* feat(agent-team): P3-flip Phase 1 — expand denylist vectors (§4.2) + runner-trust assertion (§4.1) First controls of the P3-live-flip Phase-1 CI hardening (workflow stays INERT; this only tightens the trust boundary). Whole Phase-1 surface is gated by /sh-security-review + GPT-4.1 cross-review before any flip. §4.2 — expand the trust-control denylist with direct code-execution / supply-chain vectors, kept byte-identical across all three copies (ci_gate.DENYLIST_GLOBS + the guard + post-build inline DENY_GLOBS), drift-guarded: .gitmodules, .husky/**, .githooks/**, .gitattributes, .npmrc, and generated/build artifacts (__generated__, *.generated.*, dist/**, build/**, *.min.js). Deliberate: lockfiles are NOT wholesale denied — lockfile-postinstall RCE is already contained by the credential-less egress-blocked build sandbox, and the Tier-3 dep-CVE fixer rewrites lockfiles to produce its draft PRs; a blanket deny would make it un-shippable. Flagged in-code for the security gate. Direct code-execution config (hooks/filters/npmrc/submodules) is the actual §4.2 RCE surface. §4.1 — runner-trust: assert no job (esp. the privileged gate-and-pr) can run on a self-hosted/user-provided runner; all must be GitHub-hosted. 998 tests pass, ruff clean. * feat(agent-team): P3-flip Phase 1 — gate-weakening detector (§4.5) A diff that ADDS a lint/type/coverage/security suppression (noqa, type: ignore, pragma: no cover, nosec, nosemgrep), a test skip/xfail, or a hook bypass (--no-verify) could make CI pass falsely. The pure-code gate now flags these via gate_weakening_violations() and BLOCKs in evaluate_ci_gate as a top-priority trust violation (step 1b, alongside the denylist) — regardless of the authenticated CI conclusion. A build cannot pass itself by disabling its own checks; flagged diffs escalate to a human. Only ADDED lines are inspected (removing a suppression is fine). 1015 tests pass, ruff clean. * feat(agent-team): P3-flip — diff transport (§4.3) + flip privileged apply path live Completes the box->CI diff handoff and flips the apply/verify privileged job live (gated behind the agent-apply environment's required reviewer). Transport (§4.3): the read-only box (D2) emits a diff but holds no write token. - New credential-less `materialize` job decodes the untrusted `diff_b64` dispatch input via env (CWE-94), fail-closed re-hashes it against `expected_diff_hash`, and uploads it as the named artifact so guard/build-test download it same-run. guard now `needs: materialize`. - New `dispatcher.py` (the trusted apply path, operator/Mac-side — never the box): pushes the diff as a head branch then `gh workflow run`s the workflow. Pure input-assembly (sha256 == sha256sum, b64 round-trip, head ref) is unit-tested; git/gh are injected seams. Push-before-dispatch; fail-closed on empty diff/scope, unsafe task_id/owner/repo. Flip: gate-and-pr binds `environment: agent-apply` (required reviewer amoussa1229) + grants exactly `pull-requests: write`; the App-token + draft-PR steps run only on `steps.gate.outputs.gate == 'pass'` (no more if:false); the draft PR opens with an explicit `--head`; task_id/head_branch charset-validated (§4.6). Updated the hardening tests from inert-state to live-state assertions + added transport tests. 1039 tests, ruff clean, workflow YAML valid. NOTE: workflow only runs on manual workflow_dispatch and the privileged job is held at the required-reviewer gate, so nothing privileged runs unapproved. * fix(agent-team): P3-flip — address GPT-4.1 cross-review (size bound, ref-traversal guard) - BLOCK: cap candidate diff at 40 KB in the dispatcher (the diff rides a base64 workflow_dispatch input; GitHub caps inputs at ~64 KB so an oversized diff cannot dispatch at all) + a defense-in-depth decoded-size bound in materialize. - FIX: harden the draft-PR HEAD_BRANCH guard to reject leading/trailing slash, '..' segments, and '//' (CWE-88 git ref-traversal), not just bad charset. - NIT: document the mandatory invariants on gate-and-pr (required-reviewer environment must stay; runs-on must stay GitHub-hosted). - QUESTION (lockfiles): answered in-code — the build-test sandbox is credential-less + egress-blocked, so lockfile-postinstall RCE is contained. Tests added for all guards. 1042 tests, ruff clean, YAML valid. * fix(agent-team): P3-flip — resolve /sh-security-review findings (LOGIC-1/2/3) High-recall fan-out (injection/logic/iac+secrets) + proof-or-kill on the LIVE apply path found 3 real issues the cross-review missed; all fixed: - LOGIC-2 (HIGH, was a live hole): build-test ran `ruff check . || echo` / `pytest -q || echo`, swallowing failures so the job was always 'success' and the gate would open draft PRs on RED builds. ruff/pytest now run authoritatively under set -e (pytest exit 5 'no tests' is the only non-fatal case); the exit code IS the build-test conclusion the gate keys on. - LOGIC-1 (verified!=shipped): the dispatcher used `git apply` + `git add -A`, staging stray untracked content into the pushed PR head. Now `git apply --index` stages exactly the diff, so the head tree is precisely base+diff — bound to the bytes CI hash-verified. - LOGIC-3 (§4.5 on the live path): gate-weakening was enforced only box-side; added a gate-weakening check to the guard job so the live PR-opening path rejects a diff that adds suppressions/skips, even on a green build. Injection / secrets / least-privilege / flip-correctness / no-untrusted-checkout all came back clean. 1044 tests, ruff clean, YAML valid.
482 lines
16 KiB
Python
482 lines
16 KiB
Python
"""Unit tests for agent_team.ci_gate — the pure-code pass/fail gate (§3.3.2)."""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import pytest
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from agent_team.ci_gate import (
