procurement-ingest/cdk/po_stack.py
Adam Moussa 7b9e26d79d
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Add fail-closed SES sender authentication (INFRA-107) (#98)
* Add fail-closed SES sender authentication

The From header and any raw-MIME Authentication-Results copies are
attacker-forgeable, so a forged email to apm@int.seahaven.com or
amazon_po@int.seahaven.com could create or mutate a WO/PO (INFRA-107,
CRITICAL). Both S3-triggered email processors now authenticate the
sender against the Authentication-Results header SES itself prepends
at delivery: only the topmost header is consulted, its authserv-id
must be amazonses.com, and it must carry dkim=pass for a domain in
the per-pipeline ALLOWED_DKIM_DOMAINS env var (comma-separated, set
in CDK so ops can adjust without code changes).

Allowlists come from live traffic observed 2026-07-15 on both ingest
buckets: WO mail arrives via the apm@ Google Groups forward, which
re-signs as seahaven.com (the hxgnsmartcloud.com signature does not
survive the forward); PO mail passes for amazon.coupahost.com.
amazonses.com also passes on PO mail but is deliberately excluded --
every SES customer's outbound mail passes for it.

Every failure path (env var unset, header missing or unparseable,
verdict fail, unaligned domain) rejects the email: a structured
warning with the reason and S3 key is logged and the record skipped
without erroring the invocation, so rejected mail causes no Lambda
retries or DLQ messages. Handler signatures and event sources are
unchanged.

Refs: INFRA-107

* Harden AR parser per cross-family review

Cross-family (GPT-4.1) review findings: terminate the dkim result
token at end-of-clause, whitespace, or a comment so a value like
"dkim=pass-fake" can never be read as a pass; normalize trailing
dots off allowlist entries so "seahaven.com." matches; make the
compat32 parser policy explicit. Adds tests for result-token
boundaries, comments after the result, quoted domain values, and
folding inside a dkim clause.

Refs: INFRA-107

* Harden AR parsing and alarm on sender-auth rejects

The SES-stamped Authentication-Results value echoes attacker-controlled
SMTP-session tokens (envelope-from, helo, header.from) as their own
semicolon-delimited property clauses. A naive split(";") tore an RFC 5321
quoted-local-part MAIL FROM apart and manufactured a forged dkim=pass
clause, so a fully spoofed email was accepted on the genuinely
SES-stamped topmost header. Tokenise comment- and quoted-string-aware
(RFC 8601 / RFC 5322): strip CFWS comments, split clauses only on
semicolons outside a quoted-string, and fail closed on unbalanced
quotes/comments so a ';' inside a quoted pvalue can never start a clause.

Rejected mail returns normally (no error, no retry, no DLQ message), so a
signing-domain drift or a wrong allowlist would silently discard 100% of
legitimate mail while every alarm stayed green. Add a CloudWatch Logs
metric filter + alarm on the sender_auth_rejected warning to both stacks
so a false-reject storm pages instead of vanishing. This is also the
safety net for the WO seahaven.com allowlist assumption, which must be
validated against a live SES-stamped header (a plain Gmail auto-forward
re-signs under the sending Workspace domain, not seahaven.com).

Refs: INFRA-107

* chore: retrigger CI (no run recorded for 7c74ac1)

* Fix quoted-AUID DKIM domain spoof in sender auth

Resolve three confirmed /sh-security-review findings on the fail-closed
SES sender-authentication control.

HIGH: header.i/header.d domain extraction was not quoted-string aware.
An attacker with a valid DKIM key for their own domain could set an
RFC 6376-legal AUID such as i="@seahaven.com"@attacker.com; the naive
extractor stopped at the closing quote and returned seahaven.com,
accepting forged mail. Extraction now tokenises the clause with the same
quoted-string discipline already used for clause splitting: header.d
(the plain signing domain) is authoritative when present, otherwise the
header.i domain is the part after the AUID's LAST top-level "@", so a "@"
inside a quoted local-part is treated as signer-controlled label text and
yields the true signer (attacker.com), not seahaven.com.

