# agent-team/ci — split-job CI apply/verify workflow (Plane-2 leaf)

Pre-deployment scaffolding for the R720 agent-team SDLC pipeline. This directory
holds the **split-job CI apply/verify workflow** that turns a builder agent's
**untrusted candidate diff** into a verified **draft PR** — the §3.3.2 trust
boundary, Phase P3 (§7.1) of `../../docs/r720-agent-team-design.md`.

> **STATUS: DEPLOY-GATED. NOT ENABLED, NOT PROVISIONED.** This is authored as
> files only. Per the design (§3.3.2, §7.1 P3) the workflow + its OIDC role must
> clear **BOTH `/sh-security-review` AND the mandatory GPT-4.1 cross-review**
> before deployment, because it is IaC/IAM + untrusted-input handling. The
> privileged draft-PR step is hard-disabled (`if: ${{ false }}`) and the OIDC
> `id-token`/`pull-requests: write` grants are left commented until those gates
> pass. Nothing here is wired to a live org repo.

## Files

| File | What it is |
|---|---|
| `agent-team-apply-verify.yml` | The split-job workflow. Self-contained: the load-bearing gate logic (diff integrity, trust-control denylist, declared-scope check, pure-code pass/fail) is embedded inline as stdlib-only, type-hinted Python heredocs, so the workflow has **no external script dependency**. |
| `README.md` | This file. |

The filename is kebab-case per the handbook. Deployment target (later, after the
gates): promote into `Sea-Haven-Industries/.github` as a reusable workflow
(`engineering-handbook/cicd.md`); the Option-B OIDC apply path invokes it.

## The trust boundary (design §3.3.2)

The builder agents are semi-trusted: an LLM that read repo content can be wrong
or prompt-injected, so **the candidate diff is treated as untrusted code.** The
threat is that executing it in CI with org credentials lets a bad diff exfiltrate
secrets, assume the deploy role, or tamper with other repos. The workflow
implements all five boundaries:

1. **Split CI — untrusted execution is credential-less.** The job that checks
   out and runs the diff (`build-test`) runs with `permissions: contents: read`,
   **no secrets, no OIDC, no write token**, and egress blocked
   (harden-runner). The patch executes only there, where there is nothing to
   steal and nothing to assume. Every privileged action (the eventual OIDC role,
   the draft-PR open) runs in a **separate `gate-and-pr` job that never checks
   out or executes patch-controlled code** — it consumes the build/test report
   as **data only**. There is **no `pull_request_target` + head-ref checkout**
   (the "pwn request" anti-pattern).
2. **Trust-control-surface denylist (CI-side hard fail).** The `guard` job
   rejects any diff that touches `.github/workflows/**`, IAM/policy IaC
   (CDK/SAM/Terraform), branch-protection / `CODEOWNERS` / Dependabot config, or
   files **outside the task's declared scope**. The match is not naive: it
   **canonicalizes paths, rejects parent-directory traversal, and inspects
   `rename from/to` headers**, so a rename *into* a denied path — or path
   indirection — cannot bypass it. Such a diff is escalated to mandatory human +
   GPT cross-review, never auto-built.
3. **Diff integrity, box → CI.** The builder records the candidate diff's sha256
   in the task ledger (foundation `agent_team.state_store` content-hash idiom).
   CI **re-hashes the diff and verifies it equals the recorded hash before
   applying** (in both `guard` and again pre-apply in `build-test`). Precisely:
   this is an **unkeyed** hash that binds *the bytes CI applies* to *the hash the
   dispatcher recorded* — it detects accidental corruption or substitution of the
   artifact **in transit** between the trusted dispatcher and CI. It does **not**
   prove the diff matches the approved plan, and it cannot defend a compromised
   box that generates both the diff and its hash (see "Threat-model honesty"
   below). A keyed/attested binding to the approval record is a later hardening.
4. **Pure-code pass/fail gate over authenticated results.** Mirroring secrev's
   "one pure-code script owns the block decision," the `gate-and-pr` gate reads
   **only** the authenticated `needs.*.result` job conclusions (GitHub-controlled,
   patch-independent) keyed to the run id + diff hash. It **never trusts a
   success/failure file or artifact the patch could have written.** The verifier
   *agent* only reads failures to propose the next fix; it cannot declare
   success.
5. **Branch protection is the final enforcement.** The draft PR targets a
   protected branch; the locked-down checks are required; merge needs them green
   **plus** the security-review, the Claude Code App review, and **human
   approval**. The agent never auto-merges (D2).

