feat(webhook): SHOC WO webhook emitter - dark-ship streams + HMAC secret/rotation (PR-2) (#137)
* docs(webhook): revise SHOC webhook contract and plan for post-migration reality
Branch re-cut on main 2026-07-23 (old base carried stale PR #99 commits).
Contract Rev 2026-07-23:
- Producer account corrected: seahaven-prod (011934824531); mgmt frozen
- Reconciliation backstop is the new procurement read API, not SyncController
- wo_status "unknown" is real; SHOC must map it (checklist item added)
- write_origin forward-compat note for phase-2 write-back echo suppression
- SyncVendorReplies retirement flagged (dead table, no vendor_reply event)
Plan updates:
- Account gate: seahaven-prod only; never enable streams on mgmt tables
- Emitter ships DARK (ESMs enabled=False); activation is a deliberate flip
after the SHOC receiver passes shared HMAC vectors
- Post-refactor conventions: common.py helpers, bundle-consistency AST pins,
pytest.ini --cov additions, consolidated test roots
- Dedicated-CMK rationale, secret-ARN handooff step, consumer audit refreshed
(slack-bot decommissioned), enum golden test, write_origin skip-branch test
* feat(webhook): SHOC WO webhook emitter — dark-ship streams, HMAC secret + rotation
Implements docs/shoc-webhook-plan.md Phases 1-5 (PR-2 of the SHOC
call-and-be-called effort). Everything ships DARK: both DynamoDB event
source mappings deploy enabled=False; activation is a deliberate
one-line follow-up PR gated on the SHOC receiver passing the shared
HMAC test vectors.
- Streams: NEW_AND_OLD_IMAGES on WorkOrders + WorkOrderComments
(in-place update, RETAIN + logical IDs untouched; no existing
consumers — verified live, neither table had a stream).
- workorder-shoc-emitter (Py3.12/ARM64): stream -> envelope ->
HMAC-signed POST per docs/shoc-webhook-contract.md; strict per-shard
ordering (parallelization 1, bisect off, retry until 24h age,
ReportBatchItemFailures); 429/5xx/timeout block the shard in order,
other 4xx park to workorder-shoc-emitter-rejected; ESM failures ->
workorder-shoc-emitter-failures (metadata; replay rebuilds from
DynamoDB). Echo guard skips write_origin=shoc-write-api.
- Secret workorder-ingest/shoc-webhook-hmac on a dedicated CMK
(alias workorder-ingest-shoc-webhook-kms); cross-account
GetSecretValue/DescribeSecret + kms:Decrypt granted to exactly
arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev. RemovalPolicy
DESTROY deliberately (machine-generated material; avoids the
fixed-name RETAIN-orphan deadlock).
- workorder-shoc-hmac-rotator: 30-day rotation, dual-key overlap,
64-hex keys, kid = UTC %Y-%m-%dT%H.
- Alarms (ALARM-only -> site-alerts): emitter errors/throttles/
duration + iterator-age (>=10 min) + failures/rejected queue
depth; rotator standard trio.
- scripts/replay_shoc_webhooks.py: dry-run-default operator replay
(rebuilds from tables, replay:true envelopes).
- Tests: 742 passing, 85.56% aggregate; golden HMAC vectors shared
with SHOC in docs/shoc-webhook-test-vectors.json (emitter + replay
signing pinned to identical vectors); bundle-consistency AST pins
for both new bundles.
- README: WO stack + webhook feed section, alarm table, runbooks;
removed stale seahaven-slack-bot consumer references.
* fix(webhook): kms:ViaService pins, https-only delivery, cross-account principal CI pin
GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the policy surface (no BLOCK): FIX applied
to the cross-account shoc-backend-dev Decrypt statement and both Lambda
role KMS grants (the key is only ever used via Secrets Manager); its
invariant-enforcement QUESTION answered durably with
tests/test_cross_account_principal_pin.py (any new foreign IAM principal
in cdk/ fails CI). Scanner mediums fixed: delivery.py and the replay
script now refuse non-https URLs (urllib follows file:// and http://).
SQS metadata-action and dynamodb:ListStreams NITs skipped: standard CDK
grant shapes; ListStreams has no resource-level scoping. The 4 gitleaks
HIGHs on docs/shoc-webhook-test-vectors.json are deliberate non-secrets
(shared receiver-verification vectors) suppressed machine-level with
justification.
* harden(webhook): resolve /sh-security-review findings (1 confirmed medium + cheap fixes)
High-recall detector fan-out (injection/authz/secrets-crypto/iac-iam/logic)
+ proof-or-kill verifier. Gate PASSES: 1 confirmed medium, 0 confirmed
critical/high. Confirmed finding fixed; several unverified-but-cheap
hardenings applied since the emitter ships dark and activation is weeks out.
- CONFIRMED medium (confused deputy): the rotation Lambda's generated
invoke permission for secretsmanager.amazonaws.com carried no
SourceAccount/SourceArn, so any account's Secrets Manager could invoke
the rotator. Patched the generated CfnPermission in place (a second
permission would be additive, not restrictive) to pin account + this
secret ARN.
- delivery + replay: refuse to follow receiver 3xx redirects (no-redirect
opener) so live X-SH-* auth headers can't be forwarded to a
receiver-chosen Location and an http:// Location can't slip past the
https guard. Fixed the "unfollowed 3xx" comment that was factually wrong.
- delivery: classify 401/403 as retryable (invalidate key cache + retry in
order) instead of parking -- transient auth failures (rotation outran the
TTL cache, clock skew) are availability events, not contract bugs.
- envelope: build_event now genuinely total (guarded eventID /
ApproximateCreationDateTime subscripts) per its own never-raise contract.
- handler: catch-all so an unexpected per-record error (e.g. SQS park
failure) reports only that record instead of failing the whole batch
(which would re-deliver every earlier success for 24h); per-invocation
emit/skip batch summary so a systemic silent drop is queryable/alarmable.
- rotator: narrow the AWSCURRENT-read except to ResourceNotFound/JSONDecode
(transient SM/KMS errors re-raise so the overlap key isn't silently
dropped); kid uniqueness checked against ALL retained kids with a random
suffix on collision (never reissue a kid for a different secret).
- contract: skeleton-upsert required on ANY unknown work_order_id (not just
comment-before-create) + monotonicity guard (ignore older updated_at), so
a parked created or an out-of-order replay can't corrupt receiver state.
Unverified/refuted findings left as-is with rationale: the two "high" logic
claims (whole-batch crash triggers, ordering violation) were refuted on
reachability (real stream records carry required fields; persistence writes
strings only; full-state idempotent upsert absorbs the ordering gap). Signed
kid/version binding (AUTHZ-002) declined: coordinated contract change, not
cheap, no exploit with one algorithm/key.