LOW: the topmost-header parse ran outside evaluate_sender_authentication's
try/except, so an unexpected parser exception on crafted input could
propagate into the handler and Lambda async retries/DLQ. The parse now
fails CLOSED with an authentication_results_unparseable reason.

MEDIUM: the sender_auth_rejected alarm used Sum>=3 over 15 min, blind to
a low-volume total-reject outage (a trickle that never sums to 3). Both
stacks now alarm on >=1 reject per 5-min period with evaluation_periods=3
/ datapoints_to_alarm=2, so a sustained reject condition pages even at one
reject per period while a lone stray probe self-clears.

Refs: INFRA-107

* Load Lambda function dir on sys.path in tests

Rebasing INFRA-107 onto main folded #95's pytest suite into this
branch's tests. The unified conftest loads the PO/WO handlers by file
path, and handler.py now does `from ses_auth import
authenticate_inbound_email` -- a bare sibling import that resolves in
the Lambda only because the runtime puts each function's own directory
on sys.path. The shared load_handler now adds that directory so the
handler tests import correctly alongside the sender-auth tests.

Refs: INFRA-107

* Note #97 test files in README directory tree

The rebase onto main brought in #97's tests/requirements.txt and
tests/test_po_merge.py. List both in the directory tree so it matches
the tree on disk.

Refs: INFRA-107

* Document INFRA-107 forwarder-binding risk acceptance

Record the accepted risk that WO sender auth binds to the apm@ forward's
re-signing domain (seahaven.com) rather than the Hexagon originator; the
apm@ Google Group's restricted posting policy is the load-bearing control
(escalates to HIGH if the group is opened to external posting). Also
correct the sender-auth-rejected alarm docs to match the shipped config
(>=1 per 5-min, 2-of-3 datapoints, not the superseded >=3/15min) and
note the SES-AR-01/02 parser hardening follow-ups.

