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* docs(webhook): revise SHOC webhook contract and plan for post-migration reality Branch re-cut on main 2026-07-23 (old base carried stale PR #99 commits). Contract Rev 2026-07-23: - Producer account corrected: seahaven-prod (011934824531); mgmt frozen - Reconciliation backstop is the new procurement read API, not SyncController - wo_status "unknown" is real; SHOC must map it (checklist item added) - write_origin forward-compat note for phase-2 write-back echo suppression - SyncVendorReplies retirement flagged (dead table, no vendor_reply event) Plan updates: - Account gate: seahaven-prod only; never enable streams on mgmt tables - Emitter ships DARK (ESMs enabled=False); activation is a deliberate flip after the SHOC receiver passes shared HMAC vectors - Post-refactor conventions: common.py helpers, bundle-consistency AST pins, pytest.ini --cov additions, consolidated test roots - Dedicated-CMK rationale, secret-ARN handooff step, consumer audit refreshed (slack-bot decommissioned), enum golden test, write_origin skip-branch test * feat(webhook): SHOC WO webhook emitter — dark-ship streams, HMAC secret + rotation Implements docs/shoc-webhook-plan.md Phases 1-5 (PR-2 of the SHOC call-and-be-called effort). Everything ships DARK: both DynamoDB event source mappings deploy enabled=False; activation is a deliberate one-line follow-up PR gated on the SHOC receiver passing the shared HMAC test vectors. - Streams: NEW_AND_OLD_IMAGES on WorkOrders + WorkOrderComments (in-place update, RETAIN + logical IDs untouched; no existing consumers — verified live, neither table had a stream). - workorder-shoc-emitter (Py3.12/ARM64): stream -> envelope -> HMAC-signed POST per docs/shoc-webhook-contract.md; strict per-shard ordering (parallelization 1, bisect off, retry until 24h age, ReportBatchItemFailures); 429/5xx/timeout block the shard in order, other 4xx park to workorder-shoc-emitter-rejected; ESM failures -> workorder-shoc-emitter-failures (metadata; replay rebuilds from DynamoDB). Echo guard skips write_origin=shoc-write-api. - Secret workorder-ingest/shoc-webhook-hmac on a dedicated CMK (alias workorder-ingest-shoc-webhook-kms); cross-account GetSecretValue/DescribeSecret + kms:Decrypt granted to exactly arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev. RemovalPolicy DESTROY deliberately (machine-generated material; avoids the fixed-name RETAIN-orphan deadlock). - workorder-shoc-hmac-rotator: 30-day rotation, dual-key overlap, 64-hex keys, kid = UTC %Y-%m-%dT%H. - Alarms (ALARM-only -> site-alerts): emitter errors/throttles/ duration + iterator-age (>=10 min) + failures/rejected queue depth; rotator standard trio. - scripts/replay_shoc_webhooks.py: dry-run-default operator replay (rebuilds from tables, replay:true envelopes). - Tests: 742 passing, 85.56% aggregate; golden HMAC vectors shared with SHOC in docs/shoc-webhook-test-vectors.json (emitter + replay signing pinned to identical vectors); bundle-consistency AST pins for both new bundles. - README: WO stack + webhook feed section, alarm table, runbooks; removed stale seahaven-slack-bot consumer references. * fix(webhook): kms:ViaService pins, https-only delivery, cross-account principal CI pin GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the policy surface (no BLOCK): FIX applied to the cross-account shoc-backend-dev Decrypt statement and both Lambda role KMS grants (the key is only ever used via Secrets Manager); its invariant-enforcement QUESTION answered durably with tests/test_cross_account_principal_pin.py (any new foreign IAM principal in cdk/ fails CI). Scanner mediums fixed: delivery.py and the replay script now refuse non-https URLs (urllib follows file:// and http://). SQS metadata-action and dynamodb:ListStreams NITs skipped: standard CDK grant shapes; ListStreams has no resource-level scoping. The 4 gitleaks HIGHs on docs/shoc-webhook-test-vectors.json are deliberate non-secrets (shared receiver-verification vectors) suppressed machine-level with justification. * harden(webhook): resolve /sh-security-review findings (1 confirmed medium + cheap fixes) High-recall detector fan-out (injection/authz/secrets-crypto/iac-iam/logic) + proof-or-kill verifier. Gate PASSES: 1 confirmed medium, 0 confirmed critical/high. Confirmed finding fixed; several unverified-but-cheap hardenings applied since the emitter ships dark and activation is weeks out. - CONFIRMED medium (confused deputy): the rotation Lambda's generated invoke permission for secretsmanager.amazonaws.com carried no SourceAccount/SourceArn, so any account's Secrets Manager could invoke the rotator. Patched the generated CfnPermission in place (a second permission would be additive, not restrictive) to pin account + this secret ARN. - delivery + replay: refuse to follow receiver 3xx redirects (no-redirect opener) so live X-SH-* auth headers can't be forwarded to a receiver-chosen Location and an http:// Location can't slip past the https guard. Fixed the "unfollowed 3xx" comment that was factually wrong. - delivery: classify 401/403 as retryable (invalidate key cache + retry in order) instead of parking -- transient auth failures (rotation outran the TTL cache, clock skew) are availability events, not contract bugs. - envelope: build_event now genuinely total (guarded eventID / ApproximateCreationDateTime subscripts) per its own never-raise contract. - handler: catch-all so an unexpected per-record error (e.g. SQS park failure) reports only that record instead of failing the whole batch (which would re-deliver every earlier success for 24h); per-invocation emit/skip batch summary so a systemic silent drop