2026-05-12 15:21:06 -04:00
|
|
|
"""
|
|
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|
Web UI Lambda.
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|
Serves a simple HTML dashboard for viewing work orders and comments.
|
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|
Accessed via Lambda Function URL.
|
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|
"""
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|
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|
import json
|
Land safe fixes from 2026-06-17 security sweep (#97)
* Remove gratuitous KMS grant on shared DynamoDB CMK
wo-email-processor held grant_encrypt_decrypt on the shared
seahaven-dynamodb CMK, but the WorkOrders/WorkOrderComments tables
are not encrypted with that CMK. The grant was dead weight that
extended the WO processor's decrypt reach to the CMK protecting the
purchase-orders table (cross-stack decrypt). Drop it to restore
least privilege; re-add as part of the table CMK migration (INFRA-6).
Refs: INFRA-6
* Require Secrets Manager key for Anthropic client
Remove the silent fallback to a plaintext ANTHROPIC_API_KEY env var
in both email processors; require ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN and
raise if absent so a misconfigured deploy fails loudly instead of
using an unmanaged key.
Adapted from f175323 on security/sweep-2026-06-17. The From-header
sender-domain allowlist from that commit is intentionally dropped:
the From header is spoofable (INFRA-107, confirmed critical) and
sender authentication is being reworked in a separate PR.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Merge PO revisions and handle out-of-order events
save_revision did a full put_item overwrite, so a revision omitting
line_items/supplier permanently deleted them. save_new_po used a
conditional put that silently dropped the PO when an out-of-order
cancellation had already created a skeleton row.
Switch both to field-level merge update_items: a revision now SETs
only the fields it carries, and a new_po backfills data into a
pre-existing Cancelled skeleton while preserving the Cancelled
status. No email can now delete data established by an earlier one.
* Gate web UIs behind auth and escape currency XSS
The po-web-ui and workorder-web-ui handlers had no auth: any
invocation path returned the full PO/WO DB. Add a fail-closed
shared-secret gate (X-Auth-Token / Bearer, constant-time compared to
WEB_UI_AUTH_TOKEN) so a future re-attached Function URL cannot
re-expose the data (URLs removed under INFRA-74). Wire the token from
the SSM String param /procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token.
Also fix stored XSS in po-web-ui fmt_currency: the non-numeric
fallback returned str(val) unescaped, so a prompt-injected email
could make Claude emit total_amount as <script>. Escape it.
Refs: INFRA-74
* Document sweep security fixes and merge semantics
Update the README for the 2026-06-17 security sweep: required
Secrets Manager key (no plaintext env fallback), web UI auth gate +
SSM token setup step, output-escaping note, and the new PO
revision/cancellation merge behavior.
Adapted from d91f45e on security/sweep-2026-06-17; the sender
allowlist documentation is dropped along with the allowlist itself
(deferred to the INFRA-107 sender-authentication rework).
Refs: INFRA-107
* fix: resolve web UI auth token from Secrets Manager at runtime
Replace the plaintext SSM String parameter with a Secrets Manager secret
referenced by ARN only. The token is fetched and cached at module level on
first invocation, keeping shared secrets out of CloudFormation templates and
Lambda environment variables.
Refs: PR-97
* Add TTL to web UI auth token cache for rotation
The web-ui handlers cached the Secrets Manager auth token at module
level with no expiry, so a rotated secret was only picked up when the
warm container recycled — an emergency rotation could take hours to
take effect. Cache the fetched value for a 5-minute TTL instead, so a
rotated token propagates within the TTL while still avoiding a Secrets
Manager call on every request. Still fails closed when the secret is
unset or unreadable.
Refs: INFRA-74
* Log Secrets Manager failures in web UI auth token fetch
The web UI auth gate correctly fails closed when the shared token
cannot be read, but _get_auth_token() swallowed every exception
silently. A Secrets Manager permission or config error then made
every request 401 with no operational signal, leaving an outage
indistinguishable from ordinary unauthenticated traffic.
Add a module-level logger to both web_ui handlers and log the
fetch failure with logger.exception() in the except block before
returning None. Behavior is unchanged (still fails closed); the
failure is now visible in CloudWatch. The secret value is never
logged. The two handlers stay byte-consistent in the mirrored
_get_auth_token() region.
The companion finding on the CDK import of the shared
procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token secret was evaluated and left
as-is: the token is a single secret shared by both the PO and WO
stacks, so from_secret_name_v2 (which scopes grant_read via the
standard 6-char suffix wildcard) is correct; making it a CDK-managed
Secret in both stacks would collide the two stacks on the same
explicit secret name at deploy time.
Refs: INFRA-74
* Make Cancelled PO status sticky via atomic write
The PO merge path read status with a get_item (_is_cancelled) and then
wrote with an unconditional update_item. Two defects followed from this:
- Race (Issue A): a cancellation landing between the read and the write
was silently un-cancelled by a revision carrying a non-cancelled
po_status — a TOCTOU on a table with concurrent email processing.
- Over-broad strip (Issue B): save_revision dropped po_status whenever
the PO was Cancelled, so legitimate status updates on non-cancelled
POs and status-less revisions were affected rather than only the true
un-cancel transition.
