procurement-ingest/tests/test_web_ui_auth.py
Adam Moussa f67d8b9907
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feat(api): procurement-api read stack + OpenAPI docs (SHOC reconciliation path) (#127)
* feat(api): add procurement-api stack - read API + OpenAPI docs page

Third CDK stack: API Gateway REST API (IAM SigV4) over both pipelines'
tables, replacing SHOC's retired SyncController cross-account DynamoDB
scan as the reconciliation/backfill path.

- lambdas/api/: handler (healthcheck + docs-token gate + router dispatch),
  router (single route table), pagination (opaque cursor, hostile -> 400),
  Decimal-safe serialization, wo_repo/po_repo reads. No VendorReplies.
- OpenAPI 3.1 spec as source of truth incl. top-level webhooks section
  documenting the outbound SHOC feed; phase-2 write endpoints x-planned
  (router answers 501). Self-contained /docs page, no CDN.
- Auth: AWS_IAM on data routes + resource policy scoped to exactly
  arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev on GET/*; /docs and
  /openapi.json carve-out is token-gated in the Lambda via shared
  web_ui_auth (fail-closed, INFRA-74 posture).
- KMS: explicit Decrypt/DescribeKey on the DynamoDB CMK from SSM
  (name-imported table drops the key association - INFRA-104 class).
- Alarms: errors/throttles/duration(p99>=22.5s) + gateway 5xx, ALARM-only
  to site-alerts. No access logging in v1 (docs ?token= shim stays out of
  logs); cloud_watch_role=False.
- Tests: handler auth-seam + routing + Decimal round-trip; moto cursor
  pagination incl. hostile cursors; spec<->router drift gate; bundle
  AST pins for the api command; pytest.ini --cov + loader siblings.
- Deploy role: third stack DescribeStacks ARN + procurement-api smoke
  invoke ARN (re-run create-deploy-role.sh before merge).

* harden(api): apply sh-security-review findings to procurement-api

Fan-out (6 detectors) + review findings resolved:

Correctness / DoS:
- pagination: require EXACT key-set match (was subset) so a partial/foreign
  composite cursor can't reach DynamoDB as an inconsistent ExclusiveStartKey
  -> ValidationException -> 500; comments Query now pins the cursor's
  work_order_id to the path entity.
- handler: map botocore ValidationException to 400 (defense in depth) so a
  crafted cursor can't drive the zero-threshold 5xx alarm.
- web_ui_auth: compare tokens as bytes; a non-ASCII presented token now fails
  closed (401) instead of crashing hmac.compare_digest into a 500. Resolves the
  pre-existing xfail(strict) follow-up test; hardens the web UIs too.

Docs page:
- typeStr() now escapes the one spec-derived string that reached innerHTML.
- spec inlined into the docs <script> block escapes "<" -> < (</script>
  breakout guard); /openapi.json still served byte-faithful.
- Cache-Control: no-store + Referrer-Policy: no-referrer on docs responses so
  the ?token= URL stays out of caches/Referer.
- spec-drift test asserts the committed spec carries no "</" / "<!--".

IAM / IaC:
- resource policy enumerates the 7 data GET resources instead of GET/* so a
  future GET route can't silently inherit SHOC cross-account reach.
- kms:Decrypt grant gains a kms:ViaService=dynamodb condition.
- stage throttling (50 rps / 100 burst) bounds the unauthenticated /docs blast
  radius below the 10k account default.
- corrected the PATCH/POST comment (same-account callers aren't blocked by the
  resource policy; 501 handler + absent write grant are the gate).
- documented the RETAIN log-group first-deploy rollback trap and the
  resource-policy-needs-redeploy gotcha in-stack.

Mandatory GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the full policy surface: no BLOCK/FIX.
675 tests pass, ruff clean, cdk synth green.
2026-07-23 19:32:20 -04:00