is queryable/alarmable. - rotator: narrow the AWSCURRENT-read except to ResourceNotFound/JSONDecode (transient SM/KMS errors re-raise so the overlap key isn't silently dropped); kid uniqueness checked against ALL retained kids with a random suffix on collision (never reissue a kid for a different secret). - contract: skeleton-upsert required on ANY unknown work_order_id (not just comment-before-create) + monotonicity guard (ignore older updated_at), so a parked created or an out-of-order replay can't corrupt receiver state. Unverified/refuted findings left as-is with rationale: the two "high" logic claims (whole-batch crash triggers, ordering violation) were refuted on reachability (real stream records carry required fields; persistence writes strings only; full-state idempotent upsert absorbs the ordering gap). Signed kid/version binding (AUTHZ-002) declined: coordinated contract change, not cheap, no exploit with one algorithm/key. * fix(webhook): drop kid from rotator test_ok log (CodeQL clear-text-logging FP) GHAS CodeQL flagged py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data (high) at _test_secret's success log because head["kid"] is subscripted from the same parsed-secret dict that holds head["secret"] — the taint tracker can't tell the non-secret key id from the secret. The secret value is never logged. Rather than dismiss the alert (fragile; re-alerts on line moves), remove the flow: kid is already logged at stage time in _create_secret and version_id correlates the steps, so the test_ok log keeps only event + version_id. Also hardens against a future edit that swaps the logged field.
180 lines
7.1 KiB
Python
180 lines
7.1 KiB
Python
"""
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SHOC work-order webhook emitter Lambda.
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Consumes the WorkOrders/WorkOrderComments DynamoDB streams and pushes each
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mutation to SHOC as an HMAC-signed HTTPS POST (docs/shoc-webhook-contract.md).
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This handler is the thin event loop; the work lives in flat sibling modules
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(bare-name imports resolve via the same flat-landing bundling as the email
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processor's siblings):
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envelope.py -- stream record -> envelope mapping + event classification
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delivery.py -- secret cache, signing, POST, response classification
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Ships DARK: both event-source mappings deploy with enabled=False, so this code
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runs zero deliveries until the activation PR flips them on after SHOC's
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receiver passes the shared HMAC test vectors.
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Ordering semantics: the ESMs run parallelization_factor=1 with bisect-on-error
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off, and this loop processes records strictly in order. A retryable failure
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(429/5xx/timeout/connection error) stops the batch immediately and reports
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that record via report_batch_item_failures -- earlier successes are not
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re-delivered, and the ESM blocks the shard and retries from the failed record,
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preserving per-work-order commit order. Non-retryable 4xx responses are a
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contract bug, not an availability blip: the full envelope is parked on the
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rejected queue (alarmed) and the loop continues, so a bad payload can never
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block the shard for 24 hours.
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No healthcheck branch on purpose: stream consumers are not smoke-gated
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(po-ingest-site-extractor precedent) -- there is no direct-invoke path to
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probe, and a synthetic stream record would be a real delivery.
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"""
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import json
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import logging
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import os
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import time
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import boto3
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import delivery
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import envelope
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from botocore.config import Config
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logger = logging.getLogger()
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logger.setLevel(logging.INFO)
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REJECTED_QUEUE_URL = os.environ.get("REJECTED_QUEUE_URL")
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# Bound the SQS client's timeouts (Open SWE #17): a slow SQS response while
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# parking a rejected envelope must not hang the invocation toward its 60s
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# timeout and re-deliver the whole batch.
