feat(api): procurement-api read stack + OpenAPI docs (SHOC reconciliation path) (#127)
* feat(api): add procurement-api stack - read API + OpenAPI docs page
Third CDK stack: API Gateway REST API (IAM SigV4) over both pipelines'
tables, replacing SHOC's retired SyncController cross-account DynamoDB
scan as the reconciliation/backfill path.
- lambdas/api/: handler (healthcheck + docs-token gate + router dispatch),
router (single route table), pagination (opaque cursor, hostile -> 400),
Decimal-safe serialization, wo_repo/po_repo reads. No VendorReplies.
- OpenAPI 3.1 spec as source of truth incl. top-level webhooks section
documenting the outbound SHOC feed; phase-2 write endpoints x-planned
(router answers 501). Self-contained /docs page, no CDN.
- Auth: AWS_IAM on data routes + resource policy scoped to exactly
arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev on GET/*; /docs and
/openapi.json carve-out is token-gated in the Lambda via shared
web_ui_auth (fail-closed, INFRA-74 posture).
- KMS: explicit Decrypt/DescribeKey on the DynamoDB CMK from SSM
(name-imported table drops the key association - INFRA-104 class).
- Alarms: errors/throttles/duration(p99>=22.5s) + gateway 5xx, ALARM-only
to site-alerts. No access logging in v1 (docs ?token= shim stays out of
logs); cloud_watch_role=False.
- Tests: handler auth-seam + routing + Decimal round-trip; moto cursor
pagination incl. hostile cursors; spec<->router drift gate; bundle
AST pins for the api command; pytest.ini --cov + loader siblings.
- Deploy role: third stack DescribeStacks ARN + procurement-api smoke
invoke ARN (re-run create-deploy-role.sh before merge).
* harden(api): apply sh-security-review findings to procurement-api
Fan-out (6 detectors) + review findings resolved:
Correctness / DoS:
- pagination: require EXACT key-set match (was subset) so a partial/foreign
composite cursor can't reach DynamoDB as an inconsistent ExclusiveStartKey
-> ValidationException -> 500; comments Query now pins the cursor's
work_order_id to the path entity.
- handler: map botocore ValidationException to 400 (defense in depth) so a
crafted cursor can't drive the zero-threshold 5xx alarm.
- web_ui_auth: compare tokens as bytes; a non-ASCII presented token now fails
closed (401) instead of crashing hmac.compare_digest into a 500. Resolves the
pre-existing xfail(strict) follow-up test; hardens the web UIs too.
Docs page:
- typeStr() now escapes the one spec-derived string that reached innerHTML.
- spec inlined into the docs <script> block escapes "<" -> < (</script>
breakout guard); /openapi.json still served byte-faithful.
- Cache-Control: no-store + Referrer-Policy: no-referrer on docs responses so
the ?token= URL stays out of caches/Referer.
- spec-drift test asserts the committed spec carries no "</" / "<!--".
IAM / IaC:
- resource policy enumerates the 7 data GET resources instead of GET/* so a
future GET route can't silently inherit SHOC cross-account reach.
- kms:Decrypt grant gains a kms:ViaService=dynamodb condition.
- stage throttling (50 rps / 100 burst) bounds the unauthenticated /docs blast
radius below the 10k account default.
- corrected the PATCH/POST comment (same-account callers aren't blocked by the
resource policy; 501 handler + absent write grant are the gate).
- documented the RETAIN log-group first-deploy rollback trap and the
resource-policy-needs-redeploy gotcha in-stack.
Mandatory GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the full policy surface: no BLOCK/FIX.
675 tests pass, ruff clean, cdk synth green.
2026-07-23 19:32:20 -04:00
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"""Procurement API Lambda (API Gateway REST proxy integration).
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Auth is split by route class and enforced at two layers:
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- Data routes: AWS_IAM at the gateway (SigV4; cross-account callers allowed by
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the API resource policy). The handler does NOT re-check a token there --
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authorization is API Gateway's job on those routes.
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- Docs routes (/docs, /openapi.json): reachable at the gateway (auth NONE +
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resource-policy carve-out) but the handler fails closed on the shared
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header token via web_ui_auth (same secret + constant-time compare as the
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web UIs), so they are never an unauthenticated data path (INFRA-74).
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"""
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import logging
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from pathlib import Path
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import po_repo
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import wo_repo
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from botocore.exceptions import ClientError
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from pagination import BadCursor, clamp_limit
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from router import DATA_ROUTES, DOCS_ROUTES, PLANNED_ROUTES
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from serialization import error_response, json_response
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from web_ui_auth import is_authenticated
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logger = logging.getLogger()
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logger.setLevel(logging.INFO)
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_MODULE_DIR = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
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_SPEC_PATH = _MODULE_DIR / "openapi.json"
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_DOCS_PATH = _MODULE_DIR / "docs.html"
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2026-07-23 20:19:47 -04:00
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_SWAGGER_CSS_PATH = _MODULE_DIR / "swagger-ui.css"
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_SWAGGER_JS_PATH = _MODULE_DIR / "swagger-ui-bundle.js"
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_SWAGGER_PRESET_PATH = _MODULE_DIR / "swagger-ui-standalone-preset.js"
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# The docs page template carries these placeholders, filled server-side so
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# /docs is a single token-gated request (a browser can't attach the auth
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# header to a follow-up asset fetch) with the stock Swagger UI + spec inlined,
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# no CDN.
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feat(api): procurement-api read stack + OpenAPI docs (SHOC reconciliation path) (#127)
* feat(api): add procurement-api stack - read API + OpenAPI docs page
Third CDK stack: API Gateway REST API (IAM SigV4) over both pipelines'
tables, replacing SHOC's retired SyncController cross-account DynamoDB
scan as the reconciliation/backfill path.