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DENYLIST_GLOBS,
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CiGateError,
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GateDecision,
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denylist_violations,
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diff_touched_paths,
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evaluate_ci_gate,
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gate_weakening_violations,
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verify_diff_hash,
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)
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from agent_team.state_store import compute_content_hash
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def _diff_for(*paths: str) -> str:
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"""Build a minimal unified diff touching ``paths`` (no rename)."""
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chunks = []
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for p in paths:
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chunks.append(
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f"diff --git a/{p} b/{p}\n--- a/{p}\n+++ b/{p}\n@@ -1 +1 @@\n-old\n+new\n"
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)
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return "".join(chunks)
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def _ledger_hash(diff: str) -> str:
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return compute_content_hash(diff.encode("utf-8"))
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def _good_ci(run_id: str, diff: str, conclusion: str = "success") -> dict:
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return {
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"run_id": run_id,
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"conclusion": conclusion,
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"diff_hash": _ledger_hash(diff),
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}
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# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
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# diff_touched_paths
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# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
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def test_touched_paths_basic() -> None:
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diff = _diff_for("src/foo.py", "tests/test_foo.py")
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assert diff_touched_paths(diff) == ["src/foo.py", "tests/test_foo.py"]
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def test_touched_paths_strips_git_prefix_and_dedups() -> None:
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diff = "diff --git a/pkg/mod.py b/pkg/mod.py\n@@ @@\n+x\n"
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assert diff_touched_paths(diff) == ["pkg/mod.py"]
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def test_touched_paths_includes_rename_lines() -> None:
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diff = (
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"diff --git a/safe.txt b/.github/workflows/evil.yml\n"
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"similarity index 100%\n"
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"rename from safe.txt\n"
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"rename to .github/workflows/evil.yml\n"
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)
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paths = diff_touched_paths(diff)
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assert ".github/workflows/evil.yml" in paths
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assert "safe.txt" in paths
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def test_touched_paths_non_string_raises() -> None:
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with pytest.raises(CiGateError):
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diff_touched_paths(None) # type: ignore[arg-type]
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# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
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# denylist_violations
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# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
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def test_clean_diff_has_no_violations() -> None:
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diff = _diff_for("src/foo.py", "README.md")
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assert denylist_violations(diff) == []
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@pytest.mark.parametrize(
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"path",
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[
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".github/workflows/ci.yml",
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".github/actions/deploy/action.yml",
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".github/CODEOWNERS",
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"CODEOWNERS",
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".github/dependabot.yml",
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"infra/cdk.json",
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"service/template.yaml",
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"deploy/iam/role.json",
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"stacks/policies/admin.json",
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"modules/main.tf",
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# P3-flip §4.2 — direct code-execution / supply-chain vectors.