* fix(webhook): drop kid from rotator test_ok log (CodeQL clear-text-logging FP)
GHAS CodeQL flagged py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data (high) at
_test_secret's success log because head["kid"] is subscripted from the
same parsed-secret dict that holds head["secret"] — the taint tracker
can't tell the non-secret key id from the secret. The secret value is
never logged. Rather than dismiss the alert (fragile; re-alerts on line
moves), remove the flow: kid is already logged at stage time in
_create_secret and version_id correlates the steps, so the test_ok log
keeps only event + version_id. Also hardens against a future edit that
swaps the logged field.
2026-07-24 18:12:20 -04:00
|
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|
"""Stream-record -> SHOC webhook envelope mapping tests (plan Phase 5).
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Pins the emitter's classification and envelope-building contract
|
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(docs/shoc-webhook-contract.md sections 3-4) against realistic DynamoDB
|
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stream records: event-type classification incl. the cancelled transition and
|
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the already-cancelled no-false-cancel case, the write_origin echo guard,
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exact eventSourceARN table discrimination, delivery_id/occurred_at mapping,
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data null-fill + source_email_s3_key exclusion, and Decimal JSON-safety.
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Also the enum golden pin: the emitted event_type set must equal the four
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contract names AND the published spec's webhooks keys (lambdas/api/
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openapi.json), and the classification's status/record_type value space must
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stay anchored to the WO pipeline's template_parser enums.
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2026-08-07 13:42:35 -04:00
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Offline -- envelope.py has no boto3 clients and no network. Table names
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default to PascalCase; set WORK_ORDERS_TABLE / COMMENTS_TABLE for kebab.
|
feat(webhook): SHOC WO webhook emitter - dark-ship streams + HMAC secret/rotation (PR-2) (#137)
* docs(webhook): revise SHOC webhook contract and plan for post-migration reality
Branch re-cut on main 2026-07-23 (old base carried stale PR #99 commits).
Contract Rev 2026-07-23:
- Producer account corrected: seahaven-prod (011934824531); mgmt frozen
- Reconciliation backstop is the new procurement read API, not SyncController
- wo_status "unknown" is real; SHOC must map it (checklist item added)
- write_origin forward-compat note for phase-2 write-back echo suppression
- SyncVendorReplies retirement flagged (dead table, no vendor_reply event)
Plan updates:
- Account gate: seahaven-prod only; never enable streams on mgmt tables
- Emitter ships DARK (ESMs enabled=False); activation is a deliberate flip
after the SHOC receiver passes shared HMAC vectors
- Post-refactor conventions: common.py helpers, bundle-consistency AST pins,
pytest.ini --cov additions, consolidated test roots
- Dedicated-CMK rationale, secret-ARN handooff step, consumer audit refreshed
(slack-bot decommissioned), enum golden test, write_origin skip-branch test
* feat(webhook): SHOC WO webhook emitter — dark-ship streams, HMAC secret + rotation
Implements docs/shoc-webhook-plan.md Phases 1-5 (PR-2 of the SHOC
call-and-be-called effort). Everything ships DARK: both DynamoDB event
source mappings deploy enabled=False; activation is a deliberate
one-line follow-up PR gated on the SHOC receiver passing the shared
HMAC test vectors.
- Streams: NEW_AND_OLD_IMAGES on WorkOrders + WorkOrderComments
(in-place update, RETAIN + logical IDs untouched; no existing
consumers — verified live, neither table had a stream).
- workorder-shoc-emitter (Py3.12/ARM64): stream -> envelope ->
HMAC-signed POST per docs/shoc-webhook-contract.md; strict per-shard
ordering (parallelization 1, bisect off, retry until 24h age,
ReportBatchItemFailures); 429/5xx/timeout block the shard in order,
other 4xx park to workorder-shoc-emitter-rejected; ESM failures ->
workorder-shoc-emitter-failures (metadata; replay rebuilds from
DynamoDB). Echo guard skips write_origin=shoc-write-api.
- Secret workorder-ingest/shoc-webhook-hmac on a dedicated CMK
(alias workorder-ingest-shoc-webhook-kms); cross-account
GetSecretValue/DescribeSecret + kms:Decrypt granted to exactly
arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev. RemovalPolicy
DESTROY deliberately (machine-generated material; avoids the
fixed-name RETAIN-orphan deadlock).
- workorder-shoc-hmac-rotator: 30-day rotation, dual-key overlap,
64-hex keys, kid = UTC %Y-%m-%dT%H.
- Alarms (ALARM-only -> site-alerts): emitter errors/throttles/
duration + iterator-age (>=10 min) + failures/rejected queue
depth; rotator standard trio.
- scripts/replay_shoc_webhooks.py: dry-run-default operator replay
(rebuilds from tables, replay:true envelopes).
- Tests: 742 passing, 85.56% aggregate; golden HMAC vectors shared
with SHOC in docs/shoc-webhook-test-vectors.json (emitter + replay
signing pinned to identical vectors); bundle-consistency AST pins
for both new bundles.
- README: WO stack + webhook feed section, alarm table, runbooks;
removed stale seahaven-slack-bot consumer references.
* fix(webhook): kms:ViaService pins, https-only delivery, cross-account principal CI pin
GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the policy surface (no BLOCK): FIX applied
to the cross-account shoc-backend-dev Decrypt statement and both Lambda
role KMS grants (the key is only ever used via Secrets Manager); its
invariant-enforcement QUESTION answered durably with
tests/test_cross_account_principal_pin.py (any new foreign IAM principal
in cdk/ fails CI). Scanner mediums fixed: delivery.py and the replay
script now refuse non-https URLs (urllib follows file:// and http://).
SQS metadata-action and dynamodb:ListStreams NITs skipped: standard CDK
grant shapes; ListStreams has no resource-level scoping. The 4 gitleaks
HIGHs on docs/shoc-webhook-test-vectors.json are deliberate non-secrets
(shared receiver-verification vectors) suppressed machine-level with
justification.
* harden(webhook): resolve /sh-security-review findings (1 confirmed medium + cheap fixes)
High-recall detector fan-out (injection/authz/secrets-crypto/iac-iam/logic)
+ proof-or-kill verifier. Gate PASSES: 1 confirmed medium, 0 confirmed
critical/high. Confirmed finding fixed; several unverified-but-cheap
hardenings applied since the emitter ships dark and activation is weeks out.