Enforce the invariant server-side instead. "Cancelled" is a sticky,
authoritative status: once set, later new_po/revision emails may enrich
other fields but must never move it to a non-cancelled status. When the
payload carries a non-cancelled po_status, _merge_update issues the
update_item guarded by ConditionExpression "attribute_not_exists(po_status)
OR po_status <> :marker", evaluated atomically at write time, so a
cancellation that lands first always wins. On ConditionalCheckFailedException
the same fields are re-written without po_status/cancelled_at, enriching the
record while Cancelled sticks. Payloads with no status change, or an already
-Cancelled status, take a plain merge — the status is only ever suppressed on
a real un-cancel. This removes the non-atomic get_item from the write path;
_is_cancelled is deleted. Key schema and attribute names are unchanged, so the
cross-stack purchase-orders contract (read-only by seahaven-slack-bot) holds.
Add moto-backed tests covering un-cancel suppression with field enrichment,
status-less merge onto a Cancelled PO, legitimate status updates on
non-cancelled POs, new_po backfill of a Cancelled skeleton, fresh
create/merge, and authoritative save_cancellation.
Refs: #97
2026-07-15 20:17:46 -04:00
|
|
|
import logging
|
2026-05-12 15:21:06 -04:00
|
|
|
import os
|
|
|
|
|
from html import escape as esc
|
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|
|
|
import boto3
|
feat: extract lambdas/shared/ — single-source ses_auth, web_ui auth, email parsing, EMF emitter (refactor phase 3) (#111)
Four modules move into the handbook-mandated lambdas/shared/ location,
collapsing duplicated logic that had to be kept in sync by hand across
the PO and WO pipelines:
- ses_auth.py: the PO and WO copies were verified sha256-identical
against the feature/phase-7-ops-recovery baseline before the move
(no drift since the last audit). shared/ses_auth.py is the exact
bytes of that one copy; both originals are git rm'd (the PO copy
via rename, the WO copy as a straight delete). Bundling lands the
module flat in /asset-output for both email processors, so the
handlers keep `from ses_auth import authenticate_inbound_email`
unchanged — zero handler diff for this move, which is what keeps
fail-closed auth byte-identical through the change.
- web_ui_auth.py: extracts the byte-identical _get_auth_token /
_header / is_authenticated block plus the four token-cache globals
out of both web_ui handlers. The per-stack INFRA-74 comments stay
in each handler as-is (deliberately drifted wording, stack-specific)
rather than being unified into the shared module. Fail-closed
semantics (unset ARN or Secrets Manager exception -> deny) are
unchanged.
- email_parsing.py: parse_raw_email ships as the superset version that
returns cc unconditionally. WO's output is bit-identical to before;
PO simply ignores the cc field rather than being "cleaned up" to
consume it. No second variant is kept.
- emf.py: a generic emitter parameterized by namespace, dimension
sets, and properties. Every call site's emitted EMF envelope is
unchanged, including the load-bearing
[["ParseMethod"],["ParseMethod","TemplateId"]] dimension-set shape
the alarms and metric filters depend on. Emission ordering is
untouched: PO still emits ai_fallback before the Bedrock call, WO
still emits its mutually-exclusive ai_fallback/ai_fallback_rejected
after its gate. The deliberate-double-count comments survive.
_emit_derived_agreement_metric was found living inside
derived_fields.py, so per the DERIVED-FIELDS exception it is left
as a third, unconverted copy (derived_fields.py and the shadow
DerivedFieldAgreement telemetry stay untouchable while that bake
runs) — a comment there points at shared/emf.py for the eventual
follow-up.
Bundling: both email-processor cdk bundling commands gain a trailing
`cp shared/*.py /asset-output/` (they were already cp-only post-Phase
7, so no pip step or manylinux pin is reintroduced). Both web_ui
functions gain the same widened-root staging so web_ui_auth.py ships
beside their handler; site_extractor's from_asset is untouched.
Tests: PO_EXPECTED_TOP_LEVEL_MODULES gains the shared modules that now
ship, the AST sibling-import check resolves imports whose source now
lives under shared/, and the new shared cp line has its own
revert/mutation detection. _SIBLING_MODULES resolution and
_po_parser_support.py now load ses_auth/email_parsing/emf from
shared/; the two-copy ses_auth byte-identity fixture-hygiene test is
retired as obsolete now that there is one copy, and the ses_auth
fixture parameterization over two identical copies is dropped. The
sys.modules save/restore dance for template_parser (still duplicated
per-pipeline) is left in place.
2026-07-20 13:38:23 -04:00
|
|
|
from web_ui_auth import is_authenticated
|
2026-05-12 15:21:06 -04:00
|
|
|
|
Land safe fixes from 2026-06-17 security sweep (#97)
* Remove gratuitous KMS grant on shared DynamoDB CMK
wo-email-processor held grant_encrypt_decrypt on the shared
seahaven-dynamodb CMK, but the WorkOrders/WorkOrderComments tables
are not encrypted with that CMK. The grant was dead weight that
extended the WO processor's decrypt reach to the CMK protecting the
purchase-orders table (cross-stack decrypt). Drop it to restore
least privilege; re-add as part of the table CMK migration (INFRA-6).
Refs: INFRA-6
* Require Secrets Manager key for Anthropic client
Remove the silent fallback to a plaintext ANTHROPIC_API_KEY env var
in both email processors; require ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN and
raise if absent so a misconfigured deploy fails loudly instead of
using an unmanaged key.
