mirror of
https://github.com/Sea-Haven-Industries/procurement-ingest.git
synced 2026-10-04 12:31:56 +00:00
GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the policy surface (no BLOCK): FIX applied to the cross-account shoc-backend-dev Decrypt statement and both Lambda role KMS grants (the key is only ever used via Secrets Manager); its invariant-enforcement QUESTION answered durably with tests/test_cross_account_principal_pin.py (any new foreign IAM principal in cdk/ fails CI). Scanner mediums fixed: delivery.py and the replay script now refuse non-https URLs (urllib follows file:// and http://). SQS metadata-action and dynamodb:ListStreams NITs skipped: standard CDK grant shapes; ListStreams has no resource-level scoping. The 4 gitleaks HIGHs on docs/shoc-webhook-test-vectors.json are deliberate non-secrets (shared receiver-verification vectors) suppressed machine-level with justification.
159 lines
6.3 KiB
Python
159 lines
6.3 KiB
Python
"""HMAC-signed webhook delivery to the SHOC receiver (contract sections 6-7).
|
|
|
|
Owns the signed POST and its response classification. The signing key comes
|
|
from Secrets Manager (``workorder-ingest/shoc-webhook-hmac``, dual-key shape
|
|
``{"keys": [{"kid", "secret"}, ...]}``), cached in the warm container for a
|
|
short TTL so 30-day rotation propagates without waiting for the execution
|
|
environment to recycle -- the producer always signs with ``keys[0]``.
|
|
|
|
Response contract (section 7): 2xx -> delivered; 429/5xx/timeout/connection
|
|
error -> RetryableDeliveryError (the handler surfaces it as a batch item
|
|
failure so the ESM blocks the shard and retries in order); any other status ->
|
|
("rejected", code) for the handler to park (a contract bug must not block the
|
|
shard for 24 hours). Secret material and signatures are never logged.
|
|
|
|
``sign_body`` is a module-level pure function on purpose: the golden-vector
|
|
test suite and the replay script both pin against it, and it is the shared
|
|
definition Luby's receiver verifies with.
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
import hashlib
|
|
import hmac
|
|
import json
|
|
import logging
|
|
import os
|
|
import time
|
|
import urllib.error
|
|
import urllib.request
|
|
from http import HTTPStatus
|
|
|
|
import boto3
|
|
|
|
logger = logging.getLogger()
|
|
logger.setLevel(logging.INFO)
|
|
|
|
# Endpoint path is TBD by SHOC; the activation PR confirms the final URL.
|
|
SHOC_WEBHOOK_URL = os.environ.get(
|
|
"SHOC_WEBHOOK_URL", "https://api.dev.seahaven.com/api/webhooks/work-orders"
|
|
)
|
|
HMAC_SECRET_ARN = os.environ.get("HMAC_SECRET_ARN")
|
|
|
|
POST_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 10
|
|
USER_AGENT = "workorder-shoc-emitter/1"
|
|
|
|
# 2xx = delivered; 429 and 5xx retry; everything else parks (contract sec. 7).
|
|
_HTTP_SUCCESS_RANGE = range(HTTPStatus.OK, HTTPStatus.MULTIPLE_CHOICES)
|
|
_HTTP_SERVER_ERROR_MIN = HTTPStatus.INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
|
|
|
|
# Refresh the cached key material this often so a rotated secret propagates
|
|
# without waiting for the execution environment to recycle (contract requires
|
|
# receiver-side TTL <= 300s; the producer matches it).
|
|
_HMAC_KEYS_CACHE_TTL_SECONDS = 300
|
|
_hmac_keys_cache = None
|
|
_hmac_keys_cached_at = 0.0
|
|
|
|
|
|
class RetryableDeliveryError(Exception):
|
|
"""Delivery failed in a way the ESM should retry in order (shard-blocking).
|
|
|
|
``status_code`` carries the HTTP status when one exists (429/5xx); it is
|
|
None for timeouts, connection errors, and secret-fetch failures.