Refs: INFRA-107
2026-07-15 20:58:47 -04:00

609 lines
26 KiB
Python

"""CDK stack for the Coupa PO email ingestion pipeline."""
import aws_cdk as cdk
from aws_cdk import (
Duration,
RemovalPolicy,
Stack,
aws_cloudwatch as cloudwatch,
aws_cloudwatch_actions as cw_actions,
aws_dynamodb as dynamodb,
aws_kms as kms,
aws_lambda as lambda_,
aws_lambda_event_sources as lambda_event_sources,
aws_logs as logs,
aws_s3 as s3,
aws_s3_notifications as s3n,
aws_ses as ses,
aws_ses_actions as ses_actions,
aws_secretsmanager as secretsmanager,
aws_sns as sns,
aws_sqs as sqs,
aws_ssm as ssm,
)
from constructs import Construct
# Operations these tables actually issue (PutItem/UpdateItem/DeleteItem writes,
# GetItem/Query/BatchGetItem reads). DynamoDB emits ThrottledRequests/SystemErrors
# keyed by TableName + Operation only, so the CDK *_for_operations helpers (which
# render a SUM MathExpression across these per-operation metrics) are the correct,
# non-deprecated way to roll a table up to a single alarmable series.
_DDB_ALARM_OPERATIONS = [
dynamodb.Operation.GET_ITEM,
dynamodb.Operation.BATCH_GET_ITEM,
dynamodb.Operation.QUERY,
dynamodb.Operation.SCAN,
dynamodb.Operation.PUT_ITEM,
dynamodb.Operation.UPDATE_ITEM,
dynamodb.Operation.DELETE_ITEM,
dynamodb.Operation.BATCH_WRITE_ITEM,
]
def _add_ddb_alarms(scope, id_prefix, table, alarm_name_prefix, alarm_topic):
"""Add throttle + system-error alarms for a DynamoDB table.
Both fire on any non-zero datapoint in a 5-min window. ALARM-only SnsAction
to site-alerts (no OK action); TreatMissingData NOT_BREACHING.
"""
table.metric_throttled_requests_for_operations(
operations=_DDB_ALARM_OPERATIONS,
period=Duration.minutes(5),
statistic="Sum",
).create_alarm(
scope,
f"{id_prefix}ThrottlesAlarm",
alarm_name=f"{alarm_name_prefix}-throttles",
alarm_description=f"{alarm_name_prefix} DynamoDB throttled requests",
threshold=0,
evaluation_periods=1,
comparison_operator=cloudwatch.ComparisonOperator.GREATER_THAN_THRESHOLD,
treat_missing_data=cloudwatch.TreatMissingData.NOT_BREACHING,
).add_alarm_action(cw_actions.SnsAction(alarm_topic))
table.metric_system_errors_for_operations(
operations=_DDB_ALARM_OPERATIONS,
period=Duration.minutes(5),
statistic="Sum",
).create_alarm(
scope,
f"{id_prefix}SystemErrorsAlarm",
alarm_name=f"{alarm_name_prefix}-system-errors",
alarm_description=f"{alarm_name_prefix} DynamoDB server-side (5xx) errors",
threshold=0,
evaluation_periods=1,
comparison_operator=cloudwatch.ComparisonOperator.GREATER_THAN_THRESHOLD,
treat_missing_data=cloudwatch.TreatMissingData.NOT_BREACHING,
).add_alarm_action(cw_actions.SnsAction(alarm_topic))
# CloudWatch namespace for the log-derived sender-authentication metrics.
_SENDER_AUTH_METRIC_NAMESPACE = "Seahaven/ProcurementIngest"
def _add_sender_auth_rejected_alarm(scope, id_prefix, function_name, alarm_topic):
"""Metric-filter + alarm on ``sender_auth_rejected`` warnings (INFRA-107).
A rejected inbound email is skipped without erroring the invocation, so it
is invisible to the Errors/Throttles/DLQ alarms. This turns the structured
warning log into a CloudWatch metric and pages when rejections spike --
catching a silent false-reject storm (allowlist wrong, signing-domain
drift, SES header-format change) that would otherwise discard legitimate
mail while the pipeline reports healthy.
ALARM-only SnsAction to site-alerts; no OK action. The metric filter reads
the function's own log group (imported by the deterministic
``/aws/lambda/<fn>`` name, created by the function's log_retention). A plain
substring pattern is used because Lambda prefixes each line with its own
level/timestamp/request-id, so the JSON payload is not a standalone JSON
