WO
allowlist domain assumption (seahaven.com) -- if the real Gmail-forward
re-signing domain differs, this alarm surfaces it instead of a silent
work-order outage.
ALARM-only SnsAction to site-alerts; no OK action. The metric filter reads
the function's own log group (imported by the deterministic
``/aws/lambda/<fn>`` name, created by the function's log_retention). A plain
substring pattern is used because Lambda prefixes each line with its own
level/timestamp/request-id, so the JSON payload is not a standalone JSON
log event a `{$.event=...}` pattern could match.
"""
metric_name = f"{function_name}-sender-auth-rejected"
logs.MetricFilter(
scope,
f"{id_prefix}SenderAuthRejectedFilter",
log_group=logs.LogGroup.from_log_group_name(
scope,
f"{id_prefix}LogGroup",
f"/aws/lambda/{function_name}",
),
filter_pattern=logs.FilterPattern.literal('"sender_auth_rejected"'),
metric_namespace=_SENDER_AUTH_METRIC_NAMESPACE,
metric_name=metric_name,
metric_value="1",
default_value=0,
)
# >=3 rejections in a 15-min window pages: a lone spoofed probe to the
# (obscure, internal) ingest address is tolerated, but a genuine
# false-reject storm -- where legitimate senders are being dropped -- trips
# quickly. Threshold is intentionally conservative and easy to tune.
cloudwatch.Metric(
namespace=_SENDER_AUTH_METRIC_NAMESPACE,
metric_name=metric_name,
period=Duration.minutes(15),
statistic="Sum",
).create_alarm(
scope,
f"{id_prefix}SenderAuthRejectedAlarm",
alarm_name=f"{function_name}-sender-auth-rejected",
alarm_description=(
f"{function_name} rejected inbound mail on sender authentication "
"(possible allowlist/DKIM-domain drift silently dropping real mail)"
),
threshold=3,
evaluation_periods=1,
comparison_operator=cloudwatch.ComparisonOperator.GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL_TO_THRESHOLD,
treat_missing_data=cloudwatch.TreatMissingData.NOT_BREACHING,
).add_alarm_action(cw_actions.SnsAction(alarm_topic))
class WorkorderIngestStack(Stack):
def __init__(self, scope: Construct, construct_id: str, **kwargs):
super().__init__(scope, construct_id, **kwargs)
# --- Shared alarm SNS topic (site-alerts) ---
# Imported once near the top so every alarm in this stack reuses the same
# Topic construct instance (avoids duplicate logical IDs). ALARM-only
# SnsAction; no OK action, per the CloudWatch-alarm preference. The
# topic's CMK (alias/seahaven-alarm-topics) lives on the topic itself.
alarm_topic = sns.Topic.from_topic_arn(
self,
"SiteAlertsTopic",
f"arn:aws:sns:{self.region}:{self.account}:site-alerts",
)
# --- S3 bucket for raw emails ---
email_bucket = s3.Bucket(
self,
"EmailBucket",
bucket_name=f"workorder-ingest-emails-{self.account}",
block_public_access=s3.BlockPublicAccess.BLOCK_ALL,
removal_policy=RemovalPolicy.RETAIN,
lifecycle_rules=[
s3.LifecycleRule(expiration=Duration.days(90)),
],
)
# --- DynamoDB tables ---
work_orders_table = dynamodb.Table(
self,
"WorkOrdersTable",
table_name="WorkOrders",
partition_key=dynamodb.Attribute(
name="work_order_id",
type=dynamodb.AttributeType.STRING,
),
billing_mode=dynamodb.BillingMode.PAY_PER_REQUEST,
removal_policy=RemovalPolicy.RETAIN,
)
# site-code-index and status-index GSIs removed 2026-06-03 (audit M-20):
# 0 reads in 30d against ~50k WCU each of write amplification. Re-add if
# a site-code or status query path ships.
comments_table = dynamodb.Table(
self,
"CommentsTable",
table_name="WorkOrderComments",
partition_key=dynamodb.Attribute(
name="work_order_id",
type=dynamodb.AttributeType.STRING,
),
sort_key=dynamodb.Attribute(
name="comment_id",
type=dynamodb.AttributeType.STRING,
),
billing_mode=dynamodb.BillingMode.PAY_PER_REQUEST,
removal_policy=RemovalPolicy.RETAIN,
)
# --- Secrets Manager for Anthropic API key ---
anthropic_secret = secretsmanager.Secret(
self,
"AnthropicApiKey",
secret_name="workorder-ingest/anthropic-api-key",
description="Anthropic API key for work order email parsing",
removal_policy=RemovalPolicy.RETAIN,
)