Adapted from f175323 on security/sweep-2026-06-17. The From-header
sender-domain allowlist from that commit is intentionally dropped:
the From header is spoofable (INFRA-107, confirmed critical) and
sender authentication is being reworked in a separate PR.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Merge PO revisions and handle out-of-order events
save_revision did a full put_item overwrite, so a revision omitting
line_items/supplier permanently deleted them. save_new_po used a
conditional put that silently dropped the PO when an out-of-order
cancellation had already created a skeleton row.
Switch both to field-level merge update_items: a revision now SETs
only the fields it carries, and a new_po backfills data into a
pre-existing Cancelled skeleton while preserving the Cancelled
status. No email can now delete data established by an earlier one.
* Gate web UIs behind auth and escape currency XSS
The po-web-ui and workorder-web-ui handlers had no auth: any
invocation path returned the full PO/WO DB. Add a fail-closed
shared-secret gate (X-Auth-Token / Bearer, constant-time compared to
WEB_UI_AUTH_TOKEN) so a future re-attached Function URL cannot
re-expose the data (URLs removed under INFRA-74). Wire the token from
the SSM String param /procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token.
Also fix stored XSS in po-web-ui fmt_currency: the non-numeric
fallback returned str(val) unescaped, so a prompt-injected email
could make Claude emit total_amount as <script>. Escape it.
Refs: INFRA-74
* Document sweep security fixes and merge semantics
Update the README for the 2026-06-17 security sweep: required
Secrets Manager key (no plaintext env fallback), web UI auth gate +
SSM token setup step, output-escaping note, and the new PO
revision/cancellation merge behavior.
Adapted from d91f45e on security/sweep-2026-06-17; the sender
allowlist documentation is dropped along with the allowlist itself
(deferred to the INFRA-107 sender-authentication rework).
Refs: INFRA-107
* fix: resolve web UI auth token from Secrets Manager at runtime
Replace the plaintext SSM String parameter with a Secrets Manager secret
referenced by ARN only. The token is fetched and cached at module level on
first invocation, keeping shared secrets out of CloudFormation templates and
Lambda environment variables.
Refs: PR-97
* Add TTL to web UI auth token cache for rotation
The web-ui handlers cached the Secrets Manager auth token at module
level with no expiry, so a rotated secret was only picked up when the
warm container recycled — an emergency rotation could take hours to
take effect. Cache the fetched value for a 5-minute TTL instead, so a
rotated token propagates within the TTL while still avoiding a Secrets
Manager call on every request. Still fails closed when the secret is
unset or unreadable.
Refs: INFRA-74
* Log Secrets Manager failures in web UI auth token fetch
The web UI auth gate correctly fails closed when the shared token
cannot be read, but _get_auth_token() swallowed every exception
silently. A Secrets Manager permission or config error then made
every request 401 with no operational signal, leaving an outage
indistinguishable from ordinary unauthenticated traffic.
Add a module-level logger to both web_ui handlers and log the
fetch failure with logger.exception() in the except block before
returning None. Behavior is unchanged (still fails closed); the
failure is now visible in CloudWatch. The secret value is never
logged. The two handlers stay byte-consistent in the mirrored
_get_auth_token() region.
The companion finding on the CDK import of the shared
procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token secret was evaluated and left
as-is: the token is a single secret shared by both the PO and WO
stacks, so from_secret_name_v2 (which scopes grant_read via the
standard 6-char suffix wildcard) is correct; making it a CDK-managed
Secret in both stacks would collide the two stacks on the same
explicit secret name at deploy time.
Refs: INFRA-74
* Make Cancelled PO status sticky via atomic write
The PO merge path read status with a get_item (_is_cancelled) and then
wrote with an unconditional update_item. Two defects followed from this:
- Race (Issue A): a cancellation landing between the read and the write
was silently un-cancelled by a revision carrying a non-cancelled
po_status — a TOCTOU on a table with concurrent email processing.
- Over-broad strip (Issue B): save_revision dropped po_status whenever
the PO was Cancelled, so legitimate status updates on non-cancelled
POs and status-less revisions were affected rather than only the true
un-cancel transition.
Enforce the invariant server-side instead. "Cancelled" is a sticky,
authoritative status: once set, later new_po/revision emails may enrich
other fields but must never move it to a non-cancelled status. When the
payload carries a non-cancelled po_status, _merge_update issues the
update_item guarded by ConditionExpression "attribute_not_exists(po_status)
OR po_status <> :marker", evaluated atomically at write time, so a
cancellation that lands first always wins. On ConditionalCheckFailedException
the same fields are re-written without po_status/cancelled_at, enriching the
record while Cancelled sticks. Payloads with no status change, or an already
-Cancelled status, take a plain merge — the status is only ever suppressed on
a real un-cancel. This removes the non-atomic get_item from the write path;
_is_cancelled is deleted. Key schema and attribute names are unchanged, so the
cross-stack purchase-orders contract (read-only by seahaven-slack-bot) holds.
Add moto-backed tests covering un-cancel suppression with field enrichment,
status-less merge onto a Cancelled PO, legitimate status updates on
non-cancelled POs, new_po backfill of a Cancelled skeleton, fresh
create/merge, and authoritative save_cancellation.