- CONFIRMED medium (confused deputy): the rotation Lambda's generated
invoke permission for secretsmanager.amazonaws.com carried no
SourceAccount/SourceArn, so any account's Secrets Manager could invoke
the rotator. Patched the generated CfnPermission in place (a second
permission would be additive, not restrictive) to pin account + this
secret ARN.
- delivery + replay: refuse to follow receiver 3xx redirects (no-redirect
opener) so live X-SH-* auth headers can't be forwarded to a
receiver-chosen Location and an http:// Location can't slip past the
https guard. Fixed the "unfollowed 3xx" comment that was factually wrong.
- delivery: classify 401/403 as retryable (invalidate key cache + retry in
order) instead of parking -- transient auth failures (rotation outran the
TTL cache, clock skew) are availability events, not contract bugs.
- envelope: build_event now genuinely total (guarded eventID /
ApproximateCreationDateTime subscripts) per its own never-raise contract.
- handler: catch-all so an unexpected per-record error (e.g. SQS park
failure) reports only that record instead of failing the whole batch
(which would re-deliver every earlier success for 24h); per-invocation
emit/skip batch summary so a systemic silent drop is queryable/alarmable.
- rotator: narrow the AWSCURRENT-read except to ResourceNotFound/JSONDecode
(transient SM/KMS errors re-raise so the overlap key isn't silently
dropped); kid uniqueness checked against ALL retained kids with a random
suffix on collision (never reissue a kid for a different secret).
- contract: skeleton-upsert required on ANY unknown work_order_id (not just
comment-before-create) + monotonicity guard (ignore older updated_at), so
a parked created or an out-of-order replay can't corrupt receiver state.
Unverified/refuted findings left as-is with rationale: the two "high" logic
claims (whole-batch crash triggers, ordering violation) were refuted on
reachability (real stream records carry required fields; persistence writes
strings only; full-state idempotent upsert absorbs the ordering gap). Signed
kid/version binding (AUTHZ-002) declined: coordinated contract change, not
cheap, no exploit with one algorithm/key.
* fix(webhook): drop kid from rotator test_ok log (CodeQL clear-text-logging FP)
GHAS CodeQL flagged py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data (high) at
_test_secret's success log because head["kid"] is subscripted from the
same parsed-secret dict that holds head["secret"] — the taint tracker
can't tell the non-secret key id from the secret. The secret value is
never logged. Rather than dismiss the alert (fragile; re-alerts on line
moves), remove the flow: kid is already logged at stage time in
_create_secret and version_id correlates the steps, so the test_ok log
keeps only event + version_id. Also hardens against a future edit that
swaps the logged field.
2026-07-24 18:12:20 -04:00
|
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|
"""
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import json
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from datetime import datetime, timezone
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from decimal import Decimal
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from pathlib import Path
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import pytest
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from tests.support import REPO_ROOT, load_lambda_module
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# Realistic stream ARNs for BOTH tables: "WorkOrders" is a leading substring
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# of "WorkOrderComments", which is exactly the trap the exact-segment parse
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# in envelope._table_name exists to avoid.
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WO_STREAM_ARN = (
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"arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:011934824531:table/WorkOrders"
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"/stream/2026-07-23T00:00:00.000"
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)
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COMMENTS_STREAM_ARN = (
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"arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:011934824531:table/WorkOrderComments"
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"/stream/2026-07-23T00:00:00.000"
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)
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CONTRACT_EVENT_TYPES = {
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"work_order.created",
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"work_order.updated",
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"work_order.cancelled",
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"work_order.comment_added",
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}
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@pytest.fixture(scope="module")
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def envelope():
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return load_lambda_module("wo", "shoc_emitter/envelope")
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def _record(arn, event_name, new_image=None, old_image=None, **meta):
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"""Build a stream record; ``meta`` overrides event_id / creation."""
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stream = {
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"ApproximateCreationDateTime": meta.get("creation", 1784642602.0),
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"SequenceNumber": meta.get("sequence_number", "100"),
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"StreamViewType": "NEW_AND_OLD_IMAGES",
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}
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if new_image is not None:
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stream["NewImage"] = new_image
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if old_image is not None:
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stream["OldImage"] = old_image
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return {
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"eventID": meta.get("event_id", "4b7c2f0e-0001"),
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"eventName": event_name,
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"eventSource": "aws:dynamodb",
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"eventSourceARN": arn,
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"dynamodb": stream,
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}
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def _wo_image(**overrides):
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image = {
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"work_order_id": {"S": "11144580730"},
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"wo_status": {"S": "new"},
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"description": {"S": "Dock door 14 won't close"},
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"record_type": {"S": "new_work_order"},
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"created_at": {"S": "2026-07-16T14:03:22.114208+00:00"},
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"updated_at": {"S": "2026-07-16T14:03:22.114208+00:00"},
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}
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image.update(overrides)
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return image
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def _comment_image(**overrides):
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image = {
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"work_order_id": {"S": "11144580730"},
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"comment_id": {"S": "11144580730#2026-04-27T23:51:48#a1b2c3d4e5f6"},
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"record_type": {"S": "comment"},
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"commenter": {"S": "APM Technician"},
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"text": {"S": "Vendor dispatched, ETA tomorrow AM."},
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"created_at": {"S": "2026-04-27T23:51:48"},
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"ingested_at": {"S": "2026-07-16T14:05:00+00:00"},
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}
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image.update(overrides)
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return image
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# --- Classification ----------------------------------------------------------
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def test_workorders_insert_is_created(envelope):
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event = envelope.build_event(_record(WO_STREAM_ARN, "INSERT", _wo_image()))
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assert event["event_type"] == "work_order.created"
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def test_workorders_modify_is_updated(envelope):
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event = envelope.build_event(
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_record(
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WO_STREAM_ARN,
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"MODIFY",
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_wo_image(wo_status={"S": "assigned"}),
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_wo_image(wo_status={"S": "new"}),
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)
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)
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assert event["event_type"] == "work_order.updated"
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def test_cancelled_transition_is_cancelled(envelope):
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event = envelope.build_event(
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_record(
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WO_STREAM_ARN,
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"MODIFY",
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_wo_image(wo_status={"S": "cancelled"}),
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_wo_image(wo_status={"S": "assigned"}),
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)
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)
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assert event["event_type"] == "work_order.cancelled"
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def test_already_cancelled_modify_is_updated_not_cancelled(envelope):
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# OLD already cancelled + NEW cancelled: any later touch to a cancelled
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# WO must NOT re-emit a cancelled event (no false cancels on retries).
