procurement-ingest/lambdas/po/email_processor/handler.py

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"""
PO email processor Lambda.
Triggered by S3 events when SES delivers a Coupa PO email.
Parses the raw email, sends it to Claude for structured extraction,
then writes the result to the purchase-orders DynamoDB table.
"""
import email
import json
import logging
import os
import re
from datetime import datetime
from decimal import Decimal
from email import policy
import anthropic
import boto3
Add fail-closed SES sender authentication (INFRA-107) (#98) * Add fail-closed SES sender authentication The From header and any raw-MIME Authentication-Results copies are attacker-forgeable, so a forged email to apm@int.seahaven.com or amazon_po@int.seahaven.com could create or mutate a WO/PO (INFRA-107, CRITICAL). Both S3-triggered email processors now authenticate the sender against the Authentication-Results header SES itself prepends at delivery: only the topmost header is consulted, its authserv-id must be amazonses.com, and it must carry dkim=pass for a domain in the per-pipeline ALLOWED_DKIM_DOMAINS env var (comma-separated, set in CDK so ops can adjust without code changes). Allowlists come from live traffic observed 2026-07-15 on both ingest buckets: WO mail arrives via the apm@ Google Groups forward, which re-signs as seahaven.com (the hxgnsmartcloud.com signature does not survive the forward); PO mail passes for amazon.coupahost.com. amazonses.com also passes on PO mail but is deliberately excluded -- every SES customer's outbound mail passes for it. Every failure path (env var unset, header missing or unparseable, verdict fail, unaligned domain) rejects the email: a structured warning with the reason and S3 key is logged and the record skipped without erroring the invocation, so rejected mail causes no Lambda retries or DLQ messages. Handler signatures and event sources are unchanged. Refs: INFRA-107 * Harden AR parser per cross-family review Cross-family (GPT-4.1) review findings: terminate the dkim result token at end-of-clause, whitespace, or a comment so a value like "dkim=pass-fake" can never be read as a pass; normalize trailing dots off allowlist entries so "seahaven.com." matches; make the compat32 parser policy explicit. Adds tests for result-token boundaries, comments after the result, quoted domain values, and folding inside a dkim clause. Refs: INFRA-107 * Harden AR parsing and alarm on sender-auth rejects The SES-stamped Authentication-Results value echoes attacker-controlled SMTP-session tokens (envelope-from, helo, header.from) as their own semicolon-delimited property clauses. A naive split(";") tore an RFC 5321 quoted-local-part MAIL FROM apart and manufactured a forged dkim=pass clause, so a fully spoofed email was accepted on the genuinely SES-stamped topmost header. Tokenise comment- and quoted-string-aware (RFC 8601 / RFC 5322): strip CFWS comments, split clauses only on semicolons outside a quoted-string, and fail closed on unbalanced quotes/comments so a ';' inside a quoted pvalue can never start a clause. Rejected mail returns normally (no error, no retry, no DLQ message), so a signing-domain drift or a wrong allowlist would silently discard 100% of legitimate mail while every alarm stayed green. Add a CloudWatch Logs metric filter + alarm on the sender_auth_rejected warning to both stacks so a false-reject storm pages instead of vanishing. This is also the safety net for the WO seahaven.com allowlist assumption, which must be validated against a live SES-stamped header (a plain Gmail auto-forward re-signs under the sending Workspace domain, not seahaven.com). Refs: INFRA-107 * chore: retrigger CI (no run recorded for 7c74ac1) * Fix quoted-AUID DKIM domain spoof in sender auth Resolve three confirmed /sh-security-review findings on the fail-closed SES sender-authentication control. HIGH: header.i/header.d domain extraction was not quoted-string aware. An attacker with a valid DKIM key for their own domain could set an RFC 6376-legal AUID such as i="@seahaven.com"@attacker.com; the naive extractor stopped at the closing quote and returned seahaven.com, accepting forged mail. Extraction now tokenises the clause with the same quoted-string discipline already used for clause splitting: header.d (the plain signing domain) is authoritative when present, otherwise the header.i domain is the part after the AUID's LAST top-level "@", so a "@" inside a quoted local-part is treated as signer-controlled label text and yields the true signer (attacker.com), not seahaven.com. LOW: the topmost-header parse ran outside evaluate_sender_authentication's try/except, so an unexpected parser exception on crafted input could propagate into the handler and Lambda async retries/DLQ. The parse now fails CLOSED with an authentication_results_unparseable reason. MEDIUM: the sender_auth_rejected alarm used Sum>=3 over 15 min, blind to a low-volume total-reject outage (a trickle that never sums to 3). Both stacks now alarm on >=1 reject per 5-min period with evaluation_periods=3 / datapoints_to_alarm=2, so a sustained reject condition pages even at one reject per period while a lone stray probe self-clears. Refs: INFRA-107 * Load Lambda function dir on sys.path in tests Rebasing INFRA-107 onto main folded #95's pytest suite into this branch's tests. The unified conftest loads the PO/WO handlers by file path, and handler.py now does `from ses_auth import authenticate_inbound_email` -- a bare sibling import that resolves in the Lambda only because the runtime puts each function's own directory on sys.path. The shared load_handler now adds that directory so the handler tests import correctly alongside the sender-auth tests. Refs: INFRA-107 * Note #97 test files in README directory tree The rebase onto main brought in #97's tests/requirements.txt and tests/test_po_merge.py. List both in the directory tree so it matches the tree on disk. Refs: INFRA-107 * Document INFRA-107 forwarder-binding risk acceptance Record the accepted risk that WO sender auth binds to the apm@ forward's re-signing domain (seahaven.com) rather than the Hexagon originator; the apm@ Google Group's restricted posting policy is the load-bearing control (escalates to HIGH if the group is opened to external posting). Also correct the sender-auth-rejected alarm docs to match the shipped config (>=1 per 5-min, 2-of-3 datapoints, not the superseded >=3/15min) and note the SES-AR-01/02 parser hardening follow-ups. Refs: INFRA-107
2026-07-15 20:58:47 -04:00
from ses_auth import authenticate_inbound_email
logger = logging.getLogger()
logger.setLevel(logging.INFO)
s3 = boto3.client("s3")
dynamodb = boto3.resource("dynamodb")
PO_TABLE = os.environ.get("PO_TABLE", "purchase-orders")
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN = os.environ.get("ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN")
Land safe fixes from 2026-06-17 security sweep (#97) * Remove gratuitous KMS grant on shared DynamoDB CMK wo-email-processor held grant_encrypt_decrypt on the shared seahaven-dynamodb CMK, but the WorkOrders/WorkOrderComments tables are not encrypted with that CMK. The grant was dead weight that extended the WO processor's decrypt reach to the CMK protecting the purchase-orders table (cross-stack decrypt). Drop it to restore least privilege; re-add as part of the table CMK migration (INFRA-6). Refs: INFRA-6 * Require Secrets Manager key for Anthropic client Remove the silent fallback to a plaintext ANTHROPIC_API_KEY env var in both email processors; require ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN and raise if absent so a misconfigured deploy fails loudly instead of using an unmanaged key. Adapted from f175323 on security/sweep-2026-06-17. The From-header sender-domain allowlist from that commit is intentionally dropped: the From header is spoofable (INFRA-107, confirmed critical) and sender authentication is being reworked in a separate PR. Refs: INFRA-107 * Merge PO revisions and handle out-of-order events save_revision did a full put_item overwrite, so a revision omitting line_items/supplier permanently deleted them. save_new_po used a conditional put that silently dropped the PO when an out-of-order cancellation had already created a skeleton row. Switch both to field-level merge update_items: a revision now SETs only the fields it carries, and a new_po backfills data into a pre-existing Cancelled skeleton while preserving the Cancelled status. No email can now delete data established by an earlier one. * Gate web UIs behind auth and escape currency XSS The po-web-ui and workorder-web-ui handlers had no auth: any invocation path returned the full PO/WO DB. Add a fail-closed shared-secret gate (X-Auth-Token / Bearer, constant-time compared to WEB_UI_AUTH_TOKEN) so a future re-attached Function URL cannot re-expose the data (URLs removed under INFRA-74). Wire the token from the SSM String param /procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token. Also fix stored XSS in po-web-ui fmt_currency: the non-numeric fallback returned str(val) unescaped, so a prompt-injected email could make Claude emit total_amount as <script>. Escape it. Refs: INFRA-74 * Document sweep security fixes and merge semantics Update the README for the 2026-06-17 security sweep: required Secrets Manager key (no plaintext env fallback), web UI auth gate + SSM token setup step, output-escaping note, and the new PO revision/cancellation merge behavior. Adapted from d91f45e on security/sweep-2026-06-17; the sender allowlist documentation is dropped along with the allowlist itself (deferred to the INFRA-107 sender-authentication rework). Refs: INFRA-107 * fix: resolve web UI auth token from Secrets Manager at runtime Replace the plaintext SSM String parameter with a Secrets Manager secret referenced by ARN only. The token is fetched and cached at module level on first invocation, keeping shared secrets out of CloudFormation templates and Lambda environment variables. Refs: PR-97 * Add TTL to web UI auth token cache for rotation The web-ui handlers cached the Secrets Manager auth token at module level with no expiry, so a rotated secret was only picked up when the warm container recycled — an emergency rotation could take hours to take effect. Cache the fetched value for a 5-minute TTL instead, so a rotated token propagates within the TTL while still avoiding a Secrets Manager call on every request. Still fails closed when the secret is unset or unreadable. Refs: INFRA-74 * Log Secrets Manager failures in web UI auth token fetch The web UI auth gate correctly fails closed when the shared token cannot be read, but _get_auth_token() swallowed every exception silently. A Secrets Manager permission or config error then made every request 401 with no operational signal, leaving an outage indistinguishable from ordinary unauthenticated traffic. Add a module-level logger to both web_ui handlers and log the fetch failure with logger.exception() in the except block before returning None. Behavior is unchanged (still fails closed); the failure is now visible in CloudWatch. The secret value is never logged. The two handlers stay byte-consistent in the mirrored _get_auth_token() region. The companion finding on the CDK import of the shared procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token secret was evaluated and left as-is: the token is a single secret shared by both the PO and WO stacks, so from_secret_name_v2 (which scopes grant_read via the standard 6-char suffix wildcard) is correct; making it a CDK-managed Secret in both stacks would collide the two stacks on the same explicit secret name at deploy time. Refs: INFRA-74 * Make Cancelled PO status sticky via atomic write The PO merge path read status with a get_item (_is_cancelled) and then wrote with an unconditional update_item. Two defects followed from this: - Race (Issue A): a cancellation landing between the read and the write was silently un-cancelled by a revision carrying a non-cancelled po_status — a TOCTOU on a table with concurrent email processing. - Over-broad strip (Issue B): save_revision dropped po_status whenever the PO was Cancelled, so legitimate status updates on non-cancelled POs and status-less revisions were affected rather than only the true un-cancel transition. Enforce the invariant server-side instead. "Cancelled" is a sticky, authoritative status: once set, later new_po/revision emails may enrich other fields but must never move it to a non-cancelled status. When the payload carries a non-cancelled po_status, _merge_update issues the update_item guarded by ConditionExpression "attribute_not_exists(po_status) OR po_status <> :marker", evaluated atomically at write time, so a cancellation that lands first always wins. On ConditionalCheckFailedException the same fields are re-written without po_status/cancelled_at, enriching the record while Cancelled sticks. Payloads with no status change, or an already -Cancelled status, take a plain merge — the status is only ever suppressed on a real un-cancel. This removes the non-atomic get_item from the write path; _is_cancelled is deleted. Key schema and attribute names are unchanged, so the cross-stack purchase-orders contract (read-only by seahaven-slack-bot) holds. Add moto-backed tests covering un-cancel suppression with field enrichment, status-less merge onto a Cancelled PO, legitimate status updates on non-cancelled POs, new_po backfill of a Cancelled skeleton, fresh create/merge, and authoritative save_cancellation. Refs: #97