# --- DLQ for failed async invocations (INFRA-41 / audit H-8) ---
# SES → S3 → Lambda is async; without an OnFailure destination a failed
# parse (bad email, transient error) is silently dropped after Lambda's
# retries. CDK generates the queue name to avoid colliding with the
# interim CLI-created workorder-email-processor-dlq (removed post-deploy).
email_processor_dlq = sqs.Queue(
self,
"EmailProcessorDlq",
retention_period=Duration.days(14),
enforce_ssl=True,
)
# --- Lambda function ---
email_processor = lambda_.Function(
self,
"EmailProcessor",
function_name="workorder-email-processor",
runtime=lambda_.Runtime.PYTHON_3_12,
architecture=lambda_.Architecture.ARM_64,
handler="handler.handler",
code=lambda_.Code.from_asset(
"../lambdas/wo/email_processor",
bundling=cdk.BundlingOptions(
image=lambda_.Runtime.PYTHON_3_12.bundling_image,
command=[
"bash",
"-c",
"pip install --platform manylinux2014_aarch64 --only-binary=:all: "
"-r requirements.txt -t /asset-output && "
"cp -r . /asset-output/",
],
),
),
timeout=Duration.seconds(60),
memory_size=256,
log_retention=logs.RetentionDays.TWO_MONTHS,
dead_letter_queue=email_processor_dlq,
environment={
"WORK_ORDERS_TABLE": work_orders_table.table_name,
"COMMENTS_TABLE": comments_table.table_name,
"ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN": anthropic_secret.secret_arn,
# Fail-closed sender auth (INFRA-107): the handler only
# accepts mail whose SES-stamped Authentication-Results
# header carries dkim=pass for one of these domains. APM
# mail arrives via the apm@ Google Groups forward, which
# re-signs as seahaven.com (observed on live traffic
# 2026-07-15: "dkim=pass header.i=@seahaven.com"; the
# original hxgnsmartcloud.com signature does not survive
# the forward). Unset/empty ⇒ the handler rejects all mail.
"ALLOWED_DKIM_DOMAINS": "seahaven.com",
},
)
# Grant permissions
email_bucket.grant_read(email_processor)
work_orders_table.grant_read_write_data(email_processor)
comments_table.grant_read_write_data(email_processor)
anthropic_secret.grant_read(email_processor)
# Pre-emptive KMS grant on the shared DynamoDB CMK (alias/seahaven-dynamodb,
# /seahaven/dynamodb/cmk-arn). The WorkOrders/WorkOrderComments tables are
# NOT yet SSE-KMS encrypted, so this grant is currently unused; it is added
# ahead of the CMK migration so the processor role does not hit AccessDenied
# the moment those tables are migrated. The actual table migration + kebab
# rename is tracked in INFRA-6 (and the set-aside wo_stack CMK WIP); fold the
# web-ui read grant in there.
dynamodb_cmk = kms.Key.from_key_arn(
self,
"DynamoDbCmk",
ssm.StringParameter.value_for_string_parameter(
self, "/seahaven/dynamodb/cmk-arn"
),
)
dynamodb_cmk.grant_encrypt_decrypt(email_processor)
# --- Errors alarm (INFRA-41 / audit H-8) ---
# ALARM-only (no OK action, per the CloudWatch-alarm preference) to the
# shared site-alerts topic. Any errored invocation in a 5-min window pages.
email_processor.metric_errors(
period=Duration.minutes(5),
statistic="Sum",
).create_alarm(
self,
"EmailProcessorErrorsAlarm",
alarm_name="workorder-email-processor-errors",
alarm_description="workorder-email-processor async invocation errors",
threshold=0,
evaluation_periods=1,
comparison_operator=cloudwatch.ComparisonOperator.GREATER_THAN_THRESHOLD,
treat_missing_data=cloudwatch.TreatMissingData.NOT_BREACHING,
).add_alarm_action(cw_actions.SnsAction(alarm_topic))
# --- Sender-auth rejection alarm (INFRA-107) ---
# A rejected email (bad/unaligned DKIM verdict) returns normally, so it
# produces NO Lambda error, NO DLQ message and NO retry -- only a
# `sender_auth_rejected` warning log. The WO allowlist trusts dkim=pass
# for seahaven.com on the assumption the apm@ forward re-signs there; if
# that assumption is wrong (e.g. a Gmail auto-forward re-signs under a
# different domain), 100% of legitimate work-order mail is silently
# dropped. This metric filter + alarm turns those warnings into a paging
# signal so a false-reject storm surfaces instead of a silent outage.
_add_sender_auth_rejected_alarm(
self, "EmailProcessor", "workorder-email-processor", alarm_topic
)