log event a `{$.event=...}` pattern could match.
"""
metric_name = f"{function_name}-sender-auth-rejected"
logs.MetricFilter(
scope,
f"{id_prefix}SenderAuthRejectedFilter",
log_group=logs.LogGroup.from_log_group_name(
scope,
f"{id_prefix}LogGroup",
f"/aws/lambda/{function_name}",
),
filter_pattern=logs.FilterPattern.literal('"sender_auth_rejected"'),
metric_namespace=_SENDER_AUTH_METRIC_NAMESPACE,
metric_name=metric_name,
metric_value="1",
default_value=0,
)
# Fire on a *sustained* reject condition rather than a volume spike. The
# earlier Sum>=3-over-15-min threshold had a blind spot that is exactly the
# failure this alarm exists to catch: a low-traffic pipeline in total
# drift outage (allowlist wrong / signing-domain changed) may only produce
# a trickle of rejects -- one every few minutes -- that never sums to 3 in
# any window, so the outage never pages. Instead: >=1 reject per 5-min
# period, alarming when 2 of the last 3 periods breach (evaluation_periods=3
# / datapoints_to_alarm=2, the same idiom as the duration alarm). A single
# stray spoof probe (one lone period) is tolerated and self-clears, but a
# sustained reject condition trips within ~10-15 min even at one reject per
# period. default_value=0 on the metric filter keeps the series continuous
# so NOT_BREACHING only applies before the first datapoint ever arrives.
cloudwatch.Metric(
namespace=_SENDER_AUTH_METRIC_NAMESPACE,
metric_name=metric_name,
period=Duration.minutes(5),
statistic="Sum",
).create_alarm(
scope,
f"{id_prefix}SenderAuthRejectedAlarm",
alarm_name=f"{function_name}-sender-auth-rejected",
alarm_description=(
f"{function_name} rejected inbound mail on sender authentication "
"(possible allowlist/DKIM-domain drift silently dropping real mail)"
),
threshold=1,
evaluation_periods=3,
datapoints_to_alarm=2,
comparison_operator=cloudwatch.ComparisonOperator.GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL_TO_THRESHOLD,
treat_missing_data=cloudwatch.TreatMissingData.NOT_BREACHING,
).add_alarm_action(cw_actions.SnsAction(alarm_topic))
class PoIngestStack(Stack):
def __init__(self, scope: Construct, construct_id: str, **kwargs):
super().__init__(scope, construct_id, **kwargs)
# --- Shared alarm SNS topic (site-alerts) ---
# Imported once near the top so every alarm in this stack reuses the same
# Topic construct instance (avoids duplicate logical IDs). ALARM-only
# SnsAction; no OK action, per the CloudWatch-alarm preference. The
# topic's CMK (alias/seahaven-alarm-topics) lives on the topic itself.
alarm_topic = sns.Topic.from_topic_arn(
self,
"SiteAlertsTopic",
f"arn:aws:sns:{self.region}:{self.account}:site-alerts",
)
# --- S3 bucket for raw emails ---
email_bucket = s3.Bucket(
self,
"EmailBucket",
bucket_name=f"po-ingest-emails-{self.account}",
block_public_access=s3.BlockPublicAccess.BLOCK_ALL,
removal_policy=RemovalPolicy.RETAIN,
lifecycle_rules=[
s3.LifecycleRule(expiration=Duration.days(90)),
],
)
# --- Shared customer-managed CMK for sensitive DynamoDB tables ---
# Owned by the account-baseline app (alias/seahaven-dynamodb, INFRA-95 /
# M-3); ARN published to SSM. The purchase-orders table was migrated to
# SSE-KMS out-of-band, so declaring encryption_key here reconciles the
# drift and — via grant_read_write_data below — propagates the required
# kms:Decrypt/GenerateDataKey/DescribeKey to the consumer roles.
dynamodb_cmk = kms.Key.from_key_arn(
self,
"DynamoDbCmk",
ssm.StringParameter.value_for_string_parameter(
self, "/seahaven/dynamodb/cmk-arn"
),
)
# --- Purchase-orders DynamoDB table ---
# Owned by this stack. Streams enabled for the site-extractor pipeline.
# Other stacks (seahaven-slack-bot) reference this table via fromTableName().
po_table = dynamodb.Table(
