diff --git a/.github/workflows/agent-team-apply-verify.yml b/.github/workflows/agent-team-apply-verify.yml
index 04ebe1c..077b9d9 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/agent-team-apply-verify.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/agent-team-apply-verify.yml
@@ -1057,17 +1057,29 @@ jobs:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 5
     # PROVISIONING-TIME PRIVILEGE (BLOCK-1 / FIX-4 / QUESTION-2). Privileged
-    # WS3 2026-06-23: the agent-apply GitHub Environment gate is REMOVED to
-    # enable auto-dispatch from the coordinator (attended deploy no longer
-    # requires a human reviewer to click Approve in the GitHub UI for each run).
-    # Compensating controls replace the required-reviewer hold:
-    #   (1) a Slack notice is posted to #agent-team on every draft-PR open
-    #       (AGENT_TEAM_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL secret — must be provisioned);
-    #   (2) an audit log line is emitted unconditionally so every run is
-    #       traceable in the job log.
-    # OUTSTANDING (attended — do NOT merge until done):
-    #   * Provision AGENT_TEAM_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL as a repo secret.
-    #   * Verify the Slack notice arrives in #agent-team on the first live run.
+    # declarations must be PROVISIONING-time, not live: an `environment:` that
+    # does not exist yet and a `pull-requests: write` grant are unprotected holes
+    # if declared before the `agent-apply` environment (with its required
+    # reviewer) is created. So both stay COMMENTED here — the exact deploy-gated
+    # pattern the removed cloud token-federation grant used — and are uncommented
+    # at provisioning AFTER the environment exists. Today this job is
+    # credential-less and runs ONLY the pure-code gate.
+    #
+    # The `agent-apply` GitHub Environment is the human-gate home: its REQUIRED
+    # REVIEWER (and optional wait timer / branch policy) is configured on the
+    # Environment at PROVISIONING — GitHub holds the job here until a human
+    # approves. This cannot be authored in YAML; the `environment:` reference is
+    # the hook the provisioning step attaches the reviewer to.
+    # FLIPPED LIVE 2026-06-22 (provisioning done: agent-apply env + required
+    # reviewer amoussa1229 + the GitHub App secrets exist). GitHub holds this job
+    # at the environment gate until the human reviewer approves each run.
+    # MANDATORY INVARIANTS (do not remove): (1) the agent-apply environment's
+    # required reviewer is the human gate — removing/weakening it makes the
+    # privileged job auto-run; (2) runs-on stays GitHub-hosted (never self-hosted)
+    # — a self-hosted runner could be attacker-influenced. Both are asserted by
+    # tests/test_apply_verify_workflow_hardening.py.
+    environment:
+      name: agent-apply
     permissions:
       contents: read
       # The ONLY privileged grant: open a draft PR via the App installation
@@ -1249,37 +1261,12 @@ jobs:
             --head "$HEAD_BRANCH"
           echo "draft PR opened (task=$TASK_ID, head=$HEAD_BRANCH); never auto-merged."
 
-      - name: "Post Slack notice to #agent-team on PR open (compensating control)"
-        # WS3 compensating control: notify #agent-team whenever a draft PR opens.
-        # Requires AGENT_TEAM_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL provisioned as a repo secret.
-        # Step runs only on a clean gate pass (same condition as the draft-PR
-        # step) and skips gracefully when the webhook secret is absent.
-        if: >-
-          always()
-          && needs.guard.result == 'success'
-          && needs.build-test.result == 'success'
-          && steps.gate.outputs.gate == 'pass'
-        env:
-          TASK_ID: ${{ inputs.task_id }}
-          DIFF_HASH: ${{ needs.guard.outputs.diff_hash }}
-          RUN_ID: ${{ github.run_id }}
-          GH_REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
-          SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL: ${{ secrets.AGENT_TEAM_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL }}
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          if [ -z "${SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL:-}" ]; then
-            echo "AGENT_TEAM_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL not set; skipping Slack notice"
-            exit 0
-          fi
-          payload=$(printf '{"text":"[agent-apply] draft PR opened — task=%s diff=%s repo=%s run=%s"}' \
-            "$TASK_ID" "$DIFF_HASH" "$GH_REPO" "$RUN_ID")
-          curl -fsSL -X POST -H 'Content-type: application/json' \
-            --data "$payload" "$SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL"
-          echo "Slack notice sent to #agent-team"
-
       - name: "Emit audit log entry (task + diff hash + gate result)"
-        # WS3 compensating control: unconditional audit trail for every run so
-        # every dispatch attempt is visible in the job log regardless of outcome.
+        # WS3 detective control (additive): an unconditional audit trail for
+        # every run so every dispatch attempt is traceable in the job log,
+        # regardless of outcome. This SUPPLEMENTS — it does not replace — the
+        # agent-apply environment's required-reviewer gate, which remains the
+        # preventive human approval before this privileged job runs.
         if: always()
         env:
           TASK_ID: ${{ inputs.task_id }}
diff --git a/agent-team/tests/test_apply_verify_workflow_hardening.py b/agent-team/tests/test_apply_verify_workflow_hardening.py
index d6a5f27..9379ea7 100644
--- a/agent-team/tests/test_apply_verify_workflow_hardening.py
+++ b/agent-team/tests/test_apply_verify_workflow_hardening.py
@@ -169,12 +169,9 @@ def test_app_token_step_gated_on_pure_code_pass() -> None:
 
 
 def test_gate_job_privileged_declarations_are_live() -> None:
-    # WS3: the agent-apply environment gate is REMOVED to enable auto-dispatch.
-    # Compensating controls (Slack notice + audit log) replace the
-    # required-reviewer hold. Assert:
-    #   (1) permissions are unchanged (contents: read, pull-requests: write only),
-    #   (2) the environment block is ABSENT,
-    #   (3) both compensating steps are present.
+    # Provisioning done: the gate-and-pr job now binds the agent-apply environment
+    # (its required reviewer gates every run) and grants exactly pull-requests:
+    # write — nothing more. contents stays read; no token-federation/id-token.
     job = _doc()["jobs"]["gate-and-pr"]
     perms = job.get("permissions") or {}
     assert perms.get("contents") == "read"
@@ -183,17 +180,16 @@ def test_gate_job_privileged_declarations_are_live() -> None:
     )
     assert "id-token" not in perms
     env = job.get("environment")
-    assert env is None, (
-        "gate-and-pr must NOT bind the agent-apply environment (WS3: removed; "
-        "Slack-notify + audit-log steps are the compensating controls)"
+    env_name = env.get("name") if isinstance(env, dict) else env
+    assert env_name == "agent-apply", (
+        "gate-and-pr must bind the agent-apply environment (required-reviewer gate)"
     )
-    # Compensating controls must be present.
+    # WS3 additive detective control: an audit-log step supplements (never
+    # replaces) the required-reviewer gate. Assert it is present so it cannot
+    # silently regress.
     step_names = [s.get("name", "").lower() for s in job.get("steps", [])]
-    assert any("slack" in n for n in step_names), (
-        "gate-and-pr must have a Slack-notify compensating step"
-    )
     assert any("audit" in n for n in step_names), (
-        "gate-and-pr must have an audit-log compensating step"
+        "gate-and-pr must keep the audit-log compensating step"
     )