2026-07-15 20:17:46 -04:00
# "Cancelled" is a sticky, authoritative status: once a PO reaches it, a later
# new_po/revision may enrich other fields but must never move it back to a
# non-cancelled status.
CANCELLED_STATUS = "Cancelled"
EXTRACTION_PROMPT = """\
You are an email parser for a purchase order ingest pipeline.
The emails are Coupa procurement platform notifications containing purchase order
data from Amazon.
Analyze the following email and extract structured data. Return ONLY valid JSON with these fields:
{
"email_type": "new_po" | "revision" | "cancellation",
"po_number": "string or null",
"po_status": "string or null",
"source_system": "coupa",
"submitted_by": "string or null",
"on_behalf_of": "string or null",
"order_date": "string or null",
"revision_date": "string or null",
"last_opened": "string or null",
"acknowledged_at": "string or null",
"payment_terms": "string or null",
"requisition_number": "string or null",
"department": "string or null",
"view_order_url": "URL string or null",
"supplier": {
"name": "string or null"
},
"site_code": "string or null",
"ship_to": {
"name": "string or null",
"address": "string or null",
"street": "string or null",
"city": "string or null",
"state": "string or null",
"zip": "string or null",
"location_code": "string or null",
"attn": "string or null"
},
"total_amount": 0.0,
"currency": "USD",
"fiscal_year": "string or null",
"trade": "string or null",
"coupa_category": "string or null",
"line_items": [
{
"description": "string",
"amount": 0.0,
"currency": "USD",
"need_by": "date string or null",
"category": "string or null",
"account_code": "string or null",
"period": "string or null",
"quantity": "string or null",
"unit": "string or null",
"price": "string or null"
}
]
}
## email_type detection
- "new_po": email announces a new purchase order being issued
- "revision": email announces a revised/updated purchase order (look for "revised" in subject or body)
- "cancellation": email announces a PO has been cancelled
## PO number
Extract from the email subject or body. Format is a prefix + hyphen + digits:
- "2D-18206023", "FK-21088051", "B187-17955555"
## site_code extraction
The site code is the Amazon facility code — a 3-5 character alphanumeric code identifying
the delivery site. Check these locations in order:
1. Ship-to name in parentheses: "Amazon.com Services LLC (KLAL)" → KLAL
2. Ship-to name after dash: "Amazon.com Services LLC - SNY5" → SNY5
3. Ship-to ATTN line with dash or en-dash: "ATTN: Wagon Wheel DS Station –WKY3" → WKY3
4. Ship-to ATTN line directly: "Attn: HJX1" → HJX1
5. Ship-to name IS the code: if the name is just "DBU2" or similar, use it
6. Line item description prefix: "DYO1 - Sea Haven Ind - Plumbing Repairs" → DYO1
7. Line item description in brackets: "[HMK4] Assemble 3 Wire Security Cages" → HMK4
**Not site codes — do not extract these as site_code:**
- RME (Amazon Reliability Maintenance Engineering department)
- BBM (Coupa description format tag)
- JLL (Jones Lang LaSalle — facilities management vendor)
- PARAG, ERIK (vendor/person names)
- Industry acronyms: HVAC, LED, PVC, ADA, OSHA, EMR, BMS, DDC, MRO, NTE, EST
If the only candidate matches this skip list, set site_code to null.
## Ship-to address parsing
Parse the full address into separate fields. Be aware of these common issues:
- State abbreviation may be missing entirely (e.g., "Tucson, 85704" with no state)
- Zip codes may lack leading zeros (e.g., "MA 2149" should be zip "02149", "NJ 7001" should be "07001")
- City names may be misspelled (e.g., "Charoltte" for Charlotte) — extract as-is, do not correct
- Format varies: "City, ST - ZIP", "City, ST ZIP", "City, ZIP" (no state)
If state cannot be determined from the address, set ship_to.state to null.
## fiscal_year
The calendar year the work covers. Determine from:
1. The order_date year (primary source)
2. Need-by dates on line items
3. Year in line item descriptions (e.g., "HVB2 - 2025 - Plumbing PM" → "2025")
Use the 4-digit year string (e.g., "2025").
## trade classification
Classify the primary trade from line item descriptions. Use the FIRST match in priority order:
**Plumbing - PM**: "plumbing pm", "plumbing preventative", "plumbing maintenance",
or BBM format: "Plumbing - Backflow", "Plumbing - Water Heater - Install/Repair"
**Plumbing - Reactive**: "plumbing" with: "reactive", "emergency", "repair", "clog",
"unclog", "leak", "flood", "sewer", "drain", "grease trap", "jetter", "water line",
"toilet", "faucet", "urinal", "pipe"
**Electrical**: "electrical", "lighting", "ballast", "outlet", "circuit", "panel",
"generator", "transformer", "conduit" (but NOT if "dock door" context)
**HVAC**: "hvac", "heating", "cooling", "air conditioning", "RTU", "AHU", "VAV",
"refrigerant", "thermostat", "ductwork"
**Dock Doors**: "dock door", "dock leveler", "dock plate", "dock seal", "dock bumper"
**Doors**: "door", "overhead door", "roll-up", "automatic door", "access door"
(only if not matched by Dock Doors above)
**Signage**: "sign", "banner", "wayfinding", "marquee", "directional"
**Carpentry**: "carpentry", "cabinet", "millwork", "trim", "shelving", "framing"
**Fencing/Gates**: "fence", "fencing", "gate", "bollard" (not "dock gate")
**Conveyance/MHE**: "conveyor", "MHE", "material handling", "sortation"
**Painting**: "paint", "painting", "primer", "coating", "touch-up"
**Flooring**: "floor", "tile", "carpet", "epoxy", "polishing"
**Janitorial**: "janitorial", "cleaning", "custodial", "pressure wash", "power wash"
**Fire/Life Safety**: "fire", "sprinkler", "extinguisher", "fire alarm", "suppression"
**Landscaping/Yard**: "landscape", "lawn", "tree", "yard", "mowing", "irrigation"
**Roofing**: "roof", "roofing", "gutter", "downspout"
**Security/Locksmith**: "lock", "key", "access control", "camera", "security", "CCTV"
**Snow Removal**: "snow", "ice", "salt", "de-ice", "plow"
**PO Uplift**: description is exactly or primarily "PO Uplift"
**General Building - Emergency**: "EMER" prefix, or "emergency" in a general building context
**General Building - Handyman**: BBM format "General Building - General Building Technician"
**General Building - Project**: BBM format "General Building - General Building Project"
**General Building**: any remaining facility maintenance work
If a PO has multiple line items with different trades, set "trade" to the primary
(non-uplift, non-materials) trade. If genuinely mixed, use the trade of the highest-value line item.
## coupa_category
The Coupa commodity/category field if present in the email (e.g., "Maintenance - Facilities",
"Plumbing Equipment & Materials"). This is Coupa's own classification, not the trade field.