Refs: #97
2026-07-15 20:17:46 -04:00
|
|
|
logger = logging.getLogger()
|
|
|
|
|
logger.setLevel(logging.INFO)
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-05-12 15:21:06 -04:00
|
|
|
dynamodb = boto3.resource("dynamodb")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
WORK_ORDERS_TABLE = os.environ.get("WORK_ORDERS_TABLE", "WorkOrders")
|
|
|
|
|
COMMENTS_TABLE = os.environ.get("COMMENTS_TABLE", "WorkOrderComments")
|
|
|
|
|
|
Land safe fixes from 2026-06-17 security sweep (#97)
* Remove gratuitous KMS grant on shared DynamoDB CMK
wo-email-processor held grant_encrypt_decrypt on the shared
seahaven-dynamodb CMK, but the WorkOrders/WorkOrderComments tables
are not encrypted with that CMK. The grant was dead weight that
extended the WO processor's decrypt reach to the CMK protecting the
purchase-orders table (cross-stack decrypt). Drop it to restore
least privilege; re-add as part of the table CMK migration (INFRA-6).
Refs: INFRA-6
* Require Secrets Manager key for Anthropic client
Remove the silent fallback to a plaintext ANTHROPIC_API_KEY env var
in both email processors; require ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN and
raise if absent so a misconfigured deploy fails loudly instead of
using an unmanaged key.
Adapted from f175323 on security/sweep-2026-06-17. The From-header
sender-domain allowlist from that commit is intentionally dropped:
the From header is spoofable (INFRA-107, confirmed critical) and
sender authentication is being reworked in a separate PR.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Merge PO revisions and handle out-of-order events
save_revision did a full put_item overwrite, so a revision omitting
line_items/supplier permanently deleted them. save_new_po used a
conditional put that silently dropped the PO when an out-of-order
cancellation had already created a skeleton row.
Switch both to field-level merge update_items: a revision now SETs
only the fields it carries, and a new_po backfills data into a
pre-existing Cancelled skeleton while preserving the Cancelled
status. No email can now delete data established by an earlier one.
* Gate web UIs behind auth and escape currency XSS
The po-web-ui and workorder-web-ui handlers had no auth: any
invocation path returned the full PO/WO DB. Add a fail-closed
shared-secret gate (X-Auth-Token / Bearer, constant-time compared to
WEB_UI_AUTH_TOKEN) so a future re-attached Function URL cannot
re-expose the data (URLs removed under INFRA-74). Wire the token from
the SSM String param /procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token.
Also fix stored XSS in po-web-ui fmt_currency: the non-numeric
fallback returned str(val) unescaped, so a prompt-injected email
could make Claude emit total_amount as <script>. Escape it.
Refs: INFRA-74
* Document sweep security fixes and merge semantics
Update the README for the 2026-06-17 security sweep: required
Secrets Manager key (no plaintext env fallback), web UI auth gate +
SSM token setup step, output-escaping note, and the new PO
revision/cancellation merge behavior.
Adapted from d91f45e on security/sweep-2026-06-17; the sender
allowlist documentation is dropped along with the allowlist itself
(deferred to the INFRA-107 sender-authentication rework).
Refs: INFRA-107
* fix: resolve web UI auth token from Secrets Manager at runtime
Replace the plaintext SSM String parameter with a Secrets Manager secret
referenced by ARN only. The token is fetched and cached at module level on
first invocation, keeping shared secrets out of CloudFormation templates and
Lambda environment variables.
Refs: PR-97
* Add TTL to web UI auth token cache for rotation
The web-ui handlers cached the Secrets Manager auth token at module
level with no expiry, so a rotated secret was only picked up when the
warm container recycled — an emergency rotation could take hours to
take effect. Cache the fetched value for a 5-minute TTL instead, so a
rotated token propagates within the TTL while still avoiding a Secrets
Manager call on every request. Still fails closed when the secret is
unset or unreadable.
Refs: INFRA-74
* Log Secrets Manager failures in web UI auth token fetch
The web UI auth gate correctly fails closed when the shared token
cannot be read, but _get_auth_token() swallowed every exception
silently. A Secrets Manager permission or config error then made
every request 401 with no operational signal, leaving an outage
indistinguishable from ordinary unauthenticated traffic.
Add a module-level logger to both web_ui handlers and log the
fetch failure with logger.exception() in the except block before
returning None. Behavior is unchanged (still fails closed); the
failure is now visible in CloudWatch. The secret value is never
logged. The two handlers stay byte-consistent in the mirrored
_get_auth_token() region.
The companion finding on the CDK import of the shared
procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token secret was evaluated and left
as-is: the token is a single secret shared by both the PO and WO
stacks, so from_secret_name_v2 (which scopes grant_read via the
standard 6-char suffix wildcard) is correct; making it a CDK-managed
Secret in both stacks would collide the two stacks on the same
explicit secret name at deploy time.
Refs: INFRA-74
* Make Cancelled PO status sticky via atomic write
The PO merge path read status with a get_item (_is_cancelled) and then
wrote with an unconditional update_item. Two defects followed from this:
- Race (Issue A): a cancellation landing between the read and the write
was silently un-cancelled by a revision carrying a non-cancelled
po_status — a TOCTOU on a table with concurrent email processing.
- Over-broad strip (Issue B): save_revision dropped po_status whenever
the PO was Cancelled, so legitimate status updates on non-cancelled
POs and status-less revisions were affected rather than only the true
un-cancel transition.
