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* feat(api): add procurement-api stack - read API + OpenAPI docs page Third CDK stack: API Gateway REST API (IAM SigV4) over both pipelines' tables, replacing SHOC's retired SyncController cross-account DynamoDB scan as the reconciliation/backfill path. - lambdas/api/: handler (healthcheck + docs-token gate + router dispatch), router (single route table), pagination (opaque cursor, hostile -> 400), Decimal-safe serialization, wo_repo/po_repo reads. No VendorReplies. - OpenAPI 3.1 spec as source of truth incl. top-level webhooks section documenting the outbound SHOC feed; phase-2 write endpoints x-planned (router answers 501). Self-contained /docs page, no CDN. - Auth: AWS_IAM on data routes + resource policy scoped to exactly arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev on GET/*; /docs and /openapi.json carve-out is token-gated in the Lambda via shared web_ui_auth (fail-closed, INFRA-74 posture). - KMS: explicit Decrypt/DescribeKey on the DynamoDB CMK from SSM (name-imported table drops the key association - INFRA-104 class). - Alarms: errors/throttles/duration(p99>=22.5s) + gateway 5xx, ALARM-only to site-alerts. No access logging in v1 (docs ?token= shim stays out of logs); cloud_watch_role=False. - Tests: handler auth-seam + routing + Decimal round-trip; moto cursor pagination incl. hostile cursors; spec<->router drift gate; bundle AST pins for the api command; pytest.ini --cov + loader siblings. - Deploy role: third stack DescribeStacks ARN + procurement-api smoke invoke ARN (re-run create-deploy-role.sh before merge). * harden(api): apply sh-security-review findings to procurement-api Fan-out (6 detectors) + review findings resolved: Correctness / DoS: - pagination: require EXACT key-set match (was subset) so a partial/foreign composite cursor can't reach DynamoDB as an inconsistent ExclusiveStartKey -> ValidationException -> 500; comments Query now pins the cursor's work_order_id to the path entity. - handler: map botocore ValidationException to 400 (defense in depth) so a crafted cursor can't drive the zero-threshold 5xx alarm. - web_ui_auth: compare tokens as bytes; a non-ASCII presented token now fails closed (401) instead of crashing hmac.compare_digest into a 500. Resolves the pre-existing xfail(strict) follow-up test; hardens the web UIs too. Docs page: - typeStr() now escapes the one spec-derived string that reached innerHTML. - spec inlined into the docs <script> block escapes "<" -> < (</script> breakout guard); /openapi.json still served byte-faithful. - Cache-Control: no-store + Referrer-Policy: no-referrer on docs responses so the ?token= URL stays out of caches/Referer. - spec-drift test asserts the committed spec carries no "</" / "<!--". IAM / IaC: - resource policy enumerates the 7 data GET resources instead of GET/* so a future GET route can't silently inherit SHOC cross-account reach. - kms:Decrypt grant gains a kms:ViaService=dynamodb condition. - stage throttling (50 rps / 100 burst) bounds the unauthenticated /docs blast radius below the 10k account default. - corrected the PATCH/POST comment (same-account callers aren't blocked by the resource policy; 501 handler + absent write grant are the gate). - documented the RETAIN log-group first-deploy rollback trap and the resource-policy-needs-redeploy gotcha in-stack. Mandatory GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the full policy surface: no BLOCK/FIX. 675 tests pass, ruff clean, cdk synth green.
81 lines
3 KiB
Python
81 lines
3 KiB
Python
import hmac
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import logging
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import os
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import time
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import boto3
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logger = logging.getLogger()
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_WEB_UI_AUTH_TOKEN_SECRET_ARN = os.environ.get("WEB_UI_AUTH_TOKEN_SECRET_ARN")
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# Refresh the cached token this often so a rotated secret propagates without
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# waiting for the execution environment to recycle (emergency-rotation path).
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_AUTH_TOKEN_CACHE_TTL_SECONDS = 300
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_auth_token_cache = None
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_auth_token_cached_at = 0.0
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def _get_auth_token() -> str | None:
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"""Fetch the shared web UI auth token from Secrets Manager.
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Cached in the warm container for a short TTL so we don't hit Secrets Manager
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on every request, while still picking up a rotated secret within the TTL
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rather than only when the execution environment recycles. Returns None when
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not configured or unreadable (the caller then fails closed).
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"""
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global _auth_token_cache, _auth_token_cached_at
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now = time.monotonic()
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if (
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_auth_token_cache is not None
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and now - _auth_token_cached_at < _AUTH_TOKEN_CACHE_TTL_SECONDS
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):
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return _auth_token_cache
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if not _WEB_UI_AUTH_TOKEN_SECRET_ARN:
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return None
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secrets = boto3.client("secretsmanager")
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try:
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secret = secrets.get_secret_value(SecretId=_WEB_UI_AUTH_TOKEN_SECRET_ARN)
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_auth_token_cache = secret["SecretString"]
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_auth_token_cached_at = now
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return _auth_token_cache
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except Exception:
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# Fail closed (return None -> caller 401s) but surface the failure: a
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# Secrets Manager permission/config error would otherwise make every
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# request 401 with no operational signal. The secret value is never
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# logged.
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logger.exception(
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"Failed to fetch web UI auth token from Secrets Manager; "
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"denying request (failing closed)"
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)
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return None
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def _header(event: dict, name: str) -> str:
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"""Case-insensitive header lookup from a Lambda Function URL / APIGW event."""
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headers = event.get("headers") or {}
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name_lower = name.lower()
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for key, value in headers.items():
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if key.lower() == name_lower:
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return value or ""
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return ""
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def is_authenticated(event: dict) -> bool:
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"""Constant-time check of the request's shared secret against the configured
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token. Fails closed when no token is configured."""
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token = _get_auth_token()
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if not token:
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return False
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presented = _header(event, "x-auth-token")
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if not presented:
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auth = _header(event, "authorization")
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if auth.lower().startswith("bearer "):
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presented = auth[7:].strip()
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if not presented:
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return False
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# Compare as bytes: hmac.compare_digest raises TypeError on non-ASCII str
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# operands, which a crafted token (?token=%C3%A9 or a non-ASCII header)
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# would otherwise turn into an uncaught 500. Bytes always compare in
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# constant time, so a non-matching token fails closed (401) instead.
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return hmac.compare_digest(presented.encode("utf-8"), token.encode("utf-8"))
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