|
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event = envelope.build_event(
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_record(
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WO_STREAM_ARN,
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"MODIFY",
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_wo_image(wo_status={"S": "cancelled"}),
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_wo_image(wo_status={"S": "cancelled"}),
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)
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)
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assert event["event_type"] == "work_order.updated"
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def test_comment_insert_is_comment_added(envelope):
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event = envelope.build_event(
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_record(COMMENTS_STREAM_ARN, "INSERT", _comment_image())
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)
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|
|
assert event["event_type"] == "work_order.comment_added"
|
|
|
|
|
assert set(event["data"]) == set(envelope.COMMENT_DATA_FIELDS)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-08-04 19:23:50 -04:00
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
|
|
|
|
"overrides",
|
|
|
|
|
[
|
|
|
|
|
{"text": {"S": ""}},
|
|
|
|
|
{"text": {"S": " \t\n"}},
|
|
|
|
|
{"_drop": "text"},
|
|
|
|
|
],
|
|
|
|
|
ids=["empty", "whitespace-only", "missing"],
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
def test_blank_comment_text_is_skipped(envelope, overrides):
|
|
|
|
|
image = _comment_image()
|
|
|
|
|
if overrides.get("_drop") == "text":
|
|
|
|
|
del image["text"]
|
|
|
|
|
else:
|
|
|
|
|
image.update(overrides)
|
|
|
|
|
record = _record(COMMENTS_STREAM_ARN, "INSERT", image)
|
|
|
|
|
assert envelope.build_event(record) is None
|
|
|
|
|
assert envelope.is_blank_comment_skip(record) is True
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_non_blank_comment_is_not_blank_skip(envelope):
|
|
|
|
|
record = _record(COMMENTS_STREAM_ARN, "INSERT", _comment_image())
|
|
|
|
|
assert envelope.build_event(record) is not None
|
|
|
|
|
assert envelope.is_blank_comment_skip(record) is False
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
feat(webhook): SHOC WO webhook emitter - dark-ship streams + HMAC secret/rotation (PR-2) (#137)
* docs(webhook): revise SHOC webhook contract and plan for post-migration reality
Branch re-cut on main 2026-07-23 (old base carried stale PR #99 commits).
Contract Rev 2026-07-23:
- Producer account corrected: seahaven-prod (011934824531); mgmt frozen
- Reconciliation backstop is the new procurement read API, not SyncController
- wo_status "unknown" is real; SHOC must map it (checklist item added)
- write_origin forward-compat note for phase-2 write-back echo suppression
- SyncVendorReplies retirement flagged (dead table, no vendor_reply event)
Plan updates:
- Account gate: seahaven-prod only; never enable streams on mgmt tables
- Emitter ships DARK (ESMs enabled=False); activation is a deliberate flip
after the SHOC receiver passes shared HMAC vectors
- Post-refactor conventions: common.py helpers, bundle-consistency AST pins,
pytest.ini --cov additions, consolidated test roots
- Dedicated-CMK rationale, secret-ARN handooff step, consumer audit refreshed
(slack-bot decommissioned), enum golden test, write_origin skip-branch test
* feat(webhook): SHOC WO webhook emitter — dark-ship streams, HMAC secret + rotation
Implements docs/shoc-webhook-plan.md Phases 1-5 (PR-2 of the SHOC
call-and-be-called effort). Everything ships DARK: both DynamoDB event
source mappings deploy enabled=False; activation is a deliberate
one-line follow-up PR gated on the SHOC receiver passing the shared
HMAC test vectors.
- Streams: NEW_AND_OLD_IMAGES on WorkOrders + WorkOrderComments
(in-place update, RETAIN + logical IDs untouched; no existing
consumers — verified live, neither table had a stream).
- workorder-shoc-emitter (Py3.12/ARM64): stream -> envelope ->
HMAC-signed POST per docs/shoc-webhook-contract.md; strict per-shard
ordering (parallelization 1, bisect off, retry until 24h age,
ReportBatchItemFailures); 429/5xx/timeout block the shard in order,
other 4xx park to workorder-shoc-emitter-rejected; ESM failures ->
workorder-shoc-emitter-failures (metadata; replay rebuilds from
DynamoDB). Echo guard skips write_origin=shoc-write-api.
- Secret workorder-ingest/shoc-webhook-hmac on a dedicated CMK
(alias workorder-ingest-shoc-webhook-kms); cross-account
GetSecretValue/DescribeSecret + kms:Decrypt granted to exactly
arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev. RemovalPolicy
DESTROY deliberately (machine-generated material; avoids the
fixed-name RETAIN-orphan deadlock).
- workorder-shoc-hmac-rotator: 30-day rotation, dual-key overlap,
64-hex keys, kid = UTC %Y-%m-%dT%H.
- Alarms (ALARM-only -> site-alerts): emitter errors/throttles/
duration + iterator-age (>=10 min) + failures/rejected queue
depth; rotator standard trio.
- scripts/replay_shoc_webhooks.py: dry-run-default operator replay
(rebuilds from tables, replay:true envelopes).
- Tests: 742 passing, 85.56% aggregate; golden HMAC vectors shared
with SHOC in docs/shoc-webhook-test-vectors.json (emitter + replay
signing pinned to identical vectors); bundle-consistency AST pins
for both new bundles.
- README: WO stack + webhook feed section, alarm table, runbooks;
removed stale seahaven-slack-bot consumer references.
* fix(webhook): kms:ViaService pins, https-only delivery, cross-account principal CI pin
GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the policy surface (no BLOCK): FIX applied
to the cross-account shoc-backend-dev Decrypt statement and both Lambda
role KMS grants (the key is only ever used via Secrets Manager); its
invariant-enforcement QUESTION answered durably with
tests/test_cross_account_principal_pin.py (any new foreign IAM principal
in cdk/ fails CI). Scanner mediums fixed: delivery.py and the replay
script now refuse non-https URLs (urllib follows file:// and http://).
SQS metadata-action and dynamodb:ListStreams NITs skipped: standard CDK
grant shapes; ListStreams has no resource-level scoping. The 4 gitleaks
HIGHs on docs/shoc-webhook-test-vectors.json are deliberate non-secrets
(shared receiver-verification vectors) suppressed machine-level with
justification.
* harden(webhook): resolve /sh-security-review findings (1 confirmed medium + cheap fixes)
High-recall detector fan-out (injection/authz/secrets-crypto/iac-iam/logic)
+ proof-or-kill verifier. Gate PASSES: 1 confirmed medium, 0 confirmed
critical/high. Confirmed finding fixed; several unverified-but-cheap
hardenings applied since the emitter ships dark and activation is weeks out.