self,
"PurchaseOrdersTable",
table_name="purchase-orders",
partition_key=dynamodb.Attribute(
name="po_number",
type=dynamodb.AttributeType.STRING,
),
billing_mode=dynamodb.BillingMode.PAY_PER_REQUEST,
removal_policy=RemovalPolicy.RETAIN,
stream=dynamodb.StreamViewType.NEW_IMAGE,
encryption=dynamodb.TableEncryption.CUSTOMER_MANAGED,
encryption_key=dynamodb_cmk,
)
# --- Secrets Manager for Anthropic API key ---
anthropic_secret = secretsmanager.Secret(
self,
"AnthropicApiKey",
secret_name="po-ingest/anthropic-api-key",
description="Anthropic API key for Coupa PO email parsing",
removal_policy=RemovalPolicy.RETAIN,
)
# --- DLQ for failed async invocations (INFRA-41 / audit H-8) ---
# SES → S3 → Lambda is async; without an OnFailure destination a failed
# parse (bad email, transient error) is silently dropped after Lambda's
# retries. CDK generates the queue name to avoid colliding with the
# interim CLI-created po-email-processor-dlq (removed post-deploy).
email_processor_dlq = sqs.Queue(
self,
"EmailProcessorDlq",
retention_period=Duration.days(14),
enforce_ssl=True,
)
# --- Lambda function ---
email_processor = lambda_.Function(
self,
"EmailProcessor",
function_name="po-email-processor",
runtime=lambda_.Runtime.PYTHON_3_12,
architecture=lambda_.Architecture.ARM_64,
handler="handler.handler",
code=lambda_.Code.from_asset(
"../lambdas/po/email_processor",
bundling=cdk.BundlingOptions(
image=lambda_.Runtime.PYTHON_3_12.bundling_image,
command=[
"bash",
"-c",
"pip install --platform manylinux2014_aarch64 --only-binary=:all: "
"-r requirements.txt -t /asset-output && "
"cp handler.py ses_auth.py /asset-output/",
],
),
),
timeout=Duration.seconds(60),
memory_size=256,
log_retention=logs.RetentionDays.TWO_MONTHS,
dead_letter_queue=email_processor_dlq,
environment={
"PO_TABLE": "purchase-orders",
"ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN": anthropic_secret.secret_arn,
# Fail-closed sender auth (INFRA-107): the handler only
# accepts mail whose SES-stamped Authentication-Results
# header carries dkim=pass for one of these domains.
# Observed on live traffic 2026-07-15: Coupa PO mail passes
# DKIM for amazon.coupahost.com (and amazonses.com, which is
# deliberately NOT allowlisted — every SES customer's mail
# passes that). Unset/empty ⇒ the handler rejects all mail.
"ALLOWED_DKIM_DOMAINS": "amazon.coupahost.com",
},
)
# Grant permissions
email_bucket.grant_read(email_processor)
po_table.grant_read_write_data(email_processor)
anthropic_secret.grant_read(email_processor)
# --- Errors alarm (INFRA-41 / audit H-8) ---
# ALARM-only (no OK action, per the CloudWatch-alarm preference) to the
# shared site-alerts topic. Any errored invocation in a 5-min window pages.
email_processor.metric_errors(
period=Duration.minutes(5),
statistic="Sum",
).create_alarm(
self,
"EmailProcessorErrorsAlarm",
alarm_name="po-email-processor-errors",
alarm_description="po-email-processor async invocation errors",
threshold=0,
evaluation_periods=1,
comparison_operator=cloudwatch.ComparisonOperator.GREATER_THAN_THRESHOLD,
treat_missing_data=cloudwatch.TreatMissingData.NOT_BREACHING,
).add_alarm_action(cw_actions.SnsAction(alarm_topic))
# --- Sender-auth rejection alarm (INFRA-107) ---
# A rejected email (bad/unaligned DKIM verdict) returns normally, so it
# produces NO Lambda error, NO DLQ message and NO retry -- only a
# `sender_auth_rejected` warning log. Without this metric filter + alarm a
# domain drift (Coupa rotates its signing subdomain, SES changes its
# Authentication-Results format, the allowlist is wrong) would silently
# discard 100% of legitimate PO mail while every other alarm stays green.
# A CloudWatch Logs metric filter turns those warnings into a metric so a
# false-reject storm pages instead of vanishing. default_value=0 keeps the
# series populated (alarm stays OK, never INSUFFICIENT_DATA) between events.
_add_sender_auth_rejected_alarm(
