Procurement Ingest

Unified email ingestion pipelines for Amazon procurement data. Two independent pipelines — purchase orders (Coupa) and work orders (APM/Hexagon EAM) — share a single repo and CDK app but deploy as separate CloudFormation stacks.

Pipelines

Purchase Orders (po-ingest stack)

Coupa PO emails are received at amazon_po@int.seahaven.com, parsed by Claude Haiku 4.5, and written to the purchase-orders DynamoDB table.

Flow:

1. Coupa sends a PO email (new, revision, or cancellation).
2. SES (INBOUND_MAIL rule set) drops the raw MIME into s3://po-ingest-emails-{AccountId}/inbound/.
3. S3 ObjectCreated triggers the po-email-processor Lambda.
4. Claude extracts structured JSON (PO number, status, supplier, site code, trade classification, line items, fiscal year).
5. Merge write to DynamoDB:
   • new_po — merge insert. Creates the PO, or backfills data into a pre-existing Cancelled skeleton left by an out-of-order cancellation (preserving the Cancelled status). No longer silently dropped when a record already exists.
   • revision — field-level merge (update_item SETs only the fields present in the revision). A revision that omits line_items/supplier no longer deletes them. Will not un-cancel a Cancelled PO.
   • cancellation — marks the row Cancelled (creating a minimal skeleton if the cancellation arrives before the new_po).
6. DynamoDB Streams feeds downstream consumers:
   • LedgerFlow (seahaven-slack-bot/po-sync) — daily KB sync
   • Site extractor (po-ingest-site-extractor) — real-time site address extraction into verified-sites table

Lambdas (lambdas/po/):

Function	Trigger	Purpose
po-email-processor	S3 ObjectCreated	Claude extraction + DynamoDB write
po-ingest-site-extractor	DynamoDB Streams	Site code/address extraction -> verified-sites
po-web-ui	Manual invoke	HTML dashboard (public Function URL removed 2026-06-08, INFRA-74)

Tables:

• purchase-orders (PK: po_number, Streams: NEW_IMAGE) — shared with seahaven-slack-bot (read-only; see Shared Resources)
• verified-sites (PK: siteCode) — ~1,100 unique Amazon facility sites (by-state GSI removed 2026-06-03, audit M-20)
• pending-site-review (PK: po_number) — unresolvable POs for manual Payee Central verification

Work Orders (WorkorderIngestStack stack)

Amazon APM work order emails (from Hexagon EAM / HxGN SmartCloud) are received at apm@int.seahaven.com, parsed by Claude Haiku 4.5, and written to the WorkOrders DynamoDB table.

Flow:

1. Hexagon EAM sends email notifications (new assignments, comments, updates, cancellations) to amazon@seahavenind.com.
2. Gmail filter forwards APM emails to apm@int.seahaven.com (SES).
3. SES drops the raw MIME into s3://workorder-ingest-emails-{AccountId}/inbound/.
4. S3 triggers the workorder-email-processor Lambda.
5. Claude extracts structured JSON (work order ID, site code, severity, priority, dates, assigned technician).
6. Work order upserted to WorkOrders, event/comment appended to WorkOrderComments.

Lambdas (lambdas/wo/):

Function	Trigger	Purpose
workorder-email-processor	S3 ObjectCreated	Claude extraction + DynamoDB write
workorder-web-ui	Manual invoke	HTML dashboard (public Function URL removed 2026-06-08, INFRA-74)

Tables:

• WorkOrders (PK: work_order_id) — site-code-index and status-index GSIs removed 2026-06-03 (audit M-20)
• WorkOrderComments (PK: work_order_id, SK: comment_id)

Architecture

IaC: AWS CDK (Python), two stacks in one app, region us-east-1.

All Lambdas: Python 3.12, ARM64, 60-day log retention.

Secrets:

• po-ingest/anthropic-api-key — Anthropic API key for PO parsing
• workorder-ingest/anthropic-api-key — Anthropic API key for WO parsing

The email processors require ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN to be set and resolve the key from Secrets Manager at runtime. There is no plaintext ANTHROPIC_API_KEY env fallback — a deploy missing the ARN fails loudly instead of silently running on an unmanaged key.

SES: Both stacks add rules to the shared INBOUND_MAIL receipt rule set on int.seahaven.com.

Failure handling (INFRA-41): Each email-processor is async-invoked (S3 → Lambda). Both have a CDK-managed SQS dead-letter queue (dead_letter_queue=, 14-day retention, SSL-enforced) so a failed parse is captured rather than silently dropped after Lambda's retries.

CloudWatch alarms

Every alarm is ALARM-only (no OK action), sends to the shared site-alerts SNS topic (imported once per stack via Topic.from_topic_arn), and uses TreatMissingData.NOT_BREACHING.

