Adam Moussa
3c29ce3fdb
Resolves three execution-proven verifier findings from the scaffold review. Full suite: 548 passed, 1 skipped (stable across repeated runs); ruff clean. builders denylist (§3.3.2 #2): scan was +++-only and missed header-only sections. Now section-driven off `diff --git a/<src> b/<dest>`, catching the 4 proven bypasses — delete of a denied path, mode-change-only, `copy to` a denied path, out-of-scope delete (regression tests for each). §3.3.1 compare-and-set concurrency: BEGIN IMMEDIATE moved inside guarded retry; each CAS now runs on its own connection (shared sqlite3.Connection cannot hold two transactions, and is unsafe for concurrent use even for reads). connect() stashes the db path on a Connection subclass so the path is derived by a thread-safe attribute read, not a PRAGMA on the shared conn; busy_timeout set before the WAL pragma. Added shared-connection concurrent regression tests (distinct + same question) — previously raised "transaction within a transaction". operator CLI (run-team.py): added the design-named re-deliver and force-resume verbs (were missing); audit now records the attempt BEFORE the mutation and the outcome after, so a ledger mutation can never land without a trail; main() catches OSError instead of leaving an uncaught traceback on audit-write failure.
602 lines
24 KiB
Python
602 lines
24 KiB
Python
"""Plane-2 builders node — approved plan -> candidate diff (design §3.3.2, §7.1 P3).
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This is the LangGraph **builders** stage (design §3.3): it turns the approved,
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review-cleared plan into a **candidate diff**. Per D2/D11 the box has no write
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token; builders do NOT write to repos — they emit the diff as data for the
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org-CI apply/verify workflow. This leaf owns the **box-side half** of the
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§3.3.2 CI-as-verifier trust boundary:
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* **Box-side trust-control-surface denylist (boundary #2).** Before a diff can
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advance to the build/verify path, this node rejects any candidate diff that
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touches the trust-control surface — ``.github/workflows/**``, IAM/policy/
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permission IaC (CDK/SAM), branch-protection / ``CODEOWNERS`` / Dependabot
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config, or any file **outside the task's declared scope**. The match is not
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naive: it canonicalizes paths (resolving ``.`` / ``..`` and rejecting absolute
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or parent-escaping paths), and it inspects **rename targets** so a rename into
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a denied path cannot slip through. A violation parks the task for mandatory
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human + GPT cross-review (it is the mandatory-cross-review surface regardless,
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per CLAUDE.md) and never auto-advances.
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* **Diff integrity hash (boundary #3).** The accepted diff is hashed with the
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same content-hash primitive the foundation uses
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(:func:`agent_team.state_store.compute_content_hash`) and the hash is recorded
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on the task record (``diff_hash``). CI verifies this hash matches the ledger
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before applying the patch, so a tampered/substituted diff fails closed.
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The CI-side enforcement (the credential-less untrusted job, the CI hard-fail
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guard, the pure-code pass/fail gate, branch protection — boundaries #1/#4/#5)
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lives in the CI workflow, NOT here; this node is the box-side pre-check plus the
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hash the CI gate keys against.
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The actual diff synthesis (Claude spec via the §3.1 billing seam + DeepSeek
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mechanical edits) is delegated to an **injectable** ``DiffBuilder`` so this leaf
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stays unit-testable and dependency-free; the real SDK/orchestrator wiring is
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bound by the coordinator at startup. The default builder uses
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:func:`agent_team.billing.claude_invoke` so an un-wired environment fails loudly
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via the foundation's unconfigured-invoker contract rather than silently
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producing nothing.
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This module imports the committed foundation contracts verbatim; it redefines
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none of them.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import posixpath
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import re
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from dataclasses import dataclass, field
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from typing import Any, Mapping, Protocol
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from agent_team.billing import ClaudeResult, claude_invoke
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from agent_team.state_store import compute_content_hash
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from agent_team.task_model import Phase, PipelineState, TaskStatus
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__all__ = [
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"DENYLIST_REASONS",
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"BuildError",
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"DiffBuilder",
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"TrustBoundaryViolation",
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"build_candidate_diff",
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"builders_node",
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"default_diff_builder",
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"iter_diff_target_paths",
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"scan_trust_control_surface",
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]
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Trust-control-surface denylist (design §3.3.2 boundary #2)
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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#
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# Patterns are matched against POSIX-canonicalized, repo-relative paths (see
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# ``_canonicalize``). Each entry is (compiled regex, human reason) so a
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# violation report names *why* a path is denied. The patterns intentionally
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# over-match toward rejection: a denied diff is escalated to human + GPT
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# cross-review, never silently dropped, so false positives cost a review, not a
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# security hole.