self, "EmailProcessor", "po-email-processor", alarm_topic
)
# --- Throttles alarm: po-email-processor ---
# Any throttled invocation (concurrency cap hit) in a 5-min window pages.
# ALARM-only to site-alerts; no OK action; NOT_BREACHING when no data.
email_processor.metric_throttles(
period=Duration.minutes(5),
statistic="Sum",
).create_alarm(
self,
"EmailProcessorThrottlesAlarm",
alarm_name="po-email-processor-throttles",
alarm_description="po-email-processor invocation throttles",
threshold=0,
evaluation_periods=1,
comparison_operator=cloudwatch.ComparisonOperator.GREATER_THAN_THRESHOLD,
treat_missing_data=cloudwatch.TreatMissingData.NOT_BREACHING,
).add_alarm_action(cw_actions.SnsAction(alarm_topic))
# --- DLQ messages-present alarm ---
# Pages when any message lands in the EmailProcessorDlq: a message here
# means a PO email was permanently dropped after Lambda exhausted its
# async retries. Maximum over a single 5-min window > 0 fires; missing
# data (no messages metric emitted) is not breaching. Reuses the shared
# site-alerts topic, ALARM-only, like the errors alarm above. The metric
# helper derives the QueueName dimension from the queue construct, so the
# alarm tracks the CDK-generated queue name without hardcoding it.
email_processor_dlq.metric_approximate_number_of_messages_visible(
period=Duration.minutes(5),
statistic="Maximum",
).create_alarm(
self,
"EmailProcessorDlqMessagesAlarm",
alarm_name="po-email-processor-dlq-messages",
alarm_description="po-email-processor DLQ has messages (dropped PO emails)",
threshold=0,
evaluation_periods=1,
comparison_operator=cloudwatch.ComparisonOperator.GREATER_THAN_THRESHOLD,
treat_missing_data=cloudwatch.TreatMissingData.NOT_BREACHING,
).add_alarm_action(cw_actions.SnsAction(alarm_topic))
# --- Duration alarm: po-email-processor (orphan adoption) ---
# Adopts the orphaned CLI alarm Lambda-Duration-po-email-processor under
# the repo's <fn>-duration naming (NEW logical name → no deploy collision;
# delete the orphan post-deploy). p99 / 45000 ms
# (75% of the 60s timeout) / eval 3 of 3 — tighter than the orphan's
# Maximum>=48000 / 1-of-1.
email_processor.metric_duration(
period=Duration.minutes(5),
statistic="p99",
).create_alarm(
self,
"EmailProcessorDurationAlarm",
alarm_name="po-email-processor-duration",
alarm_description="po-email-processor p99 duration approaching the 60s timeout",
threshold=45000,
evaluation_periods=3,
datapoints_to_alarm=2,
comparison_operator=cloudwatch.ComparisonOperator.GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL_TO_THRESHOLD,
treat_missing_data=cloudwatch.TreatMissingData.NOT_BREACHING,
).add_alarm_action(cw_actions.SnsAction(alarm_topic))
# S3 event notification → Lambda
email_bucket.add_event_notification(
s3.EventType.OBJECT_CREATED,
s3n.LambdaDestination(email_processor),
s3.NotificationKeyFilter(prefix="inbound/"),
)
# --- SES Receipt Rule ---
# Reuse the existing INBOUND_MAIL rule set (shared with workorder-ingest)
rule_set = ses.ReceiptRuleSet.from_receipt_rule_set_name(
self,
"ExistingRuleSet",
"INBOUND_MAIL",
)
rule_set.add_rule(
"PoEmailRule",
recipients=["amazon_po@int.seahaven.com"],
actions=[
ses_actions.S3(
bucket=email_bucket,
object_key_prefix="inbound/",
),
],
)