Enforce the invariant server-side instead. "Cancelled" is a sticky,
authoritative status: once set, later new_po/revision emails may enrich
other fields but must never move it to a non-cancelled status. When the
payload carries a non-cancelled po_status, _merge_update issues the
update_item guarded by ConditionExpression "attribute_not_exists(po_status)
OR po_status <> :marker", evaluated atomically at write time, so a
cancellation that lands first always wins. On ConditionalCheckFailedException
the same fields are re-written without po_status/cancelled_at, enriching the
record while Cancelled sticks. Payloads with no status change, or an already
-Cancelled status, take a plain merge — the status is only ever suppressed on
a real un-cancel. This removes the non-atomic get_item from the write path;
_is_cancelled is deleted. Key schema and attribute names are unchanged, so the
cross-stack purchase-orders contract (read-only by seahaven-slack-bot) holds.
Add moto-backed tests covering un-cancel suppression with field enrichment,
status-less merge onto a Cancelled PO, legitimate status updates on
non-cancelled POs, new_po backfill of a Cancelled skeleton, fresh
create/merge, and authoritative save_cancellation.
Refs: #97
2026-07-15 20:17:46 -04:00
|
|
|
# Defense-in-depth auth gate. The public Function URL was removed (INFRA-74), but
|
|
|
|
|
# the handler must still refuse unauthenticated requests so any future invocation
|
|
|
|
|
# path does not re-expose the whole WO DB. Callers must present the shared secret
|
|
|
|
|
# in the X-Auth-Token header (or Authorization: Bearer <token>). The secret is
|
|
|
|
|
# fetched at runtime from Secrets Manager to keep it out of CloudFormation
|
|
|
|
|
# templates and Lambda env vars. If the ARN is unset or the secret is missing, the
|
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|
|
|
# handler fails closed and denies every request.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-05-12 15:21:06 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def get_work_orders(limit=500):
|
|
|
|
|
table = dynamodb.Table(WORK_ORDERS_TABLE)
|
|
|
|
|
items = []
|
|
|
|
|
response = table.scan()
|
|
|
|
|
items.extend(response.get("Items", []))
|
|
|
|
|
while "LastEvaluatedKey" in response:
|
|
|
|
|
response = table.scan(ExclusiveStartKey=response["LastEvaluatedKey"])
|
|
|
|
|
items.extend(response.get("Items", []))
|
|
|
|
|
items.sort(key=lambda x: x.get("updated_at", ""), reverse=True)
|
|
|
|
|
return items[:limit]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def get_comments(work_order_id):
|
|
|
|
|
table = dynamodb.Table(COMMENTS_TABLE)
|
|
|
|
|
items = []
|
|
|
|
|
kwargs = {
|
|
|
|
|
"KeyConditionExpression": "work_order_id = :woid",
|
|
|
|
|
"ExpressionAttributeValues": {":woid": work_order_id},
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
response = table.query(**kwargs)
|
|
|
|
|
items.extend(response.get("Items", []))
|
|
|
|
|
while "LastEvaluatedKey" in response:
|
|
|
|
|
response = table.query(**kwargs, ExclusiveStartKey=response["LastEvaluatedKey"])
|
|
|
|
|
items.extend(response.get("Items", []))
|
|
|
|
|
items.sort(key=lambda x: x.get("created_at", ""), reverse=True)
|
|
|
|
|
return items
|
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|
|
|
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|
|
def render_badge(value, color_map):
|
|
|
|
|
if not value:
|
|
|
|
|
value = "unknown"
|
|
|
|
|
color = color_map.get(value.lower(), "#9ca3af")
|
|
|
|
|
label = esc(value.replace("_", " ").title())
|
|
|
|
|
return f'<span style="background:{color};color:#fff;padding:2px 10px;border-radius:12px;font-size:12px;font-weight:500;">{label}</span>'
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
STATUS_COLORS = {
|
|
|
|
|
"new": "#3b82f6",
|
|
|
|
|
"assigned": "#8b5cf6",
|
|
|
|
|
"in_progress": "#f59e0b",
|
|
|
|
|
"on_hold": "#6b7280",
|
|
|
|
|
"completed": "#10b981",
|
|
|
|
|
"cancelled": "#ef4444",
|
|
|
|
|
"unknown": "#9ca3af",
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
RECORD_TYPE_COLORS = {
|
|
|
|
|
"new_work_order": "#3b82f6",
|
|
|
|
|
"comment": "#8b5cf6",
|
|
|
|
|
"update": "#f59e0b",
|
|
|
|
|
"cancellation": "#ef4444",
|
|
|
|
|
"unknown": "#9ca3af",
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def render_work_order_detail(wo, events):
|
|
|
|
|
events_html = ""
|
|
|
|
|
if events:
|
|
|
|
|
for e in events:
|
|
|
|
|
record_type = e.get("record_type", "unknown")
|
|
|
|
|
commenter = esc(e.get("commenter", ""))
|
|
|
|
|
created = esc(e.get("created_at", ""))
|
|
|
|
|
text = esc(e.get("text", ""))
|
|
|
|
|
badge = render_badge(record_type, RECORD_TYPE_COLORS)
|
|
|
|
|