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_DENY_PATTERNS: tuple[tuple[re.Pattern[str], str], ...] = (
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(
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re.compile(r"^\.github/workflows/.+"),
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"modifies a GitHub Actions workflow (.github/workflows/**)",
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),
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(
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re.compile(r"(^|/)CODEOWNERS$"),
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"modifies CODEOWNERS",
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),
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(
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re.compile(r"(^|/)\.github/dependabot\.ya?ml$|^dependabot\.ya?ml$"),
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"modifies Dependabot configuration",
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),
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(
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re.compile(r"(^|/)\.github/settings\.ya?ml$"),
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"modifies repo/branch-protection settings (.github/settings.yml)",
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),
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# IAM / policy / permission IaC (CDK/SAM and raw policy docs). These are the
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# mandatory-cross-review surface regardless of the pipeline (CLAUDE.md).
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(
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re.compile(
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r"(^|/)(template|samconfig)\.ya?ml$"
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r"|(^|/)serverless\.ya?ml$"
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),
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"modifies SAM/serverless IaC (templates carry IAM policies)",
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),
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(
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re.compile(
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r"(^|/)cdk\.json$"
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r"|(^|/).+\.(iam|policy)\.(json|ya?ml)$"
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r"|(^|/)(iam|policies|policy)/.+\.(json|ya?ml)$"
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),
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"modifies IAM/policy IaC",
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),
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)
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# A stable, importable description of every denylist reason, useful for callers
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# (reports, tests) that want to enumerate the surface without re-deriving it.
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DENYLIST_REASONS: tuple[str, ...] = tuple(reason for _, reason in _DENY_PATTERNS)
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class BuildError(Exception):
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"""Raised when the builders node cannot produce a usable candidate diff.
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Signals a malformed approved plan or an empty/garbled diff from the
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injected builder — i.e. the node cannot proceed, distinct from a *policy*
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rejection (:class:`TrustBoundaryViolation`), which is a successful scan that
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found a forbidden change.
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"""
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@dataclass
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class TrustBoundaryViolation:
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"""A single trust-control-surface denylist hit (design §3.3.2 boundary #2).
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``path`` is the canonicalized repo-relative path that tripped the check;
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``reason`` is the human-readable denylist rule (or an out-of-scope / unsafe
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-path explanation). ``rename_from`` is set when the violation is a rename
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whose *target* lands in a denied/out-of-scope location, so a rename cannot
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launder a forbidden path.
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"""
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path: str
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reason: str
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rename_from: str | None = None
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class DiffBuilder(Protocol):
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"""Injectable diff-synthesis seam (design §3.3 builders stage).
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A ``DiffBuilder`` turns the approved ``plan`` into a unified-diff string.
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The real implementation wires Claude (spec, via the §3.1 billing seam) and
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DeepSeek (mechanical edits, via the local orchestrator); tests pass a stub.
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It MUST return a unified diff and MUST NOT perform any repo writes (D2/D11).
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"""
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def __call__(
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self, *, plan: Mapping[str, Any], config: Mapping[str, Any] | None
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) -> str:
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"""Return the candidate unified diff for ``plan``."""
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...
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def default_diff_builder(
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*, plan: Mapping[str, Any], config: Mapping[str, Any] | None
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) -> str:
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"""Default :class:`DiffBuilder`: author the diff via the Claude billing seam.
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Renders the approved plan into an instruction and calls
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:func:`agent_team.billing.claude_invoke` (the §3.1 seam) to produce the
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unified diff. Because the seam's default invoker raises until
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:func:`agent_team.billing.set_invoker` is called, an un-wired environment
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fails loudly here rather than emitting an empty diff. The coordinator binds
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the real Claude-spec + DeepSeek-edit path at startup.
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"""
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prompt = _render_build_prompt(plan)
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result: ClaudeResult = claude_invoke(prompt, config=config)
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return result.text
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def _render_build_prompt(plan: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
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"""Render the approved plan into a builder instruction prompt.