## General rules
- Extract all line items with descriptions, amounts, and metadata
- "quantity", "unit" (e.g., "EACH", "HR"), and "price" (unit price) should be extracted when present
- total_amount should be the numeric total in USD
- If a field is not present in the email, set it to null
- Do NOT invent or infer data that is not explicitly in the email
"""
def get_anthropic_client() -> anthropic.Anthropic:
Land safe fixes from 2026-06-17 security sweep (#97) * Remove gratuitous KMS grant on shared DynamoDB CMK wo-email-processor held grant_encrypt_decrypt on the shared seahaven-dynamodb CMK, but the WorkOrders/WorkOrderComments tables are not encrypted with that CMK. The grant was dead weight that extended the WO processor's decrypt reach to the CMK protecting the purchase-orders table (cross-stack decrypt). Drop it to restore least privilege; re-add as part of the table CMK migration (INFRA-6). Refs: INFRA-6 * Require Secrets Manager key for Anthropic client Remove the silent fallback to a plaintext ANTHROPIC_API_KEY env var in both email processors; require ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN and raise if absent so a misconfigured deploy fails loudly instead of using an unmanaged key. Adapted from f175323 on security/sweep-2026-06-17. The From-header sender-domain allowlist from that commit is intentionally dropped: the From header is spoofable (INFRA-107, confirmed critical) and sender authentication is being reworked in a separate PR. Refs: INFRA-107 * Merge PO revisions and handle out-of-order events save_revision did a full put_item overwrite, so a revision omitting line_items/supplier permanently deleted them. save_new_po used a conditional put that silently dropped the PO when an out-of-order cancellation had already created a skeleton row. Switch both to field-level merge update_items: a revision now SETs only the fields it carries, and a new_po backfills data into a pre-existing Cancelled skeleton while preserving the Cancelled status. No email can now delete data established by an earlier one. * Gate web UIs behind auth and escape currency XSS The po-web-ui and workorder-web-ui handlers had no auth: any invocation path returned the full PO/WO DB. Add a fail-closed shared-secret gate (X-Auth-Token / Bearer, constant-time compared to WEB_UI_AUTH_TOKEN) so a future re-attached Function URL cannot re-expose the data (URLs removed under INFRA-74). Wire the token from the SSM String param /procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token. Also fix stored XSS in po-web-ui fmt_currency: the non-numeric fallback returned str(val) unescaped, so a prompt-injected email could make Claude emit total_amount as <script>. Escape it. Refs: INFRA-74 * Document sweep security fixes and merge semantics Update the README for the 2026-06-17 security sweep: required Secrets Manager key (no plaintext env fallback), web UI auth gate + SSM token setup step, output-escaping note, and the new PO revision/cancellation merge behavior. Adapted from d91f45e on security/sweep-2026-06-17; the sender allowlist documentation is dropped along with the allowlist itself (deferred to the INFRA-107 sender-authentication rework). Refs: INFRA-107 * fix: resolve web UI auth token from Secrets Manager at runtime Replace the plaintext SSM String parameter with a Secrets Manager secret referenced by ARN only. The token is fetched and cached at module level on first invocation, keeping shared secrets out of CloudFormation templates and Lambda environment variables. Refs: PR-97 * Add TTL to web UI auth token cache for rotation The web-ui handlers cached the Secrets Manager auth token at module level with no expiry, so a rotated secret was only picked up when the warm container recycled — an emergency rotation could take hours to take effect. Cache the fetched value for a 5-minute TTL instead, so a rotated token propagates within the TTL while still avoiding a Secrets Manager call on every request. Still fails closed when the secret is unset or unreadable. Refs: INFRA-74 * Log Secrets Manager failures in web UI auth token fetch The web UI auth gate correctly fails closed when the shared token cannot be read, but _get_auth_token() swallowed every exception silently. A Secrets Manager permission or config error then made every request 401 with no operational signal, leaving an outage indistinguishable from ordinary unauthenticated traffic. Add a module-level logger to both web_ui handlers and log the fetch failure with logger.exception() in the except block before returning None. Behavior is unchanged (still fails closed); the failure is now visible in CloudWatch. The secret value is never logged. The two handlers stay byte-consistent in the mirrored _get_auth_token() region. The companion finding on the CDK import of the shared procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token secret was evaluated and left as-is: the token is a single secret shared by both the PO and WO stacks, so from_secret_name_v2 (which scopes grant_read via the standard 6-char suffix wildcard) is correct; making it a CDK-managed Secret in both stacks would collide the two stacks on the same explicit secret name at deploy time. Refs: INFRA-74 * Make Cancelled PO status sticky via atomic write The PO merge path read status with a get_item (_is_cancelled) and then wrote with an unconditional update_item. Two defects followed from this: - Race (Issue A): a cancellation landing between the read and the write was silently un-cancelled by a revision carrying a non-cancelled po_status — a TOCTOU on a table with concurrent email processing. - Over-broad strip (Issue B): save_revision dropped po_status whenever the PO was Cancelled, so legitimate status updates on non-cancelled POs and status-less revisions were affected rather than only the true un-cancel transition. Enforce the invariant server-side instead. "Cancelled" is a sticky, authoritative status: once set, later new_po/revision emails may enrich other fields but must never move it to a non-cancelled status. When the payload carries a non-cancelled po_status, _merge_update issues the update_item guarded by ConditionExpression "attribute_not_exists(po_status) OR po_status <> :marker", evaluated atomically at write time, so a cancellation that lands first always wins. On ConditionalCheckFailedException the same fields are re-written without po_status/cancelled_at, enriching the record while Cancelled sticks. Payloads with no status change, or an already -Cancelled status, take a plain merge — the status is only ever suppressed on a real un-cancel. This removes the non-atomic get_item from the write path; _is_cancelled is deleted. Key schema and attribute names are unchanged, so the cross-stack purchase-orders contract (read-only by seahaven-slack-bot) holds. Add moto-backed tests covering un-cancel suppression with field enrichment, status-less merge onto a Cancelled PO, legitimate status updates on non-cancelled POs, new_po backfill of a Cancelled skeleton, fresh create/merge, and authoritative save_cancellation. Refs: #97
2026-07-15 20:17:46 -04:00
"""Create Anthropic client, fetching API key from Secrets Manager.
Requires ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN to be set. The previous silent
fallback to a plaintext ANTHROPIC_API_KEY env var is removed: a misconfigured
deploy must fail loudly rather than quietly run on an unmanaged key.
"""
if not ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN:
raise RuntimeError(
"ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN is not set; refusing to fall back to a "
"plaintext API key. Configure the Secrets Manager ARN."
)
secrets = boto3.client("secretsmanager")
secret = secrets.get_secret_value(SecretId=ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN)
api_key = secret["SecretString"]
return anthropic.Anthropic(api_key=api_key)
def parse_raw_email(raw_bytes: bytes) -> dict:
"""Parse a raw MIME email into subject, sender, and body text."""
msg = email.message_from_bytes(raw_bytes, policy=policy.default)
subject = msg.get("Subject", "")
sender = msg.get("From", "")
to = msg.get("To", "")
date = msg.get("Date", "")
body = ""
if msg.is_multipart():
for part in msg.walk():
content_type = part.get_content_type()
if content_type == "text/plain":
body = part.get_content()
break
elif content_type == "text/html" and not body:
body = part.get_content()
else:
body = msg.get_content()
return {
"subject": subject,
"sender": sender,
"to": to,
"date": date,
"body": body,
}
def extract_with_claude(email_data: dict) -> dict:
"""Send parsed email to Claude for structured extraction."""
client = get_anthropic_client()
email_text = (
f"Subject: {email_data['subject']}\n"
f"From: {email_data['sender']}\n"
f"To: {email_data['to']}\n"
f"Date: {email_data['date']}\n"
f"\n---\n\n"
f"{email_data['body']}"
)
response = client.messages.create(
model="claude-haiku-4-5-20251001",
max_tokens=2048,
messages=[
{
"role": "user",
"content": f"{EXTRACTION_PROMPT}\n\nEMAIL:\n{email_text}",
}
],
)
response_text = response.content[0].text
# Extract JSON from response (handle markdown code blocks)
json_match = re.search(r"```(?:json)?\s*(.*?)```", response_text, re.DOTALL)
if json_match:
response_text = json_match.group(1)
return json.loads(response_text.strip(), parse_float=Decimal)
def pad_zip(zip_code: str | None) -> str | None:
if not zip_code:
return zip_code
clean = zip_code.strip().split("-")[0]
if clean.isdigit() and len(clean) < 5:
return clean.zfill(5) + zip_code.strip()[len(clean) :]
return zip_code
def enrich_parsed(parsed: dict, s3_key: str, email_subject: str):
"""Add metadata and promote nested fields to top level."""
