2026-07-15 19:06:20 -04:00
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"""Shared pytest configuration for the procurement-ingest test suite.
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The Lambda handlers create boto3 clients at module import time, so a
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region and dummy credentials must be present in the environment before
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any handler module is imported. Setting them here at conftest import
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time guarantees they exist before test collection touches a handler.
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"""
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import importlib.util
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import os
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import sys
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from pathlib import Path
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import pytest
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os.environ.setdefault("AWS_DEFAULT_REGION", "us-east-1")
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os.environ.setdefault("AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID", "testing")
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os.environ.setdefault("AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY", "testing")
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os.environ.setdefault("AWS_SESSION_TOKEN", "testing")
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REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
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def load_handler(relative_path, module_name):
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"""Load a Lambda handler module by file path under a unique name.
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The handler files all share the basename ``handler.py`` and are not
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importable as packages, so a plain ``import handler`` would collide
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Add fail-closed SES sender authentication (INFRA-107) (#98)
* Add fail-closed SES sender authentication
The From header and any raw-MIME Authentication-Results copies are
attacker-forgeable, so a forged email to apm@int.seahaven.com or
amazon_po@int.seahaven.com could create or mutate a WO/PO (INFRA-107,
CRITICAL). Both S3-triggered email processors now authenticate the
sender against the Authentication-Results header SES itself prepends
at delivery: only the topmost header is consulted, its authserv-id
must be amazonses.com, and it must carry dkim=pass for a domain in
the per-pipeline ALLOWED_DKIM_DOMAINS env var (comma-separated, set
in CDK so ops can adjust without code changes).
Allowlists come from live traffic observed 2026-07-15 on both ingest
buckets: WO mail arrives via the apm@ Google Groups forward, which
re-signs as seahaven.com (the hxgnsmartcloud.com signature does not
survive the forward); PO mail passes for amazon.coupahost.com.
amazonses.com also passes on PO mail but is deliberately excluded --
every SES customer's outbound mail passes for it.
Every failure path (env var unset, header missing or unparseable,
verdict fail, unaligned domain) rejects the email: a structured
warning with the reason and S3 key is logged and the record skipped
without erroring the invocation, so rejected mail causes no Lambda
retries or DLQ messages. Handler signatures and event sources are
unchanged.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Harden AR parser per cross-family review
Cross-family (GPT-4.1) review findings: terminate the dkim result
token at end-of-clause, whitespace, or a comment so a value like
"dkim=pass-fake" can never be read as a pass; normalize trailing
dots off allowlist entries so "seahaven.com." matches; make the
compat32 parser policy explicit. Adds tests for result-token
boundaries, comments after the result, quoted domain values, and
folding inside a dkim clause.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Harden AR parsing and alarm on sender-auth rejects
The SES-stamped Authentication-Results value echoes attacker-controlled
SMTP-session tokens (envelope-from, helo, header.from) as their own
semicolon-delimited property clauses. A naive split(";") tore an RFC 5321
quoted-local-part MAIL FROM apart and manufactured a forged dkim=pass
clause, so a fully spoofed email was accepted on the genuinely
SES-stamped topmost header. Tokenise comment- and quoted-string-aware
(RFC 8601 / RFC 5322): strip CFWS comments, split clauses only on
semicolons outside a quoted-string, and fail closed on unbalanced
quotes/comments so a ';' inside a quoted pvalue can never start a clause.
Rejected mail returns normally (no error, no retry, no DLQ message), so a
signing-domain drift or a wrong allowlist would silently discard 100% of
legitimate mail while every alarm stayed green. Add a CloudWatch Logs
metric filter + alarm on the sender_auth_rejected warning to both stacks
so a false-reject storm pages instead of vanishing. This is also the
safety net for the WO seahaven.com allowlist assumption, which must be
validated against a live SES-stamped header (a plain Gmail auto-forward
re-signs under the sending Workspace domain, not seahaven.com).
Refs: INFRA-107
* chore: retrigger CI (no run recorded for 7c74ac1)
* Fix quoted-AUID DKIM domain spoof in sender auth
Resolve three confirmed /sh-security-review findings on the fail-closed
SES sender-authentication control.
HIGH: header.i/header.d domain extraction was not quoted-string aware.