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_BOTO_CONFIG = Config(
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connect_timeout=3, read_timeout=5, retries={"max_attempts": 2, "mode": "standard"}
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)
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# Lazy cached SQS client. Keeps the public attribute name ``sqs`` so the test
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# monkeypatch target changes module only, not attribute name.
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sqs = None
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def _get_sqs():
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global sqs
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if sqs is None:
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sqs = boto3.client("sqs", config=_BOTO_CONFIG)
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return sqs
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def _delivery_log(event: dict, status_code, latency_ms: int, outcome: str) -> str:
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"""One structured record per delivery attempt (Logs-Insights-queryable)."""
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return json.dumps(
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{
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"event": "shoc_delivery",
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"delivery_id": event["delivery_id"],
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"event_type": event["event_type"],
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"work_order_id": event["data"].get("work_order_id"),
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"status_code": status_code,
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"latency_ms": latency_ms,
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"outcome": outcome,
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}
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)
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def _park_rejected(event: dict, status_code: int):
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"""Send the full envelope to the rejected queue for operator replay."""
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_get_sqs().send_message(
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QueueUrl=REJECTED_QUEUE_URL,
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MessageBody=json.dumps({"envelope": event, "response_status": status_code}),
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)
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logger.warning(
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json.dumps(
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{
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"event": "shoc_delivery_rejected",
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"delivery_id": event["delivery_id"],
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"event_type": event["event_type"],
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"work_order_id": event["data"].get("work_order_id"),
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"response_status": status_code,
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}
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)
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)
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def _batch_summary(records: int, emitted: int, skipped: int) -> str:
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"""Per-invocation emit/skip tally.
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Skips (REMOVE, echo guard, comment MODIFYs, unmappable records) return no
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delivery and would otherwise be invisible: a systemic classification break
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-- e.g. a table rename desyncing the eventSourceARN parse -- would drop
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100%% of events while every batch still reports success. Logging the ratio
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makes that queryable in Logs Insights and alarmable.
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"""
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return json.dumps(
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{
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"event": "shoc_batch_summary",
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"records": records,
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"emitted": emitted,
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"skipped": skipped,
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}
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)
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def handler(event, context):
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"""Lambda entry point. Triggered by the two WO-table stream ESMs."""
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records = event.get("Records", [])
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emitted = 0
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skipped = 0
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for record in records:
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webhook_event = envelope.build_event(record)
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if webhook_event is None:
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skipped += 1
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continue
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# Capture the sequence number BEFORE any delivery attempt so the
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# failure paths below can never KeyError on the subscript (Open SWE
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# #9/#26 -- the catch-all exists to keep an exception from re-delivering
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# the whole batch, so it must not itself raise). SequenceNumber is
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# present on every real DynamoDB stream record; a record lacking it is
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# unmappable-to-a-checkpoint, so log and skip rather than crash.
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seq = record.get("dynamodb", {}).get("SequenceNumber")
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if seq is None:
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logger.warning(
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json.dumps(
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{
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"event": "shoc_missing_sequence_number",
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"delivery_id": webhook_event["delivery_id"],
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}
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)
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)
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skipped += 1
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continue
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emitted += 1
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start = time.monotonic()
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try:
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outcome, status_code = delivery.deliver(webhook_event)
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latency_ms = int((time.monotonic() - start) * 1000)
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logger.info(_delivery_log(webhook_event, status_code, latency_ms, outcome))
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if outcome == "rejected":
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_park_rejected(webhook_event, status_code)
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except delivery.RetryableDeliveryError as exc:
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latency_ms = int((time.monotonic() - start) * 1000)
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logger.warning(
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_delivery_log(webhook_event, exc.status_code, latency_ms, "retryable")
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)
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logger.info(_batch_summary(len(records), emitted, skipped))
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# Stop here: reporting this record's sequence number makes the ESM
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# retry from it in order; earlier successes are not re-delivered.
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return {"batchItemFailures": [{"itemIdentifier": seq}]}
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except Exception:
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# Catch-all so an unexpected error (e.g. an SQS park failure)
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# cannot escape and fail the WHOLE invocation -- that would make
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# the ESM re-deliver every earlier success in the batch for up to
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# 24h. Report only THIS record so the ESM retries from it in order.
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logger.exception(
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json.dumps(
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{
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"event": "shoc_delivery_error",
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"delivery_id": webhook_event["delivery_id"],
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"event_type": webhook_event["event_type"],
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}
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)
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)
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logger.info(_batch_summary(len(records), emitted, skipped))
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return {"batchItemFailures": [{"itemIdentifier": seq}]}
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logger.info(_batch_summary(len(records), emitted, skipped))
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return {"batchItemFailures": []}
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