now = datetime.utcnow().isoformat()
parsed["raw_s3_key"] = s3_key
parsed["processed_at"] = now
parsed["data_source"] = "email"
parsed["email_subject"] = email_subject
ship_to = parsed.get("ship_to") or {}
if ship_to.get("address"):
parsed["ship_to_raw"] = ship_to["address"]
if ship_to.get("state"):
parsed["state"] = ship_to["state"]
if ship_to.get("zip"):
ship_to["zip"] = pad_zip(ship_to["zip"])
return parsed
Land safe fixes from 2026-06-17 security sweep (#97) * Remove gratuitous KMS grant on shared DynamoDB CMK wo-email-processor held grant_encrypt_decrypt on the shared seahaven-dynamodb CMK, but the WorkOrders/WorkOrderComments tables are not encrypted with that CMK. The grant was dead weight that extended the WO processor's decrypt reach to the CMK protecting the purchase-orders table (cross-stack decrypt). Drop it to restore least privilege; re-add as part of the table CMK migration (INFRA-6). Refs: INFRA-6 * Require Secrets Manager key for Anthropic client Remove the silent fallback to a plaintext ANTHROPIC_API_KEY env var in both email processors; require ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN and raise if absent so a misconfigured deploy fails loudly instead of using an unmanaged key. Adapted from f175323 on security/sweep-2026-06-17. The From-header sender-domain allowlist from that commit is intentionally dropped: the From header is spoofable (INFRA-107, confirmed critical) and sender authentication is being reworked in a separate PR. Refs: INFRA-107 * Merge PO revisions and handle out-of-order events save_revision did a full put_item overwrite, so a revision omitting line_items/supplier permanently deleted them. save_new_po used a conditional put that silently dropped the PO when an out-of-order cancellation had already created a skeleton row. Switch both to field-level merge update_items: a revision now SETs only the fields it carries, and a new_po backfills data into a pre-existing Cancelled skeleton while preserving the Cancelled status. No email can now delete data established by an earlier one. * Gate web UIs behind auth and escape currency XSS The po-web-ui and workorder-web-ui handlers had no auth: any invocation path returned the full PO/WO DB. Add a fail-closed shared-secret gate (X-Auth-Token / Bearer, constant-time compared to WEB_UI_AUTH_TOKEN) so a future re-attached Function URL cannot re-expose the data (URLs removed under INFRA-74). Wire the token from the SSM String param /procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token. Also fix stored XSS in po-web-ui fmt_currency: the non-numeric fallback returned str(val) unescaped, so a prompt-injected email could make Claude emit total_amount as <script>. Escape it. Refs: INFRA-74 * Document sweep security fixes and merge semantics Update the README for the 2026-06-17 security sweep: required Secrets Manager key (no plaintext env fallback), web UI auth gate + SSM token setup step, output-escaping note, and the new PO revision/cancellation merge behavior. Adapted from d91f45e on security/sweep-2026-06-17; the sender allowlist documentation is dropped along with the allowlist itself (deferred to the INFRA-107 sender-authentication rework). Refs: INFRA-107 * fix: resolve web UI auth token from Secrets Manager at runtime Replace the plaintext SSM String parameter with a Secrets Manager secret referenced by ARN only. The token is fetched and cached at module level on first invocation, keeping shared secrets out of CloudFormation templates and Lambda environment variables. Refs: PR-97 * Add TTL to web UI auth token cache for rotation The web-ui handlers cached the Secrets Manager auth token at module level with no expiry, so a rotated secret was only picked up when the warm container recycled — an emergency rotation could take hours to take effect. Cache the fetched value for a 5-minute TTL instead, so a rotated token propagates within the TTL while still avoiding a Secrets Manager call on every request. Still fails closed when the secret is unset or unreadable. Refs: INFRA-74 * Log Secrets Manager failures in web UI auth token fetch The web UI auth gate correctly fails closed when the shared token cannot be read, but _get_auth_token() swallowed every exception silently. A Secrets Manager permission or config error then made every request 401 with no operational signal, leaving an outage indistinguishable from ordinary unauthenticated traffic. Add a module-level logger to both web_ui handlers and log the fetch failure with logger.exception() in the except block before returning None. Behavior is unchanged (still fails closed); the failure is now visible in CloudWatch. The secret value is never logged. The two handlers stay byte-consistent in the mirrored _get_auth_token() region. The companion finding on the CDK import of the shared procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token secret was evaluated and left as-is: the token is a single secret shared by both the PO and WO stacks, so from_secret_name_v2 (which scopes grant_read via the standard 6-char suffix wildcard) is correct; making it a CDK-managed Secret in both stacks would collide the two stacks on the same explicit secret name at deploy time. Refs: INFRA-74 * Make Cancelled PO status sticky via atomic write The PO merge path read status with a get_item (_is_cancelled) and then wrote with an unconditional update_item. Two defects followed from this: - Race (Issue A): a cancellation landing between the read and the write was silently un-cancelled by a revision carrying a non-cancelled po_status — a TOCTOU on a table with concurrent email processing. - Over-broad strip (Issue B): save_revision dropped po_status whenever the PO was Cancelled, so legitimate status updates on non-cancelled POs and status-less revisions were affected rather than only the true un-cancel transition. Enforce the invariant server-side instead. "Cancelled" is a sticky, authoritative status: once set, later new_po/revision emails may enrich other fields but must never move it to a non-cancelled status. When the payload carries a non-cancelled po_status, _merge_update issues the update_item guarded by ConditionExpression "attribute_not_exists(po_status) OR po_status <> :marker", evaluated atomically at write time, so a cancellation that lands first always wins. On ConditionalCheckFailedException the same fields are re-written without po_status/cancelled_at, enriching the record while Cancelled sticks. Payloads with no status change, or an already -Cancelled status, take a plain merge — the status is only ever suppressed on a real un-cancel. This removes the non-atomic get_item from the write path; _is_cancelled is deleted. Key schema and attribute names are unchanged, so the cross-stack purchase-orders contract (read-only by seahaven-slack-bot) holds. Add moto-backed tests covering un-cancel suppression with field enrichment, status-less merge onto a Cancelled PO, legitimate status updates on non-cancelled POs, new_po backfill of a Cancelled skeleton, fresh create/merge, and authoritative save_cancellation. Refs: #97
2026-07-15 20:17:46 -04:00
def _write_fields(po_number: str, fields: dict, *, guard_cancelled: bool):
"""SET the given non-null fields on a PO record via update_item.
Only the fields supplied are written; absent fields are left untouched, so a
partial payload can never delete data that an earlier email established. The
record is created if it does not exist (DynamoDB update_item upsert).
When ``guard_cancelled`` is True the write carries a ConditionExpression that
only permits it while the record is not already Cancelled. The condition is
evaluated atomically by DynamoDB at write time, so a cancellation that lands
first always wins — there is no read-then-write TOCTOU window. A failed guard
raises ConditionalCheckFailedException for the caller to handle.
"""
table = dynamodb.Table(PO_TABLE)
Land safe fixes from 2026-06-17 security sweep (#97) * Remove gratuitous KMS grant on shared DynamoDB CMK wo-email-processor held grant_encrypt_decrypt on the shared seahaven-dynamodb CMK, but the WorkOrders/WorkOrderComments tables are not encrypted with that CMK. The grant was dead weight that extended the WO processor's decrypt reach to the CMK protecting the purchase-orders table (cross-stack decrypt). Drop it to restore least privilege; re-add as part of the table CMK migration (INFRA-6). Refs: INFRA-6 * Require Secrets Manager key for Anthropic client Remove the silent fallback to a plaintext ANTHROPIC_API_KEY env var in both email processors; require ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN and raise if absent so a misconfigured deploy fails loudly instead of using an unmanaged key. Adapted from f175323 on security/sweep-2026-06-17. The From-header sender-domain allowlist from that commit is intentionally dropped: the From header is spoofable (INFRA-107, confirmed critical) and sender authentication is being reworked in a separate PR. Refs: INFRA-107 * Merge PO revisions and handle out-of-order events save_revision did a full put_item overwrite, so a revision omitting line_items/supplier permanently deleted them. save_new_po used a conditional put that silently dropped the PO when an out-of-order cancellation had already created a skeleton row. Switch both to field-level merge update_items: a revision now SETs only the fields it carries, and a new_po backfills data into a pre-existing Cancelled skeleton while preserving the Cancelled status. No email can now delete data established by an earlier one. * Gate web UIs behind auth and escape currency XSS The po-web-ui and workorder-web-ui handlers had no auth: any invocation path returned the full PO/WO DB. Add a fail-closed shared-secret gate (X-Auth-Token / Bearer, constant-time compared to WEB_UI_AUTH_TOKEN) so a future re-attached Function URL cannot re-expose the data (URLs removed under INFRA-74). Wire the token from the SSM String param /procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token. Also fix stored XSS in po-web-ui fmt_currency: the non-numeric fallback returned str(val) unescaped, so a prompt-injected email could make Claude emit total_amount as <script>. Escape it. Refs: INFRA-74 * Document sweep security fixes and merge semantics Update the README for the 2026-06-17 security sweep: required Secrets Manager key (no plaintext env fallback), web UI auth gate + SSM token setup step, output-escaping note, and the new PO revision/cancellation merge behavior. Adapted from d91f45e on security/sweep-2026-06-17; the sender allowlist documentation is dropped along with the allowlist itself (deferred to the INFRA-107 sender-authentication rework). Refs: INFRA-107 * fix: resolve web UI auth token from Secrets Manager at runtime Replace the plaintext SSM String parameter with a Secrets Manager secret referenced by ARN only. The token is fetched and cached at module level on first invocation, keeping shared secrets out of CloudFormation templates and Lambda environment variables. Refs: PR-97 * Add TTL to web UI auth token cache for rotation The web-ui handlers cached the Secrets Manager auth token at module level with no expiry, so a rotated secret was only picked up when the warm container recycled — an emergency rotation could take hours to take effect. Cache the fetched value for a 5-minute TTL instead, so a rotated token propagates within the TTL while still avoiding a Secrets Manager call on every request. Still fails closed when the secret is unset or unreadable. Refs: INFRA-74 * Log Secrets Manager failures in web UI auth token fetch