- lambdas/api/: handler (healthcheck + docs-token gate + router dispatch),
router (single route table), pagination (opaque cursor, hostile -> 400),
Decimal-safe serialization, wo_repo/po_repo reads. No VendorReplies.
- OpenAPI 3.1 spec as source of truth incl. top-level webhooks section
documenting the outbound SHOC feed; phase-2 write endpoints x-planned
(router answers 501). Self-contained /docs page, no CDN.
- Auth: AWS_IAM on data routes + resource policy scoped to exactly
arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev on GET/*; /docs and
/openapi.json carve-out is token-gated in the Lambda via shared
web_ui_auth (fail-closed, INFRA-74 posture).
- KMS: explicit Decrypt/DescribeKey on the DynamoDB CMK from SSM
(name-imported table drops the key association - INFRA-104 class).
- Alarms: errors/throttles/duration(p99>=22.5s) + gateway 5xx, ALARM-only
to site-alerts. No access logging in v1 (docs ?token= shim stays out of
logs); cloud_watch_role=False.
- Tests: handler auth-seam + routing + Decimal round-trip; moto cursor
pagination incl. hostile cursors; spec<->router drift gate; bundle
AST pins for the api command; pytest.ini --cov + loader siblings.
- Deploy role: third stack DescribeStacks ARN + procurement-api smoke
invoke ARN (re-run create-deploy-role.sh before merge).
* harden(api): apply sh-security-review findings to procurement-api
Fan-out (6 detectors) + review findings resolved:
Correctness / DoS:
- pagination: require EXACT key-set match (was subset) so a partial/foreign
composite cursor can't reach DynamoDB as an inconsistent ExclusiveStartKey
-> ValidationException -> 500; comments Query now pins the cursor's
work_order_id to the path entity.
- handler: map botocore ValidationException to 400 (defense in depth) so a
crafted cursor can't drive the zero-threshold 5xx alarm.
- web_ui_auth: compare tokens as bytes; a non-ASCII presented token now fails
closed (401) instead of crashing hmac.compare_digest into a 500. Resolves the
pre-existing xfail(strict) follow-up test; hardens the web UIs too.
Docs page:
- typeStr() now escapes the one spec-derived string that reached innerHTML.
- spec inlined into the docs <script> block escapes "<" -> < (</script>
breakout guard); /openapi.json still served byte-faithful.
- Cache-Control: no-store + Referrer-Policy: no-referrer on docs responses so
the ?token= URL stays out of caches/Referer.
- spec-drift test asserts the committed spec carries no "</" / "<!--".
IAM / IaC:
- resource policy enumerates the 7 data GET resources instead of GET/* so a
future GET route can't silently inherit SHOC cross-account reach.
- kms:Decrypt grant gains a kms:ViaService=dynamodb condition.
- stage throttling (50 rps / 100 burst) bounds the unauthenticated /docs blast
radius below the 10k account default.
- corrected the PATCH/POST comment (same-account callers aren't blocked by the
resource policy; 501 handler + absent write grant are the gate).
- documented the RETAIN log-group first-deploy rollback trap and the
resource-policy-needs-redeploy gotcha in-stack.
Mandatory GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the full policy surface: no BLOCK/FIX.
675 tests pass, ruff clean, cdk synth green.
2026-07-23 19:32:20 -04:00
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_SPEC_PLACEHOLDER = "__OPENAPI_SPEC_JSON__"
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2026-07-23 20:19:47 -04:00
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_CSS_PLACEHOLDER = "__SWAGGER_UI_CSS__"
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_JS_PLACEHOLDER = "__SWAGGER_UI_JS__"
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_PRESET_PLACEHOLDER = "__SWAGGER_UI_STANDALONE_PRESET_JS__"
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feat(api): procurement-api read stack + OpenAPI docs (SHOC reconciliation path) (#127)
* feat(api): add procurement-api stack - read API + OpenAPI docs page
Third CDK stack: API Gateway REST API (IAM SigV4) over both pipelines'
tables, replacing SHOC's retired SyncController cross-account DynamoDB
scan as the reconciliation/backfill path.
- lambdas/api/: handler (healthcheck + docs-token gate + router dispatch),
router (single route table), pagination (opaque cursor, hostile -> 400),
Decimal-safe serialization, wo_repo/po_repo reads. No VendorReplies.
- OpenAPI 3.1 spec as source of truth incl. top-level webhooks section
documenting the outbound SHOC feed; phase-2 write endpoints x-planned
(router answers 501). Self-contained /docs page, no CDN.
- Auth: AWS_IAM on data routes + resource policy scoped to exactly
arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev on GET/*; /docs and
/openapi.json carve-out is token-gated in the Lambda via shared
web_ui_auth (fail-closed, INFRA-74 posture).
- KMS: explicit Decrypt/DescribeKey on the DynamoDB CMK from SSM
(name-imported table drops the key association - INFRA-104 class).
- Alarms: errors/throttles/duration(p99>=22.5s) + gateway 5xx, ALARM-only
to site-alerts. No access logging in v1 (docs ?token= shim stays out of
logs); cloud_watch_role=False.
- Tests: handler auth-seam + routing + Decimal round-trip; moto cursor
pagination incl. hostile cursors; spec<->router drift gate; bundle
AST pins for the api command; pytest.ini --cov + loader siblings.
- Deploy role: third stack DescribeStacks ARN + procurement-api smoke
invoke ARN (re-run create-deploy-role.sh before merge).