An attacker with a valid DKIM key for their own domain could set an
RFC 6376-legal AUID such as i="@seahaven.com"@attacker.com; the naive
extractor stopped at the closing quote and returned seahaven.com,
accepting forged mail. Extraction now tokenises the clause with the same
quoted-string discipline already used for clause splitting: header.d
(the plain signing domain) is authoritative when present, otherwise the
header.i domain is the part after the AUID's LAST top-level "@", so a "@"
inside a quoted local-part is treated as signer-controlled label text and
yields the true signer (attacker.com), not seahaven.com.
LOW: the topmost-header parse ran outside evaluate_sender_authentication's
try/except, so an unexpected parser exception on crafted input could
propagate into the handler and Lambda async retries/DLQ. The parse now
fails CLOSED with an authentication_results_unparseable reason.
MEDIUM: the sender_auth_rejected alarm used Sum>=3 over 15 min, blind to
a low-volume total-reject outage (a trickle that never sums to 3). Both
stacks now alarm on >=1 reject per 5-min period with evaluation_periods=3
/ datapoints_to_alarm=2, so a sustained reject condition pages even at one
reject per period while a lone stray probe self-clears.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Load Lambda function dir on sys.path in tests
Rebasing INFRA-107 onto main folded #95's pytest suite into this
branch's tests. The unified conftest loads the PO/WO handlers by file
path, and handler.py now does `from ses_auth import
authenticate_inbound_email` -- a bare sibling import that resolves in
the Lambda only because the runtime puts each function's own directory
on sys.path. The shared load_handler now adds that directory so the
handler tests import correctly alongside the sender-auth tests.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Note #97 test files in README directory tree
The rebase onto main brought in #97's tests/requirements.txt and
tests/test_po_merge.py. List both in the directory tree so it matches
the tree on disk.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Document INFRA-107 forwarder-binding risk acceptance
Record the accepted risk that WO sender auth binds to the apm@ forward's
re-signing domain (seahaven.com) rather than the Hexagon originator; the
apm@ Google Group's restricted posting policy is the load-bearing control
(escalates to HIGH if the group is opened to external posting). Also
correct the sender-auth-rejected alarm docs to match the shipped config
(>=1 per 5-min, 2-of-3 datapoints, not the superseded >=3/15min) and
note the SES-AR-01/02 parser hardening follow-ups.
Refs: INFRA-107
2026-07-15 20:58:47 -04:00
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across Lambdas. The same loader serves the ``ses_auth.py`` modules,
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which are likewise duplicated per pipeline and not importable as
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packages.
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The Lambda runtime puts each function's own directory on ``sys.path``,
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so handler modules import their siblings by bare name (e.g.
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``from ses_auth import authenticate_inbound_email``). The function
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directory is added to ``sys.path`` here so the module executes the
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same way under test as it does in the Lambda.
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2026-07-15 19:06:20 -04:00
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"""
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path = REPO_ROOT / relative_path
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feat: template-first WO parser + Bedrock fallback, PO Bedrock switch (#99)
* Add deterministic template parser for WO emails
The workorder-email-processor sends every one of ~22.9k emails/month to
an LLM, but ~93.6% are the plain-text "AMAZON UPDATE WO DETAILS" comment
template and ~6.4% the HTML "AMAZON assign Work Order" template. Parse
those two shapes deterministically, offline, so the AI call is reserved
for the long tail.
The module is pure (no boto3, no network). try_deterministic_parse
classifies by subject, extracts the shared contract fields, and returns
a result ONLY when it passes a strict fail-closed validation gate: exact
contract-key set, subject/id agreement, the literal "Work Order: <id>"
double space, per-type required fields, site-code shape, and a
label-bleed guard so a value that over-ran into the next field fails.
Any miss, drift, or extractor exception yields None so the caller falls
back to the AI extractor -- data is never corrupted, only the fallback
rate rises.
Refs: #23
* Migrate WO processor to Bedrock and fix comment_id collision
Switch the AI path from the Anthropic SDK to bedrock-runtime InvokeModel
on the inference profile us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0
(BEDROCK_MODEL_ID env), so parsing no longer needs a provider API key or
Secrets Manager secret. The EXTRACTION_PROMPT and JSON contract are kept
byte-identical, so the AI-fallback output is unchanged. Try the new
deterministic template parser first and only call Bedrock on a
miss/invalid result.
Fix issue #23: the WorkOrderComments range key was
work_order_id#<comment_time>, so two emails on one WO with an identical
or absent comment time collided and overwrote each other. Derive a
12-hex suffix from the S3 object key alone -- deterministic, so an async
retry of the same object is byte-identical (idempotent) while distinct
emails get distinct keys -- and keep wall-clock now() out of the key
(literal 'nocomment' segment when comment_time is absent).