The web UI auth gate correctly fails closed when the shared token cannot be read, but _get_auth_token() swallowed every exception silently. A Secrets Manager permission or config error then made every request 401 with no operational signal, leaving an outage indistinguishable from ordinary unauthenticated traffic. Add a module-level logger to both web_ui handlers and log the fetch failure with logger.exception() in the except block before returning None. Behavior is unchanged (still fails closed); the failure is now visible in CloudWatch. The secret value is never logged. The two handlers stay byte-consistent in the mirrored _get_auth_token() region. The companion finding on the CDK import of the shared procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token secret was evaluated and left as-is: the token is a single secret shared by both the PO and WO stacks, so from_secret_name_v2 (which scopes grant_read via the standard 6-char suffix wildcard) is correct; making it a CDK-managed Secret in both stacks would collide the two stacks on the same explicit secret name at deploy time. Refs: INFRA-74 * Make Cancelled PO status sticky via atomic write The PO merge path read status with a get_item (_is_cancelled) and then wrote with an unconditional update_item. Two defects followed from this: - Race (Issue A): a cancellation landing between the read and the write was silently un-cancelled by a revision carrying a non-cancelled po_status — a TOCTOU on a table with concurrent email processing. - Over-broad strip (Issue B): save_revision dropped po_status whenever the PO was Cancelled, so legitimate status updates on non-cancelled POs and status-less revisions were affected rather than only the true un-cancel transition. Enforce the invariant server-side instead. "Cancelled" is a sticky, authoritative status: once set, later new_po/revision emails may enrich other fields but must never move it to a non-cancelled status. When the payload carries a non-cancelled po_status, _merge_update issues the update_item guarded by ConditionExpression "attribute_not_exists(po_status) OR po_status <> :marker", evaluated atomically at write time, so a cancellation that lands first always wins. On ConditionalCheckFailedException the same fields are re-written without po_status/cancelled_at, enriching the record while Cancelled sticks. Payloads with no status change, or an already -Cancelled status, take a plain merge — the status is only ever suppressed on a real un-cancel. This removes the non-atomic get_item from the write path; _is_cancelled is deleted. Key schema and attribute names are unchanged, so the cross-stack purchase-orders contract (read-only by seahaven-slack-bot) holds. Add moto-backed tests covering un-cancel suppression with field enrichment, status-less merge onto a Cancelled PO, legitimate status updates on non-cancelled POs, new_po backfill of a Cancelled skeleton, fresh create/merge, and authoritative save_cancellation. Refs: #97
2026-07-15 20:17:46 -04:00
set_parts = []
attr_names = {}
attr_values = {}
for key, value in fields.items():
if value is None or key == "po_number":
continue
name_ph = f"#{key}"
val_ph = f":{key}"
attr_names[name_ph] = key
attr_values[val_ph] = value
set_parts.append(f"{name_ph} = {val_ph}")
if not set_parts:
return
params = {
"Key": {"po_number": po_number},
"UpdateExpression": "SET " + ", ".join(set_parts),
"ExpressionAttributeNames": attr_names,
"ExpressionAttributeValues": attr_values,
}
if guard_cancelled:
params["ExpressionAttributeValues"][":__cancelled_marker"] = CANCELLED_STATUS
params["ConditionExpression"] = (
"attribute_not_exists(po_status) OR po_status <> :__cancelled_marker"
)
Land safe fixes from 2026-06-17 security sweep (#97) * Remove gratuitous KMS grant on shared DynamoDB CMK wo-email-processor held grant_encrypt_decrypt on the shared seahaven-dynamodb CMK, but the WorkOrders/WorkOrderComments tables are not encrypted with that CMK. The grant was dead weight that extended the WO processor's decrypt reach to the CMK protecting the purchase-orders table (cross-stack decrypt). Drop it to restore least privilege; re-add as part of the table CMK migration (INFRA-6). Refs: INFRA-6 * Require Secrets Manager key for Anthropic client Remove the silent fallback to a plaintext ANTHROPIC_API_KEY env var in both email processors; require ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN and raise if absent so a misconfigured deploy fails loudly instead of using an unmanaged key. Adapted from f175323 on security/sweep-2026-06-17. The From-header sender-domain allowlist from that commit is intentionally dropped: the From header is spoofable (INFRA-107, confirmed critical) and sender authentication is being reworked in a separate PR. Refs: INFRA-107 * Merge PO revisions and handle out-of-order events save_revision did a full put_item overwrite, so a revision omitting line_items/supplier permanently deleted them. save_new_po used a conditional put that silently dropped the PO when an out-of-order cancellation had already created a skeleton row. Switch both to field-level merge update_items: a revision now SETs only the fields it carries, and a new_po backfills data into a pre-existing Cancelled skeleton while preserving the Cancelled status. No email can now delete data established by an earlier one. * Gate web UIs behind auth and escape currency XSS The po-web-ui and workorder-web-ui handlers had no auth: any invocation path returned the full PO/WO DB. Add a fail-closed shared-secret gate (X-Auth-Token / Bearer, constant-time compared to WEB_UI_AUTH_TOKEN) so a future re-attached Function URL cannot re-expose the data (URLs removed under INFRA-74). Wire the token from the SSM String param /procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token. Also fix stored XSS in po-web-ui fmt_currency: the non-numeric fallback returned str(val) unescaped, so a prompt-injected email could make Claude emit total_amount as <script>. Escape it. Refs: INFRA-74 * Document sweep security fixes and merge semantics Update the README for the 2026-06-17 security sweep: required Secrets Manager key (no plaintext env fallback), web UI auth gate + SSM token setup step, output-escaping note, and the new PO revision/cancellation merge behavior. Adapted from d91f45e on security/sweep-2026-06-17; the sender allowlist documentation is dropped along with the allowlist itself (deferred to the INFRA-107 sender-authentication rework). Refs: INFRA-107 * fix: resolve web UI auth token from Secrets Manager at runtime Replace the plaintext SSM String parameter with a Secrets Manager secret referenced by ARN only. The token is fetched and cached at module level on first invocation, keeping shared secrets out of CloudFormation templates and Lambda environment variables. Refs: PR-97 * Add TTL to web UI auth token cache for rotation The web-ui handlers cached the Secrets Manager auth token at module level with no expiry, so a rotated secret was only picked up when the warm container recycled — an emergency rotation could take hours to take effect. Cache the fetched value for a 5-minute TTL instead, so a rotated token propagates within the TTL while still avoiding a Secrets Manager call on every request. Still fails closed when the secret is unset or unreadable. Refs: INFRA-74 * Log Secrets Manager failures in web UI auth token fetch The web UI auth gate correctly fails closed when the shared token cannot be read, but _get_auth_token() swallowed every exception silently. A Secrets Manager permission or config error then made every request 401 with no operational signal, leaving an outage indistinguishable from ordinary unauthenticated traffic. Add a module-level logger to both web_ui handlers and log the fetch failure with logger.exception() in the except block before returning None. Behavior is unchanged (still fails closed); the failure is now visible in CloudWatch. The secret value is never logged. The two handlers stay byte-consistent in the mirrored _get_auth_token() region. The companion finding on the CDK import of the shared procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token secret was evaluated and left as-is: the token is a single secret shared by both the PO and WO stacks, so from_secret_name_v2 (which scopes grant_read via the standard 6-char suffix wildcard) is correct; making it a CDK-managed Secret in both stacks would collide the two stacks on the same explicit secret name at deploy time. Refs: INFRA-74 * Make Cancelled PO status sticky via atomic write The PO merge path read status with a get_item (_is_cancelled) and then wrote with an unconditional update_item. Two defects followed from this: - Race (Issue A): a cancellation landing between the read and the write was silently un-cancelled by a revision carrying a non-cancelled po_status — a TOCTOU on a table with concurrent email processing. - Over-broad strip (Issue B): save_revision dropped po_status whenever the PO was Cancelled, so legitimate status updates on non-cancelled POs and status-less revisions were affected rather than only the true un-cancel transition. Enforce the invariant server-side instead. "Cancelled" is a sticky, authoritative status: once set, later new_po/revision emails may enrich other fields but must never move it to a non-cancelled status. When the payload carries a non-cancelled po_status, _merge_update issues the update_item guarded by ConditionExpression "attribute_not_exists(po_status) OR po_status <> :marker", evaluated atomically at write time, so a cancellation that lands first always wins. On ConditionalCheckFailedException the same fields are re-written without po_status/cancelled_at, enriching the record while Cancelled sticks. Payloads with no status change, or an already -Cancelled status, take a plain merge — the status is only ever suppressed on a real un-cancel. This removes the non-atomic get_item from the write path; _is_cancelled is deleted. Key schema and attribute names are unchanged, so the cross-stack purchase-orders contract (read-only by seahaven-slack-bot) holds. Add moto-backed tests covering un-cancel suppression with field enrichment, status-less merge onto a Cancelled PO, legitimate status updates on non-cancelled POs, new_po backfill of a Cancelled skeleton, fresh create/merge, and authoritative save_cancellation. Refs: #97
2026-07-15 20:17:46 -04:00
table.update_item(**params)
def _merge_update(po_number: str, fields: dict):
"""Merge (SET-only) the given fields onto a PO record, keeping Cancelled sticky.
Only the fields supplied are written; absent fields are left untouched. The
record is created if it does not exist (DynamoDB update_item upsert).
"Cancelled" is a sticky, authoritative status. When the incoming payload
carries a non-cancelled ``po_status``, the write is guarded by a
ConditionExpression so the status is only applied while the record is not
already Cancelled — enforced atomically at write time, eliminating the
read-then-write TOCTOU where a concurrently-landing cancellation could be
silently un-cancelled. If the guard fails (the PO is already Cancelled), the
same fields are re-written WITHOUT po_status/cancelled_at and
unconditionally, so the other fields still merge while the Cancelled status
stays intact.
A payload with no ``po_status``, or one whose status is already "Cancelled",
needs no guard — a plain merge is correct. This is what keeps legitimate
status updates (non-cancelled PO) and status-less revisions from ever being
dropped: the status is only ever suppressed on a true un-cancel transition.