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Kept deliberately small and deterministic: the plan is the source of truth
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and the builder's job is to emit a unified diff implementing it without
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touching the trust-control surface (§3.3.2).
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"""
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title = str(plan.get("title", "(untitled task)"))
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scope = plan.get("scope") or []
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phases = plan.get("phases") or []
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scope_lines = "\n".join(f" - {p}" for p in scope) or " (no scope declared)"
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phase_lines = (
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"\n".join(f" {i + 1}. {p}" for i, p in enumerate(phases)) or " (none)"
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)
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return (
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"Implement the approved plan below as a single unified diff (git "
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"format). Touch ONLY files within the declared scope. Do NOT modify "
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"CI workflows, IAM/policy IaC, branch-protection, CODEOWNERS, or "
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"Dependabot config.\n\n"
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f"Title: {title}\n"
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f"Declared scope (paths you may edit):\n{scope_lines}\n"
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f"Phases:\n{phase_lines}\n"
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)
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Diff parsing + canonicalization
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# A unified diff is parsed **per file section**, each section delimited by its
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# ``diff --git a/<src> b/<dest>`` header. That header carries BOTH the source and
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# destination path for every change kind — modify, add, delete, mode-change,
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# rename, and copy — so reading it (not only the ``+++ b/`` body line) is what
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# lets the scan see deletes, mode-only changes, and ``copy to`` targets that have
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# no ``+++`` line or whose ``+++`` is ``/dev/null``. The ``---``/``+++`` and
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# rename/copy ``from``/``to`` lines refine the section's source/dest when present.
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_PLUS_RE = re.compile(r"^\+\+\+ (?:b/)?(.+?)\s*$")
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_MINUS_RE = re.compile(r"^--- (?:a/)?(.+?)\s*$")
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_DIFF_GIT_RE = re.compile(r"^diff --git a/(.+?) b/(.+?)\s*$")
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_RENAME_FROM_RE = re.compile(r"^rename from (.+?)\s*$")
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_RENAME_TO_RE = re.compile(r"^rename to (.+?)\s*$")
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_COPY_FROM_RE = re.compile(r"^copy from (.+?)\s*$")
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_COPY_TO_RE = re.compile(r"^copy to (.+?)\s*$")
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# /dev/null appears as the source of an add or target of a delete; it is never a
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# real repo path and must not be scanned/scoped as one.
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_DEV_NULL = "/dev/null"
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@dataclass
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class _DiffTarget:
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"""An internal record of one path the diff would create/modify/rename.
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``path`` is the canonicalized destination; ``rename_from`` is the prior
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canonical path when this target is the destination of a git rename.
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"""
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path: str
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rename_from: str | None = None
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def _canonicalize(raw: str) -> str | None:
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"""Canonicalize a repo-relative diff path; return ``None`` if it is unsafe.
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Strips a leading ``a/`` / ``b/`` prefix, normalizes ``.``/``..`` segments
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with :func:`posixpath.normpath`, and rejects anything that escapes the repo
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root (absolute paths, or a normalized path beginning with ``..``). Returning
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``None`` signals an *unsafe* path that the scan treats as a violation rather
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than silently letting an indirection bypass the denylist (§3.3.2 boundary
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#2: "it resolves symlinks and canonicalizes paths").
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"""
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path = raw.strip()
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if not path or path == _DEV_NULL:
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return None
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for prefix in ("a/", "b/"):
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if path.startswith(prefix):
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path = path[len(prefix) :]
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break
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# Normalize backslashes to forward slashes so a Windows-style separator
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# cannot smuggle a segment past the POSIX normalizer.
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path = path.replace("\\", "/")
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if posixpath.isabs(path):
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return None
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normalized = posixpath.normpath(path)
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if normalized == "." or normalized.startswith("../") or normalized == "..":
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return None
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return normalized
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def iter_diff_target_paths(diff: str) -> list[_DiffTarget]:
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"""Parse a unified diff into every path it would create/modify/move/remove.
