procurement-ingest/lambdas/shared/web_ui_auth.py

82 lines
3 KiB
Python
Raw Normal View History

feat: extract lambdas/shared/ — single-source ses_auth, web_ui auth, email parsing, EMF emitter (refactor phase 3) (#111) Four modules move into the handbook-mandated lambdas/shared/ location, collapsing duplicated logic that had to be kept in sync by hand across the PO and WO pipelines: - ses_auth.py: the PO and WO copies were verified sha256-identical against the feature/phase-7-ops-recovery baseline before the move (no drift since the last audit). shared/ses_auth.py is the exact bytes of that one copy; both originals are git rm'd (the PO copy via rename, the WO copy as a straight delete). Bundling lands the module flat in /asset-output for both email processors, so the handlers keep `from ses_auth import authenticate_inbound_email` unchanged — zero handler diff for this move, which is what keeps fail-closed auth byte-identical through the change. - web_ui_auth.py: extracts the byte-identical _get_auth_token / _header / is_authenticated block plus the four token-cache globals out of both web_ui handlers. The per-stack INFRA-74 comments stay in each handler as-is (deliberately drifted wording, stack-specific) rather than being unified into the shared module. Fail-closed semantics (unset ARN or Secrets Manager exception -> deny) are unchanged. - email_parsing.py: parse_raw_email ships as the superset version that returns cc unconditionally. WO's output is bit-identical to before; PO simply ignores the cc field rather than being "cleaned up" to consume it. No second variant is kept. - emf.py: a generic emitter parameterized by namespace, dimension sets, and properties. Every call site's emitted EMF envelope is unchanged, including the load-bearing [["ParseMethod"],["ParseMethod","TemplateId"]] dimension-set shape the alarms and metric filters depend on. Emission ordering is untouched: PO still emits ai_fallback before the Bedrock call, WO still emits its mutually-exclusive ai_fallback/ai_fallback_rejected after its gate. The deliberate-double-count comments survive. _emit_derived_agreement_metric was found living inside derived_fields.py, so per the DERIVED-FIELDS exception it is left as a third, unconverted copy (derived_fields.py and the shadow DerivedFieldAgreement telemetry stay untouchable while that bake runs) — a comment there points at shared/emf.py for the eventual follow-up. Bundling: both email-processor cdk bundling commands gain a trailing `cp shared/*.py /asset-output/` (they were already cp-only post-Phase 7, so no pip step or manylinux pin is reintroduced). Both web_ui functions gain the same widened-root staging so web_ui_auth.py ships beside their handler; site_extractor's from_asset is untouched. Tests: PO_EXPECTED_TOP_LEVEL_MODULES gains the shared modules that now ship, the AST sibling-import check resolves imports whose source now lives under shared/, and the new shared cp line has its own revert/mutation detection. _SIBLING_MODULES resolution and _po_parser_support.py now load ses_auth/email_parsing/emf from shared/; the two-copy ses_auth byte-identity fixture-hygiene test is retired as obsolete now that there is one copy, and the ses_auth fixture parameterization over two identical copies is dropped. The sys.modules save/restore dance for template_parser (still duplicated per-pipeline) is left in place.
2026-07-20 13:38:23 -04:00
import hmac
import logging
import os
import time
import boto3
logger = logging.getLogger()
_WEB_UI_AUTH_TOKEN_SECRET_ARN = os.environ.get("WEB_UI_AUTH_TOKEN_SECRET_ARN")
# Refresh the cached token this often so a rotated secret propagates without
# waiting for the execution environment to recycle (emergency-rotation path).
_AUTH_TOKEN_CACHE_TTL_SECONDS = 300
_auth_token_cache = None
_auth_token_cached_at = 0.0
def _get_auth_token() -> str | None:
"""Fetch the shared web UI auth token from Secrets Manager.
Cached in the warm container for a short TTL so we don't hit Secrets Manager
on every request, while still picking up a rotated secret within the TTL
rather than only when the execution environment recycles. Returns None when
not configured or unreadable (the caller then fails closed).
"""
global _auth_token_cache, _auth_token_cached_at
now = time.monotonic()
if (
_auth_token_cache is not None
and now - _auth_token_cached_at < _AUTH_TOKEN_CACHE_TTL_SECONDS
):
return _auth_token_cache
if not _WEB_UI_AUTH_TOKEN_SECRET_ARN:
return None
secrets = boto3.client("secretsmanager")
try:
secret = secrets.get_secret_value(SecretId=_WEB_UI_AUTH_TOKEN_SECRET_ARN)
_auth_token_cache = secret["SecretString"]
_auth_token_cached_at = now
return _auth_token_cache
except Exception:
# Fail closed (return None -> caller 401s) but surface the failure: a
# Secrets Manager permission/config error would otherwise make every
# request 401 with no operational signal. The secret value is never
# logged.
logger.exception(
"Failed to fetch web UI auth token from Secrets Manager; "
"denying request (failing closed)"
)
return None
def _header(event: dict, name: str) -> str:
"""Case-insensitive header lookup from a Lambda Function URL / APIGW event."""