"""
incoming_status = fields.get("po_status")
if incoming_status is None or incoming_status == CANCELLED_STATUS:
_write_fields(po_number, fields, guard_cancelled=False)
return
try:
_write_fields(po_number, fields, guard_cancelled=True)
except dynamodb.meta.client.exceptions.ConditionalCheckFailedException:
Land safe fixes from 2026-06-17 security sweep (#97) * Remove gratuitous KMS grant on shared DynamoDB CMK wo-email-processor held grant_encrypt_decrypt on the shared seahaven-dynamodb CMK, but the WorkOrders/WorkOrderComments tables are not encrypted with that CMK. The grant was dead weight that extended the WO processor's decrypt reach to the CMK protecting the purchase-orders table (cross-stack decrypt). Drop it to restore least privilege; re-add as part of the table CMK migration (INFRA-6). Refs: INFRA-6 * Require Secrets Manager key for Anthropic client Remove the silent fallback to a plaintext ANTHROPIC_API_KEY env var in both email processors; require ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN and raise if absent so a misconfigured deploy fails loudly instead of using an unmanaged key. Adapted from f175323 on security/sweep-2026-06-17. The From-header sender-domain allowlist from that commit is intentionally dropped: the From header is spoofable (INFRA-107, confirmed critical) and sender authentication is being reworked in a separate PR. Refs: INFRA-107 * Merge PO revisions and handle out-of-order events save_revision did a full put_item overwrite, so a revision omitting line_items/supplier permanently deleted them. save_new_po used a conditional put that silently dropped the PO when an out-of-order cancellation had already created a skeleton row. Switch both to field-level merge update_items: a revision now SETs only the fields it carries, and a new_po backfills data into a pre-existing Cancelled skeleton while preserving the Cancelled status. No email can now delete data established by an earlier one. * Gate web UIs behind auth and escape currency XSS The po-web-ui and workorder-web-ui handlers had no auth: any invocation path returned the full PO/WO DB. Add a fail-closed shared-secret gate (X-Auth-Token / Bearer, constant-time compared to WEB_UI_AUTH_TOKEN) so a future re-attached Function URL cannot re-expose the data (URLs removed under INFRA-74). Wire the token from the SSM String param /procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token. Also fix stored XSS in po-web-ui fmt_currency: the non-numeric fallback returned str(val) unescaped, so a prompt-injected email could make Claude emit total_amount as <script>. Escape it. Refs: INFRA-74 * Document sweep security fixes and merge semantics Update the README for the 2026-06-17 security sweep: required Secrets Manager key (no plaintext env fallback), web UI auth gate + SSM token setup step, output-escaping note, and the new PO revision/cancellation merge behavior. Adapted from d91f45e on security/sweep-2026-06-17; the sender allowlist documentation is dropped along with the allowlist itself (deferred to the INFRA-107 sender-authentication rework). Refs: INFRA-107 * fix: resolve web UI auth token from Secrets Manager at runtime Replace the plaintext SSM String parameter with a Secrets Manager secret referenced by ARN only. The token is fetched and cached at module level on first invocation, keeping shared secrets out of CloudFormation templates and Lambda environment variables. Refs: PR-97 * Add TTL to web UI auth token cache for rotation The web-ui handlers cached the Secrets Manager auth token at module level with no expiry, so a rotated secret was only picked up when the warm container recycled — an emergency rotation could take hours to take effect. Cache the fetched value for a 5-minute TTL instead, so a rotated token propagates within the TTL while still avoiding a Secrets Manager call on every request. Still fails closed when the secret is unset or unreadable. Refs: INFRA-74 * Log Secrets Manager failures in web UI auth token fetch The web UI auth gate correctly fails closed when the shared token cannot be read, but _get_auth_token() swallowed every exception silently. A Secrets Manager permission or config error then made every request 401 with no operational signal, leaving an outage indistinguishable from ordinary unauthenticated traffic. Add a module-level logger to both web_ui handlers and log the fetch failure with logger.exception() in the except block before returning None. Behavior is unchanged (still fails closed); the failure is now visible in CloudWatch. The secret value is never logged. The two handlers stay byte-consistent in the mirrored _get_auth_token() region. The companion finding on the CDK import of the shared procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token secret was evaluated and left as-is: the token is a single secret shared by both the PO and WO stacks, so from_secret_name_v2 (which scopes grant_read via the standard 6-char suffix wildcard) is correct; making it a CDK-managed Secret in both stacks would collide the two stacks on the same explicit secret name at deploy time. Refs: INFRA-74 * Make Cancelled PO status sticky via atomic write The PO merge path read status with a get_item (_is_cancelled) and then wrote with an unconditional update_item. Two defects followed from this: - Race (Issue A): a cancellation landing between the read and the write was silently un-cancelled by a revision carrying a non-cancelled po_status — a TOCTOU on a table with concurrent email processing. - Over-broad strip (Issue B): save_revision dropped po_status whenever the PO was Cancelled, so legitimate status updates on non-cancelled POs and status-less revisions were affected rather than only the true un-cancel transition. Enforce the invariant server-side instead. "Cancelled" is a sticky, authoritative status: once set, later new_po/revision emails may enrich other fields but must never move it to a non-cancelled status. When the payload carries a non-cancelled po_status, _merge_update issues the update_item guarded by ConditionExpression "attribute_not_exists(po_status) OR po_status <> :marker", evaluated atomically at write time, so a cancellation that lands first always wins. On ConditionalCheckFailedException the same fields are re-written without po_status/cancelled_at, enriching the record while Cancelled sticks. Payloads with no status change, or an already -Cancelled status, take a plain merge — the status is only ever suppressed on a real un-cancel. This removes the non-atomic get_item from the write path; _is_cancelled is deleted. Key schema and attribute names are unchanged, so the cross-stack purchase-orders contract (read-only by seahaven-slack-bot) holds. Add moto-backed tests covering un-cancel suppression with field enrichment, status-less merge onto a Cancelled PO, legitimate status updates on non-cancelled POs, new_po backfill of a Cancelled skeleton, fresh create/merge, and authoritative save_cancellation. Refs: #97
2026-07-15 20:17:46 -04:00
logger.info(
f"PO {po_number} is Cancelled; suppressing incoming "
f"po_status={incoming_status!r} and merging remaining fields"
)
enrich_fields = {
k: v for k, v in fields.items() if k not in ("po_status", "cancelled_at")
}
_write_fields(po_number, enrich_fields, guard_cancelled=False)
def save_new_po(parsed: dict):
"""Create a PO, merging into any pre-existing record.
Uses a merge update rather than a conditional put so that an out-of-order
cancellation (which leaves a Cancelled skeleton) is filled in with the full
PO data instead of the new_po being silently dropped. "Cancelled" is a sticky
status enforced atomically inside _merge_update: if the PO was already
cancelled, the new_po backfills its remaining fields (supplier, line_items,
amounts) but never un-cancels it.
"""
po_number = parsed["po_number"]
fields = {k: v for k, v in parsed.items() if v is not None}
_merge_update(po_number, fields)
logger.info(f"Created/merged PO {po_number}")
def save_revision(parsed: dict):
Land safe fixes from 2026-06-17 security sweep (#97) * Remove gratuitous KMS grant on shared DynamoDB CMK wo-email-processor held grant_encrypt_decrypt on the shared seahaven-dynamodb CMK, but the WorkOrders/WorkOrderComments tables are not encrypted with that CMK. The grant was dead weight that extended the WO processor's decrypt reach to the CMK protecting the purchase-orders table (cross-stack decrypt). Drop it to restore least privilege; re-add as part of the table CMK migration (INFRA-6). Refs: INFRA-6 * Require Secrets Manager key for Anthropic client Remove the silent fallback to a plaintext ANTHROPIC_API_KEY env var in both email processors; require ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN and raise if absent so a misconfigured deploy fails loudly instead of using an unmanaged key. Adapted from f175323 on security/sweep-2026-06-17. The From-header sender-domain allowlist from that commit is intentionally dropped: the From header is spoofable (INFRA-107, confirmed critical) and sender authentication is being reworked in a separate PR. Refs: INFRA-107 * Merge PO revisions and handle out-of-order events save_revision did a full put_item overwrite, so a revision omitting line_items/supplier permanently deleted them. save_new_po used a conditional put that silently dropped the PO when an out-of-order cancellation had already created a skeleton row. Switch both to field-level merge update_items: a revision now SETs only the fields it carries, and a new_po backfills data into a pre-existing Cancelled skeleton while preserving the Cancelled status. No email can now delete data established by an earlier one. * Gate web UIs behind auth and escape currency XSS The po-web-ui and workorder-web-ui handlers had no auth: any invocation path returned the full PO/WO DB. Add a fail-closed shared-secret gate (X-Auth-Token / Bearer, constant-time compared to WEB_UI_AUTH_TOKEN) so a future re-attached Function URL cannot re-expose the data (URLs removed under INFRA-74). Wire the token from the SSM String param /procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token. Also fix stored XSS in po-web-ui fmt_currency: the non-numeric fallback returned str(val) unescaped, so a prompt-injected email could make Claude emit total_amount as <script>. Escape it. Refs: INFRA-74 * Document sweep security fixes and merge semantics Update the README for the 2026-06-17 security sweep: required Secrets Manager key (no plaintext env fallback), web UI auth gate + SSM token setup step, output-escaping note, and the new PO revision/cancellation merge behavior. Adapted from d91f45e on security/sweep-2026-06-17; the sender allowlist documentation is dropped along with the allowlist itself (deferred to the INFRA-107 sender-authentication rework). Refs: INFRA-107 * fix: resolve web UI auth token from Secrets Manager at runtime Replace the plaintext SSM String parameter with a Secrets Manager secret referenced by ARN only. The token is fetched and cached at module level on first invocation, keeping shared secrets out of CloudFormation templates and Lambda environment variables. Refs: PR-97 * Add TTL to web UI auth token cache for rotation The web-ui handlers cached the Secrets Manager auth token at module level with no expiry, so a rotated secret was only picked up when the warm container recycled — an emergency rotation could take hours to take effect. Cache the fetched value for a 5-minute TTL instead, so a rotated token propagates within the TTL while still avoiding a Secrets Manager call on every request. Still fails closed when the secret is unset or unreadable. Refs: INFRA-74 * Log Secrets Manager failures in web UI auth token fetch The web UI auth gate correctly fails closed when the shared token cannot be read, but _get_auth_token() swallowed every exception silently. A Secrets Manager permission or config error then made every request 401 with no operational signal, leaving an outage indistinguishable from ordinary unauthenticated traffic. Add a module-level logger to both web_ui handlers and log the fetch failure with logger.exception() in the except block before returning None. Behavior is unchanged (still fails closed); the failure is now visible in CloudWatch. The secret value is never logged. The two handlers stay byte-consistent in the mirrored _get_auth_token() region. The companion finding on the CDK import of the shared procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token secret was evaluated and left as-is: the token is a single secret shared by both the PO and WO stacks, so from_secret_name_v2 (which scopes grant_read via the standard 6-char suffix wildcard) is correct; making it a CDK-managed Secret in both stacks would collide the two stacks on the same explicit secret name at deploy time. Refs: INFRA-74 * Make Cancelled PO status sticky via atomic write The PO merge path read status with a get_item (_is_cancelled) and then wrote with an unconditional update_item. Two defects followed from this: - Race (Issue A): a cancellation landing between the read and the write was silently un-cancelled by a revision carrying a non-cancelled po_status — a TOCTOU on a table with concurrent email processing. - Over-broad strip (Issue B): save_revision dropped po_status whenever the PO was Cancelled, so legitimate status updates on non-cancelled POs and status-less revisions were affected rather than only the true un-cancel transition. Enforce the invariant server-side instead. "Cancelled" is a sticky, authoritative status: once set, later new_po/revision emails may enrich other fields but must never move it to a non-cancelled status. When the payload carries a non-cancelled po_status, _merge_update issues the update_item guarded by ConditionExpression "attribute_not_exists(po_status) OR po_status <> :marker", evaluated atomically at write time, so a cancellation that lands first always wins. On ConditionalCheckFailedException the same fields are re-written without po_status/cancelled_at, enriching the record while Cancelled sticks. Payloads with no status change, or an already -Cancelled status, take a plain merge — the status is only ever suppressed on a real un-cancel. This removes the non-atomic get_item from the write path; _is_cancelled is deleted. Key schema and attribute names are unchanged, so the cross-stack purchase-orders contract (read-only by seahaven-slack-bot) holds. Add moto-backed tests covering un-cancel suppression with field enrichment, status-less merge onto a Cancelled PO, legitimate status updates on non-cancelled POs, new_po backfill of a Cancelled skeleton, fresh create/merge, and authoritative save_cancellation. Refs: #97
2026-07-15 20:17:46 -04:00
"""Merge revised data into an existing PO without deleting omitted fields.