Lambda alarms (AWS/Lambda, FunctionName dimension):

Alarm	Functions	Metric / config
<fn>-errors	po-email-processor, po-ingest-site-extractor, workorder-email-processor	Errors Sum, 5 min, > 0, eval 1
<fn>-throttles	po-email-processor, po-ingest-site-extractor, po-web-ui, workorder-email-processor	Throttles Sum, 5 min, > 0, eval 1
<fn>-duration	po-email-processor, po-ingest-site-extractor, po-web-ui (p99); workorder-email-processor (p95)	Duration percentile, 5 min, >= 45000 ms (75% of the 60s timeout), eval 3 / datapoints 2

The <fn>-duration and <fn>-throttles alarms for po-email-processor and workorder-email-processor supersede the orphaned, CLI-created Lambda-Duration-* / Lambda-Throttles-* alarms (deleted post-deploy).

DLQ alarms (AWS/SQS): po-email-processor-dlq-messages and workorder-email-processor-dlq-messages fire when any message is visible on an email-processor DLQ (ApproximateNumberOfMessagesVisible Maximum, 5 min, > 0, eval 1) — a message there means an email was dropped after Lambda exhausted its async retries.

DynamoDB alarms (AWS/DynamoDB): each owned table gets <table>-throttles (ThrottledRequests) and <table>-system-errors (SystemErrors). These metrics emit only at the TableName + Operation dimension set, so each alarm is a Sum math expression across the operations the table uses (Get/BatchGet/Query/Scan/Put/Update/Delete/BatchWrite). Tables covered: purchase-orders, verified-sites, pending-site-review (po-ingest); WorkOrders, WorkOrderComments (workorder-ingest).

Security

Web UI auth (defense-in-depth). The po-web-ui / workorder-web-ui handlers refuse unauthenticated requests even though their public Function URLs were removed (INFRA-74). Each requires a shared secret in the X-Auth-Token header (or Authorization: Bearer <token>), compared in constant time against the configured token. The handler fails closed if the token is unset or unreadable (denies all). The token lives in the Secrets Manager secret procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token; only its ARN is passed to the Lambda (WEB_UI_AUTH_TOKEN_SECRET_ARN), and the value is fetched at runtime — never embedded in the CloudFormation template or Lambda env vars. The fetched value is cached in the warm container with a short TTL (5 min) so a rotated secret propagates without waiting for the execution environment to recycle. This is a defense-in-depth floor for a detached URL, not primary auth.

Output escaping. All caller-influenced values (including prompt-injectable strings Claude may return for total_amount/line-item amounts) are HTML-escaped before interpolation to prevent stored XSS.

Shared Resources

purchase-orders table (owned here)

The purchase-orders DynamoDB table is owned by this repo's po-ingest stack (defined in cdk/po_stack.py with RemovalPolicy.RETAIN, StreamViewType.NEW_IMAGE, and SSE-KMS encryption with the shared customer-managed CMK alias/seahaven-dynamodb, INFRA-95 / M-3). The po-email-processor Lambda is the authoritative writer — it performs the merge inserts, field-level revision merges, and cancellation updates described above.

Consumers (read-only):

Repo	How it reads	Purpose
seahaven-slack-bot	po-sync (DynamoDB Streams + daily scan) and wo-po-lookup	Daily KB sync + Bedrock agent PO lookups

The consumer imports the table via Table.fromTableName(...) and is granted read-only access (grantReadData); it does not own or define it.

Schema-coordination rule: Any change to the purchase-orders schema (partition key, item shape, attribute names, streams view type) must be coordinated with seahaven-slack-bot. The owner here ships the change; the consumer must be updated in lockstep so its readers do not break. Treat schema changes as a cross-repo migration, not a local edit.

Known exception (INFRA-51): amazon-po-parser currently writes directly to purchase-orders outside this stack (backfill/enrichment scripts). This second writer is being folded into the po-ingest pipeline so this stack is the sole writer; until INFRA-51 closes, coordinate any schema change with amazon-po-parser as well.

WorkOrders and WorkOrderComments tables (owned here)

Both tables are owned by this repo's WorkorderIngestStack (cdk/wo_stack.py, RemovalPolicy.RETAIN):

• WorkOrders — PK work_order_id (S).
• WorkOrderComments — PK work_order_id (S), SK comment_id (S).

Both currently use default DynamoDB encryption — they are not yet on the shared customer-managed CMK (alias/seahaven-dynamodb, INFRA-95 / M-3); that migration is tracked in INFRA-6. The workorder-email-processor role no longer holds a pre-emptive encrypt/decrypt grant on that CMK (removed in the 2026-06-17 security sweep — it was unused while the tables are unencrypted and extended the role's decrypt reach to the CMK protecting purchase-orders). Re-add the grant as part of the INFRA-6 migration, at which point grant_read_write_data on the then-encrypted tables propagates the needed key permissions automatically.