headers = event.get("headers") or {}
name_lower = name.lower()
for key, value in headers.items():
if key.lower() == name_lower:
return value or ""
return ""
def is_authenticated(event: dict) -> bool:
"""Constant-time check of the request's shared secret against the configured
token. Fails closed when no token is configured."""
token = _get_auth_token()
if not token:
return False
presented = _header(event, "x-auth-token")
if not presented:
auth = _header(event, "authorization")
if auth.lower().startswith("bearer "):
presented = auth[7:].strip()
if not presented:
return False
feat(api): procurement-api read stack + OpenAPI docs (SHOC reconciliation path) (#127) * feat(api): add procurement-api stack - read API + OpenAPI docs page Third CDK stack: API Gateway REST API (IAM SigV4) over both pipelines' tables, replacing SHOC's retired SyncController cross-account DynamoDB scan as the reconciliation/backfill path. - lambdas/api/: handler (healthcheck + docs-token gate + router dispatch), router (single route table), pagination (opaque cursor, hostile -> 400), Decimal-safe serialization, wo_repo/po_repo reads. No VendorReplies. - OpenAPI 3.1 spec as source of truth incl. top-level webhooks section documenting the outbound SHOC feed; phase-2 write endpoints x-planned (router answers 501). Self-contained /docs page, no CDN. - Auth: AWS_IAM on data routes + resource policy scoped to exactly arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev on GET/*; /docs and /openapi.json carve-out is token-gated in the Lambda via shared web_ui_auth (fail-closed, INFRA-74 posture). - KMS: explicit Decrypt/DescribeKey on the DynamoDB CMK from SSM (name-imported table drops the key association - INFRA-104 class). - Alarms: errors/throttles/duration(p99>=22.5s) + gateway 5xx, ALARM-only to site-alerts. No access logging in v1 (docs ?token= shim stays out of logs); cloud_watch_role=False. - Tests: handler auth-seam + routing + Decimal round-trip; moto cursor pagination incl. hostile cursors; spec<->router drift gate; bundle AST pins for the api command; pytest.ini --cov + loader siblings. - Deploy role: third stack DescribeStacks ARN + procurement-api smoke invoke ARN (re-run create-deploy-role.sh before merge). * harden(api): apply sh-security-review findings to procurement-api Fan-out (6 detectors) + review findings resolved: Correctness / DoS: - pagination: require EXACT key-set match (was subset) so a partial/foreign composite cursor can't reach DynamoDB as an inconsistent ExclusiveStartKey -> ValidationException -> 500; comments Query now pins the cursor's work_order_id to the path entity. - handler: map botocore ValidationException to 400 (defense in depth) so a crafted cursor can't drive the zero-threshold 5xx alarm. - web_ui_auth: compare tokens as bytes; a non-ASCII presented token now fails closed (401) instead of crashing hmac.compare_digest into a 500. Resolves the pre-existing xfail(strict) follow-up test; hardens the web UIs too. Docs page: - typeStr() now escapes the one spec-derived string that reached innerHTML. - spec inlined into the docs <script> block escapes "<" -> < (</script> breakout guard); /openapi.json still served byte-faithful. - Cache-Control: no-store + Referrer-Policy: no-referrer on docs responses so the ?token= URL stays out of caches/Referer. - spec-drift test asserts the committed spec carries no "</" / "<!--". IAM / IaC: - resource policy enumerates the 7 data GET resources instead of GET/* so a future GET route can't silently inherit SHOC cross-account reach. - kms:Decrypt grant gains a kms:ViaService=dynamodb condition. - stage throttling (50 rps / 100 burst) bounds the unauthenticated /docs blast radius below the 10k account default. - corrected the PATCH/POST comment (same-account callers aren't blocked by the resource policy; 501 handler + absent write grant are the gate). - documented the RETAIN log-group first-deploy rollback trap and the resource-policy-needs-redeploy gotcha in-stack. Mandatory GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the full policy surface: no BLOCK/FIX. 675 tests pass, ruff clean, cdk synth green.
2026-07-23 19:32:20 -04:00
# Compare as bytes: hmac.compare_digest raises TypeError on non-ASCII str
# operands, which a crafted token (?token=%C3%A9 or a non-ASCII header)
# would otherwise turn into an uncaught 500. Bytes always compare in
# constant time, so a non-matching token fails closed (401) instead.
return hmac.compare_digest(presented.encode("utf-8"), token.encode("utf-8"))