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The diff is walked **per file section**, each delimited by its ``diff --git
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a/<src> b/<dest>`` header. Because that header carries the source and the
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destination for *every* change kind — including deletes (``+++ /dev/null``),
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mode-only changes (no ``+++`` line at all), and ``copy to`` targets — reading
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it closes the bypasses that a ``+++``-only scan misses. Within a section the
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``--- a/`` / ``+++ b/`` lines and the rename/copy ``from``/``to`` lines refine
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the source/destination when present (a rename/copy ``to`` is authoritative for
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the destination and links it to its source). BOTH the section source and
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destination are emitted as targets, so removing or moving a file *away from* a
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denied/out-of-scope path is flagged too. A path that fails
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:func:`_canonicalize` is surfaced as an unsafe target. Pure header parsing —
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it never executes the diff.
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"""
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targets: list[_DiffTarget] = []
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seen: set[tuple[str, str | None]] = set()
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# Per-section accumulators; flushed at each new ``diff --git`` and at EOF.
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src_raw: str | None = None
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dst_raw: str | None = None
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move_from: str | None = None
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def flush() -> None:
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nonlocal src_raw, dst_raw, move_from
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if src_raw is None and dst_raw is None:
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return
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rf = _canonicalize(move_from) if move_from else None
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# Source side: catches deletes and renames/copies away from a denied or
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# out-of-scope path. Destination side: catches creates/modifies/mode
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# changes/copy targets, linked to its source for a clear violation note.
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_emit_target(targets, seen, src_raw)
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_emit_target(targets, seen, dst_raw, rename_from=rf)
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src_raw = dst_raw = move_from = None
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for line in diff.splitlines():
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git = _DIFF_GIT_RE.match(line)
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if git:
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flush()
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src_raw, dst_raw = git.group(1), git.group(2)
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continue
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for pattern in (_RENAME_TO_RE, _COPY_TO_RE):
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m = pattern.match(line)
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if m:
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dst_raw = m.group(1) # authoritative destination for the section
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break
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else:
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for pattern in (_RENAME_FROM_RE, _COPY_FROM_RE):
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m = pattern.match(line)
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if m:
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move_from = m.group(1)
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break
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else:
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minus = _MINUS_RE.match(line)
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if minus and minus.group(1).strip() != _DEV_NULL:
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src_raw = minus.group(1)
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continue
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plus = _PLUS_RE.match(line)
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# Ignore hunk body lines starting with "+++"; a real header is
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# "+++ b/path" or "+++ /dev/null". A /dev/null target means a
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# delete, so the destination stays the diff --git path.
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if plus and plus.group(1).strip() != _DEV_NULL:
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dst_raw = plus.group(1)
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flush()
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return targets
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def _emit_target(
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targets: list[_DiffTarget],
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seen: set[tuple[str, str | None]],
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raw: str | None,
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*,
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rename_from: str | None = None,
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) -> None:
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"""Canonicalize ``raw`` and append it as a target (unsafe paths flagged).
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``/dev/null`` and empty values are dropped (no real path). A path that fails
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:func:`_canonicalize` (absolute / parent-escaping) is appended as an unsafe
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target so the scan rejects it rather than letting an indirection bypass the
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denylist.
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"""
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if raw is None:
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return
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stripped = raw.strip()
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if not stripped or stripped == _DEV_NULL:
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return
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canon = _canonicalize(stripped)
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if canon is None:
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_append_unique(targets, seen, _DiffTarget(path=stripped), unsafe=True)
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else:
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_append_unique(
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targets,
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seen,
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_DiffTarget(path=canon, rename_from=rename_from),
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unsafe=False,
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)
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# Marks a target whose path could not be safely canonicalized. Stored on the
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# _DiffTarget via a parallel set keyed by identity is overkill; instead we use a
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# reserved reason string the scanner recognizes.
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_UNSAFE_PATH_SENTINEL = "\x00unsafe\x00"
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def _append_unique(
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targets: list[_DiffTarget],
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seen: set[tuple[str, str | None]],
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target: _DiffTarget,
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*,
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unsafe: bool,
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) -> None:
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"""Append ``target`` if its (path, rename_from) pair is new; tag unsafe."""
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if unsafe:
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# Tag the rename_from slot with the sentinel so the scanner can flag it
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# without changing the public _DiffTarget shape.
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target = _DiffTarget(path=target.path, rename_from=_UNSAFE_PATH_SENTINEL)
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key = (target.path, target.rename_from)
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if key in seen:
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return
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seen.add(key)
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targets.append(target)
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def _path_denied(path: str) -> str | None:
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"""Return the denylist reason if ``path`` is on the trust-control surface."""