* harden(api): apply sh-security-review findings to procurement-api
Fan-out (6 detectors) + review findings resolved:
Correctness / DoS:
- pagination: require EXACT key-set match (was subset) so a partial/foreign
composite cursor can't reach DynamoDB as an inconsistent ExclusiveStartKey
-> ValidationException -> 500; comments Query now pins the cursor's
work_order_id to the path entity.
- handler: map botocore ValidationException to 400 (defense in depth) so a
crafted cursor can't drive the zero-threshold 5xx alarm.
- web_ui_auth: compare tokens as bytes; a non-ASCII presented token now fails
closed (401) instead of crashing hmac.compare_digest into a 500. Resolves the
pre-existing xfail(strict) follow-up test; hardens the web UIs too.
Docs page:
- typeStr() now escapes the one spec-derived string that reached innerHTML.
- spec inlined into the docs <script> block escapes "<" -> < (</script>
breakout guard); /openapi.json still served byte-faithful.
- Cache-Control: no-store + Referrer-Policy: no-referrer on docs responses so
the ?token= URL stays out of caches/Referer.
- spec-drift test asserts the committed spec carries no "</" / "<!--".
IAM / IaC:
- resource policy enumerates the 7 data GET resources instead of GET/* so a
future GET route can't silently inherit SHOC cross-account reach.
- kms:Decrypt grant gains a kms:ViaService=dynamodb condition.
- stage throttling (50 rps / 100 burst) bounds the unauthenticated /docs blast
radius below the 10k account default.
- corrected the PATCH/POST comment (same-account callers aren't blocked by the
resource policy; 501 handler + absent write grant are the gate).
- documented the RETAIN log-group first-deploy rollback trap and the
resource-policy-needs-redeploy gotcha in-stack.
Mandatory GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the full policy surface: no BLOCK/FIX.
675 tests pass, ruff clean, cdk synth green.
2026-07-23 19:32:20 -04:00
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_spec_cache = None
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2026-07-23 20:19:47 -04:00
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_docs_shell_cache = None
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# The server URL committed in openapi.json; swapped for the live invoke URL
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# (derived from the request) when the spec is served, so the docs page shows a
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# correct, current endpoint even if the RestApi is recreated.
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_COMMITTED_SERVER_URL = "https://mvul1efda2.execute-api.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/prod"
|
feat(api): procurement-api read stack + OpenAPI docs (SHOC reconciliation path) (#127)
* feat(api): add procurement-api stack - read API + OpenAPI docs page
Third CDK stack: API Gateway REST API (IAM SigV4) over both pipelines'
tables, replacing SHOC's retired SyncController cross-account DynamoDB
scan as the reconciliation/backfill path.
- lambdas/api/: handler (healthcheck + docs-token gate + router dispatch),
router (single route table), pagination (opaque cursor, hostile -> 400),
Decimal-safe serialization, wo_repo/po_repo reads. No VendorReplies.
- OpenAPI 3.1 spec as source of truth incl. top-level webhooks section
documenting the outbound SHOC feed; phase-2 write endpoints x-planned
(router answers 501). Self-contained /docs page, no CDN.
- Auth: AWS_IAM on data routes + resource policy scoped to exactly
arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev on GET/*; /docs and
/openapi.json carve-out is token-gated in the Lambda via shared
web_ui_auth (fail-closed, INFRA-74 posture).
- KMS: explicit Decrypt/DescribeKey on the DynamoDB CMK from SSM
(name-imported table drops the key association - INFRA-104 class).
- Alarms: errors/throttles/duration(p99>=22.5s) + gateway 5xx, ALARM-only
to site-alerts. No access logging in v1 (docs ?token= shim stays out of
logs); cloud_watch_role=False.
- Tests: handler auth-seam + routing + Decimal round-trip; moto cursor
pagination incl. hostile cursors; spec<->router drift gate; bundle
AST pins for the api command; pytest.ini --cov + loader siblings.
- Deploy role: third stack DescribeStacks ARN + procurement-api smoke
invoke ARN (re-run create-deploy-role.sh before merge).
* harden(api): apply sh-security-review findings to procurement-api
Fan-out (6 detectors) + review findings resolved:
Correctness / DoS:
- pagination: require EXACT key-set match (was subset) so a partial/foreign
composite cursor can't reach DynamoDB as an inconsistent ExclusiveStartKey
-> ValidationException -> 500; comments Query now pins the cursor's
work_order_id to the path entity.
- handler: map botocore ValidationException to 400 (defense in depth) so a
crafted cursor can't drive the zero-threshold 5xx alarm.
- web_ui_auth: compare tokens as bytes; a non-ASCII presented token now fails
closed (401) instead of crashing hmac.compare_digest into a 500. Resolves the
pre-existing xfail(strict) follow-up test; hardens the web UIs too.
Docs page:
- typeStr() now escapes the one spec-derived string that reached innerHTML.
- spec inlined into the docs <script> block escapes "<" -> < (</script>
breakout guard); /openapi.json still served byte-faithful.
- Cache-Control: no-store + Referrer-Policy: no-referrer on docs responses so
the ?token= URL stays out of caches/Referer.
- spec-drift test asserts the committed spec carries no "</" / "<!--".
IAM / IaC:
- resource policy enumerates the 7 data GET resources instead of GET/* so a
future GET route can't silently inherit SHOC cross-account reach.
- kms:Decrypt grant gains a kms:ViaService=dynamodb condition.
- stage throttling (50 rps / 100 burst) bounds the unauthenticated /docs blast
radius below the 10k account default.
- corrected the PATCH/POST comment (same-account callers aren't blocked by the
resource policy; 501 handler + absent write grant are the gate).
- documented the RETAIN log-group first-deploy rollback trap and the
resource-policy-needs-redeploy gotcha in-stack.