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".gitmodules",
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"vendor/.gitmodules",
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".husky/pre-commit",
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"frontend/.husky/commit-msg",
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".githooks/pre-push",
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".gitattributes",
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"pkg/.gitattributes",
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".npmrc",
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"web/.npmrc",
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"src/__generated__/schema.ts",
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"api/types.generated.ts",
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"web/dist/bundle.js",
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"service/build/output.o",
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"assets/app.min.js",
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],
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)
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def test_denylisted_paths_flagged(path: str) -> None:
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violations = denylist_violations(_diff_for(path))
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assert violations, f"expected {path!r} to be denylisted"
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def test_lockfiles_are_NOT_denylisted_so_the_tier3_fixer_can_ship() -> None:
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"""Deliberate (§4.2 note): lockfile RCE is contained by the credential-less
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egress-blocked build sandbox, and the dep-CVE fixer rewrites lockfiles to
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produce draft PRs — so lockfiles are intentionally NOT on the denylist."""
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for lock in ("package-lock.json", "web/yarn.lock", "poetry.lock", "Cargo.lock"):
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assert denylist_violations(_diff_for(lock)) == [], (
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f"{lock!r} must not be denylisted (would break the Tier-3 fixer)"
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)
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def test_rename_into_workflow_is_flagged() -> None:
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diff = (
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"diff --git a/safe.txt b/.github/workflows/evil.yml\n"
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"rename from safe.txt\n"
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"rename to .github/workflows/evil.yml\n"
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)
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violations = denylist_violations(diff)
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assert any(".github/workflows/evil.yml" in v for v in violations)
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def test_path_escape_via_dotdot_flagged() -> None:
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diff = "diff --git a/x b/../../etc/passwd\n@@ @@\n+x\n"
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violations = denylist_violations(diff)
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assert any("escapes repo root" in v for v in violations)
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def test_allowed_scope_blocks_out_of_scope_path() -> None:
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diff = _diff_for("src/in_scope.py", "other/out_of_scope.py")
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violations = denylist_violations(diff, allowed_scope=["src/"])
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assert any("declared scope" in v for v in violations)
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# In-scope path alone is clean.
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assert (
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denylist_violations(_diff_for("src/in_scope.py"), allowed_scope=["src/"]) == []
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)
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def test_allowed_scope_exact_file_prefix() -> None:
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diff = _diff_for("pkg/exact.py")
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assert denylist_violations(diff, allowed_scope=["pkg/exact.py"]) == []
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def test_denylist_globs_exported_nonempty() -> None:
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assert isinstance(DENYLIST_GLOBS, tuple)
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assert ".github/workflows/**" in DENYLIST_GLOBS
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# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
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# verify_diff_hash
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# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
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def test_hash_matches_ledger() -> None:
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diff = _diff_for("a.py")
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assert verify_diff_hash(diff, ledger_hash=_ledger_hash(diff)) is True
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def test_hash_mismatch_ledger() -> None:
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diff = _diff_for("a.py")
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assert verify_diff_hash(diff, ledger_hash="deadbeef") is False
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def test_hash_none_ledger_fails() -> None:
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diff = _diff_for("a.py")
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assert verify_diff_hash(diff, ledger_hash=None) is False
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def test_hash_empty_ledger_fails_closed() -> None:
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# An EMPTY expected hash must never be treated as a match (empty != real
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# sha). Fail-closed: there is nothing to bind to.