# --- Web UI auth token secret ---
# Shared secret for the web UI auth gate, stored in Secrets Manager and
# resolved at runtime so the token never appears in CloudFormation templates
# or Lambda environment variables. Create this secret before deploying
# either stack; both PO and WO stacks reference it by name.
web_ui_auth_secret = secretsmanager.Secret.from_secret_name_v2(
self,
"WebUiAuthToken",
"procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token",
)
# --- Web UI Lambda ---
web_ui = lambda_.Function(
self,
"WebUI",
function_name="po-web-ui",
runtime=lambda_.Runtime.PYTHON_3_12,
architecture=lambda_.Architecture.ARM_64,
handler="handler.handler",
code=lambda_.Code.from_asset("../lambdas/po/web_ui"),
timeout=Duration.seconds(60),
memory_size=256,
log_retention=logs.RetentionDays.TWO_MONTHS,
environment={
"PO_TABLE": "purchase-orders",
# Defense-in-depth shared secret for the web UI handler. The
# handler fails closed if this ARN is unset or the secret is
# missing, so any future invocation path cannot re-expose the
# PO DB unauthenticated. The secret value is fetched at runtime
# from Secrets Manager (not embedded in env vars or template).
"WEB_UI_AUTH_TOKEN_SECRET_ARN": web_ui_auth_secret.secret_arn,
},
)
po_table.grant_read_data(web_ui)
web_ui_auth_secret.grant_read(web_ui)
# --- Throttles alarm: po-web-ui ---
web_ui.metric_throttles(
period=Duration.minutes(5),
statistic="Sum",
).create_alarm(
self,
"WebUiThrottlesAlarm",
alarm_name="po-web-ui-throttles",
alarm_description="po-web-ui invocation throttles",
threshold=0,
evaluation_periods=1,
comparison_operator=cloudwatch.ComparisonOperator.GREATER_THAN_THRESHOLD,
treat_missing_data=cloudwatch.TreatMissingData.NOT_BREACHING,
).add_alarm_action(cw_actions.SnsAction(alarm_topic))
# --- Duration alarm: po-web-ui ---
# Net-new (no orphan exists for this function).
# p99 / 45000 ms (75% of the 60s timeout) / eval 3, datapoints 2.
web_ui.metric_duration(
period=Duration.minutes(5),
statistic="p99",
).create_alarm(
self,
"WebUiDurationAlarm",
alarm_name="po-web-ui-duration",
alarm_description="po-web-ui p99 duration approaching the 60s timeout",
threshold=45000,
evaluation_periods=3,
datapoints_to_alarm=2,
comparison_operator=cloudwatch.ComparisonOperator.GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL_TO_THRESHOLD,
treat_missing_data=cloudwatch.TreatMissingData.NOT_BREACHING,
).add_alarm_action(cw_actions.SnsAction(alarm_topic))
# Public Function URL removed 2026-06-08 (INFRA-74 / audit C-5): the
# unauthenticated FunctionUrlAuthType.NONE URL was deleted out-of-band
# via CLI. Removing the construct (and its auto-generated Principal:*
# invoke permission) reconciles IaC with the live state.
# --- Verified sites table (extracted from PO ship-to addresses) ---
verified_sites_table = dynamodb.Table(
self,
"VerifiedSitesTable",
table_name="verified-sites",
partition_key=dynamodb.Attribute(
name="siteCode",
type=dynamodb.AttributeType.STRING,
),
billing_mode=dynamodb.BillingMode.PAY_PER_REQUEST,
removal_policy=RemovalPolicy.RETAIN,
)
# by-state GSI removed 2026-06-03 (audit M-20): 0 reads in 30d against
# 518 WCU of write amplification. Re-add if a state-level query path ships.
# --- Site extractor Lambda (DynamoDB Streams → verified-sites) ---
site_extractor = lambda_.Function(
self,
"SiteExtractor",
function_name="po-ingest-site-extractor",
runtime=lambda_.Runtime.PYTHON_3_12,
architecture=lambda_.Architecture.ARM_64,
handler="handler.handler",
code=lambda_.Code.from_asset("../lambdas/po/site_extractor"),
timeout=Duration.seconds(60),
memory_size=256,
log_retention=logs.RetentionDays.TWO_MONTHS,
environment={
"VERIFIED_SITES_TABLE": verified_sites_table.table_name,