**Threat-model honesty (§3.3.2).** The diff hash protects box → CI transit
(tamper/substitution), **not** a box that is itself compromised — the box is in
the trusted computing base for what it *proposes*. The real backstops against a
bad box are the credential-less build job, the trust-control-surface denylist,
and above all the **human review of the draft PR** plus required checks (nothing
merges without Adam).

## Job graph

```
workflow_dispatch (task_id, diff_artifact_name, expected_diff_hash, declared_scope)
        │
        ▼
   guard            contents:read, no secrets — validates the diff as DATA:
   (boundaries 2,3) re-hash + denylist + scope. Never applies it.
        │ (needs)
        ▼
   build-test       contents:read, no secrets, no OIDC, egress blocked —
   (boundary 1)     the ONLY job that applies + runs the UNTRUSTED patch.
        │ (needs)   Emits a NON-authoritative report artifact.
        ▼
   gate-and-pr      privileged home, but NEVER checks out patch code. Pure-code
   (boundaries 1,4,5) gate over authenticated needs.*.result → DRAFT PR
                    (hard-disabled until the review gates pass).
```

`permissions: {}` at the workflow level (least privilege); each job re-declares
its own grant explicitly. The trigger is `workflow_dispatch` only — the patch
never runs in a context carrying write or secret scope.

## SHA-pinned actions (handbook Pinning Principle, §3.3.2)

Every third-party action is pinned to a full commit SHA with the human-readable
tag in a trailing comment:

| Action | SHA | Tag |
|---|---|---|
| `actions/checkout` | `11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683` | v4.2.2 |
| `actions/download-artifact` | `fa0a91b85d4f404e444e00e005971372dc801d16` | v4.1.8 |
| `actions/upload-artifact` | `b4b15b8c7c6ac21ea08fcf65892d2ee8f75cf882` | v4.4.3 |
| `actions/setup-python` | `0b93645e9fea7318ecaed2b359559ac225c90a2b` | v5.3.0 |
| `step-security/harden-runner` | `0080882f6c36860b6ba35c610c98ce87d4e2f26f` | v2.10.2 |

## Relationship to the foundation

This leaf **imports the committed Plane-2 foundation contracts verbatim** (it
does not redefine them):

- The diff-hash recorded in the ledger and re-checked in CI is the same
  content-hash idiom as `agent_team.state_store.compute_content_hash` (§6.7).
- The task this workflow verifies is an `agent_team.task_model.TaskRecord`; its
  `candidate_diff` + `diff_hash` fields (§3.3) are exactly the
  `expected_diff_hash` this workflow consumes, and `ci_results` is what the
  verifier writes back from the authenticated gate (boundary 4).
- The ledger that records provenance (diff hash, run id, gate decision) is the
  `agent_team.db` schema (`pending_questions` / `budget_ledger` live there;
  per-task CI provenance is recorded against the task thread).

## Tests

The workflow's embedded gate logic (diff integrity, the trust-control denylist
with path-canonicalization + rename/copy/delete detection, the symlink-escape
reject, and declared-scope enforcement) is **stdlib-only, type-hinted, and
ruff-clean**, and is covered by a committed, runnable suite:
`../tests/test_ci_gate_workflow.py` extracts the inline guard script from this
YAML and executes it against good and adversarial diffs — clean in-scope,
hash mismatch, workflow delete, copy-into-denied, symlink addition, non-UTF-8,
out-of-scope, unscoped, and escaping-scope. Run it with the rest of the suite:
`python3 -m pytest agent-team/tests/ -q` from the repo root. (The claim that the
gate is "verified" is therefore backed by that test, not by authoring alone.)

## Deploy gating (do NOT skip)

Before this ships (§3.3.2, §7.1 P3):

1. `/sh-security-review` over this workflow (IaC + untrusted-input handling).
2. Mandatory **GPT-4.1 cross-review** of the workflow **and** the Option-B OIDC
   role it will assume (IAM change).
3. A documented, **exercised** rollback (remove the role, revert the workflow).
4. Only then: uncomment the `id-token` / `pull-requests: write` grants, enable
   the draft-PR step, and promote to `Sea-Haven-Industries/.github`. Draft PRs
   only; never auto-merge.