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diff = _diff_for("a.py")
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assert verify_diff_hash(diff, ledger_hash="") is False
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def test_hash_empty_ci_verified_does_not_silently_pass() -> None:
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# A real ledger hash but an EMPTY ci_verified hash must not match (the empty
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# string is not the recomputed sha).
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diff = _diff_for("a.py")
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h = _ledger_hash(diff)
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assert verify_diff_hash(diff, ledger_hash=h, ci_verified_hash="") is False
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def test_hash_ci_verified_must_also_match() -> None:
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diff = _diff_for("a.py")
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h = _ledger_hash(diff)
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assert verify_diff_hash(diff, ledger_hash=h, ci_verified_hash=h) is True
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assert verify_diff_hash(diff, ledger_hash=h, ci_verified_hash="nope") is False
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def test_hash_non_string_raises() -> None:
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with pytest.raises(CiGateError):
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verify_diff_hash(123, ledger_hash="x") # type: ignore[arg-type]
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# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
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# evaluate_ci_gate — the block decision
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# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
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def test_gate_pass_on_authenticated_success() -> None:
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diff = _diff_for("src/foo.py")
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result = evaluate_ci_gate(
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candidate_diff=diff,
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ledger_hash=_ledger_hash(diff),
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ci_result=_good_ci("run-1", diff, "success"),
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expected_run_id="run-1",
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)
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assert result.decision is GateDecision.PASS
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assert result.passed is True
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assert result.ci_conclusion == "success"
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def test_gate_fail_on_authenticated_failure() -> None:
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diff = _diff_for("src/foo.py")
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result = evaluate_ci_gate(
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candidate_diff=diff,
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ledger_hash=_ledger_hash(diff),
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ci_result=_good_ci("run-1", diff, "failure"),
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expected_run_id="run-1",
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)
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assert result.decision is GateDecision.FAIL
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assert result.ci_conclusion == "failure"
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@pytest.mark.parametrize(
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"conclusion", ["timed_out", "cancelled", "startup_failure", "action_required"]
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)
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def test_gate_recognised_failures(conclusion: str) -> None:
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diff = _diff_for("src/foo.py")
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result = evaluate_ci_gate(
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candidate_diff=diff,
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ledger_hash=_ledger_hash(diff),
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ci_result=_good_ci("run-1", diff, conclusion),
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expected_run_id="run-1",
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)
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assert result.decision is GateDecision.FAIL
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def test_gate_blocks_denylisted_diff_even_if_ci_success() -> None:
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# A diff that touches the trust-control surface BLOCKs regardless of CI.
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diff = _diff_for(".github/workflows/ci.yml")
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result = evaluate_ci_gate(
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candidate_diff=diff,
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ledger_hash=_ledger_hash(diff),
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ci_result=_good_ci("run-1", diff, "success"),
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expected_run_id="run-1",
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)
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assert result.decision is GateDecision.BLOCK
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assert result.blocked is True
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assert any("denylisted" in r for r in result.reasons)
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def test_gate_blocks_on_hash_mismatch() -> None:
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diff = _diff_for("src/foo.py")
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result = evaluate_ci_gate(
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candidate_diff=diff,
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ledger_hash="deadbeef", # does not match recomputed hash
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ci_result=_good_ci("run-1", diff, "success"),
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expected_run_id="run-1",
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)
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assert result.decision is GateDecision.BLOCK
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assert any("hash" in r for r in result.reasons)
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def test_gate_blocks_on_run_id_mismatch() -> None:
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diff = _diff_for("src/foo.py")
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result = evaluate_ci_gate(
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candidate_diff=diff,
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ledger_hash=_ledger_hash(diff),
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ci_result=_good_ci("run-OTHER", diff, "success"),
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expected_run_id="run-1",
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)
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assert result.decision is GateDecision.BLOCK
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assert any("run-id" in r for r in result.reasons)
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def test_gate_blocks_on_missing_ci_result() -> None:
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diff = _diff_for("src/foo.py")
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result = evaluate_ci_gate(
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candidate_diff=diff,
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ledger_hash=_ledger_hash(diff),
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ci_result=None,
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expected_run_id="run-1",
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)
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assert result.decision is GateDecision.BLOCK
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@pytest.mark.parametrize("conclusion", [None, "neutral", "skipped", "in_progress"])
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def test_gate_blocks_on_ambiguous_conclusion(conclusion) -> None:
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# Anything not an explicit success or recognised failure must NOT silently
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# pass — it BLOCKs (refuse-to-proceed).