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for pattern, reason in _DENY_PATTERNS:
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if pattern.search(path):
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return reason
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return None
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def _in_scope(path: str, scope: tuple[str, ...]) -> bool:
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"""Return ``True`` if ``path`` falls under one of the declared scope prefixes.
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Scope entries are canonicalized directory/file prefixes. A path is in scope
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if it equals a scope entry or sits beneath a scope directory (prefix match
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on a ``/`` boundary). An empty scope means "nothing is in scope", so every
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path is rejected as out-of-scope — the design treats an undeclared scope as
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a hard stop, not a wildcard (§3.3.2: "files outside the task's declared
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scope").
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"""
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for entry in scope:
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if path == entry or path.startswith(entry + "/"):
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return True
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return False
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def _normalize_scope(scope: Any) -> tuple[str, ...]:
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"""Canonicalize the declared scope into a tuple of safe path prefixes.
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Unsafe scope entries (absolute / parent-escaping) are dropped, so a
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malformed scope can only *shrink* what is allowed, never widen it.
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"""
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if not scope:
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return ()
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out: list[str] = []
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for entry in scope:
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canon = _canonicalize(str(entry))
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if canon is not None and canon not in out:
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out.append(canon)
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return tuple(out)
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def scan_trust_control_surface(
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diff: str, *, scope: Any
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) -> list[TrustBoundaryViolation]:
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"""Scan a candidate diff for trust-control-surface violations (§3.3.2 #2).
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Returns every violation found (empty list == clean). A target violates the
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boundary if it is (a) an unsafe/uncanonicalizable path, (b) on the denylist
|
|
(``.github/workflows/**``, IAM/policy IaC, CODEOWNERS, branch-protection,
|
|
Dependabot), or (c) outside the task's declared ``scope`` — including a
|
|
rename whose *destination* is denied/out-of-scope, so a rename cannot
|
|
launder a forbidden path. The scan is pure header parsing; it never executes
|
|
the patch.
|
|
"""
|
|
declared_scope = _normalize_scope(scope)
|
|
violations: list[TrustBoundaryViolation] = []
|
|
|
|
for target in iter_diff_target_paths(diff):
|
|
rename_from = target.rename_from
|
|
is_unsafe = rename_from == _UNSAFE_PATH_SENTINEL
|
|
if is_unsafe:
|
|
rename_from = None
|
|
|
|
if is_unsafe:
|
|
violations.append(
|
|
TrustBoundaryViolation(
|
|
path=target.path,
|
|
reason="unsafe path (absolute or escapes the repo root)",
|
|
rename_from=None,
|
|
)
|
|
)
|
|
continue
|
|
|
|
denied_reason = _path_denied(target.path)
|
|
if denied_reason is not None:
|
|
violations.append(
|
|
TrustBoundaryViolation(
|
|
path=target.path,
|
|
reason=denied_reason,
|
|
rename_from=rename_from,
|
|
)
|
|
)
|
|
continue
|
|
|
|
if not _in_scope(target.path, declared_scope):
|
|
violations.append(
|
|
TrustBoundaryViolation(
|
|
path=target.path,
|
|
reason="outside the task's declared scope",
|
|
rename_from=rename_from,
|
|
)
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
return violations
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
# Build result + the node entrypoint
|
|
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
|
|
@dataclass
|
|
class _BuildOutcome:
|
|
"""Internal result of :func:`build_candidate_diff` before state assembly."""
|
|
|
|
diff: str
|
|
diff_hash: str
|
|
violations: list[TrustBoundaryViolation] = field(default_factory=list)
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def clean(self) -> bool:
|
|
return not self.violations
|
|
|
|
|
|
def build_candidate_diff(
|
|
plan: Mapping[str, Any],
|
|
*,
|
|
builder: DiffBuilder | None = None,
|
|
config: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
|
|
) -> _BuildOutcome:
|
|
"""Synthesize a candidate diff, scan it, and hash it (§3.3.2 #2/#3).
|
|
|
|
Calls the injected ``builder`` (default :func:`default_diff_builder`) to turn
|
|
the approved ``plan`` into a unified diff, runs the box-side trust-control
|
|
-surface scan against the plan's declared ``scope``, and computes the diff
|
|
integrity hash via the foundation's
|
|
:func:`agent_team.state_store.compute_content_hash`. The hash is always
|
|
computed (CI keys against it) but a non-empty violation list means the diff
|
|
must NOT auto-advance — the caller parks it for human + GPT cross-review.