"PENDING_REVIEW_TABLE": "pending-site-review",
},
)
verified_sites_table.grant_read_write_data(site_extractor)
site_extractor.add_event_source(
lambda_event_sources.DynamoEventSource(
po_table,
starting_position=lambda_.StartingPosition.TRIM_HORIZON,
batch_size=10,
max_batching_window=Duration.seconds(30),
bisect_batch_on_error=True,
retry_attempts=3,
)
)
# --- Errors alarm: po-ingest-site-extractor ---
# Stream-consumer errors retry per the event-source config, but a
# persistent failure stalls the verified-sites pipeline. ALARM-only to
# site-alerts; no OK action; NOT_BREACHING when no data.
site_extractor.metric_errors(
period=Duration.minutes(5),
statistic="Sum",
).create_alarm(
self,
"SiteExtractorErrorsAlarm",
alarm_name="po-ingest-site-extractor-errors",
alarm_description="po-ingest-site-extractor invocation errors",
threshold=0,
evaluation_periods=1,
comparison_operator=cloudwatch.ComparisonOperator.GREATER_THAN_THRESHOLD,
treat_missing_data=cloudwatch.TreatMissingData.NOT_BREACHING,
).add_alarm_action(cw_actions.SnsAction(alarm_topic))
# --- Throttles alarm: po-ingest-site-extractor ---
site_extractor.metric_throttles(
period=Duration.minutes(5),
statistic="Sum",
).create_alarm(
self,
"SiteExtractorThrottlesAlarm",
alarm_name="po-ingest-site-extractor-throttles",
alarm_description="po-ingest-site-extractor invocation throttles",
threshold=0,
evaluation_periods=1,
comparison_operator=cloudwatch.ComparisonOperator.GREATER_THAN_THRESHOLD,
treat_missing_data=cloudwatch.TreatMissingData.NOT_BREACHING,
).add_alarm_action(cw_actions.SnsAction(alarm_topic))
# --- Duration alarm: po-ingest-site-extractor ---
# Net-new (no orphan exists for this function).
# p99 / 45000 ms (75% of the 60s timeout) / eval 3, datapoints 2.
site_extractor.metric_duration(
period=Duration.minutes(5),
statistic="p99",
).create_alarm(
self,
"SiteExtractorDurationAlarm",
alarm_name="po-ingest-site-extractor-duration",
alarm_description="po-ingest-site-extractor p99 duration approaching the 60s timeout",
threshold=45000,
evaluation_periods=3,
datapoints_to_alarm=2,
comparison_operator=cloudwatch.ComparisonOperator.GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL_TO_THRESHOLD,
treat_missing_data=cloudwatch.TreatMissingData.NOT_BREACHING,
).add_alarm_action(cw_actions.SnsAction(alarm_topic))
cdk.CfnOutput(
self,
"VerifiedSitesTableName",
value=verified_sites_table.table_name,
description="Verified site addresses extracted from POs",
)
# --- Pending site review table (POs with no extractable site code) ---
pending_review_table = dynamodb.Table(
self,
"PendingSiteReviewTable",
table_name="pending-site-review",
partition_key=dynamodb.Attribute(
name="po_number",
type=dynamodb.AttributeType.STRING,
),
billing_mode=dynamodb.BillingMode.PAY_PER_REQUEST,
removal_policy=RemovalPolicy.RETAIN,
)
pending_review_table.grant_read_write_data(site_extractor)
verified_sites_table.grant_read_data(site_extractor)
# --- DynamoDB throttle + system-error alarms ---
# ThrottledRequests / SystemErrors emit at TableName + Operation only
# (verified against live CloudWatch: no TableName-only rollup exists, and
# metric_throttled_requests is deprecated/invalid in aws-cdk-lib 2.259.0).
# Each table currently has zero throttle/error datapoints, so the series
# only materialise on first occurrence — NOT_BREACHING keeps them OK until
# then.
_add_ddb_alarms(
self, "PurchaseOrdersTable", po_table, "purchase-orders", alarm_topic
)
_add_ddb_alarms(
self,
"VerifiedSitesTable",
verified_sites_table,
"verified-sites",
alarm_topic,
)
_add_ddb_alarms(
self,
"PendingSiteReviewTable",
pending_review_table,
"pending-site-review",
alarm_topic,
)