Mandatory GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the full policy surface: no BLOCK/FIX.
675 tests pass, ruff clean, cdk synth green.
2026-07-23 19:32:20 -04:00
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_REPO_FUNCS = {
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"list_work_orders": wo_repo.list_work_orders,
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"get_work_order": wo_repo.get_work_order,
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"list_comments": wo_repo.list_comments,
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"list_purchase_orders": po_repo.list_purchase_orders,
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"get_purchase_order": po_repo.get_purchase_order,
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"list_verified_sites": po_repo.list_verified_sites,
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"get_verified_site": po_repo.get_verified_site,
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}
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_PATH_PARAM_BY_RESOURCE = {
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"/work-orders/{workOrderId}": "workOrderId",
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"/work-orders/{workOrderId}/comments": "workOrderId",
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"/purchase-orders/{poNumber}": "poNumber",
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"/verified-sites/{siteCode}": "siteCode",
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}
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# Headers on the docs responses: the token rides in the ?token= query shim,
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# so keep the token-keyed URL and page out of shared/browser caches and out of
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# any Referer sent to a followed link.
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_DOCS_SECURITY_HEADERS = {
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"Cache-Control": "no-store",
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"Referrer-Policy": "no-referrer",
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}
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def _load_spec() -> str:
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2026-07-23 20:19:47 -04:00
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"""The committed spec text (cached)."""
|
feat(api): procurement-api read stack + OpenAPI docs (SHOC reconciliation path) (#127)
* feat(api): add procurement-api stack - read API + OpenAPI docs page
Third CDK stack: API Gateway REST API (IAM SigV4) over both pipelines'
tables, replacing SHOC's retired SyncController cross-account DynamoDB
scan as the reconciliation/backfill path.
- lambdas/api/: handler (healthcheck + docs-token gate + router dispatch),
router (single route table), pagination (opaque cursor, hostile -> 400),
Decimal-safe serialization, wo_repo/po_repo reads. No VendorReplies.
- OpenAPI 3.1 spec as source of truth incl. top-level webhooks section
documenting the outbound SHOC feed; phase-2 write endpoints x-planned
(router answers 501). Self-contained /docs page, no CDN.
- Auth: AWS_IAM on data routes + resource policy scoped to exactly
arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev on GET/*; /docs and
/openapi.json carve-out is token-gated in the Lambda via shared
web_ui_auth (fail-closed, INFRA-74 posture).
- KMS: explicit Decrypt/DescribeKey on the DynamoDB CMK from SSM
(name-imported table drops the key association - INFRA-104 class).
- Alarms: errors/throttles/duration(p99>=22.5s) + gateway 5xx, ALARM-only
to site-alerts. No access logging in v1 (docs ?token= shim stays out of
logs); cloud_watch_role=False.
- Tests: handler auth-seam + routing + Decimal round-trip; moto cursor
pagination incl. hostile cursors; spec<->router drift gate; bundle
AST pins for the api command; pytest.ini --cov + loader siblings.
- Deploy role: third stack DescribeStacks ARN + procurement-api smoke
invoke ARN (re-run create-deploy-role.sh before merge).
* harden(api): apply sh-security-review findings to procurement-api
Fan-out (6 detectors) + review findings resolved:
Correctness / DoS:
- pagination: require EXACT key-set match (was subset) so a partial/foreign
composite cursor can't reach DynamoDB as an inconsistent ExclusiveStartKey
-> ValidationException -> 500; comments Query now pins the cursor's
work_order_id to the path entity.
- handler: map botocore ValidationException to 400 (defense in depth) so a
crafted cursor can't drive the zero-threshold 5xx alarm.
- web_ui_auth: compare tokens as bytes; a non-ASCII presented token now fails
closed (401) instead of crashing hmac.compare_digest into a 500. Resolves the
pre-existing xfail(strict) follow-up test; hardens the web UIs too.
Docs page:
- typeStr() now escapes the one spec-derived string that reached innerHTML.
- spec inlined into the docs <script> block escapes "<" -> < (</script>
breakout guard); /openapi.json still served byte-faithful.
- Cache-Control: no-store + Referrer-Policy: no-referrer on docs responses so
the ?token= URL stays out of caches/Referer.
- spec-drift test asserts the committed spec carries no "</" / "<!--".
IAM / IaC:
- resource policy enumerates the 7 data GET resources instead of GET/* so a
future GET route can't silently inherit SHOC cross-account reach.
- kms:Decrypt grant gains a kms:ViaService=dynamodb condition.
- stage throttling (50 rps / 100 burst) bounds the unauthenticated /docs blast
radius below the 10k account default.
- corrected the PATCH/POST comment (same-account callers aren't blocked by the
resource policy; 501 handler + absent write grant are the gate).
- documented the RETAIN log-group first-deploy rollback trap and the
resource-policy-needs-redeploy gotcha in-stack.
Mandatory GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the full policy surface: no BLOCK/FIX.
675 tests pass, ruff clean, cdk synth green.
2026-07-23 19:32:20 -04:00
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global _spec_cache
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if _spec_cache is None:
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_spec_cache = _SPEC_PATH.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
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return _spec_cache
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2026-07-23 20:19:47 -04:00
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def _base_url(event: dict) -> str | None:
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rc = event.get("requestContext") or {}
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domain, stage = rc.get("domainName"), rc.get("stage")
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return f"https://{domain}/{stage}" if domain and stage else None
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def _spec_for_request(event: dict) -> str:
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"""Committed spec with servers[0].url set to the live invoke URL when the
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request context provides it (falls back to the committed literal)."""