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diff = _diff_for("src/foo.py")
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ci = _good_ci("run-1", diff, "success")
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ci["conclusion"] = conclusion
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result = evaluate_ci_gate(
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candidate_diff=diff,
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ledger_hash=_ledger_hash(diff),
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ci_result=ci,
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expected_run_id="run-1",
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)
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assert result.decision is GateDecision.BLOCK
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def test_gate_ignores_patch_written_success_field() -> None:
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# The gate reads only the authenticated conclusion. A patch-controlled
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# "passed" flag must not flip a failing run to pass.
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diff = _diff_for("src/foo.py")
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ci = _good_ci("run-1", diff, "failure")
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ci["passed"] = True # attacker-controlled artifact field
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ci["success"] = "true"
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result = evaluate_ci_gate(
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candidate_diff=diff,
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ledger_hash=_ledger_hash(diff),
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ci_result=ci,
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expected_run_id="run-1",
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)
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assert result.decision is GateDecision.FAIL
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def test_gate_blocks_on_empty_ledger_hash() -> None:
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# Fail-closed: an empty ledger hash binds to nothing -> BLOCK, never a pass,
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# even with an authenticated CI success.
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diff = _diff_for("src/foo.py")
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result = evaluate_ci_gate(
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candidate_diff=diff,
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ledger_hash="",
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ci_result=_good_ci("run-1", diff, "success"),
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expected_run_id="run-1",
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)
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assert result.decision is GateDecision.BLOCK
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assert any("hash" in r for r in result.reasons)
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def test_gate_blocks_on_empty_ci_diff_hash() -> None:
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# An empty CI-verified diff_hash must not silently pass the integrity check.
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diff = _diff_for("src/foo.py")
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ci = _good_ci("run-1", diff, "success")
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ci["diff_hash"] = ""
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result = evaluate_ci_gate(
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candidate_diff=diff,
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ledger_hash=_ledger_hash(diff),
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ci_result=ci,
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expected_run_id="run-1",
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)
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assert result.decision is GateDecision.BLOCK
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def test_gate_blocks_when_ci_diff_hash_mismatch() -> None:
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# CI verified a different diff than the ledger recorded -> BLOCK.