- CONFIRMED medium (confused deputy): the rotation Lambda's generated
invoke permission for secretsmanager.amazonaws.com carried no
SourceAccount/SourceArn, so any account's Secrets Manager could invoke
the rotator. Patched the generated CfnPermission in place (a second
permission would be additive, not restrictive) to pin account + this
secret ARN.
- delivery + replay: refuse to follow receiver 3xx redirects (no-redirect
opener) so live X-SH-* auth headers can't be forwarded to a
receiver-chosen Location and an http:// Location can't slip past the
https guard. Fixed the "unfollowed 3xx" comment that was factually wrong.
- delivery: classify 401/403 as retryable (invalidate key cache + retry in
order) instead of parking -- transient auth failures (rotation outran the
TTL cache, clock skew) are availability events, not contract bugs.
- envelope: build_event now genuinely total (guarded eventID /
ApproximateCreationDateTime subscripts) per its own never-raise contract.
- handler: catch-all so an unexpected per-record error (e.g. SQS park
failure) reports only that record instead of failing the whole batch
(which would re-deliver every earlier success for 24h); per-invocation
emit/skip batch summary so a systemic silent drop is queryable/alarmable.
- rotator: narrow the AWSCURRENT-read except to ResourceNotFound/JSONDecode
(transient SM/KMS errors re-raise so the overlap key isn't silently
dropped); kid uniqueness checked against ALL retained kids with a random
suffix on collision (never reissue a kid for a different secret).
- contract: skeleton-upsert required on ANY unknown work_order_id (not just
comment-before-create) + monotonicity guard (ignore older updated_at), so
a parked created or an out-of-order replay can't corrupt receiver state.
Unverified/refuted findings left as-is with rationale: the two "high" logic
claims (whole-batch crash triggers, ordering violation) were refuted on
reachability (real stream records carry required fields; persistence writes
strings only; full-state idempotent upsert absorbs the ordering gap). Signed
kid/version binding (AUTHZ-002) declined: coordinated contract change, not
cheap, no exploit with one algorithm/key.
* fix(webhook): drop kid from rotator test_ok log (CodeQL clear-text-logging FP)
GHAS CodeQL flagged py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data (high) at
_test_secret's success log because head["kid"] is subscripted from the
same parsed-secret dict that holds head["secret"] — the taint tracker
can't tell the non-secret key id from the secret. The secret value is
never logged. Rather than dismiss the alert (fragile; re-alerts on line
moves), remove the flow: kid is already logged at stage time in
_create_secret and version_id correlates the steps, so the test_ok log
keeps only event + version_id. Also hardens against a future edit that
swaps the logged field.
2026-07-24 18:12:20 -04:00
|
|
|
def test_remove_is_skipped(envelope):
|
|
|
|
|
assert envelope.build_event(_record(WO_STREAM_ARN, "REMOVE")) is None
|
|
|
|
|
assert envelope.build_event(_record(COMMENTS_STREAM_ARN, "REMOVE")) is None
|
2026-08-04 19:23:50 -04:00
|
|
|
assert (
|
|
|
|
|
envelope.is_blank_comment_skip(_record(COMMENTS_STREAM_ARN, "REMOVE")) is False
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
feat(webhook): SHOC WO webhook emitter - dark-ship streams + HMAC secret/rotation (PR-2) (#137)
* docs(webhook): revise SHOC webhook contract and plan for post-migration reality
Branch re-cut on main 2026-07-23 (old base carried stale PR #99 commits).
Contract Rev 2026-07-23:
- Producer account corrected: seahaven-prod (011934824531); mgmt frozen
- Reconciliation backstop is the new procurement read API, not SyncController
- wo_status "unknown" is real; SHOC must map it (checklist item added)
- write_origin forward-compat note for phase-2 write-back echo suppression
- SyncVendorReplies retirement flagged (dead table, no vendor_reply event)
Plan updates:
- Account gate: seahaven-prod only; never enable streams on mgmt tables
- Emitter ships DARK (ESMs enabled=False); activation is a deliberate flip
after the SHOC receiver passes shared HMAC vectors
- Post-refactor conventions: common.py helpers, bundle-consistency AST pins,
pytest.ini --cov additions, consolidated test roots
- Dedicated-CMK rationale, secret-ARN handooff step, consumer audit refreshed
(slack-bot decommissioned), enum golden test, write_origin skip-branch test
* feat(webhook): SHOC WO webhook emitter — dark-ship streams, HMAC secret + rotation
Implements docs/shoc-webhook-plan.md Phases 1-5 (PR-2 of the SHOC
call-and-be-called effort). Everything ships DARK: both DynamoDB event
source mappings deploy enabled=False; activation is a deliberate
one-line follow-up PR gated on the SHOC receiver passing the shared
HMAC test vectors.
- Streams: NEW_AND_OLD_IMAGES on WorkOrders + WorkOrderComments
(in-place update, RETAIN + logical IDs untouched; no existing
consumers — verified live, neither table had a stream).
- workorder-shoc-emitter (Py3.12/ARM64): stream -> envelope ->
HMAC-signed POST per docs/shoc-webhook-contract.md; strict per-shard
ordering (parallelization 1, bisect off, retry until 24h age,
ReportBatchItemFailures); 429/5xx/timeout block the shard in order,
other 4xx park to workorder-shoc-emitter-rejected; ESM failures ->
workorder-shoc-emitter-failures (metadata; replay rebuilds from
DynamoDB). Echo guard skips write_origin=shoc-write-api.
- Secret workorder-ingest/shoc-webhook-hmac on a dedicated CMK
(alias workorder-ingest-shoc-webhook-kms); cross-account
GetSecretValue/DescribeSecret + kms:Decrypt granted to exactly
arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev. RemovalPolicy
DESTROY deliberately (machine-generated material; avoids the
fixed-name RETAIN-orphan deadlock).
- workorder-shoc-hmac-rotator: 30-day rotation, dual-key overlap,
64-hex keys, kid = UTC %Y-%m-%dT%H.
- Alarms (ALARM-only -> site-alerts): emitter errors/throttles/
duration + iterator-age (>=10 min) + failures/rejected queue
depth; rotator standard trio.
- scripts/replay_shoc_webhooks.py: dry-run-default operator replay
(rebuilds from tables, replay:true envelopes).
- Tests: 742 passing, 85.56% aggregate; golden HMAC vectors shared
with SHOC in docs/shoc-webhook-test-vectors.json (emitter + replay
signing pinned to identical vectors); bundle-consistency AST pins
for both new bundles.
- README: WO stack + webhook feed section, alarm table, runbooks;
removed stale seahaven-slack-bot consumer references.