Land safe fixes from 2026-06-17 security sweep (#97) * Remove gratuitous KMS grant on shared DynamoDB CMK wo-email-processor held grant_encrypt_decrypt on the shared seahaven-dynamodb CMK, but the WorkOrders/WorkOrderComments tables are not encrypted with that CMK. The grant was dead weight that extended the WO processor's decrypt reach to the CMK protecting the purchase-orders table (cross-stack decrypt). Drop it to restore least privilege; re-add as part of the table CMK migration (INFRA-6). Refs: INFRA-6 * Require Secrets Manager key for Anthropic client Remove the silent fallback to a plaintext ANTHROPIC_API_KEY env var in both email processors; require ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN and raise if absent so a misconfigured deploy fails loudly instead of using an unmanaged key. Adapted from f175323 on security/sweep-2026-06-17. The From-header sender-domain allowlist from that commit is intentionally dropped: the From header is spoofable (INFRA-107, confirmed critical) and sender authentication is being reworked in a separate PR. Refs: INFRA-107 * Merge PO revisions and handle out-of-order events save_revision did a full put_item overwrite, so a revision omitting line_items/supplier permanently deleted them. save_new_po used a conditional put that silently dropped the PO when an out-of-order cancellation had already created a skeleton row. Switch both to field-level merge update_items: a revision now SETs only the fields it carries, and a new_po backfills data into a pre-existing Cancelled skeleton while preserving the Cancelled status. No email can now delete data established by an earlier one. * Gate web UIs behind auth and escape currency XSS The po-web-ui and workorder-web-ui handlers had no auth: any invocation path returned the full PO/WO DB. Add a fail-closed shared-secret gate (X-Auth-Token / Bearer, constant-time compared to WEB_UI_AUTH_TOKEN) so a future re-attached Function URL cannot re-expose the data (URLs removed under INFRA-74). Wire the token from the SSM String param /procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token. Also fix stored XSS in po-web-ui fmt_currency: the non-numeric fallback returned str(val) unescaped, so a prompt-injected email could make Claude emit total_amount as <script>. Escape it. Refs: INFRA-74 * Document sweep security fixes and merge semantics Update the README for the 2026-06-17 security sweep: required Secrets Manager key (no plaintext env fallback), web UI auth gate + SSM token setup step, output-escaping note, and the new PO revision/cancellation merge behavior. Adapted from d91f45e on security/sweep-2026-06-17; the sender allowlist documentation is dropped along with the allowlist itself (deferred to the INFRA-107 sender-authentication rework). Refs: INFRA-107 * fix: resolve web UI auth token from Secrets Manager at runtime Replace the plaintext SSM String parameter with a Secrets Manager secret referenced by ARN only. The token is fetched and cached at module level on first invocation, keeping shared secrets out of CloudFormation templates and Lambda environment variables. Refs: PR-97 * Add TTL to web UI auth token cache for rotation The web-ui handlers cached the Secrets Manager auth token at module level with no expiry, so a rotated secret was only picked up when the warm container recycled — an emergency rotation could take hours to take effect. Cache the fetched value for a 5-minute TTL instead, so a rotated token propagates within the TTL while still avoiding a Secrets Manager call on every request. Still fails closed when the secret is unset or unreadable. Refs: INFRA-74 * Log Secrets Manager failures in web UI auth token fetch The web UI auth gate correctly fails closed when the shared token cannot be read, but _get_auth_token() swallowed every exception silently. A Secrets Manager permission or config error then made every request 401 with no operational signal, leaving an outage indistinguishable from ordinary unauthenticated traffic. Add a module-level logger to both web_ui handlers and log the fetch failure with logger.exception() in the except block before returning None. Behavior is unchanged (still fails closed); the failure is now visible in CloudWatch. The secret value is never logged. The two handlers stay byte-consistent in the mirrored _get_auth_token() region. The companion finding on the CDK import of the shared procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token secret was evaluated and left as-is: the token is a single secret shared by both the PO and WO stacks, so from_secret_name_v2 (which scopes grant_read via the standard 6-char suffix wildcard) is correct; making it a CDK-managed Secret in both stacks would collide the two stacks on the same explicit secret name at deploy time. Refs: INFRA-74 * Make Cancelled PO status sticky via atomic write The PO merge path read status with a get_item (_is_cancelled) and then wrote with an unconditional update_item. Two defects followed from this: - Race (Issue A): a cancellation landing between the read and the write was silently un-cancelled by a revision carrying a non-cancelled po_status — a TOCTOU on a table with concurrent email processing. - Over-broad strip (Issue B): save_revision dropped po_status whenever the PO was Cancelled, so legitimate status updates on non-cancelled POs and status-less revisions were affected rather than only the true un-cancel transition. Enforce the invariant server-side instead. "Cancelled" is a sticky, authoritative status: once set, later new_po/revision emails may enrich other fields but must never move it to a non-cancelled status. When the payload carries a non-cancelled po_status, _merge_update issues the update_item guarded by ConditionExpression "attribute_not_exists(po_status) OR po_status <> :marker", evaluated atomically at write time, so a cancellation that lands first always wins. On ConditionalCheckFailedException the same fields are re-written without po_status/cancelled_at, enriching the record while Cancelled sticks. Payloads with no status change, or an already -Cancelled status, take a plain merge — the status is only ever suppressed on a real un-cancel. This removes the non-atomic get_item from the write path; _is_cancelled is deleted. Key schema and attribute names are unchanged, so the cross-stack purchase-orders contract (read-only by seahaven-slack-bot) holds. Add moto-backed tests covering un-cancel suppression with field enrichment, status-less merge onto a Cancelled PO, legitimate status updates on non-cancelled POs, new_po backfill of a Cancelled skeleton, fresh create/merge, and authoritative save_cancellation. Refs: #97
2026-07-15 20:17:46 -04:00
A revision email often omits unchanged sections (line_items, supplier). The
previous full-overwrite put_item permanently dropped those. This SETs only the
fields present in the revision, leaving everything else intact.
"Cancelled" is a sticky status: a revision may enrich a cancelled PO's fields
but must never move it to a non-cancelled status. That invariant is enforced
atomically inside _merge_update and applies ONLY to the un-cancel transition —
a revision that carries no status change, or one targeting a non-cancelled PO,
updates po_status normally.
"""
po_number = parsed["po_number"]
fields = {k: v for k, v in parsed.items() if v is not None}
_merge_update(po_number, fields)
logger.info(f"Revised PO {po_number}")
def save_cancellation(parsed: dict):
Land safe fixes from 2026-06-17 security sweep (#97) * Remove gratuitous KMS grant on shared DynamoDB CMK wo-email-processor held grant_encrypt_decrypt on the shared seahaven-dynamodb CMK, but the WorkOrders/WorkOrderComments tables are not encrypted with that CMK. The grant was dead weight that extended the WO processor's decrypt reach to the CMK protecting the purchase-orders table (cross-stack decrypt). Drop it to restore least privilege; re-add as part of the table CMK migration (INFRA-6). Refs: INFRA-6 * Require Secrets Manager key for Anthropic client Remove the silent fallback to a plaintext ANTHROPIC_API_KEY env var in both email processors; require ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN and raise if absent so a misconfigured deploy fails loudly instead of using an unmanaged key. Adapted from f175323 on security/sweep-2026-06-17. The From-header sender-domain allowlist from that commit is intentionally dropped: the From header is spoofable (INFRA-107, confirmed critical) and sender authentication is being reworked in a separate PR. Refs: INFRA-107 * Merge PO revisions and handle out-of-order events save_revision did a full put_item overwrite, so a revision omitting line_items/supplier permanently deleted them. save_new_po used a conditional put that silently dropped the PO when an out-of-order cancellation had already created a skeleton row. Switch both to field-level merge update_items: a revision now SETs only the fields it carries, and a new_po backfills data into a pre-existing Cancelled skeleton while preserving the Cancelled status. No email can now delete data established by an earlier one. * Gate web UIs behind auth and escape currency XSS The po-web-ui and workorder-web-ui handlers had no auth: any invocation path returned the full PO/WO DB. Add a fail-closed shared-secret gate (X-Auth-Token / Bearer, constant-time compared to WEB_UI_AUTH_TOKEN) so a future re-attached Function URL cannot re-expose the data (URLs removed under INFRA-74). Wire the token from the SSM String param /procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token. Also fix stored XSS in po-web-ui fmt_currency: the non-numeric fallback returned str(val) unescaped, so a prompt-injected email could make Claude emit total_amount as <script>. Escape it. Refs: INFRA-74 * Document sweep security fixes and merge semantics Update the README for the 2026-06-17 security sweep: required Secrets Manager key (no plaintext env fallback), web UI auth gate + SSM token setup step, output-escaping note, and the new PO revision/cancellation merge behavior. Adapted from d91f45e on security/sweep-2026-06-17; the sender allowlist documentation is dropped along with the allowlist itself (deferred to the INFRA-107 sender-authentication rework). Refs: INFRA-107 * fix: resolve web UI auth token from Secrets Manager at runtime Replace the plaintext SSM String parameter with a Secrets Manager secret referenced by ARN only. The token is fetched and cached at module level on first invocation, keeping shared secrets out of CloudFormation templates and Lambda environment variables. Refs: PR-97 * Add TTL to web UI auth token cache for rotation The web-ui handlers cached the Secrets Manager auth token at module level with no expiry, so a rotated secret was only picked up when the warm container recycled — an emergency rotation could take hours to take effect. Cache the fetched value for a 5-minute TTL instead, so a rotated token propagates within the TTL while still avoiding a Secrets Manager call on every request. Still fails closed when the secret is unset or unreadable. Refs: INFRA-74 * Log Secrets Manager failures in web UI auth token fetch The web UI auth gate correctly fails closed when the shared token cannot be read, but _get_auth_token() swallowed every exception silently. A Secrets Manager permission or config error then made every request 401 with no operational signal, leaving an outage indistinguishable from ordinary unauthenticated traffic. Add a module-level logger to both web_ui handlers and log the fetch failure with logger.exception() in the except block before returning None. Behavior is unchanged (still fails closed); the failure is now visible in CloudWatch. The secret value is never logged. The two handlers stay byte-consistent in the mirrored _get_auth_token() region. The companion finding on the CDK import of the shared procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token secret was evaluated and left as-is: the token is a single secret shared by both the PO and WO stacks, so from_secret_name_v2 (which scopes grant_read via the standard 6-char suffix wildcard) is correct; making it a CDK-managed Secret in both stacks would collide the two stacks on the same explicit secret name at deploy time. Refs: INFRA-74 * Make Cancelled PO status sticky via atomic write The PO merge path read status with a get_item (_is_cancelled) and then wrote with an unconditional update_item. Two defects followed from this: - Race (Issue A): a cancellation landing between the read and the write was silently un-cancelled by a revision carrying a non-cancelled po_status — a TOCTOU on a table with concurrent email processing. - Over-broad strip (Issue B): save_revision dropped po_status whenever the PO was Cancelled, so legitimate status updates on non-cancelled POs and status-less revisions were affected rather than only the true un-cancel transition. Enforce the invariant server-side instead. "Cancelled" is a sticky, authoritative status: once set, later new_po/revision emails may enrich other fields but must never move it to a non-cancelled status. When the payload carries a non-cancelled po_status, _merge_update issues the update_item guarded by ConditionExpression "attribute_not_exists(po_status) OR po_status <> :marker", evaluated atomically at write time, so a cancellation that lands first always wins. On ConditionalCheckFailedException the same fields are re-written without po_status/cancelled_at, enriching the record while Cancelled sticks. Payloads with no status change, or an already -Cancelled status, take a plain merge — the status is only ever suppressed on a real un-cancel. This removes the non-atomic get_item from the write path; _is_cancelled is deleted. Key schema and attribute names are unchanged, so the cross-stack purchase-orders contract (read-only by seahaven-slack-bot) holds. Add moto-backed tests covering un-cancel suppression with field enrichment, status-less merge onto a Cancelled PO, legitimate status updates on non-cancelled POs, new_po backfill of a Cancelled skeleton, fresh create/merge, and authoritative save_cancellation. Refs: #97
2026-07-15 20:17:46 -04:00
"""Mark a PO Cancelled, creating a minimal skeleton if it doesn't exist yet.