commenter_str = (
|
|
|
|
|
f"<strong>{commenter}</strong> — " if commenter else ""
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
border_colors = {
|
|
|
|
|
"new_work_order": "#3b82f6",
|
|
|
|
|
"comment": "#8b5cf6",
|
|
|
|
|
"update": "#f59e0b",
|
|
|
|
|
"cancellation": "#ef4444",
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
border = border_colors.get(record_type, "#94a3b8")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
events_html += f"""
|
|
|
|
|
<div style="border-left:3px solid {border};padding:8px 12px;margin-bottom:10px;background:#f8fafc;border-radius:0 6px 6px 0;">
|
|
|
|
|
<div style="font-size:12px;color:#64748b;margin-bottom:4px;">
|
|
|
|
|
{badge} {commenter_str}{created}
|
|
|
|
|
</div>
|
|
|
|
|
{"<div style='font-size:14px;color:#1e293b;margin-top:6px;'>" + text + "</div>" if text else ""}
|
|
|
|
|
</div>"""
|
|
|
|
|
else:
|
|
|
|
|
events_html = '<p style="color:#94a3b8;font-style:italic;">No events yet.</p>'
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
wo_id = esc(wo.get("work_order_id", ""))
|
|
|
|
|
fields = [
|
|
|
|
|
("Description", esc(wo.get("description", "")) or None),
|
|
|
|
|
("Status", render_badge(wo.get("wo_status", "unknown"), STATUS_COLORS)),
|
|
|
|
|
(
|
|
|
|
|
"Record Type",
|
|
|
|
|
render_badge(wo.get("record_type", "unknown"), RECORD_TYPE_COLORS),
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
("Site Code", esc(wo.get("site_code", "")) or None),
|
|
|
|
|
("Building", esc(wo.get("building", "")) or None),
|
|
|
|
|
("Address", esc(wo.get("address", "")) or None),
|
|
|
|
|
("Severity", esc(wo.get("severity", "")) or None),
|
|
|
|
|
("Priority", esc(wo.get("priority", "")) or None),
|
|
|
|
|
("Due Date", esc(wo.get("due_date", "")) or None),
|
|
|
|
|
("Date Reported", esc(wo.get("date_reported", "")) or None),
|
|
|
|
|
("Scheduled Start", esc(wo.get("scheduled_start", "")) or None),
|
|
|
|
|
("Assigned To", esc(wo.get("assigned_to", "")) or None),
|
|
|
|
|
("Created", esc(wo.get("created_at", "")) or None),
|
|
|
|
|
("Last Updated", esc(wo.get("updated_at", "")) or None),
|
|
|
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
details_html = ""
|
|
|
|
|
for label, value in fields:
|
|
|
|
|
if value:
|
|
|
|
|
details_html += f"""
|
|
|
|
|
<div style="display:flex;padding:8px 0;border-bottom:1px solid #f1f5f9;">
|
|
|
|
|
<div style="width:140px;font-size:13px;color:#64748b;font-weight:500;">{label}</div>
|
|
|
|
|
<div style="flex:1;font-size:14px;color:#1e293b;">{value}</div>
|
|
|
|
|
</div>"""
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return f"""<!DOCTYPE html>
|
|
|
|
|
<html lang="en">
|
|
|
|
|
<head>
|
|
|
|
|
<meta charset="UTF-8">
|
|
|
|
|
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0">
|
|
|
|
|
<title>WO {wo_id} - Sea Haven</title>
|
|
|
|
|
<style>
|
|
|
|
|
* {{ margin: 0; padding: 0; box-sizing: border-box; }}
|
|
|
|
|
body {{ font-family: -apple-system, BlinkMacSystemFont, 'Segoe UI', sans-serif; background: #f1f5f9; color: #1e293b; }}
|
|
|
|
|
</style>
|
|
|
|
|
</head>
|
|
|
|
|
<body>
|
|
|
|
|
<div style="max-width:800px;margin:0 auto;padding:20px;">
|
|
|
|
|
<div style="margin-bottom:20px;">
|
|
|
|
|
<a href="/" style="color:#3b82f6;text-decoration:none;font-size:14px;">← All Work Orders</a>
|
|
|
|
|
</div>
|
|
|
|
|
<div style="background:#fff;border-radius:10px;padding:24px;box-shadow:0 1px 3px rgba(0,0,0,0.08);margin-bottom:20px;">
|
|
|
|
|
<h1 style="font-size:20px;margin-bottom:16px;">Work Order {wo_id}</h1>
|
|
|
|
|
{details_html}
|
|
|
|
|
</div>
|
|
|
|
|
<div style="background:#fff;border-radius:10px;padding:24px;box-shadow:0 1px 3px rgba(0,0,0,0.08);">
|
|
|
|
|
<h2 style="font-size:16px;margin-bottom:16px;">Events ({len(events)})</h2>
|
|
|
|
|
{events_html}
|
|
|
|
|
</div>
|
|
|
|
|
</div>
|
|
|
|
|
</body>
|
|
|
|
|
</html>"""
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def render_work_orders_list(work_orders):
|
|
|
|
|
rows = ""
|
|
|
|
|
for wo in work_orders:
|
|
|
|
|
wo_id = esc(wo.get("work_order_id", ""))
|
|
|
|
|
desc = esc(wo.get("description", ""))
|
|
|
|
|
site = esc(wo.get("site_code", ""))
|
|
|
|
|
status = wo.get("wo_status", "unknown")
|
|
|
|
|
record_type = wo.get("record_type", "unknown")
|
|
|
|
|
due = esc(wo.get("due_date", ""))
|
|
|
|
|
updated = esc((wo.get("updated_at") or "")[:16])
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rows += f"""
|
|
|
|
|
<tr style="border-bottom:1px solid #f1f5f9;cursor:pointer;" onclick="window.location={esc(json.dumps(f"/wo?id={wo.get("work_order_id", "")}"), quote=True)}">
|
|
|
|
|
<td style="padding:12px;font-weight:500;color:#3b82f6;">{wo_id}</td>
|
|
|
|
|