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
def __init__(self, message: str, status_code: int | None = None):
|
|
super().__init__(message)
|
|
self.status_code = status_code
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _get_hmac_keys() -> list[dict]:
|
|
"""Fetch the signing-key list from Secrets Manager, TTL-cached.
|
|
|
|
An empty/missing ``keys`` list is the bootstrap state before the first
|
|
rotation has run -- retryable, not a crash: the shard blocks until the
|
|
rotator populates the secret. Fetch failures (throttle, transient IAM/KMS
|
|
denial) are likewise retryable so a Secrets Manager blip blocks in order
|
|
instead of failing the whole batch. Key material is never logged.
|
|
"""
|
|
global _hmac_keys_cache, _hmac_keys_cached_at
|
|
now = time.monotonic()
|
|
if (
|
|
_hmac_keys_cache is not None
|
|
and now - _hmac_keys_cached_at < _HMAC_KEYS_CACHE_TTL_SECONDS
|
|
):
|
|
return _hmac_keys_cache
|
|
secrets = boto3.client("secretsmanager")
|
|
try:
|
|
secret = secrets.get_secret_value(SecretId=HMAC_SECRET_ARN)
|
|
keys = json.loads(secret["SecretString"]).get("keys") or []
|
|
except Exception as exc:
|
|
raise RetryableDeliveryError(f"hmac secret fetch failed: {exc}") from exc
|
|
if not keys:
|
|
raise RetryableDeliveryError("hmac secret not yet rotated")
|
|
_hmac_keys_cache = keys
|
|
_hmac_keys_cached_at = now
|
|
return keys
|
|
|
|
|
|
def sign_body(secret_hex: str, timestamp: int, raw_body: bytes) -> str:
|
|
"""HMAC-SHA256 hex digest over ``f"{timestamp}.{raw_body}"`` (raw bytes).
|
|
|
|
The key is the UTF-8 bytes of the secret string exactly as stored in the
|
|
secret's ``secret`` field (the receiver reads the same JSON field -- no
|
|
hex-decoding on either side). Pure function; the golden-vector tests and
|
|
Luby's receiver both pin against this definition.
|
|
"""
|
|
string_to_sign = f"{timestamp}.".encode() + raw_body
|
|
return hmac.new(
|
|
secret_hex.encode("utf-8"), string_to_sign, hashlib.sha256
|
|
).hexdigest()
|
|
|
|
|
|
def deliver(envelope: dict) -> tuple[str, int]:
|
|
"""POST one envelope to SHOC. Returns ("delivered"|"rejected", status).
|
|
|
|
Raises RetryableDeliveryError for 429/5xx/timeout/connection failures so
|
|
the caller can block the shard (in-order retry, contract section 7).
|
|
"""
|
|
if not SHOC_WEBHOOK_URL.startswith("https://"):
|
|
# Fail closed on any non-HTTPS scheme (file://, http://, ...): the
|
|
# URL is operator-set env config, but urllib would happily follow
|
|
# other schemes and the HMAC only protects an HTTPS transport.
|
|
raise RetryableDeliveryError(
|
|
"SHOC_WEBHOOK_URL is not an https:// URL; refusing to deliver"
|
|
)
|
|
raw_body = json.dumps(envelope).encode("utf-8")
|
|
timestamp = int(time.time())
|
|
signing_key = _get_hmac_keys()[0]
|
|
signature = sign_body(signing_key["secret"], timestamp, raw_body)
|
|
request = urllib.request.Request(
|
|
SHOC_WEBHOOK_URL,
|
|
data=raw_body,
|
|
headers={
|
|
"Content-Type": "application/json; charset=utf-8",
|
|
"User-Agent": USER_AGENT,
|
|
"X-SH-Timestamp": str(timestamp),
|
|
"X-SH-Key-Id": signing_key["kid"],
|
|
"X-SH-Signature": f"v1={signature}",
|
|
},
|
|
method="POST",
|
|
)
|
|
try:
|
|
with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=POST_TIMEOUT_SECONDS) as response:
|
|
status_code = response.status
|
|
except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
|
|
status_code = exc.code
|
|
if (
|
|
status_code == HTTPStatus.TOO_MANY_REQUESTS
|
|
or status_code >= _HTTP_SERVER_ERROR_MIN
|
|
):
|
|
raise RetryableDeliveryError(
|
|
f"receiver returned {status_code}", status_code=status_code
|
|
) from exc
|
|
return ("rejected", status_code)
|
|
except (TimeoutError, urllib.error.URLError, OSError) as exc:
|
|
raise RetryableDeliveryError(f"connection error: {exc}") from exc
|
|
if status_code in _HTTP_SUCCESS_RANGE:
|
|
return ("delivered", status_code)
|
|
# A non-2xx that urlopen did not raise for (e.g. an unfollowed 3xx):
|
|
# contract bug on someone's side -- park it, never block the shard.
|
|
return ("rejected", status_code)
|