* fix(webhook): kms:ViaService pins, https-only delivery, cross-account principal CI pin
GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the policy surface (no BLOCK): FIX applied
to the cross-account shoc-backend-dev Decrypt statement and both Lambda
role KMS grants (the key is only ever used via Secrets Manager); its
invariant-enforcement QUESTION answered durably with
tests/test_cross_account_principal_pin.py (any new foreign IAM principal
in cdk/ fails CI). Scanner mediums fixed: delivery.py and the replay
script now refuse non-https URLs (urllib follows file:// and http://).
SQS metadata-action and dynamodb:ListStreams NITs skipped: standard CDK
grant shapes; ListStreams has no resource-level scoping. The 4 gitleaks
HIGHs on docs/shoc-webhook-test-vectors.json are deliberate non-secrets
(shared receiver-verification vectors) suppressed machine-level with
justification.
* harden(webhook): resolve /sh-security-review findings (1 confirmed medium + cheap fixes)
High-recall detector fan-out (injection/authz/secrets-crypto/iac-iam/logic)
+ proof-or-kill verifier. Gate PASSES: 1 confirmed medium, 0 confirmed
critical/high. Confirmed finding fixed; several unverified-but-cheap
hardenings applied since the emitter ships dark and activation is weeks out.
- CONFIRMED medium (confused deputy): the rotation Lambda's generated
invoke permission for secretsmanager.amazonaws.com carried no
SourceAccount/SourceArn, so any account's Secrets Manager could invoke
the rotator. Patched the generated CfnPermission in place (a second
permission would be additive, not restrictive) to pin account + this
secret ARN.
- delivery + replay: refuse to follow receiver 3xx redirects (no-redirect
opener) so live X-SH-* auth headers can't be forwarded to a
receiver-chosen Location and an http:// Location can't slip past the
https guard. Fixed the "unfollowed 3xx" comment that was factually wrong.
- delivery: classify 401/403 as retryable (invalidate key cache + retry in
order) instead of parking -- transient auth failures (rotation outran the
TTL cache, clock skew) are availability events, not contract bugs.
- envelope: build_event now genuinely total (guarded eventID /
ApproximateCreationDateTime subscripts) per its own never-raise contract.
- handler: catch-all so an unexpected per-record error (e.g. SQS park
failure) reports only that record instead of failing the whole batch
(which would re-deliver every earlier success for 24h); per-invocation
emit/skip batch summary so a systemic silent drop is queryable/alarmable.
- rotator: narrow the AWSCURRENT-read except to ResourceNotFound/JSONDecode
(transient SM/KMS errors re-raise so the overlap key isn't silently
dropped); kid uniqueness checked against ALL retained kids with a random
suffix on collision (never reissue a kid for a different secret).
- contract: skeleton-upsert required on ANY unknown work_order_id (not just
comment-before-create) + monotonicity guard (ignore older updated_at), so
a parked created or an out-of-order replay can't corrupt receiver state.
Unverified/refuted findings left as-is with rationale: the two "high" logic
claims (whole-batch crash triggers, ordering violation) were refuted on
reachability (real stream records carry required fields; persistence writes
strings only; full-state idempotent upsert absorbs the ordering gap). Signed
kid/version binding (AUTHZ-002) declined: coordinated contract change, not
cheap, no exploit with one algorithm/key.
* fix(webhook): drop kid from rotator test_ok log (CodeQL clear-text-logging FP)
GHAS CodeQL flagged py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data (high) at
_test_secret's success log because head["kid"] is subscripted from the
same parsed-secret dict that holds head["secret"] — the taint tracker
can't tell the non-secret key id from the secret. The secret value is
never logged. Rather than dismiss the alert (fragile; re-alerts on line
moves), remove the flow: kid is already logged at stage time in
_create_secret and version_id correlates the steps, so the test_ok log
keeps only event + version_id. Also hardens against a future edit that
swaps the logged field.
2026-07-24 18:12:20 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_comment_modify_is_skipped(envelope):
|
|
|
|
|
record = _record(COMMENTS_STREAM_ARN, "MODIFY", _comment_image(), _comment_image())
|
|
|
|
|
assert envelope.build_event(record) is None
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_shoc_write_origin_echo_guard_skips(envelope):
|
|
|
|
|
record = _record(
|
|
|
|
|
WO_STREAM_ARN,
|
|
|
|
|
"INSERT",
|
|
|
|
|
_wo_image(write_origin={"S": "shoc-write-api"}),
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
assert envelope.build_event(record) is None
|
|
|
|
|
# Any OTHER write_origin value is not an echo and must still deliver.
|
|
|
|
|
record = _record(
|
|
|
|
|
WO_STREAM_ARN,
|
|
|
|
|
"INSERT",
|
|
|
|
|
_wo_image(write_origin={"S": "email-processor"}),
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
assert envelope.build_event(record) is not None
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# --- eventSourceARN table discrimination -------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_table_discrimination_is_exact_segment_not_substring(envelope):
|
|
|
|
|
# The WorkOrders stream must classify as a WO state event and the
|
|
|
|
|
# WorkOrderComments stream as a comment event -- never cross-parsed even
|
|
|
|
|
# though "WorkOrders" is a leading substring of "WorkOrderComments".
|
|
|
|
|
wo_event = envelope.build_event(_record(WO_STREAM_ARN, "INSERT", _wo_image()))
|
|
|
|
|
assert wo_event["event_type"] == "work_order.created"
|
|
|
|
|
comment_event = envelope.build_event(
|
|
|
|
|
_record(COMMENTS_STREAM_ARN, "INSERT", _comment_image())
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
assert comment_event["event_type"] == "work_order.comment_added"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Superstring table names must not substring-match either known table.
|
|
|
|
|
for table in ("WorkOrdersLegacy", "WorkOrderCommentsArchive", "XWorkOrders"):
|
|
|
|
|
arn = (
|
|
|
|
|
f"arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:011934824531:table/{table}"
|
|
|
|
|
"/stream/2026-07-23T00:00:00.000"
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
assert envelope.build_event(_record(arn, "INSERT", _wo_image())) is None
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# A malformed / missing ARN skips rather than raises (total function).
|
|
|
|
|
assert envelope.build_event(_record("", "INSERT", _wo_image())) is None
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-08-07 13:42:35 -04:00
|
|
|
def test_kebab_table_names_via_env(monkeypatch):
|
|
|
|
|
"""PLAT-11: classification follows WORK_ORDERS_TABLE / COMMENTS_TABLE."""