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raw = _load_spec()
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base = _base_url(event)
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return raw.replace(_COMMITTED_SERVER_URL, base) if base else raw
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def _docs_shell() -> str:
|
|
|
|
|
"""The Swagger UI page with the vendored CSS/JS/preset inlined; the SPEC
|
|
|
|
|
placeholder is left intact so the per-request server-injected spec splices
|
|
|
|
|
in cheaply (the heavy ~1.8MB assets are assembled once and cached).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Each blob is spliced into a <style>/<script> block, where the HTML parser
|
|
|
|
|
ends the element at the first literal "</style"/"</script" regardless of
|
|
|
|
|
quoting, so guard each against a breakout a future asset update could add
|
|
|
|
|
(the pinned assets have none today): JS/preset "</script" -> "<\\/script"
|
|
|
|
|
(equivalent inside JS string/regex), CSS "</style" -> "<\\/style".
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
global _docs_shell_cache
|
|
|
|
|
if _docs_shell_cache is None:
|
|
|
|
|
css = _SWAGGER_CSS_PATH.read_text(encoding="utf-8").replace(
|
|
|
|
|
"</style", "<\\/style"
|
feat(api): procurement-api read stack + OpenAPI docs (SHOC reconciliation path) (#127)
* feat(api): add procurement-api stack - read API + OpenAPI docs page
Third CDK stack: API Gateway REST API (IAM SigV4) over both pipelines'
tables, replacing SHOC's retired SyncController cross-account DynamoDB
scan as the reconciliation/backfill path.
- lambdas/api/: handler (healthcheck + docs-token gate + router dispatch),
router (single route table), pagination (opaque cursor, hostile -> 400),
Decimal-safe serialization, wo_repo/po_repo reads. No VendorReplies.
- OpenAPI 3.1 spec as source of truth incl. top-level webhooks section
documenting the outbound SHOC feed; phase-2 write endpoints x-planned
(router answers 501). Self-contained /docs page, no CDN.
- Auth: AWS_IAM on data routes + resource policy scoped to exactly
arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev on GET/*; /docs and
/openapi.json carve-out is token-gated in the Lambda via shared
web_ui_auth (fail-closed, INFRA-74 posture).
- KMS: explicit Decrypt/DescribeKey on the DynamoDB CMK from SSM
(name-imported table drops the key association - INFRA-104 class).
- Alarms: errors/throttles/duration(p99>=22.5s) + gateway 5xx, ALARM-only
to site-alerts. No access logging in v1 (docs ?token= shim stays out of
logs); cloud_watch_role=False.
- Tests: handler auth-seam + routing + Decimal round-trip; moto cursor
pagination incl. hostile cursors; spec<->router drift gate; bundle
AST pins for the api command; pytest.ini --cov + loader siblings.
- Deploy role: third stack DescribeStacks ARN + procurement-api smoke
invoke ARN (re-run create-deploy-role.sh before merge).
* harden(api): apply sh-security-review findings to procurement-api
Fan-out (6 detectors) + review findings resolved:
Correctness / DoS:
- pagination: require EXACT key-set match (was subset) so a partial/foreign
composite cursor can't reach DynamoDB as an inconsistent ExclusiveStartKey
-> ValidationException -> 500; comments Query now pins the cursor's
work_order_id to the path entity.
- handler: map botocore ValidationException to 400 (defense in depth) so a
crafted cursor can't drive the zero-threshold 5xx alarm.
- web_ui_auth: compare tokens as bytes; a non-ASCII presented token now fails
closed (401) instead of crashing hmac.compare_digest into a 500. Resolves the
pre-existing xfail(strict) follow-up test; hardens the web UIs too.
Docs page:
- typeStr() now escapes the one spec-derived string that reached innerHTML.
- spec inlined into the docs <script> block escapes "<" -> < (</script>
breakout guard); /openapi.json still served byte-faithful.
- Cache-Control: no-store + Referrer-Policy: no-referrer on docs responses so
the ?token= URL stays out of caches/Referer.
- spec-drift test asserts the committed spec carries no "</" / "<!--".
IAM / IaC:
- resource policy enumerates the 7 data GET resources instead of GET/* so a
future GET route can't silently inherit SHOC cross-account reach.
- kms:Decrypt grant gains a kms:ViaService=dynamodb condition.
- stage throttling (50 rps / 100 burst) bounds the unauthenticated /docs blast
radius below the 10k account default.
- corrected the PATCH/POST comment (same-account callers aren't blocked by the
resource policy; 501 handler + absent write grant are the gate).
- documented the RETAIN log-group first-deploy rollback trap and the
resource-policy-needs-redeploy gotcha in-stack.
Mandatory GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the full policy surface: no BLOCK/FIX.
675 tests pass, ruff clean, cdk synth green.
2026-07-23 19:32:20 -04:00
|
|
|
)
|
2026-07-23 20:19:47 -04:00
|
|
|
js = _SWAGGER_JS_PATH.read_text(encoding="utf-8").replace(
|
|
|
|
|
"</script", "<\\/script"
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
preset = _SWAGGER_PRESET_PATH.read_text(encoding="utf-8").replace(
|
|
|
|
|
"</script", "<\\/script"
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
_docs_shell_cache = (
|
|
|
|
|
_DOCS_PATH.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
|
|
|
|
|
.replace(_CSS_PLACEHOLDER, css)
|
|
|
|
|
.replace(_JS_PLACEHOLDER, js)
|
|
|
|
|
.replace(_PRESET_PLACEHOLDER, preset)
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
return _docs_shell_cache
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _render_docs_html(event: dict) -> str:
|
|
|
|
|
# "<" -> < so a spec string can never close the <script> block (same
|
|
|
|
|
# value to JSON.parse); the spec object is inlined into SwaggerUIBundle.
|
|
|
|
|
spec = _spec_for_request(event).replace("<", "\\u003c")
|
|
|
|
|
return _docs_shell().replace(_SPEC_PLACEHOLDER, spec)
|
feat(api): procurement-api read stack + OpenAPI docs (SHOC reconciliation path) (#127)
* feat(api): add procurement-api stack - read API + OpenAPI docs page
Third CDK stack: API Gateway REST API (IAM SigV4) over both pipelines'
tables, replacing SHOC's retired SyncController cross-account DynamoDB
scan as the reconciliation/backfill path.