Also emit one CloudWatch EMF line per record (Seahaven/WorkorderIngest
ParseOutcome, dimensioned by ParseMethod/TemplateId) for parse-outcome
observability, replace the deprecated datetime.utcnow() with
datetime.now(timezone.utc), and drop the anthropic dependency.
Refs: #23
* Migrate PO processor to Bedrock
Switch the PO email processor's AI extraction from the Anthropic SDK to
bedrock-runtime InvokeModel on the inference profile
us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0 (BEDROCK_MODEL_ID env), so
it no longer needs a provider API key or Secrets Manager secret. PO
parsing stays fully AI -- only the provider changes. The EXTRACTION_PROMPT
is kept byte-identical and the Bedrock text output is still decoded with
json.loads(..., parse_float=Decimal), which DynamoDB requires (it rejects
floats). Replace the deprecated datetime.utcnow() with
datetime.now(timezone.utc) and drop the anthropic dependency.
* Grant Bedrock IAM, drop Anthropic secrets, add fallback alarm
Both stacks moved their processors from the Anthropic API to the Bedrock
inference profile us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0. Grant each
processor role bedrock:InvokeModel + bedrock:InvokeModelWithResponseStream
on BOTH the inference-profile ARN AND the per-region foundation-model
ARNs for us-east-1/us-east-2/us-west-2 (empty-account) -- the us.* profile
routes cross-region, so a profile-only grant AccessDenies at runtime.
Remove both anthropic-api-key Secret constructs, their grant_read, and
the ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN env; add BEDROCK_MODEL_ID. The secrets
had RemovalPolicy.RETAIN so they are orphaned, not deleted -- flagged in
the README for manual post-deploy deletion and key revocation.
Add the workorder-email-processor-template-fallback-rate alarm: a
FILL(0) + >=10-sample volume-floor MathExpression over the EMF
ParseOutcome metric (15-min periods) that pages when the AI-fallback
share exceeds 15% sustained, catching Hexagon template drift. ALARM-only
SnsAction to site-alerts, no OK action, NOT_BREACHING, matching the
existing stack idiom.
* Add offline WO parser test suite
Cover the deterministic parser with golden-file tests over 55 real
scrubbed .eml fixtures (both comment sub-shapes, username Submitted-By,
address present/absent, br+CRLF assign addresses), fail-closed
validation-gate rules, adversarial and prompt-injection cases that must
route to ai_fallback or parse without corrupting other fields, the issue
#23 comment_id idempotency invariants, and the Bedrock-fallback dispatch
plus EMF-metric emission with a mocked invoke_model.
Extend pytest.ini testpaths to discover the co-located suite, and update
tests/conftest.load_handler to put a handler's own directory on sys.path
so the WO handler's new `from template_parser import ...` resolves under
the existing shared handler tests. Point test_local.py at the new
template-first + Bedrock flow.
Refs: #23
* Document Bedrock migration and WO parse flow in README
Record the provider switch to the Bedrock inference profile (no Anthropic
API key or Secrets Manager secret, with the retired secrets flagged for
manual deletion), the WO deterministic-template-first + AI-fallback flow,
the new ParseOutcome EMF metric and template-fallback-rate alarm, the
issue #23 comment_id format change, the +00:00 aware-UTC timestamp shift,
and offline test instructions.
Refs: #23
* Fix f-string lint and formatting in backfill scripts
Drop the f prefix from two f-strings that carry no placeholders
(F541) and apply ruff format, so `ruff check` / `ruff format --check`
pass in CI.
* Emit ParseMethod-only EMF set so fallback alarm can fire
The fallback-rate alarm queries the ParseOutcome series keyed on
ParseMethod alone, but the emitter published only the joint
(ParseMethod, TemplateId) dimension set. CloudWatch materializes
exactly the listed dimension sets and does not auto-aggregate, so the
alarm's series never received data: it evaluated a constant 0 and
could never page on template-drift coverage collapse.
Publish both ["ParseMethod"] and ["ParseMethod","TemplateId"] and
update the EMF regression test to assert both sets are present.
* Commit WO parser .eml fixtures for executable coverage
The parser test suite globbed for input .eml fixtures that the repo's
`*.eml` ignore rule kept uncommitted, so every parametrized golden and
fail-closed test collected zero cases and CI could not exercise the
deterministic parser that handles 100% of WO email volume.
