The web UI auth gate correctly fails closed when the shared token
cannot be read, but _get_auth_token() swallowed every exception
silently. A Secrets Manager permission or config error then made
every request 401 with no operational signal, leaving an outage
indistinguishable from ordinary unauthenticated traffic.
Add a module-level logger to both web_ui handlers and log the
fetch failure with logger.exception() in the except block before
returning None. Behavior is unchanged (still fails closed); the
failure is now visible in CloudWatch. The secret value is never
logged. The two handlers stay byte-consistent in the mirrored
_get_auth_token() region.
The companion finding on the CDK import of the shared
procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token secret was evaluated and left
as-is: the token is a single secret shared by both the PO and WO
stacks, so from_secret_name_v2 (which scopes grant_read via the
standard 6-char suffix wildcard) is correct; making it a CDK-managed
Secret in both stacks would collide the two stacks on the same
explicit secret name at deploy time.
Refs: INFRA-74
The web-ui handlers cached the Secrets Manager auth token at module
level with no expiry, so a rotated secret was only picked up when the
warm container recycled — an emergency rotation could take hours to
take effect. Cache the fetched value for a 5-minute TTL instead, so a
rotated token propagates within the TTL while still avoiding a Secrets
Manager call on every request. Still fails closed when the secret is
unset or unreadable.
Refs: INFRA-74
Replace the plaintext SSM String parameter with a Secrets Manager secret
referenced by ARN only. The token is fetched and cached at module level on
first invocation, keeping shared secrets out of CloudFormation templates and
Lambda environment variables.
Refs: PR-97
The po-web-ui and workorder-web-ui handlers had no auth: any
invocation path returned the full PO/WO DB. Add a fail-closed
shared-secret gate (X-Auth-Token / Bearer, constant-time compared to
WEB_UI_AUTH_TOKEN) so a future re-attached Function URL cannot
re-expose the data (URLs removed under INFRA-74). Wire the token from
the SSM String param /procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token.
Also fix stored XSS in po-web-ui fmt_currency: the non-numeric
fallback returned str(val) unescaped, so a prompt-injected email
could make Claude emit total_amount as <script>. Escape it.
Refs: INFRA-74
save_revision did a full put_item overwrite, so a revision omitting
line_items/supplier permanently deleted them. save_new_po used a
conditional put that silently dropped the PO when an out-of-order
cancellation had already created a skeleton row.
Switch both to field-level merge update_items: a revision now SETs
only the fields it carries, and a new_po backfills data into a
pre-existing Cancelled skeleton while preserving the Cancelled
status. No email can now delete data established by an earlier one.
Remove the silent fallback to a plaintext ANTHROPIC_API_KEY env var
in both email processors; require ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN and
raise if absent so a misconfigured deploy fails loudly instead of
using an unmanaged key.
Adapted from f175323 on security/sweep-2026-06-17. The From-header
sender-domain allowlist from that commit is intentionally dropped:
the From header is spoofable (INFRA-107, confirmed critical) and
sender authentication is being reworked in a separate PR.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Merge workorder-ingest pipeline into unified repo
Move PO lambdas under lambdas/po/, add WO pipeline under lambdas/wo/.
Two independent CloudFormation stacks in one CDK app. Fix WO stack
compliance: ARM64 architecture, 60-day log retention, aarch64 bundling,
RETAIN on Anthropic secret. Remove stale CodePipeline buildspec.
* Fix test_local.py import path and remove dead shared/models.py
test_local.py referenced the old lambdas/email_processor path. Updated
to lambdas/wo/email_processor. Removed shared/ directory entirely as
nothing imports from it.
* Escape HTML in both web UI dashboards to prevent XSS
Both Function URLs are public (auth_type=NONE) and render
email-derived content via f-strings. Attacker-crafted emails
could inject scripts. Added html.escape() on all interpolated
values in both PO and WO dashboards.
* Add pagination to WO web UI scan
get_work_orders() only fetched the first 1MB page from DynamoDB.
Loop on LastEvaluatedKey to match the PO web UI pattern.
* Fix esc(None) TypeError and javascript: scheme in PO web UI
Coerce supplier name through `or ""` before escaping to handle
nested None from DynamoDB. Add scheme allowlist on view_order_url
to block javascript:/data: hrefs from LLM-extracted URLs.
* Fix WO render_badge None guard, updated_at slice, and backfill path
Add null guard to WO render_badge matching the PO version. Use
`or ""` before slicing updated_at to handle explicit None values.
Fix backfill_sites.py sys.path to use new lambdas/po/site_extractor.
* Harden WO web UI and fix JS-context XSS in both dashboards
- Use json.dumps for onclick URLs to prevent JS string breakout
- Add .lower() to WO render_badge color lookup matching PO pattern
- Add pagination to get_comments query
- Cap get_work_orders to 500 results matching PO pattern
* Apply ruff formatting to web UI handlers