- lambdas/api/: handler (healthcheck + docs-token gate + router dispatch),
router (single route table), pagination (opaque cursor, hostile -> 400),
Decimal-safe serialization, wo_repo/po_repo reads. No VendorReplies.
- OpenAPI 3.1 spec as source of truth incl. top-level webhooks section
documenting the outbound SHOC feed; phase-2 write endpoints x-planned
(router answers 501). Self-contained /docs page, no CDN.
- Auth: AWS_IAM on data routes + resource policy scoped to exactly
arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev on GET/*; /docs and
/openapi.json carve-out is token-gated in the Lambda via shared
web_ui_auth (fail-closed, INFRA-74 posture).
- KMS: explicit Decrypt/DescribeKey on the DynamoDB CMK from SSM
(name-imported table drops the key association - INFRA-104 class).
- Alarms: errors/throttles/duration(p99>=22.5s) + gateway 5xx, ALARM-only
to site-alerts. No access logging in v1 (docs ?token= shim stays out of
logs); cloud_watch_role=False.
- Tests: handler auth-seam + routing + Decimal round-trip; moto cursor
pagination incl. hostile cursors; spec<->router drift gate; bundle
AST pins for the api command; pytest.ini --cov + loader siblings.
- Deploy role: third stack DescribeStacks ARN + procurement-api smoke
invoke ARN (re-run create-deploy-role.sh before merge).
* harden(api): apply sh-security-review findings to procurement-api
Fan-out (6 detectors) + review findings resolved:
Correctness / DoS:
- pagination: require EXACT key-set match (was subset) so a partial/foreign
composite cursor can't reach DynamoDB as an inconsistent ExclusiveStartKey
-> ValidationException -> 500; comments Query now pins the cursor's
work_order_id to the path entity.
- handler: map botocore ValidationException to 400 (defense in depth) so a
crafted cursor can't drive the zero-threshold 5xx alarm.
- web_ui_auth: compare tokens as bytes; a non-ASCII presented token now fails
closed (401) instead of crashing hmac.compare_digest into a 500. Resolves the
pre-existing xfail(strict) follow-up test; hardens the web UIs too.
Docs page:
- typeStr() now escapes the one spec-derived string that reached innerHTML.
- spec inlined into the docs <script> block escapes "<" -> < (</script>
breakout guard); /openapi.json still served byte-faithful.
- Cache-Control: no-store + Referrer-Policy: no-referrer on docs responses so
the ?token= URL stays out of caches/Referer.
- spec-drift test asserts the committed spec carries no "</" / "<!--".
IAM / IaC:
- resource policy enumerates the 7 data GET resources instead of GET/* so a
future GET route can't silently inherit SHOC cross-account reach.
- kms:Decrypt grant gains a kms:ViaService=dynamodb condition.
- stage throttling (50 rps / 100 burst) bounds the unauthenticated /docs blast
radius below the 10k account default.
- corrected the PATCH/POST comment (same-account callers aren't blocked by the
resource policy; 501 handler + absent write grant are the gate).
- documented the RETAIN log-group first-deploy rollback trap and the
resource-policy-needs-redeploy gotcha in-stack.
Mandatory GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the full policy surface: no BLOCK/FIX.
675 tests pass, ruff clean, cdk synth green.
2026-07-23 19:32:20 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _with_token_shim(event: dict) -> dict:
|
|
|
|
|
"""Copy a ?token= query parameter into an x-auth-token header.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Browsers can't set headers on plain navigation, so /docs accepts the
|
|
|
|
|
shared token as a query parameter too. The constant-time compare still
|
|
|
|
|
happens inside web_ui_auth -- this only synthesizes the header on a
|
|
|
|
|
shallow copy. Acceptable only while API Gateway access logging stays off
|
|
|
|
|
(nothing at the gateway records the query string); rotate the token if
|
|
|
|
|
access logging is ever enabled.
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
qs = event.get("queryStringParameters") or {}
|
|
|
|
|
token = qs.get("token")
|
|
|
|
|
if not token:
|
|
|
|
|
return event
|
|
|
|
|
shimmed = dict(event)
|
|
|
|
|
headers = dict(event.get("headers") or {})
|
|
|
|
|
headers["x-auth-token"] = token
|
|
|
|
|
shimmed["headers"] = headers
|
|
|
|
|
return shimmed
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _docs_response(resource: str, event: dict) -> dict:
|
|
|
|
|
# SECURITY INVARIANT: these routes serve ONLY the committed spec and the
|
|
|
|
|
# static docs page -- never table data. The gateway resource policy allows
|
|
|
|
|
# Principal "*" on exactly these two GETs on the strength of that; serving
|
|
|
|
|
# anything dynamic here requires a resource-policy + security re-review.
|
|
|
|
|
if not is_authenticated(_with_token_shim(event)):
|
|
|
|
|
return error_response(401, "unauthorized")
|
|
|
|
|
if resource == "/openapi.json":
|
|
|
|
|
return {
|
|
|
|
|
"statusCode": 200,
|
|
|
|
|
"headers": {"Content-Type": "application/json", **_DOCS_SECURITY_HEADERS},
|
2026-07-23 20:19:47 -04:00
|
|
|
"body": _spec_for_request(event),
|
feat(api): procurement-api read stack + OpenAPI docs (SHOC reconciliation path) (#127)
* feat(api): add procurement-api stack - read API + OpenAPI docs page
Third CDK stack: API Gateway REST API (IAM SigV4) over both pipelines'
tables, replacing SHOC's retired SyncController cross-account DynamoDB
scan as the reconciliation/backfill path.