|
|
|
|
Raises :class:`BuildError` if the plan is not a mapping or the builder
|
|
returns an empty/whitespace-only diff (nothing to build).
|
|
"""
|
|
if not isinstance(plan, Mapping):
|
|
raise BuildError("approved plan must be a mapping")
|
|
|
|
diff_builder = builder if builder is not None else default_diff_builder
|
|
diff = diff_builder(plan=plan, config=config)
|
|
|
|
if not isinstance(diff, str) or not diff.strip():
|
|
raise BuildError("diff builder produced an empty candidate diff")
|
|
|
|
diff_hash = compute_content_hash(diff.encode("utf-8"))
|
|
violations = scan_trust_control_surface(diff, scope=plan.get("scope"))
|
|
return _BuildOutcome(diff=diff, diff_hash=diff_hash, violations=violations)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _format_violations(violations: list[TrustBoundaryViolation]) -> str:
|
|
"""Render violations into a single human-readable park reason."""
|
|
lines = []
|
|
for v in violations:
|
|
if v.rename_from:
|
|
lines.append(f"{v.rename_from} -> {v.path}: {v.reason}")
|
|
else:
|
|
lines.append(f"{v.path}: {v.reason}")
|
|
return "; ".join(lines)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def builders_node(
|
|
state: PipelineState,
|
|
*,
|
|
builder: DiffBuilder | None = None,
|
|
config: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
|
|
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
|
"""LangGraph builders node: approved plan -> candidate diff (§3.3, §3.3.2).
|
|
|
|
Reads the approved ``plan`` from ``state``, produces a candidate diff via the
|
|
injected (or default) :class:`DiffBuilder`, runs the §3.3.2 box-side
|
|
trust-control-surface scan, and writes the result back as a **partial**
|
|
:class:`agent_team.task_model.PipelineState` update (the graph state is
|
|
``total=False``):
|
|
|
|
* **Clean diff** — writes ``candidate_diff`` + ``diff_hash``, sets
|
|
``current_phase`` to ``VERIFY`` and ``status`` to ``ACTIVE`` so the org-CI
|
|
apply/verify stage runs next (the box never builds locally, D2/D11).
|
|
* **Violation(s)** — does NOT advance to verify. Records the diff + hash
|
|
(provenance, per §3.3.2: a denylist-touching diff is an ALARM), sets
|
|
``current_phase`` to ``PARKED`` and ``status`` to ``PARKED``, and writes a
|
|
``park_reason`` naming the violations so the coordinator escalates to
|
|
mandatory human review + GPT cross-review. It is never auto-built.
|
|
|
|
The node never raises for a *policy* rejection (that is an expected outcome);
|
|
it raises :class:`BuildError` only when there is no usable plan/diff at all.
|
|
The graph-state enum-valued keys are written as their ``.value`` strings to
|
|
match the :class:`PipelineState` ``TypedDict`` (str-typed), mirroring
|
|
:func:`agent_team.task_model.task_to_dict`. The return type is a plain
|
|
``dict`` (a structural superset of the partial ``PipelineState`` update) so
|
|
the park path can carry an extra ``park_reason`` annotation without
|
|
redefining the foundation ``TypedDict``.
|
|
"""
|
|
plan = state.get("plan")
|
|
if not plan:
|
|
raise BuildError("builders_node requires an approved plan in state")
|
|
|
|
outcome = build_candidate_diff(plan, builder=builder, config=config)
|
|
|
|
update: dict[str, Any] = {
|
|
"candidate_diff": outcome.diff,
|
|
"diff_hash": outcome.diff_hash,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if outcome.clean:
|
|
update["current_phase"] = Phase.VERIFY.value
|
|
update["status"] = TaskStatus.ACTIVE.value
|
|
else:
|
|
update["current_phase"] = Phase.PARKED.value
|
|
update["status"] = TaskStatus.PARKED.value
|
|
update["park_reason"] = (
|
|
"trust-control-surface violation (mandatory human + GPT "
|
|
f"cross-review): {_format_violations(outcome.violations)}"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
return update
|