Add a fixtures-only negation to .gitignore and commit the 55 scrubbed
positive samples (50 update-plaintext, 5 assign-html) plus 14
ai-fallback and 3 adversarial fixtures. The ai-fallback set covers each
fail-closed reason code (subject_no_match, single_space_work_order,
malformed_site_code, label_bleed, creation_time_unparseable,
wo_id_mismatch, missing_required_field) and the adversarial set proves
the parser is total and confines prompt-injection payloads to
comment_text without steering the structured fields.
* Fix WO parser advisories A1-A3 (PR #99 follow-ups)
A1 — AI-fallback comment_id nondeterminism: parsed comment_time is model
output and not stable across Lambda async retries, so on the ai_fallback
path the comment_id range-key time segment now derives from the email Date
header (deterministic per S3 object) instead of the model's comment_time.
The template path is unchanged (its comment_time is a pure function of the
raw email). Bedrock invoke pins temperature 0 so retries reproduce the same
extraction. Closes the #23 reopening on the AI path.
A2 — EMF record now carries the spec-required _aws.Timestamp (epoch ms) so
CloudWatch reliably extracts the ParseOutcome datapoint that the
fallback-rate alarm depends on.
A3 — T1 New Comment capture no longer truncates at the first blank line;
multi-paragraph comments are captured through internal blanks and terminate
at the next label/separator. 17 golden files regenerated from the real
fixtures accordingly.
Hardening from the sh-security-review pass on this diff:
- _header_date_iso is total: OverflowError/OSError from an extreme Date
header fall back to 'nocomment' instead of failing the invocation.
- _capture_block trims blanks in O(n) (no pop(0)) — removes a quadratic
path on a crafted large blank run.
- work_order_id is enforced digits-only on BOTH parse paths before it is
used as a DynamoDB key, so prompt-injected AI output cannot forge '#'
range-key segments or land on an arbitrary WO.
2026-07-16 12:45:11 -04:00
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# Put the handler's own directory on sys.path so its sibling-module imports
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# (e.g. the WO handler's ``from template_parser import ...`` and the
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# ``from ses_auth import ...`` in both handlers) resolve.
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handler_dir = str(path.parent)
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if handler_dir not in sys.path:
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sys.path.insert(0, handler_dir)
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2026-07-15 19:06:20 -04:00
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spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(module_name, path)
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module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
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sys.modules[module_name] = module
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spec.loader.exec_module(module)
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return module
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@pytest.fixture(scope="session")
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def po_handler():
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"""The PO email processor handler module."""
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return load_handler(
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"lambdas/po/email_processor/handler.py",
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"po_email_processor_handler",
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)
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@pytest.fixture(scope="session")
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def wo_handler():
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"""The WO email processor handler module."""
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return load_handler(
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"lambdas/wo/email_processor/handler.py",
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"wo_email_processor_handler",
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)
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@pytest.fixture(params=["po_handler", "wo_handler"])
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def email_handler(request):
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"""Parametrized fixture yielding each email processor handler module."""
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return request.getfixturevalue(request.param)
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Add fail-closed SES sender authentication (INFRA-107) (#98)
* Add fail-closed SES sender authentication
The From header and any raw-MIME Authentication-Results copies are
attacker-forgeable, so a forged email to apm@int.seahaven.com or
amazon_po@int.seahaven.com could create or mutate a WO/PO (INFRA-107,
CRITICAL). Both S3-triggered email processors now authenticate the
sender against the Authentication-Results header SES itself prepends
at delivery: only the topmost header is consulted, its authserv-id
must be amazonses.com, and it must carry dkim=pass for a domain in
the per-pipeline ALLOWED_DKIM_DOMAINS env var (comma-separated, set
in CDK so ops can adjust without code changes).
Allowlists come from live traffic observed 2026-07-15 on both ingest
buckets: WO mail arrives via the apm@ Google Groups forward, which
re-signs as seahaven.com (the hxgnsmartcloud.com signature does not
survive the forward); PO mail passes for amazon.coupahost.com.
amazonses.com also passes on PO mail but is deliberately excluded --
every SES customer's outbound mail passes for it.