Consumer (read-only) — data contract: seahaven-slack-bot imports both tables via Table.fromTableName(...) (grantReadData) and reads them from two Lambdas: workorder-sync (daily full-table scan into the Bedrock knowledge base) and wo-po-lookup (the Bedrock agent's direct WO lookup action group). The bot depends on the PK/SK schema above and these attributes: on WorkOrders — description, wo_status, customer, site_code, building, address, severity, priority, assigned_to, date_reported, scheduled_start, due_date, updated_at; on WorkOrderComments — created_at (used to sort comments), commenter, text. Any change to table name, key schema, these attribute names, or the encryption configuration (e.g. the INFRA-6 CMK migration) must be coordinated with seahaven-slack-bot before it ships, or the Bedrock agent breaks at runtime (not at deploy — the tables are imported by name, so there is no compile-time link).

verified-sites table (owned here)

Owned by this repo's po-ingest stack (cdk/po_stack.py). PK siteCode (S); default DynamoDB encryption (NOT the shared CMK).

Consumer (read-only) — data contract: seahaven-slack-bot's wo-po-lookup Lambda imports this table via Table.fromTableName(...) for the Bedrock agent's lookup_site action. It does point lookups by siteCode and reads address, fullAddress, city, state, zip, latitude, longitude, notes. Coordinate any change to the table name, key schema, or these attribute names with seahaven-slack-bot.

GSI drift (INFRA-138): the by-state GSI was removed here on 2026-06-03 (audit M-20, "0 reads in 30d"), but seahaven-slack-bot still queries IndexName: 'by-state' for its state-listing path, so that path fails at runtime today. Restoring the GSI or removing the consumer's state path needs to be reconciled cross-repo. This is the kind of silent owner-side lifecycle change this data-contract note exists to prevent.

Documentation

The canonical map of Sea Haven's AWS infrastructure lives in Confluence. This project's po-ingest and WorkorderIngestStack stacks are represented there as Mermaid subgraphs.

• AWS Architecture Map (Confluence, IT space, page 1540098)

CI/CD

GitHub Actions with reusable workflows from Sea-Haven-Industries/.github (all pinned to a commit SHA of main):

• CI (ci.yaml, PR to main): linting + cdk synth via ci-python-sam.yaml
• CD (deploy.yaml, push to main): CDK deploy via cd-cdk.yaml (OIDC auth)
• Plus dependency review and PR labeler workflows on every PR

Branch protection on main — all changes through PR.

Setup

1. Bootstrap CDK: cdk bootstrap aws://{AccountId}/us-east-1
2. Create the web UI auth-gate shared secret. Unlike the Anthropic keys, this secret is imported by name (Secret.from_secret_name_v2), not CDK-managed, so it must exist before deploy or the web-ui Lambdas fail closed:

   aws secretsmanager create-secret --name procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token --secret-string "$(openssl rand -hex 32)"
   

3. Deploy both stacks (this also creates the two Anthropic Secrets Manager secrets — they are CDK-managed, so don't create-secret them by hand):

   cd cdk
   pip install -r requirements.txt
   cdk deploy --all
   

4. Set the Anthropic API key values:

   aws secretsmanager put-secret-value --secret-id po-ingest/anthropic-api-key --secret-string "sk-ant-..."
   aws secretsmanager put-secret-value --secret-id workorder-ingest/anthropic-api-key --secret-string "sk-ant-..."
   

5. Dashboards: po-web-ui and workorder-web-ui have no public endpoint (the Function URLs were removed 2026-06-08, INFRA-74). Invoke them through an authenticated path that forwards the X-Auth-Token header, e.g. aws lambda invoke --function-name po-web-ui /tmp/out.json.

Scripts

Reprocess PO emails (re-run parser against all emails still in S3):

python scripts/reprocess.py            # dry-run
python scripts/reprocess.py --execute  # invoke po-email-processor for each

Backfill verified sites (one-time scan of historical POs):

python scripts/backfill_sites.py

Directory Structure

cdk/
  app.py               # Two stacks: po-ingest + WorkorderIngestStack
  po_stack.py          # Purchase order pipeline resources
  wo_stack.py          # Work order pipeline resources
lambdas/
  po/                  # PO pipeline Lambdas
    email_processor/
    site_extractor/
    web_ui/
  wo/                  # WO pipeline Lambdas
    email_processor/
    web_ui/
scripts/
  reprocess.py
  backfill_sites.py
test_local.py          # Parse sample emails through Claude locally (no AWS)