|
|
|
|
|
import sys
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch.setenv("WORK_ORDERS_TABLE", "work-orders")
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch.setenv("COMMENTS_TABLE", "work-order-comments")
|
|
|
|
|
sys.modules.pop("wo_shoc_emitter_envelope", None)
|
|
|
|
|
kebab_envelope = load_lambda_module("wo", "shoc_emitter/envelope")
|
|
|
|
|
wo_arn = (
|
|
|
|
|
"arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:011934824531:table/work-orders"
|
|
|
|
|
"/stream/2026-08-07T00:00:00.000"
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
comments_arn = (
|
|
|
|
|
"arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:011934824531:table/work-order-comments"
|
|
|
|
|
"/stream/2026-08-07T00:00:00.000"
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
assert (
|
|
|
|
|
kebab_envelope.build_event(_record(wo_arn, "INSERT", _wo_image()))["event_type"]
|
|
|
|
|
== "work_order.created"
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
assert (
|
|
|
|
|
kebab_envelope.build_event(_record(comments_arn, "INSERT", _comment_image()))[
|
|
|
|
|
"event_type"
|
|
|
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
|
== "work_order.comment_added"
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
# Legacy PascalCase ARNs must not match kebab env names.
|
|
|
|
|
assert (
|
|
|
|
|
kebab_envelope.build_event(_record(WO_STREAM_ARN, "INSERT", _wo_image()))
|
|
|
|
|
is None
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
# Restore cached module for later tests that expect PascalCase defaults.
|
|
|
|
|
sys.modules.pop("wo_shoc_emitter_envelope", None)
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch.delenv("WORK_ORDERS_TABLE", raising=False)
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch.delenv("COMMENTS_TABLE", raising=False)
|
|
|
|
|
load_lambda_module("wo", "shoc_emitter/envelope")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
feat(webhook): SHOC WO webhook emitter - dark-ship streams + HMAC secret/rotation (PR-2) (#137)
* docs(webhook): revise SHOC webhook contract and plan for post-migration reality
Branch re-cut on main 2026-07-23 (old base carried stale PR #99 commits).
Contract Rev 2026-07-23:
- Producer account corrected: seahaven-prod (011934824531); mgmt frozen
- Reconciliation backstop is the new procurement read API, not SyncController
- wo_status "unknown" is real; SHOC must map it (checklist item added)
- write_origin forward-compat note for phase-2 write-back echo suppression
- SyncVendorReplies retirement flagged (dead table, no vendor_reply event)
Plan updates:
- Account gate: seahaven-prod only; never enable streams on mgmt tables
- Emitter ships DARK (ESMs enabled=False); activation is a deliberate flip
after the SHOC receiver passes shared HMAC vectors
- Post-refactor conventions: common.py helpers, bundle-consistency AST pins,
pytest.ini --cov additions, consolidated test roots
- Dedicated-CMK rationale, secret-ARN handooff step, consumer audit refreshed
(slack-bot decommissioned), enum golden test, write_origin skip-branch test
* feat(webhook): SHOC WO webhook emitter — dark-ship streams, HMAC secret + rotation
Implements docs/shoc-webhook-plan.md Phases 1-5 (PR-2 of the SHOC
call-and-be-called effort). Everything ships DARK: both DynamoDB event
source mappings deploy enabled=False; activation is a deliberate
one-line follow-up PR gated on the SHOC receiver passing the shared
HMAC test vectors.
- Streams: NEW_AND_OLD_IMAGES on WorkOrders + WorkOrderComments
(in-place update, RETAIN + logical IDs untouched; no existing
consumers — verified live, neither table had a stream).
- workorder-shoc-emitter (Py3.12/ARM64): stream -> envelope ->
HMAC-signed POST per docs/shoc-webhook-contract.md; strict per-shard
ordering (parallelization 1, bisect off, retry until 24h age,
ReportBatchItemFailures); 429/5xx/timeout block the shard in order,
other 4xx park to workorder-shoc-emitter-rejected; ESM failures ->
workorder-shoc-emitter-failures (metadata; replay rebuilds from
DynamoDB). Echo guard skips write_origin=shoc-write-api.
- Secret workorder-ingest/shoc-webhook-hmac on a dedicated CMK
(alias workorder-ingest-shoc-webhook-kms); cross-account
GetSecretValue/DescribeSecret + kms:Decrypt granted to exactly
arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev. RemovalPolicy
DESTROY deliberately (machine-generated material; avoids the
fixed-name RETAIN-orphan deadlock).
- workorder-shoc-hmac-rotator: 30-day rotation, dual-key overlap,
64-hex keys, kid = UTC %Y-%m-%dT%H.
- Alarms (ALARM-only -> site-alerts): emitter errors/throttles/
duration + iterator-age (>=10 min) + failures/rejected queue
depth; rotator standard trio.
- scripts/replay_shoc_webhooks.py: dry-run-default operator replay
(rebuilds from tables, replay:true envelopes).
- Tests: 742 passing, 85.56% aggregate; golden HMAC vectors shared
with SHOC in docs/shoc-webhook-test-vectors.json (emitter + replay
signing pinned to identical vectors); bundle-consistency AST pins
for both new bundles.
- README: WO stack + webhook feed section, alarm table, runbooks;
removed stale seahaven-slack-bot consumer references.
* fix(webhook): kms:ViaService pins, https-only delivery, cross-account principal CI pin
GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the policy surface (no BLOCK): FIX applied
to the cross-account shoc-backend-dev Decrypt statement and both Lambda
role KMS grants (the key is only ever used via Secrets Manager); its
invariant-enforcement QUESTION answered durably with
tests/test_cross_account_principal_pin.py (any new foreign IAM principal
in cdk/ fails CI). Scanner mediums fixed: delivery.py and the replay
script now refuse non-https URLs (urllib follows file:// and http://).
SQS metadata-action and dynamodb:ListStreams NITs skipped: standard CDK
grant shapes; ListStreams has no resource-level scoping. The 4 gitleaks
HIGHs on docs/shoc-webhook-test-vectors.json are deliberate non-secrets
(shared receiver-verification vectors) suppressed machine-level with
justification.
* harden(webhook): resolve /sh-security-review findings (1 confirmed medium + cheap fixes)
High-recall detector fan-out (injection/authz/secrets-crypto/iac-iam/logic)
+ proof-or-kill verifier. Gate PASSES: 1 confirmed medium, 0 confirmed
critical/high. Confirmed finding fixed; several unverified-but-cheap
hardenings applied since the emitter ships dark and activation is weeks out.
- CONFIRMED medium (confused deputy): the rotation Lambda's generated
invoke permission for secretsmanager.amazonaws.com carried no
SourceAccount/SourceArn, so any account's Secrets Manager could invoke
the rotator. Patched the generated CfnPermission in place (a second
permission would be additive, not restrictive) to pin account + this
secret ARN.