# --- Throttles alarm: workorder-email-processor ---
# Any throttled invocation (concurrency cap hit) in a 5-min window pages.
# ALARM-only to site-alerts; no OK action; NOT_BREACHING when no data.
email_processor.metric_throttles(
period=Duration.minutes(5),
statistic="Sum",
).create_alarm(
self,
"EmailProcessorThrottlesAlarm",
alarm_name="workorder-email-processor-throttles",
alarm_description="workorder-email-processor invocation throttles",
threshold=0,
evaluation_periods=1,
comparison_operator=cloudwatch.ComparisonOperator.GREATER_THAN_THRESHOLD,
treat_missing_data=cloudwatch.TreatMissingData.NOT_BREACHING,
).add_alarm_action(cw_actions.SnsAction(alarm_topic))
# --- Duration alarm: workorder-email-processor (orphan adoption) ---
# Adopts the orphaned CLI alarm Lambda-Duration-workorder-email-processor
# under the repo's <fn>-duration naming (NEW logical name → no deploy
# collision; delete the orphan post-deploy). p95 /
# 45000 ms (75% of the 60s timeout) / eval 3 of which 2 datapoints —
# tighter than the orphan's Maximum>=48000 / 1-of-1.
email_processor.metric_duration(
period=Duration.minutes(5),
statistic="p95",
).create_alarm(
self,
"EmailProcessorDurationAlarm",
alarm_name="workorder-email-processor-duration",
alarm_description="workorder-email-processor p95 duration approaching the 60s timeout",
threshold=45000,
evaluation_periods=3,
datapoints_to_alarm=2,
comparison_operator=cloudwatch.ComparisonOperator.GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL_TO_THRESHOLD,
treat_missing_data=cloudwatch.TreatMissingData.NOT_BREACHING,
).add_alarm_action(cw_actions.SnsAction(alarm_topic))
# --- DLQ messages-present alarm (INFRA-41 / audit H-8) ---
# The errors alarm above fires on any errored invocation, but a message
# only lands in the DLQ after Lambda exhausts its async retries and gives
# up — i.e. a genuinely dropped email. ALARM-only (no OK action) to the
# same shared site-alerts topic. MAXIMUM over a 5-min window so a single
# visible message pages even if it is later consumed/redriven.
email_processor_dlq.metric_approximate_number_of_messages_visible(
period=Duration.minutes(5),
statistic="Maximum",
).create_alarm(
self,
"EmailProcessorDlqMessagesAlarm",
alarm_name="workorder-email-processor-dlq-messages",
alarm_description="workorder-email-processor DLQ has visible messages (dropped emails)",
threshold=0,
evaluation_periods=1,
comparison_operator=cloudwatch.ComparisonOperator.GREATER_THAN_THRESHOLD,
treat_missing_data=cloudwatch.TreatMissingData.NOT_BREACHING,
).add_alarm_action(cw_actions.SnsAction(alarm_topic))
# S3 event notification -> Lambda
email_bucket.add_event_notification(
s3.EventType.OBJECT_CREATED,
s3n.LambdaDestination(email_processor),
s3.NotificationKeyFilter(prefix="inbound/"),
)
# --- SES Receipt Rule ---
rule_set = ses.ReceiptRuleSet.from_receipt_rule_set_name(
self,
"ExistingRuleSet",
"INBOUND_MAIL",
)
rule_set.add_rule(
"WorkorderEmailRule",
recipients=["apm@int.seahaven.com"],
actions=[
ses_actions.S3(
bucket=email_bucket,
object_key_prefix="inbound/",
),
],
)
# --- Web UI Lambda ---
web_ui = lambda_.Function(
self,
"WebUI",
function_name="workorder-web-ui",
runtime=lambda_.Runtime.PYTHON_3_12,
architecture=lambda_.Architecture.ARM_64,
handler="handler.handler",
code=lambda_.Code.from_asset("../lambdas/wo/web_ui"),
timeout=Duration.seconds(15),
memory_size=128,
log_retention=logs.RetentionDays.TWO_MONTHS,
environment={
"WORK_ORDERS_TABLE": work_orders_table.table_name,
"COMMENTS_TABLE": comments_table.table_name,
},
)
work_orders_table.grant_read_data(web_ui)
comments_table.grant_read_data(web_ui)
# --- DynamoDB throttle + system-error alarms ---
# ThrottledRequests / SystemErrors emit at TableName + Operation only
# (verified against live CloudWatch: no TableName-only rollup exists, and
# metric_throttled_requests is deprecated/invalid in aws-cdk-lib 2.259.0).
# Each table currently has zero throttle/error datapoints, so the series
# only materialise on first occurrence — NOT_BREACHING keeps them OK until
# then.
_add_ddb_alarms(
self, "WorkOrdersTable", work_orders_table, "WorkOrders", alarm_topic
)
_add_ddb_alarms(
self, "WorkOrderComments", comments_table, "WorkOrderComments", alarm_topic
)
# Public Function URL removed 2026-06-08 (INFRA-74 / audit C-5): the
# unauthenticated FunctionUrlAuthType.NONE URL was deleted out-of-band
# via CLI. Removing the construct (and its auto-generated Principal:*
# invoke permission) reconciles IaC with the live state.