If the cancellation arrives before the new_po, the skeleton it creates is
later backfilled by save_new_po (which preserves this Cancelled status), so no
PO data is lost on out-of-order delivery.
"""
table = dynamodb.Table(PO_TABLE)
table.update_item(
Key={"po_number": parsed["po_number"]},
UpdateExpression="SET po_status = :status, cancelled_at = :cancelled_at, raw_s3_key = :s3_key",
ExpressionAttributeValues={
":status": "Cancelled",
":cancelled_at": parsed.get("processed_at", datetime.utcnow().isoformat()),
":s3_key": parsed.get("raw_s3_key", ""),
},
)
logger.info(f"Cancelled PO {parsed['po_number']}")
def handler(event, context):
"""Lambda entry point. Triggered by S3 ObjectCreated events."""
for record in event.get("Records", []):
bucket = record["s3"]["bucket"]["name"]
key = record["s3"]["object"]["key"]
s3_key = f"s3://{bucket}/{key}"
logger.info(f"Processing email: {s3_key}")
response = s3.get_object(Bucket=bucket, Key=key)
raw_email = response["Body"].read()
Add fail-closed SES sender authentication (INFRA-107) (#98) * Add fail-closed SES sender authentication The From header and any raw-MIME Authentication-Results copies are attacker-forgeable, so a forged email to apm@int.seahaven.com or amazon_po@int.seahaven.com could create or mutate a WO/PO (INFRA-107, CRITICAL). Both S3-triggered email processors now authenticate the sender against the Authentication-Results header SES itself prepends at delivery: only the topmost header is consulted, its authserv-id must be amazonses.com, and it must carry dkim=pass for a domain in the per-pipeline ALLOWED_DKIM_DOMAINS env var (comma-separated, set in CDK so ops can adjust without code changes). Allowlists come from live traffic observed 2026-07-15 on both ingest buckets: WO mail arrives via the apm@ Google Groups forward, which re-signs as seahaven.com (the hxgnsmartcloud.com signature does not survive the forward); PO mail passes for amazon.coupahost.com. amazonses.com also passes on PO mail but is deliberately excluded -- every SES customer's outbound mail passes for it. Every failure path (env var unset, header missing or unparseable, verdict fail, unaligned domain) rejects the email: a structured warning with the reason and S3 key is logged and the record skipped without erroring the invocation, so rejected mail causes no Lambda retries or DLQ messages. Handler signatures and event sources are unchanged. Refs: INFRA-107 * Harden AR parser per cross-family review Cross-family (GPT-4.1) review findings: terminate the dkim result token at end-of-clause, whitespace, or a comment so a value like "dkim=pass-fake" can never be read as a pass; normalize trailing dots off allowlist entries so "seahaven.com." matches; make the compat32 parser policy explicit. Adds tests for result-token boundaries, comments after the result, quoted domain values, and folding inside a dkim clause. Refs: INFRA-107 * Harden AR parsing and alarm on sender-auth rejects The SES-stamped Authentication-Results value echoes attacker-controlled SMTP-session tokens (envelope-from, helo, header.from) as their own semicolon-delimited property clauses. A naive split(";") tore an RFC 5321 quoted-local-part MAIL FROM apart and manufactured a forged dkim=pass clause, so a fully spoofed email was accepted on the genuinely SES-stamped topmost header. Tokenise comment- and quoted-string-aware (RFC 8601 / RFC 5322): strip CFWS comments, split clauses only on semicolons outside a quoted-string, and fail closed on unbalanced quotes/comments so a ';' inside a quoted pvalue can never start a clause. Rejected mail returns normally (no error, no retry, no DLQ message), so a signing-domain drift or a wrong allowlist would silently discard 100% of legitimate mail while every alarm stayed green. Add a CloudWatch Logs metric filter + alarm on the sender_auth_rejected warning to both stacks so a false-reject storm pages instead of vanishing. This is also the safety net for the WO seahaven.com allowlist assumption, which must be validated against a live SES-stamped header (a plain Gmail auto-forward re-signs under the sending Workspace domain, not seahaven.com). Refs: INFRA-107 * chore: retrigger CI (no run recorded for 7c74ac1) * Fix quoted-AUID DKIM domain spoof in sender auth Resolve three confirmed /sh-security-review findings on the fail-closed SES sender-authentication control. HIGH: header.i/header.d domain extraction was not quoted-string aware. An attacker with a valid DKIM key for their own domain could set an RFC 6376-legal AUID such as i="@seahaven.com"@attacker.com; the naive extractor stopped at the closing quote and returned seahaven.com, accepting forged mail. Extraction now tokenises the clause with the same quoted-string discipline already used for clause splitting: header.d (the plain signing domain) is authoritative when present, otherwise the header.i domain is the part after the AUID's LAST top-level "@", so a "@" inside a quoted local-part is treated as signer-controlled label text and yields the true signer (attacker.com), not seahaven.com. LOW: the topmost-header parse ran outside evaluate_sender_authentication's try/except, so an unexpected parser exception on crafted input could propagate into the handler and Lambda async retries/DLQ. The parse now fails CLOSED with an authentication_results_unparseable reason. MEDIUM: the sender_auth_rejected alarm used Sum>=3 over 15 min, blind to a low-volume total-reject outage (a trickle that never sums to 3). Both stacks now alarm on >=1 reject per 5-min period with evaluation_periods=3 / datapoints_to_alarm=2, so a sustained reject condition pages even at one reject per period while a lone stray probe self-clears. Refs: INFRA-107 * Load Lambda function dir on sys.path in tests Rebasing INFRA-107 onto main folded #95's pytest suite into this branch's tests. The unified conftest loads the PO/WO handlers by file path, and handler.py now does `from ses_auth import authenticate_inbound_email` -- a bare sibling import that resolves in the Lambda only because the runtime puts each function's own directory on sys.path. The shared load_handler now adds that directory so the handler tests import correctly alongside the sender-auth tests. Refs: INFRA-107 * Note #97 test files in README directory tree The rebase onto main brought in #97's tests/requirements.txt and tests/test_po_merge.py. List both in the directory tree so it matches the tree on disk. Refs: INFRA-107 * Document INFRA-107 forwarder-binding risk acceptance Record the accepted risk that WO sender auth binds to the apm@ forward's re-signing domain (seahaven.com) rather than the Hexagon originator; the apm@ Google Group's restricted posting policy is the load-bearing control (escalates to HIGH if the group is opened to external posting). Also correct the sender-auth-rejected alarm docs to match the shipped config (>=1 per 5-min, 2-of-3 datapoints, not the superseded >=3/15min) and note the SES-AR-01/02 parser hardening follow-ups. Refs: INFRA-107
2026-07-15 20:58:47 -04:00
# Fail-closed sender authentication (INFRA-107): only mail with an
# SES-stamped dkim=pass verdict for an allowlisted domain may create
# or update purchase orders. Rejected mail is logged and skipped
# without erroring the invocation (no retries / DLQ spam).
if not authenticate_inbound_email(raw_email, s3_key):
continue
email_data = parse_raw_email(raw_email)
logger.info(f"Subject: {email_data['subject']}")
parsed = extract_with_claude(email_data)
logger.info(
f"Parsed: type={parsed.get('email_type')}, po={parsed.get('po_number')}"
)
if not parsed.get("po_number"):
logger.warning(f"No PO number found in email, skipping: {key}")
continue
parsed = enrich_parsed(parsed, s3_key, email_data["subject"])
email_type = parsed.get("email_type")
if email_type == "cancellation":
save_cancellation(parsed)
elif email_type == "revision":
save_revision(parsed)
else:
save_new_po(parsed)
return {"statusCode": 200, "body": "OK"}