- delivery + replay: refuse to follow receiver 3xx redirects (no-redirect
opener) so live X-SH-* auth headers can't be forwarded to a
receiver-chosen Location and an http:// Location can't slip past the
https guard. Fixed the "unfollowed 3xx" comment that was factually wrong.
- delivery: classify 401/403 as retryable (invalidate key cache + retry in
order) instead of parking -- transient auth failures (rotation outran the
TTL cache, clock skew) are availability events, not contract bugs.
- envelope: build_event now genuinely total (guarded eventID /
ApproximateCreationDateTime subscripts) per its own never-raise contract.
- handler: catch-all so an unexpected per-record error (e.g. SQS park
failure) reports only that record instead of failing the whole batch
(which would re-deliver every earlier success for 24h); per-invocation
emit/skip batch summary so a systemic silent drop is queryable/alarmable.
- rotator: narrow the AWSCURRENT-read except to ResourceNotFound/JSONDecode
(transient SM/KMS errors re-raise so the overlap key isn't silently
dropped); kid uniqueness checked against ALL retained kids with a random
suffix on collision (never reissue a kid for a different secret).
- contract: skeleton-upsert required on ANY unknown work_order_id (not just
comment-before-create) + monotonicity guard (ignore older updated_at), so
a parked created or an out-of-order replay can't corrupt receiver state.
Unverified/refuted findings left as-is with rationale: the two "high" logic
claims (whole-batch crash triggers, ordering violation) were refuted on
reachability (real stream records carry required fields; persistence writes
strings only; full-state idempotent upsert absorbs the ordering gap). Signed
kid/version binding (AUTHZ-002) declined: coordinated contract change, not
cheap, no exploit with one algorithm/key.
* fix(webhook): drop kid from rotator test_ok log (CodeQL clear-text-logging FP)
GHAS CodeQL flagged py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data (high) at
_test_secret's success log because head["kid"] is subscripted from the
same parsed-secret dict that holds head["secret"] — the taint tracker
can't tell the non-secret key id from the secret. The secret value is
never logged. Rather than dismiss the alert (fragile; re-alerts on line
moves), remove the flow: kid is already logged at stage time in
_create_secret and version_id correlates the steps, so the test_ok log
keeps only event + version_id. Also hardens against a future edit that
swaps the logged field.
2026-07-24 18:12:20 -04:00
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# --- Envelope fields ---------------------------------------------------------
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def test_envelope_constant_fields_and_delivery_id(envelope):
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record = _record(WO_STREAM_ARN, "INSERT", _wo_image(), event_id="evt-abc-123")
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event = envelope.build_event(record)
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assert event["schema_version"] == 1
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assert event["source"] == "procurement-ingest/workorder-shoc-emitter"
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assert event["replay"] is False
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# delivery_id is the stream record eventID: unique per source event and
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# stable across ESM retries (the receiver's idempotency key).
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assert event["delivery_id"] == "evt-abc-123"
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def test_occurred_at_from_decimal_creation_time(envelope):
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# ApproximateCreationDateTime arrives as epoch seconds; via the low-level
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# stream API it deserializes as Decimal -- must still map to an aware
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# ISO-8601 +00:00 instant.
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creation = Decimal("1784642602")
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record = _record(WO_STREAM_ARN, "INSERT", _wo_image(), creation=creation)
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event = envelope.build_event(record)
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expected = datetime.fromtimestamp(1784642602.0, tz=timezone.utc).isoformat()
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assert event["occurred_at"] == expected
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assert event["occurred_at"].endswith("+00:00")
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def test_data_null_fills_absent_fields_and_excludes_s3_key(envelope):
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image = {
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"work_order_id": {"S": "11144580730"},
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"wo_status": {"S": "unknown"},
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# Internal pointer: must never leave the account via the webhook.
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"source_email_s3_key": {"S": "inbound/2026/07/abc.eml"},
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}
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event = envelope.build_event(_record(WO_STREAM_ARN, "INSERT", image))
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assert set(event["data"]) == set(envelope.WO_DATA_FIELDS)
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assert "source_email_s3_key" not in event["data"]
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assert event["data"]["work_order_id"] == "11144580730"
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for field in set(envelope.WO_DATA_FIELDS) - {"work_order_id", "wo_status"}:
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assert event["data"][field] is None
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def test_decimal_image_values_become_json_safe(envelope):
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image = _wo_image(
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severity={"N": "3"},
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priority={"N": "2.5"},
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)
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event = envelope.build_event(_record(WO_STREAM_ARN, "INSERT", image))
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assert event["data"]["severity"] == 3
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assert isinstance(event["data"]["severity"], int)
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assert event["data"]["priority"] == 2.5
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assert isinstance(event["data"]["priority"], float)
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# The whole envelope must serialize -- this is the raw body that gets
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# signed and POSTed.
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json.dumps(event)
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# --- Enum golden pin ---------------------------------------------------------
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def test_event_type_set_matches_contract_and_openapi_webhooks(envelope):
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scenarios = [
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_record(WO_STREAM_ARN, "INSERT", _wo_image()),
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_record(
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WO_STREAM_ARN,
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"MODIFY",
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_wo_image(wo_status={"S": "assigned"}),
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_wo_image(wo_status={"S": "new"}),
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),
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_record(
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WO_STREAM_ARN,
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"MODIFY",
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_wo_image(wo_status={"S": "cancelled"}),
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_wo_image(wo_status={"S": "assigned"}),
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),
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_record(COMMENTS_STREAM_ARN, "INSERT", _comment_image()),
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]
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emitted = {envelope.build_event(record)["event_type"] for record in scenarios}
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assert emitted == CONTRACT_EVENT_TYPES
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# The published read-API spec documents the same four outbound webhook
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# events; emitter and spec must move together.
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spec_path = Path(REPO_ROOT) / "lambdas" / "api" / "openapi.json"
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spec = json.loads(spec_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
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assert set(spec["webhooks"]) == emitted
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def test_status_and_record_type_value_space_anchored_to_template_parser(envelope):
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# The WO pipeline's template_parser enums are the wo_status/record_type
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# value space the stream carries (prompts.py mirrors them for the AI
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# path). The cancelled-transition trigger value must be a real status,
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# and the contract's record_type enum must be exactly the pipeline's
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# email-type enum -- widen either side only in a PR that updates both.
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template_parser = load_lambda_module("wo", "email_processor/template_parser")
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assert envelope.CANCELLED_STATUS in template_parser.VALID_STATUSES
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assert template_parser.VALID_EMAIL_TYPES == {
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"new_work_order",
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"update",
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"comment",
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"cancellation",
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}
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