- lambdas/api/: handler (healthcheck + docs-token gate + router dispatch),
router (single route table), pagination (opaque cursor, hostile -> 400),
Decimal-safe serialization, wo_repo/po_repo reads. No VendorReplies.
- OpenAPI 3.1 spec as source of truth incl. top-level webhooks section
documenting the outbound SHOC feed; phase-2 write endpoints x-planned
(router answers 501). Self-contained /docs page, no CDN.
- Auth: AWS_IAM on data routes + resource policy scoped to exactly
arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev on GET/*; /docs and
/openapi.json carve-out is token-gated in the Lambda via shared
web_ui_auth (fail-closed, INFRA-74 posture).
- KMS: explicit Decrypt/DescribeKey on the DynamoDB CMK from SSM
(name-imported table drops the key association - INFRA-104 class).
- Alarms: errors/throttles/duration(p99>=22.5s) + gateway 5xx, ALARM-only
to site-alerts. No access logging in v1 (docs ?token= shim stays out of
logs); cloud_watch_role=False.
- Tests: handler auth-seam + routing + Decimal round-trip; moto cursor
pagination incl. hostile cursors; spec<->router drift gate; bundle
AST pins for the api command; pytest.ini --cov + loader siblings.
- Deploy role: third stack DescribeStacks ARN + procurement-api smoke
invoke ARN (re-run create-deploy-role.sh before merge).
* harden(api): apply sh-security-review findings to procurement-api
Fan-out (6 detectors) + review findings resolved:
Correctness / DoS:
- pagination: require EXACT key-set match (was subset) so a partial/foreign
composite cursor can't reach DynamoDB as an inconsistent ExclusiveStartKey
-> ValidationException -> 500; comments Query now pins the cursor's
work_order_id to the path entity.
- handler: map botocore ValidationException to 400 (defense in depth) so a
crafted cursor can't drive the zero-threshold 5xx alarm.
- web_ui_auth: compare tokens as bytes; a non-ASCII presented token now fails
closed (401) instead of crashing hmac.compare_digest into a 500. Resolves the
pre-existing xfail(strict) follow-up test; hardens the web UIs too.
Docs page:
- typeStr() now escapes the one spec-derived string that reached innerHTML.
- spec inlined into the docs <script> block escapes "<" -> < (</script>
breakout guard); /openapi.json still served byte-faithful.
- Cache-Control: no-store + Referrer-Policy: no-referrer on docs responses so
the ?token= URL stays out of caches/Referer.
- spec-drift test asserts the committed spec carries no "</" / "<!--".
IAM / IaC:
- resource policy enumerates the 7 data GET resources instead of GET/* so a
future GET route can't silently inherit SHOC cross-account reach.
- kms:Decrypt grant gains a kms:ViaService=dynamodb condition.
- stage throttling (50 rps / 100 burst) bounds the unauthenticated /docs blast
radius below the 10k account default.
- corrected the PATCH/POST comment (same-account callers aren't blocked by the
resource policy; 501 handler + absent write grant are the gate).
- documented the RETAIN log-group first-deploy rollback trap and the
resource-policy-needs-redeploy gotcha in-stack.
Mandatory GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the full policy surface: no BLOCK/FIX.
675 tests pass, ruff clean, cdk synth green.
2026-07-23 19:32:20 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
return {
|
|
|
|
|
"statusCode": 200,
|
|
|
|
|
"headers": {
|
|
|
|
|
"Content-Type": "text/html; charset=utf-8",
|
|
|
|
|
**_DOCS_SECURITY_HEADERS,
|
|
|
|
|
},
|
2026-07-23 20:19:47 -04:00
|
|
|
"body": _render_docs_html(event),
|
feat(api): procurement-api read stack + OpenAPI docs (SHOC reconciliation path) (#127)
* feat(api): add procurement-api stack - read API + OpenAPI docs page
Third CDK stack: API Gateway REST API (IAM SigV4) over both pipelines'
tables, replacing SHOC's retired SyncController cross-account DynamoDB
scan as the reconciliation/backfill path.
- lambdas/api/: handler (healthcheck + docs-token gate + router dispatch),
router (single route table), pagination (opaque cursor, hostile -> 400),
Decimal-safe serialization, wo_repo/po_repo reads. No VendorReplies.
- OpenAPI 3.1 spec as source of truth incl. top-level webhooks section
documenting the outbound SHOC feed; phase-2 write endpoints x-planned
(router answers 501). Self-contained /docs page, no CDN.
- Auth: AWS_IAM on data routes + resource policy scoped to exactly
arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev on GET/*; /docs and
/openapi.json carve-out is token-gated in the Lambda via shared
web_ui_auth (fail-closed, INFRA-74 posture).
- KMS: explicit Decrypt/DescribeKey on the DynamoDB CMK from SSM
(name-imported table drops the key association - INFRA-104 class).
- Alarms: errors/throttles/duration(p99>=22.5s) + gateway 5xx, ALARM-only
to site-alerts. No access logging in v1 (docs ?token= shim stays out of
logs); cloud_watch_role=False.
- Tests: handler auth-seam + routing + Decimal round-trip; moto cursor
pagination incl. hostile cursors; spec<->router drift gate; bundle
AST pins for the api command; pytest.ini --cov + loader siblings.