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diff = _diff_for("src/foo.py")
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ci = _good_ci("run-1", diff, "success")
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ci["diff_hash"] = "tampered"
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result = evaluate_ci_gate(
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candidate_diff=diff,
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ledger_hash=_ledger_hash(diff),
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ci_result=ci,
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expected_run_id="run-1",
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)
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assert result.decision is GateDecision.BLOCK
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def test_gate_scope_violation_blocks() -> None:
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diff = _diff_for("src/foo.py", "unrelated/bar.py")
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result = evaluate_ci_gate(
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candidate_diff=diff,
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ledger_hash=_ledger_hash(diff),
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ci_result=_good_ci("run-1", diff, "success"),
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expected_run_id="run-1",
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allowed_scope=["src/"],
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)
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assert result.decision is GateDecision.BLOCK
|
|
assert any("scope" in r for r in result.reasons)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_gate_empty_run_id_raises() -> None:
|
|
diff = _diff_for("src/foo.py")
|
|
with pytest.raises(CiGateError):
|
|
evaluate_ci_gate(
|
|
candidate_diff=diff,
|
|
ledger_hash=_ledger_hash(diff),
|
|
ci_result=_good_ci("run-1", diff),
|
|
expected_run_id="",
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_gate_result_carries_provenance() -> None:
|
|
diff = _diff_for("src/foo.py")
|
|
h = _ledger_hash(diff)
|
|
result = evaluate_ci_gate(
|
|
candidate_diff=diff,
|
|
ledger_hash=h,
|
|
ci_result=_good_ci("run-7", diff, "success"),
|
|
expected_run_id="run-7",
|
|
)
|
|
assert result.run_id == "run-7"
|
|
assert result.diff_hash == h
|
|
assert result.reasons # always records why
|
|
|
|
|
|
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
|
|
# §4.5 gate-weakening detector
|
|
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _diff_adding(added_line: str, path: str = "src/mod.py") -> str:
|
|
"""A unified diff that ADDS one line (plus an unchanged context line)."""
|
|
return (
|
|
f"diff --git a/{path} b/{path}\n--- a/{path}\n+++ b/{path}\n"
|
|
f"@@ -1 +1,2 @@\n unchanged\n+{added_line}\n"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
|
"added_line",
|
|
[
|
|
"x = 1 # noqa",
|
|
"y = 2 # noqa: E501",
|
|
"z = bad() # type: ignore",
|
|
"z = bad() # type:ignore[arg-type]",
|
|
"def f(): # pragma: no cover",
|
|
"def f(): # pragma: no-cover",
|
|
"subprocess.run(cmd) # nosec",
|
|
"eval(x) # nosemgrep",
|
|
" git commit --no-verify",
|
|
"@pytest.mark.skip(reason='flaky')",
|
|
"@pytest.mark.xfail",
|
|
" pytest.skip('todo')",
|
|
" self.skipTest('later')",
|
|
],
|
|
)
|
|
def test_gate_weakening_added_line_flagged(added_line: str) -> None:
|
|
violations = gate_weakening_violations(_diff_adding(added_line))
|
|
assert violations, f"expected {added_line!r} to be flagged as gate-weakening"
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_gate_weakening_clean_diff_has_no_violations() -> None:
|
|
assert gate_weakening_violations(_diff_for("src/foo.py")) == []
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_gate_weakening_only_inspects_added_lines() -> None:
|
|
# A diff that REMOVES a suppression (line starts with '-') must not be flagged.
|
|
removing = (
|
|
"diff --git a/m.py b/m.py\n--- a/m.py\n+++ b/m.py\n"
|
|
"@@ -1,2 +1 @@\n-x = 1 # noqa\n unchanged\n"
|
|
)
|
|
assert gate_weakening_violations(removing) == []
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_gate_weakening_rejects_non_str() -> None:
|
|
with pytest.raises(CiGateError):
|
|
gate_weakening_violations(None) # type: ignore[arg-type]
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_gate_blocks_weakening_diff_even_if_ci_success() -> None:
|
|
# A diff that adds a coverage suppression BLOCKs even with a green CI run.
|
|
diff = _diff_adding("def f(): # pragma: no cover")
|
|
result = evaluate_ci_gate(
|
|
candidate_diff=diff,
|
|
ledger_hash=_ledger_hash(diff),
|
|
ci_result=_good_ci("run-w", diff, "success"),
|
|
expected_run_id="run-w",
|
|
)
|
|
assert result.decision is GateDecision.BLOCK
|
|
assert result.blocked is True
|
|
assert any("gate-weakening" in r for r in result.reasons)
|