<td style="padding:12px;max-width:250px;overflow:hidden;text-overflow:ellipsis;white-space:nowrap;">{desc}</td>
|
|
|
|
|
<td style="padding:12px;">{site}</td>
|
|
|
|
|
<td style="padding:12px;">{render_badge(record_type, RECORD_TYPE_COLORS)}</td>
|
|
|
|
|
<td style="padding:12px;">{render_badge(status, STATUS_COLORS)}</td>
|
|
|
|
|
<td style="padding:12px;">{due}</td>
|
|
|
|
|
<td style="padding:12px;color:#64748b;font-size:13px;">{updated}</td>
|
|
|
|
|
</tr>"""
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return f"""<!DOCTYPE html>
|
|
|
|
|
<html lang="en">
|
|
|
|
|
<head>
|
|
|
|
|
<meta charset="UTF-8">
|
|
|
|
|
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0">
|
|
|
|
|
<title>Work Orders - Sea Haven</title>
|
|
|
|
|
<style>
|
|
|
|
|
* {{ margin: 0; padding: 0; box-sizing: border-box; }}
|
|
|
|
|
body {{ font-family: -apple-system, BlinkMacSystemFont, 'Segoe UI', sans-serif; background: #f1f5f9; color: #1e293b; }}
|
|
|
|
|
table {{ width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse; }}
|
|
|
|
|
tr:hover {{ background: #f8fafc; }}
|
|
|
|
|
th {{ text-align: left; padding: 12px; font-size: 12px; text-transform: uppercase; color: #64748b; border-bottom: 2px solid #e2e8f0; }}
|
|
|
|
|
</style>
|
|
|
|
|
</head>
|
|
|
|
|
<body>
|
|
|
|
|
<div style="max-width:1100px;margin:0 auto;padding:20px;">
|
|
|
|
|
<div style="display:flex;justify-content:space-between;align-items:center;margin-bottom:20px;">
|
|
|
|
|
<h1 style="font-size:22px;">Work Orders</h1>
|
|
|
|
|
<span style="color:#64748b;font-size:14px;">{len(work_orders)} total</span>
|
|
|
|
|
</div>
|
|
|
|
|
<div style="background:#fff;border-radius:10px;box-shadow:0 1px 3px rgba(0,0,0,0.08);overflow:hidden;">
|
|
|
|
|
<table>
|
|
|
|
|
<thead>
|
|
|
|
|
<tr>
|
|
|
|
|
<th>WO #</th>
|
|
|
|
|
<th>Description</th>
|
|
|
|
|
<th>Site</th>
|
|
|
|
|
<th>Last Action</th>
|
|
|
|
|
<th>Status</th>
|
|
|
|
|
<th>Due Date</th>
|
|
|
|
|
<th>Updated</th>
|
|
|
|
|
</tr>
|
|
|
|
|
</thead>
|
|
|
|
|
<tbody>
|
|
|
|
|
{rows if rows else '<tr><td colspan="7" style="padding:40px;text-align:center;color:#94a3b8;">No work orders yet.</td></tr>'}
|
|
|
|
|
</tbody>
|
|
|
|
|
</table>
|
|
|
|
|
</div>
|
|
|
|
|
</div>
|
|
|
|
|
</body>
|
|
|
|
|
</html>"""
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def handler(event, context):
|
Land safe fixes from 2026-06-17 security sweep (#97)
* Remove gratuitous KMS grant on shared DynamoDB CMK
wo-email-processor held grant_encrypt_decrypt on the shared
seahaven-dynamodb CMK, but the WorkOrders/WorkOrderComments tables
are not encrypted with that CMK. The grant was dead weight that
extended the WO processor's decrypt reach to the CMK protecting the
purchase-orders table (cross-stack decrypt). Drop it to restore
least privilege; re-add as part of the table CMK migration (INFRA-6).
Refs: INFRA-6
* Require Secrets Manager key for Anthropic client
Remove the silent fallback to a plaintext ANTHROPIC_API_KEY env var
in both email processors; require ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN and
raise if absent so a misconfigured deploy fails loudly instead of
using an unmanaged key.
Adapted from f175323 on security/sweep-2026-06-17. The From-header
sender-domain allowlist from that commit is intentionally dropped:
the From header is spoofable (INFRA-107, confirmed critical) and
sender authentication is being reworked in a separate PR.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Merge PO revisions and handle out-of-order events
save_revision did a full put_item overwrite, so a revision omitting
line_items/supplier permanently deleted them. save_new_po used a
conditional put that silently dropped the PO when an out-of-order
cancellation had already created a skeleton row.
Switch both to field-level merge update_items: a revision now SETs
only the fields it carries, and a new_po backfills data into a
pre-existing Cancelled skeleton while preserving the Cancelled
status. No email can now delete data established by an earlier one.
* Gate web UIs behind auth and escape currency XSS
The po-web-ui and workorder-web-ui handlers had no auth: any
invocation path returned the full PO/WO DB. Add a fail-closed
shared-secret gate (X-Auth-Token / Bearer, constant-time compared to
WEB_UI_AUTH_TOKEN) so a future re-attached Function URL cannot
re-expose the data (URLs removed under INFRA-74). Wire the token from
the SSM String param /procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token.
Also fix stored XSS in po-web-ui fmt_currency: the non-numeric
fallback returned str(val) unescaped, so a prompt-injected email
could make Claude emit total_amount as <script>. Escape it.