- Deploy role: third stack DescribeStacks ARN + procurement-api smoke
invoke ARN (re-run create-deploy-role.sh before merge).
* harden(api): apply sh-security-review findings to procurement-api
Fan-out (6 detectors) + review findings resolved:
Correctness / DoS:
- pagination: require EXACT key-set match (was subset) so a partial/foreign
composite cursor can't reach DynamoDB as an inconsistent ExclusiveStartKey
-> ValidationException -> 500; comments Query now pins the cursor's
work_order_id to the path entity.
- handler: map botocore ValidationException to 400 (defense in depth) so a
crafted cursor can't drive the zero-threshold 5xx alarm.
- web_ui_auth: compare tokens as bytes; a non-ASCII presented token now fails
closed (401) instead of crashing hmac.compare_digest into a 500. Resolves the
pre-existing xfail(strict) follow-up test; hardens the web UIs too.
Docs page:
- typeStr() now escapes the one spec-derived string that reached innerHTML.
- spec inlined into the docs <script> block escapes "<" -> < (</script>
breakout guard); /openapi.json still served byte-faithful.
- Cache-Control: no-store + Referrer-Policy: no-referrer on docs responses so
the ?token= URL stays out of caches/Referer.
- spec-drift test asserts the committed spec carries no "</" / "<!--".
IAM / IaC:
- resource policy enumerates the 7 data GET resources instead of GET/* so a
future GET route can't silently inherit SHOC cross-account reach.
- kms:Decrypt grant gains a kms:ViaService=dynamodb condition.
- stage throttling (50 rps / 100 burst) bounds the unauthenticated /docs blast
radius below the 10k account default.
- corrected the PATCH/POST comment (same-account callers aren't blocked by the
resource policy; 501 handler + absent write grant are the gate).
- documented the RETAIN log-group first-deploy rollback trap and the
resource-policy-needs-redeploy gotcha in-stack.
Mandatory GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the full policy surface: no BLOCK/FIX.
675 tests pass, ruff clean, cdk synth green.
2026-07-23 19:32:20 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _data_response(route_key: tuple, event: dict) -> dict:
|
|
|
|
|
method, resource = route_key
|
|
|
|
|
func = _REPO_FUNCS[DATA_ROUTES[route_key]]
|
|
|
|
|
qs = event.get("queryStringParameters") or {}
|
|
|
|
|
path_params = event.get("pathParameters") or {}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if DATA_ROUTES[route_key].startswith("list_"):
|
|
|
|
|
limit = clamp_limit(qs.get("limit"))
|
|
|
|
|
cursor = qs.get("cursor")
|
|
|
|
|
if resource in _PATH_PARAM_BY_RESOURCE:
|
|
|
|
|
entity_id = path_params.get(_PATH_PARAM_BY_RESOURCE[resource], "")
|
|
|
|
|
items, next_cursor = func(entity_id, limit, cursor)
|
|
|
|
|
else:
|
|
|
|
|
items, next_cursor = func(limit, cursor)
|
|
|
|
|
return json_response(200, {"items": items, "next_cursor": next_cursor})
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
entity_id = path_params.get(_PATH_PARAM_BY_RESOURCE[resource], "")
|
|
|
|
|
item = func(entity_id)
|
|
|
|
|
if item is None:
|
|
|
|
|
return error_response(404, "not found")
|
|
|
|
|
return json_response(200, item)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _dispatch(route_key: tuple, event: dict) -> dict:
|
|
|
|
|
if route_key in PLANNED_ROUTES:
|
|
|
|
|
return error_response(501, "planned endpoint - not implemented (phase 2)")
|
|
|
|
|
if route_key in DOCS_ROUTES:
|
|
|
|
|
return _docs_response(route_key[1], event)
|
|
|
|
|
if route_key in DATA_ROUTES:
|
|
|
|
|
return _data_response(route_key, event)
|
|
|
|
|
return error_response(404, "not found")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def handler(event, context):
|
|
|
|
|
# Deploy-guard healthcheck: a direct-invoke {"healthcheck": true} probe
|
|
|
|
|
# returns before any routing/auth so the post-deploy smoke gate can verify
|
|
|
|
|
# the bundle imports and the runtime boots.
|
|
|
|
|
if isinstance(event, dict) and event.get("healthcheck") is True:
|
|
|
|
|
return {"healthcheck": "ok"}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
method = (event.get("httpMethod") or "").upper()
|
|
|
|
|
resource = event.get("resource") or ""
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
|
|
|
return _dispatch((method, resource), event)
|
|
|
|
|
except BadCursor as exc:
|
|
|
|
|
return error_response(400, str(exc))
|
|
|
|
|
except ClientError as exc:
|
|
|
|
|
# A client-supplied cursor that survives validation but is still
|
|
|
|
|
# inconsistent at the data layer makes DynamoDB raise
|
|
|
|
|
# ValidationException; map it to 400, not 500, so a crafted cursor
|
|
|
|
|
# can't drive the 5xx alarm. Any other AWS error is a real 500.
|
|
|
|
|
if exc.response.get("Error", {}).get("Code") == "ValidationException":
|
|
|
|
|
return error_response(400, "cursor is not valid")
|
|
|
|
|
logger.exception("AWS error serving %s %s", method, resource)
|
|
|
|
|
return error_response(500, "internal error")
|
|
|
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
|
|
|
# A raised exception would surface as an opaque 502 from the proxy
|
|
|
|
|
# integration; return a clean 500 instead. The API Gateway 5XX alarm
|
|
|
|
|
# pages on these; the exception (never the request token) is logged.
|
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logger.exception("Unhandled error serving %s %s", method, resource)
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return error_response(500, "internal error")
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