Every failure path (env var unset, header missing or unparseable,
verdict fail, unaligned domain) rejects the email: a structured
warning with the reason and S3 key is logged and the record skipped
without erroring the invocation, so rejected mail causes no Lambda
retries or DLQ messages. Handler signatures and event sources are
unchanged.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Harden AR parser per cross-family review
Cross-family (GPT-4.1) review findings: terminate the dkim result
token at end-of-clause, whitespace, or a comment so a value like
"dkim=pass-fake" can never be read as a pass; normalize trailing
dots off allowlist entries so "seahaven.com." matches; make the
compat32 parser policy explicit. Adds tests for result-token
boundaries, comments after the result, quoted domain values, and
folding inside a dkim clause.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Harden AR parsing and alarm on sender-auth rejects
The SES-stamped Authentication-Results value echoes attacker-controlled
SMTP-session tokens (envelope-from, helo, header.from) as their own
semicolon-delimited property clauses. A naive split(";") tore an RFC 5321
quoted-local-part MAIL FROM apart and manufactured a forged dkim=pass
clause, so a fully spoofed email was accepted on the genuinely
SES-stamped topmost header. Tokenise comment- and quoted-string-aware
(RFC 8601 / RFC 5322): strip CFWS comments, split clauses only on
semicolons outside a quoted-string, and fail closed on unbalanced
quotes/comments so a ';' inside a quoted pvalue can never start a clause.
Rejected mail returns normally (no error, no retry, no DLQ message), so a
signing-domain drift or a wrong allowlist would silently discard 100% of
legitimate mail while every alarm stayed green. Add a CloudWatch Logs
metric filter + alarm on the sender_auth_rejected warning to both stacks
so a false-reject storm pages instead of vanishing. This is also the
safety net for the WO seahaven.com allowlist assumption, which must be
validated against a live SES-stamped header (a plain Gmail auto-forward
re-signs under the sending Workspace domain, not seahaven.com).
Refs: INFRA-107
* chore: retrigger CI (no run recorded for 7c74ac1)
* Fix quoted-AUID DKIM domain spoof in sender auth
Resolve three confirmed /sh-security-review findings on the fail-closed
SES sender-authentication control.
HIGH: header.i/header.d domain extraction was not quoted-string aware.
An attacker with a valid DKIM key for their own domain could set an
RFC 6376-legal AUID such as i="@seahaven.com"@attacker.com; the naive
extractor stopped at the closing quote and returned seahaven.com,
accepting forged mail. Extraction now tokenises the clause with the same
quoted-string discipline already used for clause splitting: header.d
(the plain signing domain) is authoritative when present, otherwise the
header.i domain is the part after the AUID's LAST top-level "@", so a "@"
inside a quoted local-part is treated as signer-controlled label text and
yields the true signer (attacker.com), not seahaven.com.
LOW: the topmost-header parse ran outside evaluate_sender_authentication's
try/except, so an unexpected parser exception on crafted input could
propagate into the handler and Lambda async retries/DLQ. The parse now
fails CLOSED with an authentication_results_unparseable reason.
MEDIUM: the sender_auth_rejected alarm used Sum>=3 over 15 min, blind to
a low-volume total-reject outage (a trickle that never sums to 3). Both
stacks now alarm on >=1 reject per 5-min period with evaluation_periods=3
/ datapoints_to_alarm=2, so a sustained reject condition pages even at one
reject per period while a lone stray probe self-clears.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Load Lambda function dir on sys.path in tests
Rebasing INFRA-107 onto main folded #95's pytest suite into this
branch's tests. The unified conftest loads the PO/WO handlers by file
path, and handler.py now does `from ses_auth import
authenticate_inbound_email` -- a bare sibling import that resolves in
the Lambda only because the runtime puts each function's own directory
on sys.path. The shared load_handler now adds that directory so the
handler tests import correctly alongside the sender-auth tests.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Note #97 test files in README directory tree
The rebase onto main brought in #97's tests/requirements.txt and
tests/test_po_merge.py. List both in the directory tree so it matches
the tree on disk.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Document INFRA-107 forwarder-binding risk acceptance
Record the accepted risk that WO sender auth binds to the apm@ forward's
re-signing domain (seahaven.com) rather than the Hexagon originator; the
apm@ Google Group's restricted posting policy is the load-bearing control
(escalates to HIGH if the group is opened to external posting). Also
correct the sender-auth-rejected alarm docs to match the shipped config
(>=1 per 5-min, 2-of-3 datapoints, not the superseded >=3/15min) and
note the SES-AR-01/02 parser hardening follow-ups.
Refs: INFRA-107
2026-07-15 20:58:47 -04:00
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@pytest.fixture(params=["wo", "po"])
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def ses_auth(request):
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"""The ses_auth module of each pipeline (duplicated file, kept in sync)."""
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pipeline = request.param
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return load_handler(
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f"lambdas/{pipeline}/email_processor/ses_auth.py",
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f"{pipeline}_ses_auth",
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)
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