Refs: INFRA-74
* Document sweep security fixes and merge semantics
Update the README for the 2026-06-17 security sweep: required
Secrets Manager key (no plaintext env fallback), web UI auth gate +
SSM token setup step, output-escaping note, and the new PO
revision/cancellation merge behavior.
Adapted from d91f45e on security/sweep-2026-06-17; the sender
allowlist documentation is dropped along with the allowlist itself
(deferred to the INFRA-107 sender-authentication rework).
Refs: INFRA-107
* fix: resolve web UI auth token from Secrets Manager at runtime
Replace the plaintext SSM String parameter with a Secrets Manager secret
referenced by ARN only. The token is fetched and cached at module level on
first invocation, keeping shared secrets out of CloudFormation templates and
Lambda environment variables.
Refs: PR-97
* Add TTL to web UI auth token cache for rotation
The web-ui handlers cached the Secrets Manager auth token at module
level with no expiry, so a rotated secret was only picked up when the
warm container recycled — an emergency rotation could take hours to
take effect. Cache the fetched value for a 5-minute TTL instead, so a
rotated token propagates within the TTL while still avoiding a Secrets
Manager call on every request. Still fails closed when the secret is
unset or unreadable.
Refs: INFRA-74
* Log Secrets Manager failures in web UI auth token fetch
The web UI auth gate correctly fails closed when the shared token
cannot be read, but _get_auth_token() swallowed every exception
silently. A Secrets Manager permission or config error then made
every request 401 with no operational signal, leaving an outage
indistinguishable from ordinary unauthenticated traffic.
Add a module-level logger to both web_ui handlers and log the
fetch failure with logger.exception() in the except block before
returning None. Behavior is unchanged (still fails closed); the
failure is now visible in CloudWatch. The secret value is never
logged. The two handlers stay byte-consistent in the mirrored
_get_auth_token() region.
The companion finding on the CDK import of the shared
procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token secret was evaluated and left
as-is: the token is a single secret shared by both the PO and WO
stacks, so from_secret_name_v2 (which scopes grant_read via the
standard 6-char suffix wildcard) is correct; making it a CDK-managed
Secret in both stacks would collide the two stacks on the same
explicit secret name at deploy time.
Refs: INFRA-74
* Make Cancelled PO status sticky via atomic write
The PO merge path read status with a get_item (_is_cancelled) and then
wrote with an unconditional update_item. Two defects followed from this:
- Race (Issue A): a cancellation landing between the read and the write
was silently un-cancelled by a revision carrying a non-cancelled
po_status — a TOCTOU on a table with concurrent email processing.
- Over-broad strip (Issue B): save_revision dropped po_status whenever
the PO was Cancelled, so legitimate status updates on non-cancelled
POs and status-less revisions were affected rather than only the true
un-cancel transition.
Enforce the invariant server-side instead. "Cancelled" is a sticky,
authoritative status: once set, later new_po/revision emails may enrich
other fields but must never move it to a non-cancelled status. When the
payload carries a non-cancelled po_status, _merge_update issues the
update_item guarded by ConditionExpression "attribute_not_exists(po_status)
OR po_status <> :marker", evaluated atomically at write time, so a
cancellation that lands first always wins. On ConditionalCheckFailedException
the same fields are re-written without po_status/cancelled_at, enriching the
record while Cancelled sticks. Payloads with no status change, or an already
-Cancelled status, take a plain merge — the status is only ever suppressed on
a real un-cancel. This removes the non-atomic get_item from the write path;
_is_cancelled is deleted. Key schema and attribute names are unchanged, so the
cross-stack purchase-orders contract (read-only by seahaven-slack-bot) holds.
Add moto-backed tests covering un-cancel suppression with field enrichment,
status-less merge onto a Cancelled PO, legitimate status updates on
non-cancelled POs, new_po backfill of a Cancelled skeleton, fresh
create/merge, and authoritative save_cancellation.
Refs: #97
2026-07-15 20:17:46 -04:00
|
|
|
if not is_authenticated(event):
|
|
|
|
|
return {
|
|
|
|
|
"statusCode": 401,
|
|
|
|
|
"headers": {"Content-Type": "text/html"},
|
|
|
|
|
"body": "<h1>401 Unauthorized</h1>",
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-05-12 15:21:06 -04:00
|
|
|
path = event.get("rawPath", "/")
|
|
|
|
|
qs = event.get("queryStringParameters") or {}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if path == "/wo" and "id" in qs:
|
|
|
|
|
wo_id = qs["id"]
|
|
|
|
|
# Get work order
|
|
|
|
|
table = dynamodb.Table(WORK_ORDERS_TABLE)
|
|
|
|
|
result = table.get_item(Key={"work_order_id": wo_id})
|
|
|
|
|
wo = result.get("Item")
|
|
|
|
|
if not wo:
|
|
|
|
|
return {
|
|
|
|
|
"statusCode": 404,
|
|
|
|
|
"headers": {"Content-Type": "text/html"},
|
|
|
|
|
"body": "<h1>Work order not found</h1>",
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
events = get_comments(wo_id)
|
|
|
|
|
html = render_work_order_detail(wo, events)
|
|
|
|
|
else:
|
|
|
|
|
work_orders = get_work_orders()
|
|
|
|
|
html = render_work_orders_list(work_orders)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return {
|
|
|
|
|
"statusCode": 200,
|
|
|
|
|
"headers": {"Content-Type": "text/html"},
|
|
|
|
|
"body": html,
|
|
|
|
|
}
|