116 lines
4.5 KiB
Python

"""web_ui_auth.is_authenticated coverage (constraint 5c) -- 0% before Phase 8.
Auth is the mandatory-review surface, so this pins: fail-closed on an unset ARN
(read at import -> reload), fail-closed on a Secrets-Manager exception, the TTL
cache refresh, the Bearer / X-Auth-Token / case-insensitivity header matrix,
wrong-token, and the non-ASCII-token TypeError (a documenting pin -- the module
is frozen this phase, so the fix is deferred).
Loaded through the shared loader (``load_lambda_module("shared", "web_ui_auth")``)
and reloaded per test because the secret ARN is read at module-import time.
"""
import pytest
from tests.support import load_lambda_module
_ARN = "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:web-ui-auth-token"
class _FakeSecrets:
def __init__(self, value):
self.value = value
def get_secret_value(self, SecretId): # noqa: N803 (boto3 kwarg name)
return {"SecretString": self.value}
class _RaisingSecrets:
def get_secret_value(self, SecretId): # noqa: N803
raise RuntimeError("secretsmanager access denied")
@pytest.fixture
def load_auth(monkeypatch):
"""Return a loader that (re)imports web_ui_auth with a chosen ARN env, so the
module-level ``_WEB_UI_AUTH_TOKEN_SECRET_ARN`` (read at import) reflects it."""
mod = load_lambda_module("shared", "web_ui_auth")
def _load(arn=_ARN):
if arn is None:
monkeypatch.delenv("WEB_UI_AUTH_TOKEN_SECRET_ARN", raising=False)
else:
monkeypatch.setenv("WEB_UI_AUTH_TOKEN_SECRET_ARN", arn)
# Re-exec the module body in place (importlib.reload can't re-find a
# file-path-loaded module by name). This re-reads the ARN env and resets
# _auth_token_cache / _auth_token_cached_at to their module defaults.
mod.__spec__.loader.exec_module(mod)
return mod
return _load
def _evt(**headers):
return {"headers": headers}
def test_fail_closed_on_unset_arn(load_auth):
mod = load_auth(arn=None)
assert mod.is_authenticated(_evt(**{"x-auth-token": "anything"})) is False
def test_fail_closed_on_secrets_manager_exception(load_auth, monkeypatch):
mod = load_auth()
monkeypatch.setattr(mod.boto3, "client", lambda *a, **k: _RaisingSecrets())
# Fails closed (False) and does NOT raise -- the except in _get_auth_token.
assert mod.is_authenticated(_evt(**{"x-auth-token": "anything"})) is False
def test_ttl_cache_refresh_picks_up_rotated_secret(load_auth, monkeypatch):
mod = load_auth()
fake = _FakeSecrets("tok1")
monkeypatch.setattr(mod.boto3, "client", lambda *a, **k: fake)
clock = [1000.0]
monkeypatch.setattr(mod.time, "monotonic", lambda: clock[0])
assert mod._get_auth_token() == "tok1" # first fetch, cached at t=1000
fake.value = "tok2" # secret rotated
clock[0] = 1000.0 + 299 # still within the 300s TTL
assert mod._get_auth_token() == "tok1" # served from cache
clock[0] = 1000.0 + 301 # TTL elapsed
assert mod._get_auth_token() == "tok2" # refetched, rotation picked up
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
("headers", "expected"),
[
({"x-auth-token": "SECRET"}, True),
({"X-Auth-Token": "SECRET"}, True), # header-name case-insensitive
({"Authorization": "Bearer SECRET"}, True),
({"authorization": "bearer SECRET"}, True), # scheme case-insensitive
# X-Auth-Token takes precedence over an Authorization header.
({"X-Auth-Token": "SECRET", "Authorization": "Bearer WRONG"}, True),
({"x-auth-token": "WRONG"}, False),
({"Authorization": "Bearer WRONG"}, False),
({"Authorization": "SECRET"}, False), # no Bearer prefix
({}, False), # no credentials at all
({"x-auth-token": ""}, False), # empty presented token
],
)
def test_header_matrix(load_auth, monkeypatch, headers, expected):
mod = load_auth()
monkeypatch.setattr(mod, "_get_auth_token", lambda: "SECRET")
assert mod.is_authenticated(_evt(**headers)) is expected
def test_non_ascii_token_should_fail_closed(load_auth, monkeypatch):
# Fixed 2026-07-23 (procurement-api security review): is_authenticated now
# compares tokens as bytes, so a non-ASCII presented token fails closed to
# False instead of raising TypeError (which surfaced as a 500 that would
# page the API's zero-threshold 5xx alarm). Was xfail(strict) while
# web_ui_auth was frozen; the fix landed with the shared bytes-compare.
mod = load_auth()
monkeypatch.setattr(mod, "_get_auth_token", lambda: "SECRET")
assert mod.is_authenticated(_evt(**{"x-auth-token": "SÉCRET"})) is False